



This volume of ELH
is dedicated to

KEMP MALONE

IN RECOGNITION OF HIS ACHIEVEMENTS
DURING HIS TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
AT JOHNS HOPKINS

ELH

*A Journal of
English Literary History*

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THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT:
A SELECTIVE AND CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
FOR THE YEAR 1948

J. RAYMOND DERBY, Editor

This bibliography, as a whole, is designed to cover a "movement" rather than a period. The English section is limited to the years 1800-1837; but other sections are not so limited, of course. Important books published earlier are included in the list for 1948 when for some reason they were inadequately noticed in the bibliography for 1947 (*ELH* 15. 1-59) or when significant reviews have appeared within the year 1948. In all cases when no date is specified, 1948 may be assumed.

The Editor acknowledges with gratitude the assistance provided by his several collaborators, for materials gathered or for critical comments or for both. They are Albert J. George (French), Ludwig W. Kahn (German), Nicholson B. Adams and E. Herman Hespelt (Spanish), Gerald M. Moser (Portuguese); and, in English, Stewart C. Wilcox, James V. Logan, Richard D. Altick, Ernest Bernbaum, Kenneth Neill Cameron, Clarence D. Thorpe, Bennett Weaver, Elisabeth Schneider, David V. Erdman, and Thomas M. Raysor.

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2 THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT: BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS

AcLLB	Bulletin de l'Académie royale de langue et de littérature française de Belgique (Brussels)
Ad	The Adelphi (Manchester, England)
AF	Amérique française (Montreal)
AL	American literature
APS	Proceedings of the American philosophical society
APSR	American political science review
AR	Antioch review
Ar	L'Arche (Paris)
ASEER	American Slavic and East European review
ASLH	The American Society of the Legion of Honor magazine (New York)
At	Atenea (Concepción, Chile)
BA	Books abroad
BAT	La Bataille (Paris)
BB	Bulletin du bibliophile et du bibliothécaire
BBMP	Boletín de la biblioteca menéndez pelayo
BEF	Bulletin des études françaises (Montreal)
BH	Bibliografía Hispánica
BIH	Bulletin Hispanique
BSS	Bulletin of Spanish studies (Liverpool)
C	The Commonwealth
CA	Cuadernos americanos (Mexico)
CE	College English
CF	Le Canada Français (Quebec)
CFL	Confluences (Paris)
CHRF	Cahiers d'histoire de la révolution française (New York)
CL	Cuadernos de literatura
CLS	Comparative literature studies (Cardiff)
CLSB	Charles Lamb society bulletin
Clt	Culture (Quebec)
Co	Conférence (Paris)
DR	The Dublin review
DUJ	Durham University journal
E	Esprit (Paris)
ELH	Journal of English literary history
ER	L'Eternelle revue (Paris)
Et	Les Etoiles (Paris)
Exp.	The Explicator
F	Fontaine (Algiers and Paris)
FA	France-Amérique (New York)
FAC	La France au combat (Paris)
FL	La France libre (London)
FR	French review
G	De Gids (Amsterdam)
GAV	Gavroche (Paris)
GR	Germanic review
HJ	Hibbert journal
HLQ	Huntington library quarterly
HOR	Horizon (London)
HR	Hispanic review
HS	Hemispheres (Brooklyn, N. Y.)

ABBREVIATIONS

3

J	Jeunesse (Paris)
JEGP	Journal of English and Germanic philology
JHI	Journal of the history of ideas
JMH	Journal of modern history
JPh	Journal of philosophy
JSS	Jewish social studies
KR	Kenyon review
L	Latomus, revue d'études latines (Brussels)
LF	Lettres françaises (Buenos Ayres)
LFS	Les Lettres françaises (Paris)
L ₁	British broadcasting corporation listener
M	Le Monde (Paris)
MF	Mercure de France
MfDU	Monatshefte für Deutschen Unterricht
ML	Modern languages
MLJ	Modern language journal
MLN	Modern language notes
MLQ	Modern language quarterly
MLR	Modern language review
MNY	Messenger de New York
MP	Modern philology
MQ	Musical quarterly
MuL	Music and letters (London)
N	The Nation
NEF	La Nef (Paris)
NER	New English review
NL	Nouvelles littéraires (Paris)
NPh	Neophilologus (Groningen)
N&Q	Notes & queries
NR	The New republic
NREL	La nouvelle relève (Montreal)
NSN	New statesman & nation
NY	New Yorker
NYHTB	New York Herald Tribune book review
NYT	New York Times book review
P	Poetry
Pa	Paru (Paris)
PHYL	Phylon (The Atlanta University review)
PMLA	Publications of modern language association of America
Po	Poésie (Paris)
PQ	Philological quarterly
PR	Partisan review
PV	Poesia e verità (Rome)
QRL	Quarterly review of literature (Chapel Hill)
REN	Renaissance (New York)
RES	Review of English studies
RF	La République française (New York)
RFE	Revista de filología española
RFH	Revista de filología hispánica
RIIL	Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France
RIIP	Revue d'histoire de la philosophie
RI	Revista Iberoamericana
RLC	Revue de littérature comparée

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RLI	Revista de las Indias (Bogota)
RMR	Rocky mountain review
RP	Revue de Paris
RPF	Revue de la pensée française (New York)
RPP	Revue politique et parlementaire (Paris)
RR	Romanic review
RREL	The Review of religion
RTC	Revue trimestrielle canadienne (Montreal)
RUO	Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa
SAB	The Shakespeare Association bulletin
SAQ	South Atlantic quarterly
SCR	Scrutiny
SEER	Slavonic and East European review
SP	Studies in philology
SR	Sewanee review
SRL	Saturday review of literature
TH	Thought
TLS	Times literary supplement (London)
T&T	Time and tide
ULH	Universidad de la Habana
USQBL	United States quarterly book list
UTQ	University of Toronto quarterly
VMHB	Virginia magazine of history and biography
VQR	Virginia quarterly review
YR	Yale review

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- Fogle, Richard Harter. A recent attack upon Romanticism. *CE* 9 (1948). 356-61.
 This is a companion-piece to Mr Fogle's "The imaginal design of Shelley's 'Ode to the West Wind'" (see "Shelley"), which is a particular application of the sort of criticism the author advocates.
 Here Mr. Fogle, without overlooking the acute sensitiveness of the "New Critics," sees them as "weak where the great Romantics are strongest" in a theory of the Imagination." We need more, and more extended, discussions of the new-day theories of Irony and the Organic. The article seems to me a perspicuous defense and a suggestive attack. (S C. W.)

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Lovejoy, A. O. *Essays in the history of ideas*. See "French. . . 2. General," *infra*.

McCarthy, B. G. *The female pen: the later women novelists, 1744-1818*. Cork. Cork Univ. Press; Oxford. Blackwell.

Rev. in TLS Mar. 27, p. 175; by Lorna Reynolds in Dublin Magazine (July-Sept.). 51-53

Mizener, Arthur. *The Scrutiny group*. KR 10 (1948). 355-60.

See p. 358 for brief appraisal of F. R. Leavis as critic of Shelley and Keats.

Priestley, F. E. L. *Newton and the Romantic concept of nature*. UTQ (July, 1948). 323-36.

Mr Priestley points out the danger of reading into the eighteenth century the view of the nineteenth-century Romanticists that Newton destroyed the beauty of the universe by making it "hard, cold, colourless, silent and dead; a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity." The danger lies in believing that Newton's stream of influence in the eighteenth century flowed but in one direction. Actually, however, Newtonianism could and did lead either to mechanism or to animism- to the French materialism of Holbach and Helvetius (through Locke), or to an alliance with the idealism of the Cambridge Platonists and Shaftesbury. Thus we can understand Shelley's comment in the notes to *Mab-* one which would have astounded Newton himself-that "the consistent Newtonian is necessarily an atheist," as well as Shaftesbury's adoring rhapsodies and Wordsworth's "Wisdom and Spirit of the Universe!" passage: the point being that Shelley reflects Holbach; Wordsworth the *Anima Mundi* of English Platonic-Newtonian conceptions.

Mr Priestley suggests therefore that "we need not believe with Marjorie Nicolson in *Newton demands the muse* that . . . 'the shades of Plato with his disciples, Plotinus, Ficino, Pico, the Cambridge Platonists, and Shaftesbury, seemed to 'strive for mastery' over men's souls with the ghosts of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Newton,' and that Thomson seems 'temporarily to reconcile the irreconcilables,' for "the argument over whether Thomson was a Shaftesburian or a Newtonian is in large measure a sham battle." (pp. 335-36) It seems to me good literary history to examine the implications drawn from Newton's *Principia* by the eighteenth century itself, and to avoid reading back into the century either what seem to us logical implications of Newtonianism or the attitudes of the nineteenth century regarding it. (S. C. W.)

Shapiro, Karl. *English prosody and modern poetry*. See ELII 15 (1948). 8.

Rev. by Raymond Holden in SRL March 20, p. 16.

Stoll, Elmer Edgar. Critics at cross-purposes. ELH 14 (1947). 320-28.

Mr Stoll emphasizes that the function of the critic is to attend to the work of art itself, not irresponsibly use the object of art as a starting point for unrelated subjective vagaries or for personal introspection. He cites criticism from Wordsworth and Coleridge to illustrate his point. (S C. W.)

Tarr, Sister Mary Muriel. Catholicism in Gothic fiction (1762-1820). Washington. The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1946.

Rev. by J M S. Tompkins in RES 24 (1948) 166-67.

Tinker, Chauncey Brewster. Essays in retrospect: collected articles and essays. New Haven. Yale Univ. Press.

Rev in AL 20 (1948). 87; by Homer Woodbridge in YR (Summer, 1948). 733, by Ben Ray Redman in SRL July 31, 24-25.

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4. STUDIES OF AUTHORS

Austen. Chapman, R. W. "Emma." TLS Nov. 20, p. 653.

Evidence for believing that *The Watsons* was a trial sketch for *Emma*. See also Q D. Leavis in TLS Dec. 4, p. 682

McLaren, M. Charlotte Yonge and Jane Austen. TLS July 31, p. 429.

A letter to the editor on biographical links between the two novelists.

Maugham, W. Somerset. Great novelists and their novels. *Pride and prejudice*. Philadelphia. Winston.

Rev. by John W. Aldridge in SRL Oct. 2, pp. 23-24.

Pechey, R. F. *Emma* and Alton. TLS Sept. 11, p. 513.

A letter to the editor on the probable location of Highbury in Jane Austen's novel. See also TLS Sept. 18, p. 527.

Baillie. Boyle, Andrew. Joanna Baillie. TLS Oct. 9, p. 569.

An appeal for letters she wrote in 1825.

Bentham. Bentham, Jeremy. A fragment on government, and an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Ed. with an introduction by Wilfred Harrison. Oxford. Blackwell.

Keeton, George, and Schwarzenberger, Georg, eds. Jeremy Bentham and the law: a symposium. London. Stevens.

Rev. in TLS Aug. 28, p. 480. See also TLS Sept. 25, p. 541, for comment by D. Geraint Evans.

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Laski, Harold J. Jeremy Bentham. NSN 36 (1948). 152.

An anniversary article (Bentham was born Feb. 15, 1748), summarizing Bentham's historical significance (C.F.U.)

Blake. Blake's "Introduction" to songs of innocence. Exp. 6. No. 6 (April, 1948). Q 14.

Blake, William. Songs of innocence and of experience. As originally written and engraved. Albion Facsimiles. No. 1. London. Falcon Press.

Facsimile of the copy in the Houghton Library

Davenport, A. Blake's "Minute particulars." N&Q 193 (1948). 7.

The phrase in *Jerusalem*, 91, has commonly been traced to a quite irrelevant passage in Swedenborg's *Divine Providence*. Here is a strikingly relevant suggestion—that the Fiend who accumulates particulars instead of "loving the greatest men best" is a spectre of Boswell who apologised for detailing "minute particulars." But the "swell'd & bloated Form" would not be "a residual image of Dr Johnson" but Boswell's book or what Boswell made of Johnson. (D.V.E.)

Davies, J. G. The theology of William Blake. London. Oxford Univ. Press.

Rev. by Kathleen Raine in NSN 36 (1948) 377; in TLS Nov. 20, p. 658.

Erdman, David V. Blake, Flaxman, and the £100. PQ 27 (1948). 279-81.

Identification of a receipt previously thought to concern William Blake.

Frye, Northrop. Fearful symmetry. See ELII 15 (1948). 9-10.

Rev. by Henry Wasser in MLQ 9 (1948). 248-49; in TLS Jan. 10, p. 25; by Helen W. Randall in UTQ 17 (1948). 204-07.

Fuseli. See Ganz, *infra*.

Ganz, Paul. Die Zeichnungen Hans Heinrich Fusslis (Henry Fuseli). Bern-Olten. Urs Graf, 1947.

These 120 reproductions, plus the briefer selection in Ruthven Todd's *Tracks in the snow* (1947), provide matter for the student of Romantic surrealism—as well as visible evidence (not specifically pointed out by the editor) that Fuseli did find Blake "good to steal from." One can see that "Oberon" (1795) imitates "Glad Day" (1780), that "The Spectre of the Night" (1808) is a direct steal from the sixth page of *Europe* (1794), and that Fuseli's sketch for the deluge (plate 66) derives from the last page of *Europe*.

Influence the other way is not so evident, although in a general way one agrees with Professor Ganz that Blake sees the human body "in den Proportionen und mit der Bewegungsfreiheit von Fussli"—with the difference that Blake's eye is always, and Fuseli's seldom, innocent. The one example I find here of Blake's direct borrowing illustrates this difference. Plate 6 of *Europe* comes from a drawing in Fuseli's Roman sketchbook which he made from an Italian fresco. Blake's handling is symbolic and chaste, Fuseli's heavily suggestive. The theme—a woman uncovering her sleeping lover—is one Fuseli frequently repeated (plates 13, 73; and plate 25 in Todd). (D.V.E.)

Ironside, Robin. The followers of William Blake. *Magazine of Art* 40 (1947). 309-14.

Blake's illustrations for the *Eclogues* of Virgil (1821) taught artists Palmer, Calvert, and Richmond "how nature could be handled so as to express a spiritual conception" and brought on a ferment of religious bucolicism in the artists' retreat at Shoreham (1825-1837) now recognized as "a climax in the evolution of English Romanticism"

Perhaps too much is made of the special influence on Blake of the subject matter of the *Eclogues*, for Mr. Ironside might have added the sheep-herding scenes in Blake's *Job* (1825) to illustrate the climax of this same "disturbing pastoralism" in Blake's own art and to indicate the Old Testament as a further and more complex source. (D.V.E)

McElderry. See "Coleridge."

Mabbott, Thomas O. The hour of Blake's birth. *N&Q* 143 (1948). 7.

Blake's horoscope, widely reprinted since Garnett discovered it in 1895, is here "discovered" once more. (D V E)

Mabbott, T. O., and Samson, Edward C. Blake's "A poison tree."

Exp. 6. No. 3 (Dec., 1947). 19.

Two explanations

Wasser, Henry H. Notes on the *Visions of the daughters of Albion* by William Blake. *MLQ* 9 (1948). 292-97.

Views the poem "as an expression of Blake's knowledge of the love affair between Mary Wollstonecraft and Henry Fuseli . . . [and of] his views on the nature of love and the function of the female instinct in his philosophy" (R D A)

Weiss, Paul. Prophetic Blake. *QRL* 3 (1947). 406-13.

Blake as a believer in Man.

Byron. Bandy, W. T. Lord Byron and Lady Blessington: a bibliographical note. *PQ* 27 (1948). 186-87.

Byron's lines to the Countess first appeared in *Les annales Romantiques* for 1827-28, again in the *Monthly magazine* (Feb., 1829), and then in the *Letters and journals*, ed. Moore Lady Blessington's reply, a poem, is quoted. (S.C.W)

Borst, William A. Lord Byron's first pilgrimage, 1809-1811. New Haven. Yale Univ. Press.

Rev. by Carlos Baker in *NYT* Dec. 12, p. 19.

Evans, Margiad. Byron and Emily Brontë, an essay. *Life and letters* 57 (1948). 193-216.

"She *was* his superior I agree—but not always—he could and did equal her." "Manfred and Heathcliffe paraphrase, translate, substantiate and personify one voice uttering out of one inspiration."

Fuller, Roy, ed. Byron for today. London. Porcupine Press.

An anthology.

John Bull's letter to Lord Byron. See "Lockhart."

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Jordan, Hoover H. Byron and Moore. *MLQ* 9 (1948). 429-39.

Draws from the standard sources a connected narrative of the personal relations between the two poets beginning in 1811, and concludes that "Moore seems to have exerted a powerful influence on Byron up to 1816, with the result that a surprising number of parallels occur between their writings" (R. D. A.)

Joyce, Michael. My friend H. London. Murray.

Rev. by C. E. Vulliamy in *Spectator* Nov. 19, p. 672; in *TLS* Dec. 11, p. 695

A life of John Cam Hobhouse

Marchand, L. A. Byron's Beppo. *Spectator* 180 (1948). 468.

The basis of Byron's narrative is found in a diary entry by Hobhouse, August 29, 1817, not much over a month before the composition of *Beppo*.

———. On writing a new life of Byron. *Li* Oct. 23, 1947, pp. 721-22.

A BBC talk in which Professor Marchand describes the great amount of Byroniana still not utilized, and his plans for research in Italy and Greece (R. D. A.)

Nicolson, Harold. Byron: the last journey. London. Constable.

A new edition of this book, which was first published in 1924, with a new preface by the author.

———. Marginal comment. *Spectator* May 14, p. 584.

Discursive reflections on Byron and his present reputation

Origo, Marchesa Iris. Byron's last attachment. *Li* June 24, pp. 1014-15.

The author has transcribed, for use in her book *The last attachment*, the contents of the chest of personal papers left by the Contessa Guiccioli, now in the possession of her great-nephew at a villa near Florence. "They include, not only 150 of his love-letters to Teresa and some of her answers, but her own account (written in French, in her old age) of his life in Italy, and letters to her from Shelley, Mary Shelley, Lady Blessington, Lamartine and many others," as well as "the documents of the Guiccioli lawsuits, which tell us, for the first time, the full story of the events which led to Teresa's separation." In this article (originally a BBC talk) the Marchesa Origo summarizes her interpretation of the Contessa Guiccioli's character and of the famous *liaison* with Byron (R. D. A.)

Pratt, Willis W. Byron at Southwell: the making of a poet. With new poems and letters from the rare books collection of the University of Texas. Univ. of Texas Byron Monographs. No. 1. Austin. Univ. of Texas.

Rev. in *TLS* June 26, p. 361.

A tale of Byron's early life (1801-1811) suffices to link together a "rather heterogeneous group of documents" now first published or first published correctly. The most considerable item in the first category is a manuscript of 23 stanzas on "prim Mary Ann"; the most charming is Elizabeth Pigot's "Wonderful History of Lord Byron & his Dog," which, with other minor documents, reveals Miss Pigot as an important (unrequited) admirer of Byron.

In the second category are Byron's letters to William Harness, restored

from Moore's bowdlerization. They express a much more intense affection for Harness than Moore thought fit to print. And from one restored letter we discover that the "Sentimentalities" of Bland and Hodgson in 1811, which made Byron feel like "a monument of prudence" in comparison, involved his friends' contraction of venereal diseases.

Byron's unpublished juvenile verses are of interest, but it is difficult to see that they differ in any important respect from those he published. Some are indeed more "irreverent and erotic" but hardly reveal the "real comic detachment" which Mr. Pratt asks us to believe was in them but did not emerge "again" until *Beppo*. (D.V.E.)

Lord Byron and his circle. A calendar of manuscripts in the University of Texas library. Austin. Univ. of Texas.

Rev. in TLS June 26, p. 361.

Though designed for students, and though professedly not complete bibliographically, it contains entries from documents and letters "apparently unpublished." Similar lists of the Texas Shelley, Mary Shelley, Scott, Maturin, and other collections are planned. (S.C.W.)

Sister M. Rosa, S.S.J. See "Scott."

Steffan, Guy. *Don Juan*. TLS June 12, p. 331.

Asks location of Mary Shelley's fair copies of the first drafts of cantos IX-XVI.

Vulliamy, Colwyn Edward. Byron. With a view of the kingdom of cant and a dissection of the Byronic ego. London. Michael Joseph.

Rev. (briefly) in TLS June 5, p. 322.

A swift, cliché-ridden survey of Byron's life which does little to advance a sober appraisal is eked out by several light essays on cant, Byronic love, Byronic friendship, and Byronicism.

An overriding contempt for women ("it would be foolish to apply to their dealings the usual standards") and a disclaimer of interest in "Byron's present reputation as a poet" scarcely qualify Mr. Vulliamy for the rôle of avuncular recording angel in which he has cast himself. One suspects something of the cant he deplores in this fine scorn of "popular writers" who find writing of Byron's amorous adventures "exceedingly remunerative." What purpose other than a remunerative one is served by a rehearsal of the Glenarvon story hanging on the "charge" that Byron behaved "like a cad"? Or in a solemn weighing of "the Augusta problem" that puts only selected morsels of evidence in the scales?

To rely "almost entirely upon contemporary sources" means to dismiss Hunt and the *Examiner* with a spiteful quotation from the *Quarterly*, or to rely on Moore's picture of Byron's childhood and neglect Symon's more recent (1924) but fuller documentation. (D.V.E.)

Carleton. Kiely, Benedict. Poor scholar. A study of the works and days of William Carleton, 1794-1869. London. Sheed and Ward.

Rev. in TLS Apr. 24, p. 236. Cf. TLS May 8, p. 261 (correction of review)

Clare. Heath-Stubbs, John. John Clare and the peasant tradition. Penguin new writing 32 (1947). 112-24.

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Clarke. Altick, Richard D. *The Cowden Clarkes*. London. Oxford Univ. Press.

Rev. by Dame Una Pope-Hennessy in *Spectator* Nov. 26, pp. 706-08.

Coleridge. Bishop, Morchard. Books in general. NSN 36 (1948). 12.

An appreciative essay on Coleridge, emphasizing "the broad vein of humor which formed a part, and a not often observed part, of Coleridge's many-faceted temperament."

Brinkley, R. Florence. Coleridge transcribed. RES 24 (1948). 219-26.

A description of some Coleridge marginalia and notes that have been copied by other hands.

Coleridge, Nicholas F. D. Coleridge and Wordsworth. TLS July 3, p. 373.

A letter to the editor, quoting a note written by Coleridge in a copy of the *Biographia literaria* (Vol. 2) which he presented to Derwent: "My main motive and continued impulse [in writing this volume] was to secure . . . an intelligent admiration of Mr. Wordsworth's poems." (R D A)

Coleridge's "Kubla Kahn." Exp. 7. No. 1 (Oct., 1948). Q 1.

Dickson, Arthur. Coleridge's "The ancient mariner." Exp. 6. No. 8 (June, 1948). 52.

Interprets "vespers nine" to mean eventides, not devotions.

Elwin. See "Wordsworth."

Fausset, H. P. A. See "Wordsworth."

Grigson, Geoffrey. *Kubla Khan in Wales*. Cornhill No. 970 (Spring, 1947). 275-83.

The author suggests Hafod in North Wales as partial source for the scenery of Coleridge's "deep romantic chasm." Many of the parallels he offers are far-fetched, however.

Harris, Lynn H. Coleridge's "The ancient mariner." Exp. 6. No. 5 (March, 1948). 32.

The relation of the poem's moral action to Wordsworth's philosophy.

Kennedy, Wilma L. *The English heritage of Coleridge of Bristol, 1798*. See ELH 15 (1948). 15.

Rev. by Earl Wasserman in JEGP 47 (1948). 204-207; by Carlos Baker in PQ 27 (1948). 134-35; by Barbara Handy in MLR 43 (1948). 264-65.

Kirschbaum, Leo. Coleridge's "The ancient mariner." Exp. 7. No. 1 (Oct., 1948). 5.

An interpretation of the fourth stanza of Part II.

Link, Arthur S. Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the economic and political crisis in Great Britain. HLQ 9 (1948). 323-38.

An account of Coleridge's later political views drawn from his *Statesman's manual*, *A Lay sermon*, and elsewhere. He was a "Tory humanitarian," with an astute understanding of the economic and social problems of these years. (J. V. L.)

McElderry, B. R., Jr. Coleridge on Blake's *Songs*. MLQ 9 (1948). 298-302.

On Coleridge's letter to C. A. Tulk (1818) in which he ranks the contents of Blake's *Songs of innocence* and *Songs of experience* "in the order in which I was pleased by the several poems." Concludes that "Blake's poems do not appear to have called forth in Coleridge the critical subtlety they deserved." (R. D. A.)

Marcoux, Hervé. The philosophy of Coleridge. Revue de l'université d'Ottawa. 18. Section speciale. (Janvier-Mars, Avril-Juin, Juillet-Septembre). 38-51, 104-12, 150-69.

These three articles, which are to be concluded with a fourth, are a study of the problem of knowledge in Coleridge's philosophy, the problem in which his abstract thought was most fully, though never completely, developed.

Though Coleridge rejected the materialist forms of the doctrine, "he never, in our opinion, succeeded in freeing himself from the intricate meshes of Pantheism." He does, however, proceed to a spiritual pantheism, which is based on the distinction of Nature and Spirit. And this, of course, depends in turn on the distinction of the Understanding and the Reason.

The articles are in the main an exposition rather than a critique of Coleridge's distinctions between these terms, simplified for the sake of clearness and logical continuity. But they also criticize Muirhead's views at times (rightly, I think); and they make some reference to Kantian and non-Kantian sources of Coleridge's theory of knowledge. Though there is an undeveloped allusion to Hegel, the discussion of these non-Kantian elements in Coleridge emphasizes their Platonic origin, as Coleridge did in some passages cited. "Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant, or likewise constitutive, and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato and Plotinus . . . is the highest problem of philosophy," Coleridge said. This is one of the crucial distinctions with which the author may be concerned in his conclusion, since his sympathies seem to be Thomist, but the analysis of the first three articles is discursive and makes no attempt at judgment. (T. M. R.)

Neumann, Joshua H. Coleridge on the English language. PMLA 63 (1948). 642-61.

A review of Coleridge's interest in linguistics and his experiments in vocabulary. He believed in the genetic classification of languages. He was concerned with the relation of words to meanings; "in fact, his speculations on the subjects clearly make him a forerunner of the semanticists of the twentieth century." His skill in definition is seen in his differentiating words considered synonymous. But his etymologies are frequently incorrect. He was interested in sound symbolism. He was frequently concerned with word creation and speculated on the history of English neologisms. (J. V. L.)

Patton, Lewis. Coleridge's marginal comments on Bowles's *The spirit of discovery*. Library Notes No. 19 (Feb., 1948). 12-15. Duke Univ. Library.

Unpublished marginalia unfriendly to Bowles.

Read, Herbert. Coleridge as critic. SR 56 (1948). 597-624.

This article by one of the most distinguished living critics should be part of a book, for it deserves more development than an article permits. It is a

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study of Coleridge's theory of the imagination Mr Read does not, like Mr. Richards, separate the theory of the imagination from Coleridge's transcendentalism, but associates it, as it should be associated for full understanding, with the thought of Schelling—and not only Schelling, but Kierkegaard, Sartre and the Existentialists, Bergson, and Richard Woltereck, a most interesting biological philosopher who is quoted in an appendix. Though the present reviewer is not sympathetic toward the type of idealism represented in Coleridge's theory of the imagination and regards his aesthetics as curiously unrelated to most of his literary criticism, he believes that all students of Coleridge would welcome a full study of the subject against its appropriate philosophical background, at much greater length than this excellent article affords (T. M. R.)

Stevenson, Lionel. "The ancient mariner" as a dramatic monologue. *Personalist* 30 (1948). 34-44.

Stoll, Elmer Edgar. Symbolism in Coleridge. *PMLA* 63 (1948). 214-33.

A critical examination of the symbolic interpretations of Wilson Knight, Kenneth Burke, and Robert Penn Warren Professor Stoll remarks "Now all these symbolist critics of *The Ancient Mariner*, and of *Kubla Khan* as well, suffer, in my opinion, from at least three fundamental failings. 1. They ignore the self-evident principle [that] . . . 'A perfect Judge will read each work of Wit/With the same spirit that the author writ' . . . 2. They have not greatly profited by Coleridge's own utterances upon the critical principle and process. 3. They have not profited at all, apparently, by perusing *The Road to Xanadu*." Some of the points that Professor Stoll makes are: it is an anachronism to discover sophisticated present-day symbolism in a "literary fairy-tale"; Coleridge believed that a poem should be self-contained as to its meaning; Coleridge's explanation of the literary origin of *The ancient mariner* does not permit elaborate symbolical interpretation; there is no hint of such symbolism in his marginal glosses; Wordsworth, in his comments on the poem, was unaware of an under-meaning, and so were the other Romantic poets (J. V. L.)

———. See "3. Criticism."

Thorpe, James. A note on Coleridge's "Gutch commonplace book." *MLN* 63 (1948). 130-31.

Tillyard, E. M. W. *Five poems, 1470-1870*. London. Chatto and Windus; New York. Macmillan.

Rev. by Henry W. Wells in *SRL* Aug. 21, p. 22, in *VQR* (Autumn, 1948). cxv; in *TLS* Aug. 28, p. 484; by John Bryson in *Spectator* Sept. 24, p. 408.

An interpretation of Henryson's *Testament of Cresseid*, Sir John Davies' *Orchestra*, Dryden's *Ode on Anne Killigrew*, Coleridge's *Rime of the ancient mariner*, and Swinburne's *Hertha*.

The reading of *The ancient mariner* is brief (twenty pages) but perceptive. Mr Tillyard goes beyond Lowes in accepting an implicit symbolism in the poem—in the spiritual adventure of the voyage, the isolation in crime, the pattern of rebirth (Miss Bodkin's subject). He sees a hint of pantheism, as well as other religious moods; and he deals with the theme of the Romantic wanderer isolated in his own mind. This is part of the new, more profound reading of the poem which we have seen emerging in the last ten years, but

it is free from the excesses of some of the symbolists and psychoanalysts and is therefore more likely to be accepted (T M R)

Warren, Robert Penn, ed. *The rime of the ancient mariner*. See ELH 15 (1948). 15-16.

Rev by Elder Olson in MP 45 (1948) 275-79.

Wasserman, Earl R. Coleridge's "Metrical experiments." MLN 63 (1948). 491-92.

The tenth of the poems printed under that title in E. H. Coleridge's edition is borrowed from William Cartwright's "Sadness"

Colman. Bagster-Collins, J. George Colman the younger: 1762-1836. New York. King's Crown Press. 1946.

Rev by V de Sola Pinto in MLR 42 (1947) 511-12.

DeQuincey. DeQuincey, Thomas. *The confessions of an English opium-eater*. Illustrated by Blair Hughes-Stanton. London. Folio Society.

———. *Recollections of the lake poets*. Ed. with an introduction by Edward Sackville-West. London. Lehmann.

Rev by G W Stonier in NSN 36 (1948) 316; in *Dublin Magazine* July-Sept., 1948 59-60, in TLS Mar 13, p 148

This book is more than a mere reprint of essays from the Masson edition of DeQuincey's work, which followed the text prepared by DeQuincey himself in 1853 for the first collected edition. Mr Sackville-West has restored from the original files of *Tait's magazine* some interesting passages that do not appear in the later versions. The most significant of these relate to Wordsworth and to DeQuincey himself

Mr. Sackville-West in his introduction shows the same insight that distinguished his critical biography of DeQuincey (*A flame in sunlight*, 1936). He discusses certain underlying causes of the break between Wordsworth and DeQuincey, tracing it in part to the latter's dependent character and to Wordsworth's somewhat self-centered preoccupation with his own and his family's interests. Here, as in his book, he uses illuminatingly, without being enslaved by, a modern psychological approach. (E S.)

Jordan, John E. *DeQuincey's criticism of English literature*. Ph. D. dissertation. The Johns Hopkins Univ., 1947.

Morley, Edith J. *DeQuincey and Wordsworth*. TLS Mar. 27, p. 177.

On the cause of the estrangement between the two poets, a reply to a writer in TLS Mar. 13, p 148. The latter adds a rejoinder.

Godwin. Godwin, William. *Enquiry concerning political justice and its influence on morals and happiness*. Photographic facsimile of the third edition corrected, edited with variant readings of the first and second editions and with a critical introduction and notes by F. E. L. Priestley. 3 vols. Toronto. Univ. of Toronto Press, 1946.

Rev by Newman I White in UTQ 18 (1948). 101-103; by Elizabeth Nitchie in MLQ 9 (1948). 365-66; by A. O. Aldridge in MLN 63 (1948). 567-68.

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Woodcock, George. William Godwin: a biographical study. See ELH 15 (1948). 17.

Rev. in TLS Feb. 21, 1947, p. 2.

Hazlitt. Bennion, Lynn B. William Hazlitt's Shakespeare criticism. Ph. D. dissertation. The Johns Hopkins Univ., 1947.

———. *Liber amoris* and dramatic criticisms; with a long essay of introduction by Charles Morgan. London. Peter Nevill.

Pacey, Desmond. Virginia Woolf as a literary critic. UTQ 18 (1948). 234-44.

See pp. 242-44 for a comparison of Hazlitt and Mrs. Woolf as impressionistic critics.

Wilcox, Stewart C. Hazlitt's aphorisms. MLQ 9 (1948). 418-23.

Hunt. Gates. See "Shelley."

Jeffrey. Greig, James A. Francis Jeffrey of the *Edinburgh review*. London. Oliver and Boyd.

Rev. in TLS Aug. 28, p. 485.

Keats. Allick. See "Clarke."

Bate, W. J. The stylistic development of Keats. See ELH 15 (1948). 19.

Rev. by R. W. King in RES 24 (1948). 71-73.

Breyer, Bernard. Keats' "La belle dame sans merci." Exp. 6. No. 3 (Dec., 1947). 18.

The demon lover is ideal Beauty, neither moral nor sensual, but imaginative.

Brook, Cleanth. Keats's sylvan historian. See ELH 15 (1948). 19-20.

Rev. in VQR (Spring, 1948). xlv-lvii.

Caldwell, J. R. John Keats' fancy. See ELH 14 (1947). 11.

Rev. by R. W. King in RES 24 (1948). 71-73.

✓ Church, Richard. John Keats. Poets on the poets series. London. Phoenix House.

An anthology, with a long introduction. Cf. TLS Nov. 6, p. 625 (leading article).

Clapp, Edwin R. "La belle dame" as vampire. PQ 27 (1948). 89-92. See ELH 14 (1947). 13 and ELH 15 (1948). 21, 22.

Mr. Clapp proposes "to account at least in part for the note 'of mystery and desolation,' the 'style of horror-stricken reticence and suggestion'" by relating the vampire theme to the poem's central motif, "the wasting power of love," and to its "dominant sustaining image . . . the pallor of the fuy's victims. . . ." (S. C. W.)

Cooper, Barbara. One that gathers samphire. Penguin new writing 34 (1948). 93-103.

An appreciation and "attempt [at] a more balanced judgment" of Keats's letters; occasioned by the appearance of the 1947 reprint of Forman's edition.

The dream and the business. TLS Nov. 6, p. 625.

A leading article on Keats and present-day politics.

Eberly, Ralph D. Keats' "Ode on melancholy." Exp. 6. No. 6 (April, 1948). 38.

There are two themes in the poem, like melodies in counterpoint. They are Melancholy and Delight, two equally important phases of intense experience.

Elton, William. "Sooth" in Shakespeare, Milton, and Keats. MLN 63 (1948). 436.

On "soother" in "The eve of St Agnes"; a reply to Charles E Mounts. See ELH 15 (1948) 22.

Ford, Newell F. Keats, empathy, and "the poetical character." SP 45 (1948). 477-90.

Supplements the discussion of Richard Fogle (see ELH 14 [1947] 12), with additional illustrative passages from Keats's letters and an attempt "to explain empathically two supposedly illogical passages in the Odes." (R. D. A.)

Gay, R. M. Keats' "Ode on a Grecian urn." Exp. 6. No. 6 (April, 1948). 43.

Suggests reason for change from "thou" to "ye" in the last two lines

Gordon, R. K. Keats and Milton. MLR 42 (1947). 434-46.

"Emphasizes, with some fresh evidence, what has, of course, long been known to readers of Keats's poetry and letters, his admiration for Milton's poetry, especially *Paradise lost*" (p 446), and presents many parallels in words, phrases, and lines. In some cases the argument is tenuous or far-fetched. (C F.H.)

Gorell, Lord. John Keats: the principle of beauty. London. Sylvan Press.

Rev. in TLS Nov. 27, p. 668.

Keats, John. Endymion. With engravings by John Buckland-Wright. London. Golden Cockerell Press.

Rev. in TLS Apr. 3, p 196

An *édition de luxe*, priced at seven guineas.

Keister, Don A. Keats' "Ode to a nightingale." Exp. 6. No. 5 (March, 1948). 31.

On punctuation of line 35.

The letters of John Keats. Ed. by M. Buxton Forman. See ELH 15 (1948). 21-22.

Rev. by Geoffrey Bullough in MLR 43 (1948). 293-94.

Mizener. See "3. Criticism."

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Preston, J. H. *The story of Hampstead*. Photography by J. Manwaring. London. Staples Press.

Rev. in TLS July 31, p. 432

Contains material (none of it new) on Keats

Rollins, Hyder Edward, ed. *The Keats circle: letters and papers 1816-1878*. 2 vols. Cambridge. Harvard Univ. Press.

Rev. by Clarence D. Thorpe in NYT Dec. 19, pp. 1, 14, by George F. Whicher in NYHTB Dec. 12, p. 1

Utilizing manuscript materials in the notable Harvard Keats Collection supplemented by the celebrated Woodhouse Scrapbook in the Morgan Library, Mr. Rollins has compiled and edited two quite notable volumes of correspondence and documents written by Keats's friends and family from 1816, the date of the first preserved letters by members of the circle, to 1878, the year R. M. Milnes finished the second edition of his *Life and letters*. Some of these things had been printed before, by the Formans and others, but often only in fragments and in no particular order, but the majority of them appear here for the first time, all unabridged, conveniently arranged in chronological order, and furnished forth with an excellent introduction and a set of informative synopses of the lives of the principal persons concerned: George Keats, Woodhouse, Taylor, Severn, Bailey, Reynolds and the rest. The result is a book remarkable for the mass and continuity of evidence about both Keats and his friends—a first-hand story of what members of his circle thought and wrote and did in relation to Keats, both during his life and in the fifty years following his death; and along with this the most intimate view we have yet had of the manner of men and women these were who were worthy to be called his friends. These volumes furnish a valuable supplement to existing biographies and will prove indispensable to students of Keats. (C. D. T.)

Keats's letters. JEGP 47 (1948). 139-45.

Sets forth especially important information regarding errors in the H. Buxton and Maurice Buxton Forman texts of the letters, some of which are corrected by reference to the Harvard Keats Collection. Moreover, Mr. Rollins adds pertinent criticism of the "Chronology" and "Biographical Memoranda" as rendered by the Formans. Appended is a list of corrections to be embodied in any future edition of Keats's letters. (S. C. W.)

Keats's reputation in America to 1848. See ELH 15 (1948). 23.

Rev. by D. J. Gordon in RES 24 (1948). 260-61.

Thorpe, James. Keats's "Hymn to Pan" and the litany. MLQ 9 (1948). 424-28.

"The framework of the ode appears . . . as a synthesis of the forms of the invocations and obsecrations of the Litany." Speculates briefly on the source of Keats's knowledge of the Anglian service.

Lamb. Barnett, George Leonard. A critical analysis of the Lucas edition of Lamb's letters. MLQ 9 (1948). 303-14.

An important article on "the shortcomings, the errors, the lack of information, the misinformation, the liberties taken, and the omissions" in the Lucas edition. In the light of the wealth of evidence he presents, Mr. Barnett's

conclusion, that "we do not yet possess a definitive edition of the letters of Charles Lamb," is temperate indeed (R D A)

Blunden, Edmund. Charles Lamb and the Japanese. CLSB No. 84 (July, 1948).

Brown, John Mason. Seeing things: "The shorn Lambs," "The man who was Lamb," "Elia versus Charles," "Lamb as a critic." SRL July 3, pp. 22-25; July 10, pp. 22-25; July 24, pp. 22-26; July 31, pp. 26-28.

In expanded form these essays will be the introduction to "The Viking Portable Library Charles Lamb." They are pleasantly informative and do justice to Lamb as essayist and critic (S C W)

Charles Lamb and "Button Snap." CLSB No. 85 (Sept., 1948).

An account of this property of Lamb's, including a facsimile of the concluding portion of the deed under which he sold "Button Snap" to Thomas Greg in 1815, and one of his letter to Sargus, the tenant of the cottage.

Finch, Jeremiah S. Charles Lamb's copy of *The history of Philip de Commynes* with autograph notes by Lamb and Coleridge. Princeton Univ. library chronicle 9 (1947). 30-37.

Lamb's copy of the volume contains two annotations by himself and one by Coleridge, all of which Mr Finch prints. The remainder of the article traces the history of the volume after the dispersal of Lamb's library in 1848.

French, J. Milton. Elia. Journal of Rutgers Univ. library 11 (1948). 92-94.

A Lamb commonplace book. CLSB No. 86 (Nov., 1948).

Bibliographical note on the sale of the manuscript

Logan, James Venable. Yorick and Elia. CLSB No. 85 (Sept., 1948); No. 86 (Nov., 1948).

A comparison of the humor and sentiment of Sterne and Lamb, especially as seen in *The sentimental journey* and the *Essays of Elia*.

McKechnie, Samuel. Charles Lamb of the India House. CLSB No. 83 (May, 1948); No. 84 (July, 1948); No. 86 (Nov., 1948).

"The series of notes . . . will consist in the main of new facts, and of theories based on new facts." A few were published earlier in N&Q. See ELH 15 (1948). 25-26.

Tillett, Nettie S. Mary Lamb (December 3, 1764-May 20, 1847). SAQ 47 (1948). 76-87.

An appreciative essay.

Turnbull, John M. Lamb's multiple portrait. N&Q 193 (1948). 107.

Landor. Landor, Walter Savage. The sculptured garland. A selection from the lyrical poems, chosen and arranged by Richard Buxton. Illustrated by Iain MacNab. London. Dropmore Press.

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Sidgwick, J. B., ed. The shorter poems of Walter Savage Landor.

See ELH 15 (1948). 26.

Rev. in TLS Feb. 1, 1947, p. 64.

Super, R. H. The publication of Landor's early works. PMLA 63 (1948). 577-603.

Landor perhaps had dealings with more publishing houses than any other English writer. At least twenty-eight publishers are concerned with the appearances of his separate volumes. He was careless in correcting manuscripts and proofs. "A consequence of his haste is that there exists somewhere a copy of nearly every one of his printed volumes, completely revised after its publication because Landor was dissatisfied with the state in which he had permitted the work to be printed." The essay traces Landor's relations with seven publishers from his "first dealings with a publisher, at the age of twenty, to the publication of his first important collection of Latin poetry at the age of forty" (J. V. L.).

Lockhart. John Bull's letter to Lord Byron [1821]. See ELH 15 (1948). 26.

Rev. (briefly) in TLS Oct. 2, p. 559, by S. C. Chew in MLN 63 (1948). 568-69; in VQR (Spring, 1948). xlix; in CE9 (1948) 403.

Martin. Balston, Thomas. John Martin, 1789-1854: his life and works. London. Duckworth.

Rev. by Eardley Knollys in NSN 35 (1948) 483-84, in TLS Mar. 27, pp. 169-70.

Moore. Jordan. See "Byron."

Peacock. Peacock, Thomas Love. Nightmare abbey and Crotchet castle. With an introduction by J. B. Priestley. London. Hamish Hamilton.

Rev. in TLS June 5, p. 316.

Scott. Aspinall, A. Some new Scott letters. TLS Mar. 27, p. 184; Apr. 10, p. 212; Apr. 24, p. 240.

Addressed to the Right Hon. William Adam, from MSS at Blair Adam.

Mayo, Robert D. The chronology of the Waverley novels: the evidence of the manuscripts. PMLA 63 (1948). 935-49.

Evidence for accepting the conventional chronology rather than the theory of early composition as argued by Dame Una Pope-Hennessy and Mr. Donald Carswell. There is no external evidence to support the "apprenticeship theory." "Actually a great deal is known about Scott's methods of workmanship from initial idea to galley proof; yet in the whole vast biographical legacy—the twelve volumes of letters, the 'Prefaces' and 'Notes' to the 'Author's Edition,' the monumental *Life*, the correspondence of the letterbooks, and the numerous portraits and reminiscences of friends—there is not the slightest hint that outside of *Waverley* Scott ever rewrote or completed an earlier work of fiction." Moreover, an examination of the holograph manuscripts of eleven novels of the Waverley series provides evidence to corroborate the conventionally accepted chronology—the watermarks, the handwriting and methodical appearance of the pages, and other evidence concerning Scott's method of composition. (J. V. L.).

Sir Walter Scott: private letters of the seventeenth century. With an introduction by Douglas Grant. Oxford. Clarendon Press; London. Cumberlege.

Rev. in TLS Mar. 20, p 165.

Sister M. Rosa, S. S. J. Romanticism in Anette von Droste-Hülshoff. MLJ 32 (1948). 279-87.

A centenary article, reminding us how much Anette von Droste-Hülshoff (who died in 1848) owed to Scott, Byron, Schiller, and Goethe. (C F H)

Tait, J. G., and Parker, W. M., eds. The journal of Sir Walter Scott: 1829-1832. Edinburgh. Oliver and Boyd, 1947.

Rev. by W D. Taylor in RES 24 (1948). 261-63.

Shelley. Aveling, E., and Aveling, A. E. Shelley's socialism: two lectures. Manchester. Leslie Preger.

Baker, Carlos. Shelley's Ferrarese maniac. English institute essays: 1946, pp. 41-73. New York. Columbia Univ. Press, 1947. See "3. Criticism" s. v. "English institute essays."

The purpose of the essay is to identify the Maniac in "Julian and Maddalo" as Tasso, a suggestion made earlier by Dowden and R D Havens Salt, Peck, Grabo, J H Smith, and White have all interpreted the Maniac's section of the poem as autobiographical. Professor Baker gives a detailed argument against White's interpretation. In accepting the Maniac's story as the narrative of Tasso's imprisonment, Baker points to parallels between the Maniac and Byron's poem, "Lament of Tasso," and the biographies of Tasso by Mansa and Serassi, which Shelley had read. It is of course known that Shelley had intended to write a tragedy on Tasso, two fragments of which have survived (J V L)

———. Shelley's major poetry: the fabric of a vision. Princeton. Princeton Univ. Press.

Rev by George F. Whicher in NYHTB June 27, p 4, by Emery Neff in NYT June 27, p. 5; in VQR (Autumn, 1948) cxvi.

For the research scholar the most valuable aspects of Professor Baker's study are, first, its up-to-date bibliographical use of scholarship, and, second, its treatment of source material. Here one might mention in particular the relationship of *Queen Mab* to eighteenth century moral allegory; the Zoroastrian element in *The revolt of Islam*; the influence of Spenser on *The witch of Atlas* and *The triumph of life*, and of Milton on *Queen Mab* (Satan as a possible prototype for Ahasueras) and *The sensitive plant*; the reflection of the political background in *The mask of anarchy* and *Swellfoot the tyrant*. Occasionally an important source is forgotten (*Riccardetto* for *The witch of Atlas*) or inadequately integrated (Petrarch's *Triumphs for The triumph of life*), and sometimes the treatment is more derivative than the notes imply (the Zoroastrian element in *The revolt of Islam*), but most of the influences, even though not always convincing in the detail, are suggestive and some are important.

In addition to these research projects, Professor Baker presents "revised interpretations" of all the major poems, emphasizing "moral and esthetic beliefs" and "changing philosophical and psychological convictions." As a

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result of "an exhaustive independent study of Shelley's reading," and "with the help of earlier source hunters" he has, he believes, discovered "the origins of most of his symbolic figures" and thus provided "a topographical map to Shelley's realms of gold."

On this aspect of the book opinions will differ. The overall approach is similar to Grabo's in its emphasis on philosophy and symbolism and its concept of Shelley's development from materialist to mystic, but Baker emphasizes the psychological more than Grabo and the Platonic less. Within this framework the book makes important contributions, for every poem one receives fresh insights (into the motivation of the characters in *The Cenci*, the psychological aspects of *Prometheus unbound*, the satiric motifs of *Swellfoot the tyant*). But one might question the scope of the framework. The book fails (except in treating the directly political poems) to give adequate recognition to the social revolutionary content and is peculiarly blind to the (typically Romantic) confessional element. The first of these defects results in throwing off balance the interpretation of such poems as *Queen Mab*, *The revolt of Islam*, *Prometheus unbound* and *Hellas* by elevating secondary matter into primary position for detailed treatment, the second results in the denial of the autobiographical element in *Epipsychidion* and *Julian and Maddalo*, the former being treated exclusively as an exposition of Platonic psychology, and in the development of the elaborate, but, to me, unconvincing theory of the madman in *Julian and Maddalo* (the madman representing Tasso and the abusive lady, the Princess Leonora) (K N C.).

Barrell, Joseph. Shelley and the thought of his time. See ELH 15 (1948). 27-28.

Rev. in TLS May 8, p. 263, by Carlos Baker in MLN 63 (1948) 571-72; by Carl H. Grabo in JEGP 47 (1948): 313-18.

Cameron, Kenneth Neill. The planet-tempest passage in "Epipsychidion." PMLA 63 (1948). 950-72.

Professor Cameron argues for identifying the Planet as the suicide of Harriet, the Tempest as Shelley's persecution by Eliza Westbrook, and the earthquakes as the litigation over his children. This identification would be untenable if the passage refers to a period subsequent to 1817. This later date (perhaps 1819-1820) has generally been accepted because of the reference to the Moon (Mary) and the "chaste cold bed." Did Shelley regard Mary as cold as early as 1817? Cameron argues that he did, chiefly by citing evidence from the short lyric "To Constantia" (1817). Therefore, since the passage may refer to events of 1817 or earlier, Cameron suggests the following interpretations. The "storms" "represent a general introductory metaphor for the poet's disturbances throughout the period." The Moon (Mary) was blotted out. The persecution by Eliza Westbrook (Shelley held her responsible for Harriet's suicide and for the litigation) was the Tempest that shook the ocean of his sleep. When the Planet was quenched (Harriet's suicide), his state corresponded to the "frost" and the "death of ice." The "earthquakes" followed (the litigation over his children). The "Moon" continues to smile (Mary's tender care of him during the crisis). (J. V. L.)

Christensen, Francis. "From heaven, or near it." CE 10 (1948). 107.

A reply to Miss Wingo (see below), citing W. H. Hudson and S. W. Borchley in defense of Shelley's "To a Skylark." It is probably a fair

conclusion that accuracy of observation, though perhaps desirable, is not of prime importance in bird-poetry (S.C.W.)

Fogle, Richard Harter. The imaginal design of Shelley's "Ode to the west wind." *ELH* 15 (1948). 219-26. See "3. Criticism" s.v. "Fogle."

Originally read before the Modern Language Association in Detroit (1947), this article is a detailed defense against the attacks of such new critics as Tate, Ransom and Brooks. But it is also, more than a defense. Going beyond I. J. Kapstein, N. I. White, and the original essay on the form of the ode by Stopford Brooke, Mr. Fogle speaks with some fullness upon imagery. With skill, he relates it to the personal element in the poem, properly regarding the personal as organically a part of the design. Thus form and imagery are seen to be so fused with the personal that only partitive criticism can ignore their integral relationship. The defense of Mr. Fogle, then, rests upon an evaluation of what he as critic believes Shelley intended to do in the whole poem. This approach has the obvious critical advantage of not applying to Shelley standards he never intended to meet, and of not mourning tacitly in attack over an unfortunate Romantic who was born too soon to have the advantage of "irony," "sensitivity," and the objective correlative (valuable as these may be to modern poets trying to do something equally admirable, but different). In short, Mr. Fogle is more than reluctant to let Shelley go by default. For these reasons I think the article more important than its length would indicate. (S.C.W.)

Gates, Payson C. Leigh Hunt's review of Shelley's *Posthumous poems*. The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 42 (1948). 1-40.

The first publication—from a MS previously owned by Forman—of the review (1825) which was later used for the Shelley chapter in *Lord Byron and his contemporaries* (1828), which, in turn, was the foundation for the account in the *Autobiography* (1850). The new text differs only in a few minor details from that of 1828 and adds almost nothing to our knowledge of Shelley. (K.N.C.)

Griffiths, J. Gwyn. Shelley's "Ozymandias" and Diodorus Siculus. *MLR* 43 (1948). 80-84.

Himelick, Raymond. Cabell, Shelley, and the "incorrigible flesh." *SAQ* 47 (1948). 88-95.

On the "intense preoccupation [in Cabell and Shelley] with man's hopeful and determined quest for beauty and harmony of existence that is somehow epitomized by the woman dream."

Hughes, A. M. D. The nascent mind of Shelley. See *ELH* 15 (1948). 29.

Rev. by F. L. Jones in *MLN* 63 (1948) 569-71; by John Wain in *RES* 24 (1948). 258-60; in *CE* 9 (1948) 348.

The first part of Professor Hughes' study sketches Shelley's early life; the second part presents an analysis of *Queen Mab* and its ideological background. The biographical treatment is skilful and balanced, psychologically less penetrative than White's but more so than Blunden's. Although it does not make any important disclosures, its careful, objective re-sifting of evidence

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(especially in the sequence of events leading up to the elopement) often results in new insights, and it adds information on a variety of subjects, e.g., religious instruction (or lack of it) at Eton; Dr. Land, the sources of *Zastrozzi* and *St Irvyne*, the influence of Paley on Shelley's early deistic thinking; Daniel Isaac Eaton and his trial; the government investigations of Shelley in Devon, the influence of Southey. On the other hand, although some acquaintance with White and Gabor is evidenced, the book is deficient in its use of modern scholarship. For instance, Jones' articles on *Leonora* and *The necessity of atheism* (which demonstrated that the work was in large part by Hogg) are unmentioned, as are the Glasheens' article on the publication of *The wandering Jew* and Baker's on the allegorical sources of *Queen Mab*.

In the second part, the analysis of *Queen Mab* and its background is one of the most comprehensive yet to appear. It is especially important in its treatment of ethical influences (from Rousseau, Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft and Sir James Lawrence) and has something to say also on metaphysical and scientific influences; but it is weak in its treatment of political and anti-religious motifs, the influence of Godwin in the first of these fields and of Holbach in the second receiving inadequate attention. In the final chapter, "The sequel," Professor Hughes goes beyond the early period to make some investigation of Shelley's Platonism and add some comments on *A defence of poetry* and *The witch of Atlas*. (K. N. C.)

Jones, Frederick L. Unpublished fragments by Shelley and Mary. SP 45 (1948). 472-76.

From the Mary Shelley notebook, dated 1814, now in the Library of Congress. (1) Shelley on the Christian religion: probably the first draft of *A refutation of deism*; (2) Shelley on the game laws, a groping beginning for an essay that seemingly never progressed beyond this stage. An incomplete translation by Mary of the "Cupid and Psyche" of Apuleius, which is also found in the notebook, is not printed here. (R. D. A.)

Lehmann, John, ed. Shelley in Italy: an anthology. The Chiltern library. Lehmann.

Rev. in Dublin magazine (July-Sept.). 72.

Mary Shelley's journal. See ELII 15 (1948). 30.

Rev. by Elizabeth Nitchie in MLN 63 (1948). 572-73

Meldrum, Elizabeth. The classical background of Shelley. Contemporary review 173 (1948). 160-65.

Mizener. See "3. Criticism."

Origo. See "Byron."

Priestley, F. E. L. See "3. Criticism."

Scott, W. S., ed. New Shelley letters. London. Bodley Head.

Rev. in TLS Dec 4, p 682.

Prints the majority of the letters hitherto available only in three limited editions of the Golden Cockerell Press: *The Athenians, Harriet and Mary*, and *Shelley at Oxford*.

Steffan. See "Byron."

Vail, Curtis C. D. Shelley's translations from Goethe. GR 23 (1948). 91-103.

A survey of the twentieth-century studies devoted to the influence of Goethe on Shelley. The author comments that Shelley's biographers have neglected this aspect of the poet.

Wingo, Alice Logan. Hark, hark, the lark. CE 9 (1948). 217.

A note contending that the English skylark does not, like Shelley's, soar upward so far as to disappear (See Christensen, F, *ante*)

W. R. Shelley, Emerson, and Sir William Osler. N&Q 190 (1946). 120-21.

Although Emerson's remarks on machinery in his *Journal* for 1848 anticipated Osler's, Shelley in the *Defence* anticipated Emerson.

Sherwood. Sargeaunt, M. Joan. Mrs. Sherwood's doctrine. TLS Feb. 1, 1947, p. 65.

A letter to the editor See also C B Moss' reply, *ibid* Feb 21, 1947, p 3.

Southey. Elwin. See "Wordsworth."

Wordsworth. Ames, Alfred C. Contemporary defense of Wordsworth's "Pedlar." MLN 63 (1948). 543-45.

On "the propriety of casting one of the interlocutors [in *The excursion*] as a *pedlar*"

Bandy, W. T. An uncollected letter from Wordsworth to Crofton Croker. MLR 43 (1948). 242.

Dated Nov 11 [1827], printed in *The autographic mirror* (1864).

Coe, Charles Norton. A note on Wordsworth's "The solitary reaper." MLN 63 (1948). 493.

On the possible influence of a passage in Robert Heron's *Observations of Scotland*.

Coleridge, Nicholas F. D. See "Coleridge."

Darbishire, Helen. Wordsworth's belief in the doctrine of necessity. RES 24 (1948). 121-25.

Wordsworth's belief in the necessary movement of mankind towards perfection differs from Godwin's. For Godwin, Reason is the guiding force. For Wordsworth, it is the "mighty stream of tendency," an inevitable movement of life brought about by a close communion between the mind of man and Nature. The essay contains numerous pertinent quotations from the poems, some from unpublished texts. (J. V. L.)

———. See "3. Criticism": "Essays."

DeQuincey. See "DeQuincey . . . Recollections."

Dockhorn, Klaus. Wordsworth und die rhetorische Tradition in England. Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Nr. 11. Göttingen. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1944.

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Douglas, Wallace W. Wordsworth as business man. *PMLA* 63 (1948). 625-41.

A close examination of Wordsworth's tangled money affairs: the investment of the Calveit legacy, the purchase of real estate, the management of the family estate and of his wife's and the Hutchinsons' investments, his pensions; and many dealings with his publishers. He was, in reality, a man of property and much engaged in money matters. "Certain questions follow from these assumptions. Was it the distraction of money affairs that exhausted his capacity to feel and to write his best poetry? Did his business interests compel him to shift from the radical to the Tory? Was he always at heart a conservative business man?" (J V L.)

———. Wordsworth in politics: the Westmorland election of 1818. *MLN* 63 (1948). 437-49.

A detailed study of the background of Brougham's contest for one of the Westmorland seats in 1818, concluding that "Wordsworth had simply been called in to defend a family political machine [i.e. that of the Lowthers]. This he did completely enough, even though the instability of Henry Brougham hardly warranted the apparent fear, the exaggeration, and the irrelevant arguments with which Wordsworth met his campaign." (R D A.)

Duffin, Henry Charles. *The way of happiness. A reading of Wordsworth.* London. Sidgwick and Jackson; New York. Macmillan.

"An interpretation of Wordsworth's philosophy of happiness, illustrated with many quotations from his poetry." (*TLS* June 26, p. 363.)

Elwin, Malcolm. *The first romantics.* New York. Longmans. See *ELH* 15 (1948). 31.

Rev. by Claire McGlinchey in *NYT* Dec. 19, p. 5; by Marya Zaturenska in *NYHTB* Dec. 26, p. 5.

Fausset, Hugh I'A. *Poets and pundits.* See *ELH* 15 (1948). 32.

Rev. in *VQR* (Winter, 1948). xviii-xiv; by Homer Woodbridge in *YR* (Winter, 1948). 366-68.

Fink, Z. S. Wordsworth and the English republican tradition. *JEGP* 47 (1948). 107-26.

In a heavily documented article—it carries 117 footnotes—the author builds up his case for the influence upon Wordsworth of the English republicans of the seventeenth century. These republicans—Milton, Harrington, Algernon Sydney, *et al.*—were especially honored by Michel Beaupny and the Girondins, with whom Wordsworth consorted in France. "The poet's stay in Paris coincided exactly with the period at which the influence of English republicanism on the Girondins was at its height." Upon his return to England he plunged into the circle "of the English Jacobins," admirers of Milton and Sydney. A study of the *Letter to the Bishop of Mlandaff* will reveal the continuing of the influence of the republicans, especially of Harrington, Milton, and Sydney. This influence endures. It re-asserts itself in *The Prelude*. In fact, the author concludes: "There certainly were principles of consistency, relationship, and development running through his earlier and later views." (B. W.)

Lacey, Norman. Wordsworth's view of nature. Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press; New York. Macmillan.

Rev. by Gwendolen Freeman in *Spectator* June 4, pp 684-86

Leyburn, Ellen Douglass. Berkeleian elements in Wordsworth's thought. *JEGP* 47 (1948). 14-28.

From the "web of Wordsworth's thought" the author purposes to disentangle the Berkeleian strands. These strands, she suggests, were originally drawn out of the conversation of Coleridge and from *Alciphron*, a copy of which the poet owned. *Alciphron* alone carries the heart idea of "the relation of the mind of man to the physical world, with the consequent relation between man and man, and finally between man and God." The method of the essay is to quote passages allegedly revealing the influence of Berkeleian ideas. In this subtle business the author on the whole succeeds. There are some statements and ascriptions that one might question: viz., Wordsworth "never loses the feeling of holding communion through sensuous forms" [cf. *The Prelude* VI 599-601, XII 222-223]; "Wordsworth follows Berkeley in considering the eye 'the most despotic of our senses.'" Shakespeare, of course, said much the same thing. But these are little matters (B W)

Logan, J. V. Wordsworthian criticism. See *ELH* 15 (1948). 32-33.

Rev. by R. D. Havens in *MLN* 63 (1948) 574; by Burns Martin in *Dalhousie Review* 28 (1948). 202

MacLean, Kenneth. The water symbol in *The Prelude*. *UTQ* (July, 1948). 372-89.

Although suffering from excessive quotation, this article serves part of its purpose by revealing how often Wordsworth connected water imagery with the fostering of the imagination and the mystical experience. I do not believe, however, that water ever actually became a symbol to him until his later period. Probably the closest approach to symbolism in *The Prelude* is in the dream parable (V, 70 ff) of the Arab carrying the stone (geometry) and the shell (poetry).

Reference to the "later" Wordsworth may be helpful here. In his note to the River Duddon sonnets he says, "The power of waters over the minds of poets has been acknowledged from the earliest ages . . ." and the Duddon itself symbolizes the unchanging "The Form remains, the Function never dies . . ." Likewise the earlier *White Doe* is based upon esthetic principle designed to resolve inner spiritual conflict through symbolic art. The question remains, then, whether Wordsworth in *The Prelude* does not so subdue water imagery to the coloring of his own mind that it possesses no external symbolic meaning (S C W)

Morley. See "DeQuincey."

The poetical works of William Wordsworth, Vol. 4. Ed. by Ernest de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire. Oxford. Clarendon Press.

Rev. by Edith C. Batho in *MLR* 43 (1948). 114-15; in *TLS* Feb 28, p. 120; by R. D. Havens in *MLN* 63 (1948). 507-08; in *CE* 10 (1948). 120.

Priestley, F. E. L. See "3. Criticism."

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de Selincourt, Ernest. Wordsworthian and other studies. See ELH 15 (1948). 31.

Rev by Edith C. Batho in MLR 43 (1948) 114-15; in VQR (Winter, 1948) xx

Speech in poetry. TLS Aug. 21, p. 471; Aug. 28, p. 485; Sept. 4, p. 499; and Sept. 11, p. 513.

An incidental reference in the first item (a leading article) to Wordsworth's theories of poetry led to a series of letters to the editor

Stoll. See "3. Criticism."

Wordsworth, William. A guide through the district of the lakes in the north of England. Malvern. Tantivy Press.

A facsimile of the definitive fifth edition (1835)

Worthington, Jane. Wordsworth's reading of Roman prose. See ELH 15 (1948). 34.

Rev by Edith C. Batho in MLR 43 (1948). 114-15.

FRENCH

(By Albert Joseph George)

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Duveau, Georges. Petite promenade bibliographique à travers 1848. Pa 42 (1948). 44-49.

2. GENERAL

Archambault, Paul. 1848- révolution créatrice. Paris. Bloud et Gay.

Armand, Félix. Les Fouriéristes et les luttes révolutionnaires de 1848 à 1851. Paris. Presses Universitaires.

The author maintains that the Fourierists were incapable of understanding the true nature of the struggle of 1848. With most of its members drawn from the petite bourgeoisie, the group thought principally in terms of the utopia envisioned by shopkeepers

Auger-Duvignaud, Jean. Le XX^e siècle commence en 48. Europe 26 (1948). 8-12.

1848 determines the modern man more by the failure of the revolution than by any illusory success.

Bertaut, Jules. L'époque romantique. Paris. Tallandier, 1947.

———. Jérôme Paturot avait-il raison? RP 55 (1948). 94-109.

Each revolution during the nineteenth century became an immense deception for those who fought. This was the fate of the generation of Romantics, by nature enthusiastic, generous, and dreaming of the impossible.

Bertaut, Jules. 1848 et la seconde république. Paris. Fayard.

Bourgin, Georges. Le printemps des peuples. NL Feb. 26, p. 4.

Bray, René. La préciosité et les précieux. Paris. Albin Michel.

A study of *préciosité* as a trend in French literature from Thibaut de Champagne to Jean Giraudoux. In connection with the nineteenth century, Professor Bray studies Gautier, Banville, Hugo, Verlaine, and Baudelaire as *précieux* to the extent that they are dandies, indulge in verbal acrobatics, or are bound to art for art's sake.

Brun, A. Le romantisme et les Marseillais. Aix-en-Provence. Imprimerie Universitaire E. Fourcine, 1939.

Reviewed in RHL 47 (1947) 375-77.

Carré, Jean-Marie. Les écrivains français et le mirage allemand, 1800-1940. Paris. Boivin.

From the days of Madame de Staël on, French writers have looked at Germany through eyes dimmed by illusions and preconceptions. This is not a complete study, but a fairly objective monograph which is concerned primarily with a few great names.

Cassou, Jean. Quarante-huit. Paris. NRF.

Charlier, Gustave. Le mouvement romantique en Belgique, 1818-1830: la bataille romantique. Bruxelles. La Renaissance du Livre.

A major work on the origins of Belgian Romanticism that has long been needed for a clear understanding of how French Romanticism spread over frontiers.

———. Passages. Bruxelles. La Renaissance du Livre, 1947.

Six essays, four of which are concerned with French Romanticism. Les Musset et la Belgique; Les débuts de Juliette Drouet; Autour d'un grand exil; Baudelaire et l'opinion belge de son temps.

Cuvillier, Armand. L'idéologie de 1848. Revue Philosophique 63 (1948). 409-26.

———. La révolution des prophètes. NL Feb. 26, p. 1.

1848 was a revolution constantly prophesied since 1830 by the Saint-Simonians, the Fourierists, and the followers of Cabet.

Dansette, Adrien. Deuxième république et second empire. Paris. Fayard.

Decaunes, Luc. Lumière de quarante-huit. Cahiers du Sud 289 (1948). 494-98.

Fouquet, Jean. A l'indépendance du monde! Europe 26 (1948). 86-112.

A comprehensive survey of popular songs and the worker song-writers who produced them during the period immediately prior to the revolution.

Guillemin, Henri. Histoire des catholiques français au XIX^e siècle, 1815-1905. Geneva. Editions du Milieu du Monde, 1947.

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Guillemin, Henri. La tragédie de quarante-huit. Paris. Editions du Milieu du Monde.

Kemp, Robert. Un critique de l'angoisse. NL Feb. 12, p. 2.

A commentary on the publication of a new edition of Albert Béguin's *L'âme romantique et le rêve* which stresses the fact that the feeling of anguish constitutes an integral part of French Romanticism.

Larnac, Jean. Une révolution dans les lettres il y a cent ans. Europe 26 (1948). 64-85.

The beginnings of proletarian literature and the relationship of the worker's literature to Romanticism has more and more interested the modern scholar. The present article gives a clear and concise introduction to this new field with a general treatment of the works of Perdiguer, Gilland, Vincard, and many others.

Leflou, le Chanoine. L'église de France et la révolution de 1848. Paris. Bloud et Gay.

Leibowitz, René. Les fondements de l'opéra romantique. Temps Modernes 3 (1948). 355-60.

Leroy, Maxime. La veille de 48—de Guizot à Tocqueville. Hommes et Mondes 5 (1948). 249-60.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. Essays in the history of ideas. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

All the articles contained in this volume have previously been published, though most have been revised for this issue. Of particular note to the scholar interested in Romanticism are "The Chinese origin of a Romanticism," and the famous article "On the discrimination of Romanticisms."

Maurois, André. Les leçons de 1848. NL Feb. 26, p. 1.

The revolution of 1848 was not a necessary revolution, nor was it a lasting one, although it reacted "generously" on France.

Meeus, Adrien de. Le romantisme. Paris. Fayard.

The author beats on open doors when he proclaims that French Romanticism is "tout ce qui s'oppose en nous à la raison." The word "Romantic" is stretched to cover all literature except the classic parenthesis of 1660 and the second wave of neo-classicism after 1830. Though the book contains many ingenious *rapprochements*, it loses force from the author's insistence on finding Freudian tendencies everywhere.

Montreuil, Jean. Histoire du mouvement ouvrier en France des origines à nos jours. Paris. Aubier, 1946.

Contains an interesting chapter on 1830.

Moulin, Charles. Le livre du centenaire—1848. Paris. Editions Atlas.

Pommier, Jean. Panorama d'une révolution. NL Feb. 26, p. 4.

Ponteil, Félix. 1848. Paris. Armand Colin.

Stambak, Dinko. La complainte de la noble femme d'Asan-Aga

ou l'invitation romantique au voyage illyrien. RLC 22 (1848). 296-303.

A discussion of the fifteen translations into French of the Yugoslav folklore theme of the complaint of a repudiated woman

Suffel, Jacques. Les mémorialistes. NL Feb. 26, p. 5.

Tersen, Emile. La presse NL Feb. 26, p. 5.

On the sudden flourishing of newspapers in 1848.

Thomas, Edith. Les femmes en 1848. Europe 26 (1948). 56-63.

A discussion of feminism in 1848, of the women in the clubs and the ateliers who were fighting for their social and political rights.

Thomas, Lucien-Paul. Le vers moderne, ses moyens d'expression, son esthétique. Bruxelles. Palais des Académies, 1943.

Thorel, Guy. Chronologie du mouvement ouvrier en France, 1791-1946. Paris. Editions du Temps Present, 1947.

van Tieghem, Paul. L'ère romantique: le romantisme dans la littérature européenne. Paris. Michel.

This should be a major work in the field of Romanticism, but it unfortunately is not available for review at the present time.

Vaulx, Bernard de. L'écheance de 1852, ou la liquidation de 1848. Paris. Société d'Editions Littéraires Françaises.

3. STUDIES OF AUTHORS

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In her *Souvenirs d'une ambassade en Espagne et au Portugal*, the Duchess apparently used whole chapters copied from Duperron's *Nouveau voyage en Espagne fait en 1777 et 1778*. Furthermore she borrowed heavily from the Count de Hoffmansegg's *Voyage en Portugal*, as well as from other sources, a fact which sharply reduces the value of her observations.

Agoult. Joubert, Solange. Une correspondance romantique: Madame d'Agoult, Liszt, Henri Lehman. Paris. Flammarion, 1947.

Ballanche. Montesquiou. See "Récamier."

Balzac. Béguin, Albert. Balzac et 1848. Europe 26 (1948). 165-74.

Chazel, Pierre. Figures de proue, de Corneille à Valéry. Paris. Delachaux et Niestlé.

This evaluation of a variety of great men frankly stems from a strong Catholic point of view. Corneille becomes a herald of grandeur, Balzac a mystic, with both of them living under the sign of Prometheus. Hugo and Baudelaire are "témoins blessés" who have strayed from the truth.

Gallotti, Jean. Au vallon de Ville-d'Avray avec Balzac, Corot et Jean Rostand. NL Feb. 12, pp. 1, 5.

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Guyon, Bernard. *La pensée politique et sociale de Balzac*. Paris. Colin.

A long and careful analysis of Balzac's social and political thought as it evolved during the first part of his career.

Launay, Jean-Jacques. *Balzac, père du tourisme*. Alençon. Bulletin des Amitiés Littéraires et Artistiques, 1947.

Maugham, Somerset. *Balzac*. *Atlantic monthly* 181 (1948). 46-52.

A popular writer gives his opinion of a great one, borrowing copiously from scholarly sources. Mr. Maugham finds Balzac uninteresting, obvious and superficial, a writer who somehow became great despite his vulgarity and bad style.

Sacy, S. de. *Balzac, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire et l'unité de composition*. MF 1018-1019 (1948). 292-305; 469-80.

Balzac's work all stems from a famous statement by Saint-Hilaire "Il n'y a qu'un animal. Le Créateur ne s'est servi que d'un seul et même patron pour tous les êtres organisés." Balzac borrowed from the scientist the belief that environment modified all animals, and on the basis of this idea evolved his technique as a novelist.

Thouvenin, Georges. *La composition de La Duchesse de Langeais*. RIL 47 (1947). 331-47.

This novel is not only the story of a great deception and revenge; it is also the barely disguised tale of Balzac's affair with the Duchesse de Castries, as well as that of Ulric Guttinguer with Rosalie A.

Barbès. Jeanjean, Jean-François. Armand Barbès. Carcassonne. Imprimerie Gabelle.

Barbey d'Aurevilly. Harcourt, Bernard d'. *Lamartine, Barbey d'Aurevilly et Paul de Saint-Victor en 1848*. Paris. Calmann-Lévy.

Most of this material, drawn from the correspondence of Barbey d'Aurevilly and Saint-Victor, concerns the career of the latter. Since the letters cover a considerable period, the title is a misnomer. Furthermore, Lamartine enters the study primarily as the employer of Saint-Victor, who acted as his secretary after the poet's fall from political power.

Bonnes, Jean-Paul. *Le bonheur du masque; petite introduction aux romans de Barbey d'Aurevilly*. Tournai-Paris. Casterman.

Baudelaire. Ajello, Lina. *La poétique de Baudelaire*. Palermo. Pezzino.

Aressy, Lucien. *Les dernières années de Baudelaire, 1861-67*. Paris. Jouve, 1947.

Arnold, Paul. *Le Dieu de Baudelaire*. Paris. Savet, 1947.

Baudelaire fits into the great esoteric tradition of the Kabbala and neo-Platonism. A mystic rather than an orthodox Catholic, his conception of Satan is consubstantial to men, a quality inherent to the human soul.

Audrey, Colette. Sur une introduction à Baudelaire. Cahiers du Sud 284 (1947). 621-29.

Another anti-Sartre contribution to the great quarrel over the Existentialist interpretation of Baudelaire's work

Baudey, W. T., et Mouquet, Jules. Baudelaire en 1848—la tribune nationale. Paris. Emile-Paul.

Blin, Georges. Le sadisme de Baudelaire. Paris. José Corti.

The present volume develops and complements sections of M. Blin's previous book on Baudelaire with five unrelated essays, the most important of which yields the above title. According to the author's thesis, Baudelaire's "besoin d'autrui" makes him don a mask of sadism. Sartre had misunderstood this when he tried to judge Baudelaire according to the tenets of Existentialism.

Brosset, Georges, et Schmidt, Claude. Le procès des *Fleurs du Mal*. Geneva. Editions de la Basoche.

Charlier, Gustave. See "2. General."

Charpentier, John. Baudelaire. Paris. Tallandier, 1947.

Chazel. See "Balzac."

Coleno, Alice. Les portes d'ivoire: Baudelaire, Nerval, Rimbaud, Mallarmé. Paris. Plon.

The four writers represent to the author four major attempts to find knowledge through the poetic vision. In their attempt to find the supra-world, they display common elements, a classic perfection of their art

Fage, André. Des lettres inédites de Baudelaire. NL Dec. 18, 1947, p. 1.

Léon-Daudet, François. Charles Baudelaire et l'esprit classique. Paris. Pierre Farre, 1946.

A defense of the classic spirit which treats Baudelaire as a reactionary who bitterly criticized the stupidities of the nineteenth century

Levriss, Michel. Le Baudelaire de Sartre. Paris. Gallimard, 1947.

Messiaen, Pierre. Sentiment chrétien et poésie française: Baudelaire, Verlaine, Rimbaud. Paris. Daubin.

Mury, Gilbert. Baudelaire et l'infini. Europe 26 (1948). 112-14.

At the core of Baudelaire's poetic inspiration lies a contradiction between the philosophy of the immutable and the personal experience of becoming. Torn between these alternatives, Baudelaire foundered into uncertainty.

Patri, Aimé. Sur le cas Baudelaire. Pa 42 (1948). 5-9.

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Béranger. Daubray. See "Hugo."

Berlioz. Boschot, Adolphe. Un romantique sous Louis-Philippe: Hector Berlioz, 1831-1842. Paris. Plon.

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Benda, Julien. Chateaubriand ou un romantique mauvais teint. RP 55 (1948). 22-36.

In the history of the evolution of "sensibilité" in French literature, Chateaubriand will stand for the abolition of the distinct, the feeling of what is separate. Although M. Benda dislikes René, he does not admit Chateaubriand is a Romantic, on the grounds that he never lost control over his creations. He introduced a new conception of the relationship between the writer and the public, a new sense of considering great events as they affect daily life. As usual with the work of M. Benda, the article contains a number of moot points.

Gastard, Joseph. Chateaubriand à Combourg. Rennes. Les Nouvelles.

Gautier, J. M. Quelques aspects de l'archaïsme dans l'œuvre de Chateaubriand: de l'*Essai* à l'*Itinéraire*. French Studies 2 (1948). 315-23.

Henriot, Emile. Courier littéraire XIX^e siècle. I: Autour de Chateaubriand. II: Stendhal-Mérimée et leurs amis. Paris. Daubin.

Letessier, Fernand. Cinq lettres inédites de Chateaubriand à un gentilhomme breton. RHL 47 (1947). 363-67.

Loménie, F. Beau de. Un siècle de Chateaubriand. Hommes et Mondes 6 (1948). 613-26.

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Mistler, Jean. La dernière image de Chateaubriand. Gazette des Lettres July 10, p. 1.

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Robida, Michel. Chateaubriand. Paris. Julliard.

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Taillandier, Mme Saint-René. La dernière ambassade de Chateaubriand. Hommes et Mondes 6 (1948). 34-43.

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Dumesnil, René. 48 et l'*Education sentimentale*. NL Feb. 26, p. 5.

Gallotti, Jean. A Rouen chez Corneille et chez Flaubert. NL Aug. 5, pp. 1, 6.

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In this way, Flaubert has been blessed with the Existentialist acceptance, at least for the last two sections of his novel. Each of his characters is seen by M. Garcin to pass from "ce qu'il est pour autrui" to "ce qu'il est pour soi."

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GERMAN

(By Ludwig W. Kahn)

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Kluckhohn, Paul. Wesenszüge romantischer Dichtung. Die Pforte 1 (1947/48). 469-82.

One lecture of a cycle given by various professors in 1947 at Tübingen University. Not for the specialist

Lion, Ferdinand. Romantik als deutsches Schicksal. Stuttgart, Hamburg. Rowohlt, 1947.

"In diesem Buch, das eine historisch-politische Studie sein will, wird versucht, Romantik und Preussentum zuerst in ihrer Vereinzelung und dann in ihrer Begegnung, in ihrer Verbindung und in den verschiedenen Abwandlungen ihrer Verbindung darzustellen"

Reich, Willi. Musik in romantischer Schau: Visionen der Dichter. Basel. Auerbach Verlag, 1946.

Twenty-two poets, from Herder to Morike, on music. From their works and letters.

Schneider, Reinhold. Dämonie und Verklärung. Vaduz. Liechtenstein Verlag, 1947.

A collection of essays, many previously or separately published. One, on Kleist, was noted in ELH 15 (1948). 48; some others are listed in this bibliography if they were published separately. The collection contains, among others Holderlins Deutschland—Novalis und der Tod—Kleists Ende—Die Wende Clemens Brentanos—Lenaus geistiges Schicksal—Der Lebenskampf der Droste—Eichendorffs Weltgefühl—Grillparzers Epilog auf die Geschichte.

Strich, Fritz. Der Dichter und die Zeit: eine Sammlung von Reden und Vorträgen. Bern. Francke, 1947.

Contains, among others, the following essays: Goethe und Heine—Zu Holderlins Gedächtnis—Ricarda Huch und die Romantik.

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Arnim. Guignard, René. L'histoire dans les *Gardiens de la couronne* d'Arnim. Etudes germaniques 3 (1948). 251-59.

Ricci, J. F. A. Cardénio et Célinde. Paris. Librairie José Corti.

Baader. Dempf. See "General."

Brentano. Pfeiffer-Belli, Wolfgang. Clemens Brentano: ein romantisches Dichterleben. Freiburg i. B. Herder, 1947.

Beutler. See "General."

Chamisso. Grolman, Adolf von. Zu einem Gedicht von Adelbert von Chamisso. Hamburg. Heinrich Ellermann, 1946.

Droste. Gausewitz, Walter. Gattungstradition und Neugestaltung: Anette von Droste-Hülshoffs *Die Judenbuche*. MfDU 40 (1947). 314-20.

The genus "Novelle," according to tradition, was concerned with a new and spectacular event ("Begebenheit"), whereas the more modern treat-

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ment places greater emphasis on human character ("Mensch") *Die Juden-buche* marks the transition from the older to the newer tradition.

Heselhaus, Clemens. Die späten Gedichte der Droste. *Zeitschrift f. dt. Philologie* 70 (1947/48). 83-96.

Silz, Walter. The poetical character of Anette von Droste-Hülshoff (1797-1848). *PMLA* 63 (1948). 973-83.

Sister M. Rosa, S. S. J. Romanticism in Anette von Droste-Hülshoff. *MLJ* 32 (1948). 279-87. See "Scott," *supra*.

Vernekohl, Wilhelm. Westfalens Dichterin. *Begegnung* 3 (1948). 76-81.

This, like most articles on Anette von Droste-Hülshoff listed, was occasioned by the centenary of her death. Obviously, the list is incomplete.

Eichendorff. Schneider, Reinhold. *Schwermut und Zuversicht: Lenau-Eichendorff*. Heidelberg.

Görres. Dempf. See "2. General."

Hirth, Friedrich. *Der junge Görres*. Baden-Baden. Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft, 1947.

Laros, Matthias. Görres' Vermächtnis an unsere Zeit. *Begegnung* 3 (1948). 1-11.

As in the case of Droste-Hülshoff, 1948 was the centenary of Görres' death, too. There were many short notices on this occasion, but this compiler has not yet seen any really significant contribution to the study of Görres published in 1948.

Grillparzer. Klarmann, Adolf D. Psychological motivation in Grillparzer's *Sappho*. *MDU* 40 (1948). 271-78.

Ludwig, Alfred Josef. *Der klassische Wiener: Franz Grillparzer*. Wien. Amandus-Edition, 1946.

Mühlher, Robert. Grillparzer und der deutsche Idealismus: ein Beitrag zum Sakularisationsproblem. *Wissenschaft und Weltbild* 1 (1948). 62-75.

Schneider, Reinhold. Im Anfang liegt das Ende: Grillparzers Epilog auf die Geschichte. Baden-Baden. H. Bühler, 1946.

Sprengler, Josef. Grillparzer: der Tragiker der Schuld. Lorch, Stuttgart. Bürger-Verlag, 1947.

Vancsa, Karl. *Franz Grillparzer*. Wien. 1946.

Quoted by title and not verified.

Grimm. Hering, Gerhard I. Ueber Jakob Grimm. *Deutsche Beiträge* 1 (1947). 360-71.

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———. *Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel*. Paris. Aubier.

Lukacs, G. *Der junge Hegel*.

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Niel, Henri. *De la méditation dans la philosophie de Hegel*. Paris. Aubier, 1945.

Scherer, René. *Der Stand der Hegelforschung*. Wort und Tat No. 5 (August, 1947), pp. 36-47.

Heine. Andler, Charles. *Le Buch der Lieder*. 1. L'Intermezzo; 2. Die Heimkehr; 3. Le Romancero; 4. La poésie de l'agonie; conclusion. *Etudes Germaniques* 1 (1946). 337-59; 2 (1947). 72-91, 152-72, 282-307.

———. *L'œuvre lyrique de Heine*. *Etudes germaniques* 1 (1946). 196-225.

A book on Heine by Charles Andler has been announced as forthcoming

Bächli, Samuel. *Heine in seinen Jugendbriefen*. Univ. of Zürich dissertation. Zurich-Höngg. A. Moos, 1945.

Bianquis, Geneviève. *Henri Heine: l'homme et l'œuvre*. Paris. Boivin.

Bieber, Hugo. Recent literature on Heine's attitude toward Judaism. *Historia Judaica* 10 (1948). 175-83.

A conclusive refutation of Wadepuhl's arguments in *PMLA* 61 (1946). 125-56. See *ELH* 14 (1947). 37. Also a critique of the book by Tabak listed below.

Eulenberg, Herbert. *Heinrich Heine*. Berlin. Aufbau, 1947.

Feise, Ernst. *Heinrich Heine: political poet and publicist*. *MfDU* 40 (1948). 211-20.

Hirth, Friedrich. *Heinrich Heine und Karl Marx*. Das goldene Tor 2 (1947). 1065 ff.

Lion, Ferdinand. *Fragmente über Heine*. Das goldene Tor 1 (1946). 107-14.

Loewenthal, Leo. *Heine's religion: the messianic ideals of the poet*. *Commentary* 4 (1947). 153-57.

Maliniemi, Irja. *Heinrich Heine suomen kirjallisuudessa*. Helsingissä. Univ. of Helsinki dissertation. Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1941.

Heinrich Heine in Finnish literature. This book is listed here belatedly as otherwise it might easily escape notice.

Maurer, K. W. *The voice of Heine*. *The Gate* 1. No. 4 (December, 1947). 15-21.

Meyer-Benfey, H. *Heinrich Heine und seine Hamburger Zeit*. Hamburg. Deutscher Literaturverlag, 1947.

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The poetry and prose of Heinrich Heine. Selected and edited with an introduction by Frederic Ewen. New York. Citadel Press.

Rev. by Harvey Breit in NYT Oct. 31, pp. 33-34, by Ben Ray Redman in SRL Dec. 4, pp. 40-42.

The introduction, "Heinrich Heine—humanity's soldier," stresses the social context of Heine's writing. The prose selections, often taken out of their original context, are rearranged in large groups under such headings as "Self Portrait," "Germany," etc. Interesting for its point of view.

Politzer, Heinz. Heinrich Heine. Die neue Rundschau, Heft 9 (Winter, 1948). 1-29.

Streisand, Hugo. Ein unbekannter Heinrich Heine? Aufbau 4 (1948). 890-92.

Suggests Heine as possible translator and editor of Adolphe Granier's *Geschichte der arbeitenden und bürgerlichen Klassen*, published by Georg Westermann in 1839.

Tabak, Israel. Judaic Lore in Heine: The heritage of a poet. Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins Press.

See Bieber, *supra*.

Vallentin, Antonina. Henri Heine et la révolution en marche. Europe 26. No. 27 (Mars, 1948). 50-64.

Werner, A. Poet of the pleasure principle. SRL Dec. 20, 1947.

Hoffmann. Eysselsteijn, Ben van. E. T. A. Hoffmann: der verteller der romantiek. Bibliotheek voor weten en denken 14. Den Haag. H. P. Leopold, 1944.

Gloor, Arthur. E. T. A. Hoffmann: der Dichter der entwurzelten Geistigkeit. Univ. of Zürich dissertation. Zürich. Selbstverlag, 1947.

Hewett-Thayer, Harvey W. Hoffmann: author of tales. Princeton. Princeton Univ. Press.

Rev. by O. Seidlin in NYT Aug. 29, p. 14.

———. A Source of Hoffmann's *Der Kampf der Sänger*. MLN 63 (1948). 526-27.

Ricci, J. F. A. E. T. A. Hoffmann: l'homme et l'œuvre. Paris. Librairie José Corti.

Hölderlin. Heuschele, Otto. Friedrich Hölderlin: Ewige Sendung. Hamburg. Hoffmann und Campe, 1946.

Klein, Johannes. Hölderlin in unserer Zeit. Köln, Schaffstein. 1947.

Lukács, Georg. Goethe und seine Zeit. Bern. A. Francke, 1947.

In this book, pp. 110-126, there is an essay on Hölderlin's *Hyperion*. Lukács sees in all three,—Goethe, Hegel, and Hölderlin,—representatives of the bourgeois revolution; but whereas Goethe and Hegel accommodated themselves to the historical situation as it developed, Hölderlin fought with heroic lack of compromise against the bourgeois reality. He opposes to the

"Bourgeois-Roman" a "Citoyen-Roman" From his Marxist point of view Lukács decries recent attempts to see in Holderlin a Romantic visionary The fact is, of course, that Lukács bases his Holderlin interpretation on *Hyperion*, whereas the interpreters criticized by him stress almost exclusively the Poet's later and latest hymns

Michel, Wilhelm. Holderlin und der deutsche Geist. Stuttgart. Klett, 1947.

Nottmeyer, Barbara. Holderlin: das himmlische Feuer. Stuttgart. A. Genter Verlag, 1947.

Ruprecht, Erich. Wanderung und Heimkunft: Hölderlins Elegie *Der Wanderer*. Stuttgart. Dr. R. Schmiedel, 1947.

Schneider, Reinhold. Der Dichter vor der Geschichte: Hölderlin-Novalis. Zweite Auflage. Heidelberg. Kerle Verlag, 1947.

Wiesman, Louis. Das Dionysische bei Hölderlin und in der deutschen Romantik. Basler Studien zur dt. Sprache und Literatur 6. Basel. B. Schwabe.

Winklhofer, Alois. Hölderlin und Christus. Reden und Vorträge der Hochschule Passau 3. Nürnberg. Glock und Lutz, 1946.

Kleist. De Leeuwe, H. H. J. Molières und Kleists Amphitryon: ein Vergleich. NPh 31 (1947). 174-93.

Mühlher, Robert. Kleists und Adam Müllers Freundschaftskrise. Zwei ungedruckte Briefe Adam Müllers. . . . Wien. Europa Verlag.

Schneider, Reinhold. Kleists Ende. München. Karl Alber, 1946.
Cf Schneider under "Kleist" in ELH 15 (1948). 48

Scott, D. F. S. Heinrich von Kleist's Kant crisis. MLR 42 (1947). 474-84.

Cassirer had attributed the crisis to Fichte's *Bestimmung des Menschen* rather than to Kant; Scott suggests Fichte's *Sonnenklarer Bericht . . . über das eigentliche Wesen der neueren Philosophie*.

Stahl, E. L. The dramas of Heinrich von Kleist. Oxford. Blackwell.

Wolff, Hans M. Heinrich von Kleist als politischer Dichter. Univ. of California Publ. in Modern Philology, Vol. 27. No. 6. Berkeley and Los Angeles. Univ. of California Press, 1947.
Rev by J C Blankenagel in MLN 43 (1948) 410-13

The present reviewer (L Kahn, *Social Ideals in German Literature*, 1938, p 85) wrote: "But there is nevertheless a clearly perceptible evolution in Kleist's work, from emphasis upon the individualistic aspect to that upon the more collectivistic" Professor Wolff, by careful and ingenious interpretations, partly substantiates, partly modifies this general statement This writer, now as then, believes that Kleist's development is not so much a succession of mutually exclusive political views as rather a shift of emphasis in Kleist's dominant search for an ideal political community. Therefore this writer disagrees to some extent with the first part of Professor Wolff's study,

where Kleist's early period is characterized as one of antisocial individualism. The letter of August 15, 1801 (p. 364), for example, expresses less antisocial individualism than ethical resignation since we do not know what is absolutely good and what bad, Kleist says, we must do our best and be satisfied with that. In Kleist's writings of this period the attack is directed, not against human association as such, but rather against a corrupt society that is founded on neither mutual respect nor confidence, tolerance, or understanding. These, however, are moot questions of interpretation.

Recent scholarship saw Kleist from the point of view of the 19th and 20th centuries and arrived at an extremely complicated, philosophical, "existentialist," and even esoteric picture. Professor Wolff regards Kleist rather from the point of view of the 18th century and seems to be much closer to an historically true picture.

Levin, Rahel. Litvinoff, Barnet. *Rahel Levin: the apex of a triangle. German life and letters n. s.* 1 (1947/48). 303-11.

Mörke, Meyer, Herbert. *Mörkes Weggefahrene nach Orplid. Die Pforte* 1 (1947/48). 521-43.

An estimate of Ludwig Amandus Bauer, who was co-discoverer, with Mörke, of imaginary Orplid.

Wooley, E. O. *Du bist Orplid, mein Land. MfDU* 40 (1948). 137-48.

Novalis. Albrecht, Luitgard. *Der magische Idealismus in Novalis' Marchentheorie und Marchendichtung. Dichtung, Wort und Sprache* 13. Hamburg. Hansischer Gildenverlag.

Bus, A. J. M. *Der Mythos der Musik in Novalis' Heinrich von Ofterdingen.* Univ. of Amsterdam dissertation. Alkmaar. II Coster & Zoon, 1947.

Rev. by L. W. Kahn in *MLN* 43 (1948) 553-57. This review covers also two books listed in *ELH* 15 (1948). 48, namely those by Besset and Kamla.

Hiebel, Frederick. *Goethe's Märchen in the light of Novalis. PMLA* 63 (1948). 918-34.

Novalis, the first interpreter of the *Märchen*, is claimed as a precursor of modern interpreters (especially R. Steiner) who explain the *Märchen* in mystical-chemical and occult-religious terms. This interpretation of Goethe's *Märchen* influenced Novalis' own tales. Incidentally, the author sees in Novalis' contributions to the *Jahrbücher der Preussischen Monarchie* (the collection of aphorisms, "Glauben und Liebe," and the cycle of poems, "Blumen") not expressions of political, monarchical (and reactionary) sentiment but mystical-chemical insights.

———. *Novalis and the problem of Romanticism. MfDU* 39 (1947). 515-23.

Two pages cursorily discuss the attempts of the last eighty years to define Romanticism. Then the author turns to what Novalis meant by "romantizing". "This process includes: finding the way back to the original, giving the world the radiance of the distant, the magic, the absolute, the universal, and the transcendental." In two final paragraphs the author tries to persuade us that Novalis was a lonely forerunner, different from other Romanticists, not understood by them. Novalis, we are told somewhat

apodictically, was the purest embodiment of Romantic humanity and the noblest example of Christian cosmopolitanism. This, like the preceding article, is in line with recent attempts to re-interpret Novalis as a religious mystic and to "de-politicize" him.

Kohlschmidt, Werner. *Der Wortschatz der Innerlichkeit bei Novalis*. Kluckhohn-Schneider Festschrift, pp. 396-426. Tübingen. Mohr.

Kühne, Karl. Novalis. *Das Goldene Tor* 2 (1947). 780 ff.

Novalis. *Hymns to the night*. Translated by Mabel Cotterell. Bilingual edition, with introduction by A. Closs. London. Phoenix Press.

Quoted by title.

Novalis. *Das Märchen*. Mit einem Aufsatz "Ueber das Märchen von Novalis" von Carl Brestowsky. Freiburg i. B. Novalis Verlag, 1946.

Quoted by title. The interpretation is said to be from R. Steiner's anthroposophical point of view.

Rehder, Helmut. Novalis and Shakespeare. *PMLA* 63 (1948). 604-24.

An important study. After the death of his fiancée, on May 13, 1797, Novalis recorded in his diary a vision which is generally conceded to be the point of poetic inception for his *Hymnen an die Nacht*. The same entry mentions Novalis' reading of Shakespeare, i. e. *Romeo and Juliet*, in Schlegel's translation just published. The tragedy of love and death must have meant much to the poet in his despair.

Professor Rehder is not concerned with the dependence in literary detail but with much more important similarities in poetic essence. Professor Rehder also makes it more than likely that Novalis was familiar with the new approach to Shakespeare as a creative poet, formulated at the time by Goethe and especially by A. W. Schlegel. This new poetic doctrine must have been of utmost importance to Novalis' intellectual growth and artistic creativeness.

Schneider. See "Holderlin."

Schlegel, A. W. Brentano, Bernard von. August Wilhelm Schlegel: *Geschichte eines romantischen Geistes*. Stuttgart. Cotta, 1943.

Schlegel, F. Anstett, J.-J. Lucinde, eine Reflexion: essai d'interprétation. *Etudes germaniques* 3 (1948). 241-50.

Hugo, Howard E. An examination of Friedrich Schlegel's *Gespräch über die Poesie*. *MfDU* 40 (1948). 221-31.

Rothenhäusler, Paul. Ironie, Witz und Fragment im Schaffen Friedrich Schlegels. *Deutsche Rundschau* 71 (1948). 135-43.

Schäfer, Georg. Zur Konversion von Friedrich und Dorothea Schlegel. *Begegnung* 2 (1947). 235-38.

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(By Nicholson B. Adams and E. Herman Hespelt)

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Castagnino, Raúl H. Contribución documental a la historia del teatro en Buenos Aires durante la época de Rosas (1830-1852). Buenos Aires. Comisión Nacional de Cultura, Instituto Nacional de Estudios de Teatro, 1944. See ELII 15 (1948). 51.

Rev. by J K Leslie in IIR 16 (1948). 348-49

Lists the daily repertory of the Buenos Aires theaters during the Rosas regime.

Rogers, Paul Patrick. The Spanish drama collection in the Oberlin College Library. A supplementary volume Oberlin. Oberlin College, 1946.

A companion volume to the author's publication by the same title in 1940, which was an author list. The present volume is a title list. In addition it contains a list of composers, of printers, and of theaters. It is extremely useful for identifying many Romantic plays

2. GENERAL

Alegría, Fernando. Orígenes del romanticismo en Chile: Bello. Sarmiento. Lastarria. CA 6 (Sept.-Oct., 1947). 173-85.

Alonso Cortés, N. El teatro en Valladolid. siglo XIX. Valladolid. 1947.

Antología poética moderna. Poetas españoles e hispanoamericanos de los siglos XIX y XX. Selección de Agustín de Saz. 2da edición. Madrid.

Azuela, Mariano. Cien años de novela mexicana. México. Botas, 1947.

Rev. by Gaston Lilton in BA 22 (1948) 400.

A series of lectures presenting a survey of Mexican fiction as represented by a dozen Mexican novelists

Cabañas, Pablo. No me olvides (1837-38). Madrid, 1946. See ELII 15 (1948). 51.

Rev. by José Luis Varela in CL 1 (1947). 115-16.

Díaz-Plaja, G. Historia de la poesía lírica española. 2da edición, corregida y aumentada. Barcelona.

Gandía, Enrique de. Caracteres del romanticismo. El reproductor campechano 4 (1947). 167-85.

García Martí, V. *El Ateneo de Madrid, 1835-1935*. Madrid. 1947(?).

The golden land: an anthology of Latin American folklore in literature. Selected, edited and translated by Harriet de Onís. New York. Alfred A. Knopf.

Contains a short but illuminating statement of the significance of the Romantic movement for Latin American literature. Among the authors represented are Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda, Estanislao del Campo, Sarmiento, Hernández and Palma. A brief biographical and critical sketch of each author precedes the selection from his works. The translations are excellent.

Historia general de las literaturas hispánicas. Bajo la dirección de D. Guillermo Díaz-Plaja. Introducción de R. Menéndez-Pidal. Ensayo preliminar de J. Ortega y Gasset. Volume III: Romanticismo.

Quoted by title. Unavailable at present writing.

Martínez Olmedilla, A. *Mujeres del romanticismo*. Anecdótico. Bilbao.

Menéndez y Pelayo, M. *Historia de la poesía argentina*. México. Espasa-Calpe, Arg., 1947.

Reprint of the material in Chapter XII of the author's *Antología de poetas hispanoamericanos*.

Répide, Pedro de. Prolegómenos de romanticismo en España. *Revista nacional de cultura* (Caracas) 6 (1944). 52-64.

Rossel, Milton. *La polémica del romanticismo*. At 87 (July, 1947). 43-54.

Discusses the intellectual climate of Chile in 1842 and the articles for and against Romanticism which were published that year in the various journals of Valparaíso and Santiago by Vicente Fidel López, Sarmiento, Salvador San Fuentes and Jotabeche.

Sanín Cano, Baldomero. *Letras colombianas*. México. 1944. See ELH 13 (1946). 33.

Rev. by Manuel Pedro González in RI 12 (1947) 326-29.

The book presents vigorous portraits of Rafael Pombo and Jorge Isaacs.

Simón Díaz, José. *El alba* (Madrid, 1838-39). Madrid. 1946.

In the series, now in course of publication, of *Índices de publicaciones periodísticas*, directed by G. de Entrambasaguas.

El alba contains some of the earliest poems of Campoamor and of Rodríguez Rubí.

———. *El arpa del creyente* (Madrid, 1842). Madrid. 1947.

In the same series as above. This journal was directed by Navarro Villoslada. It lasted from Oct. 6 to Oct. 25, 1842 (Hartzenbusch, *Catálogo*).

———. *Liceo artístico y literario* (Madrid, 1839). Madrid. 1947.

In the same series as above. Hartzenbusch, *Catálogo*, lists this journal as

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appearing first in 1838. It was the organ of the Romantic organization by the same name.

-. *El reflejo* (Madrid, 1843). Madrid. 1947.

In same series as above. This weekly journal lasted from Jan. 5 to June 6, 1843 (Hartzenbusch, *Catálogo*).

-. *Semanario pintoresco español* (Madrid, 1836-1857). Madrid. 1946.

In the same series as above. Founded by Mesonero Romanos and contributed to by many important Spanish Romantics.

Varela, José Luis. *Generación romántica española*. CL 2 (1947). 423-40.

Discusses the term "generation" according to Dilthey, Petersen, and Ortega y Gasset and finds it thoroughly applicable to Spanish Romanticism, to the group whose admitted leader was Espronceda. Martínez de la Rosa and the Duke of Rivas did not really "belong." Considers decisive years 1835-1845.

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Alcalá Galiano. Ximénez de Sandoval, Felipe. Antonio Alcalá Galiano (*El hombre que no llegó*). Prólogo de G. Marañón. Madrid. 1945.

Altamirano. Sterling, William. *Obras maestras hispanoamericanas: "El Zarco" de Ignacio Manuel Altamirano*. *El reproductor campechano* 4 (1947). 30-33.

Rather superficial article giving a slight sketch of the career of Altamirano and calling attention to the historical background of "El Zarco." Stresses author's faith in the Indian and his love of nature.

Bécquer. Altolaguirre, Manuel. *Versos escondidos de Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer*. CA 4 (Jan.-Feb., 1945). 231-35.

Del olvido en el ángulo oscuro . . . Páginas abandonadas. (Prosa y verso). Carta íntima de Dámaso Alonso. Ensayo crítico, apéndices y notas por Dionisio Gamallo Fierros. Madrid.

Desde mi celda. Cartas. I. Colección "Más allá." Madrid.

Hernández, A. Bécquer y Heine. Madrid. 1946.

Levi, María Teresa. *El gran amor de Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer*. Buenos Aires. Losada, 1945.

Rev. in BA 22 (1948) 288

Leyendas. Colección "Más allá." 2 vols. Madrid.

Martínez Cachero, José María. "Donde habite el olvido . . ." (Notas para una fortuna póstuma de Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer). CL 1 (1947). 211-27.

Monner Sans, J. M. *Las fuentes de las "Rimas" becquerianas*.

Boletín de la Academia Argentina de Letras 15 (1946) 447-74.

———. Notas sobre Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer. Boletín de la Academia Argentina de Letras 15 (1946). 273-86.

Rimas. 4ta edición. Colección "Más allá." Madrid.

Rimas y leyendas. Selección, estudio y notas por Ildefonso M. Gil Zaragoza. 1943.

Las rimas y otras páginas. Prólogo y notas de José María Monne Sans. Clásicos castellanos. Barcelona. 1947.

Calderón y Beltrán. Ávila, Pablo. Influencias del romanticismo europeo en "Ana Bolena" de Fernando Calderón. RI 15 (1947). 123-34.

The author finds in Calderón's work definite traces of influence by Duma and notes passages reminiscent of some in the dramas of García Gutiérrez and especially in Larra's *Un desafío* and *Roberto Dullón*. Larra adapted these two plays from originals written by Lockroy and Badon and Ducange, a fact not noted by the author.

Coronado. Sandoval, A. de. Carolina Coronado y su época. Zaragoza. 1944.

Espronceda. Alonso, M. Entorno a un centenario. Espronceda y la crítica literaria (1842-1942). La ciudad de Dios 15 (1942). 489-99.

Samuels, Daniel G. Some Spanish Romantic debts of Espronceda HR 16 (1948). 157-62.

Segura Covarsí, E. Una canción petrarquista en el siglo XIX. CI 1 (1947). 101-06.

On the derivation of Espronceda's "La entrada del invierno en Londres" from Petrarch's Canzone V ("Ne la stagion . . .").

García Gutiérrez. Poesías. Selección y prólogo de Joaquín de Entrambasaguas. Madrid.

Rev. by E. Segura Covarsí in CL 1 (1947). 512-13.

Gil y Carrasco. Guillon, Ricardo. La vida breve de Enrique Gil Insula 1. No. 6 (June, 1946). 1-2.

Peers, E. Allison. Enrique Gil y Walter Scott. Insula 1. No. 6 (June, 1946). 1-2.

Written in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Gil's death.

Segura Covarsí, E. Enrique Gil: rasgos biográficos. Revista de Centro de Estudios Extremeños 2 (1946). 305-19.

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Description of the author's childhood memories of that part of Colombia which is the setting of *Maria*. He knew some of Isaac's father's friends. Tells anecdotes of the descendants of the people described in the novel.
- Larra.** Artículos de costumbres, filosóficos, satíricos y literarios. Prólogo y edición de José Mallorquí Figuerola. Barcelona. 1944.
- Benítez Claros, R. Influencias de Quevedo en Larra. CL 1 (1947). 117-23.
- "Fígaro." Artículos completos. See ELII 12 (1945). 33.
Rev. by A. Rumeau in BIH 49 (1947) 106-09
- Gómez de la Serna, Julio. Larra et la France. Résumé de la conférence donnée à l'Institut de Madrid . . . le 13 février 1947. Bulletin des bibliothèques de l'Institut français en Espagne. March, 1947. 6-7.
- Martí.** González, Manuel Pedro. José Martí, epistológrafo. RI 13 (1947). 23-37.
The publication of the collection of Martí's letters to Manuel Mercado opens up a rich source of information on some hitherto obscure episodes in the poet's life. The style and tenor of the letters is that of Martí at his best. The correspondence bears witness to his crystalline sincerity, his patriotic fervor and moral integrity.
- Harrison Boyston, Jo Ann. José Martí y Oklahoma. Repertorio americano 43 (June 26, 1948). 373-75.
Martí wrote a description of the "land run" into Oklahoma three days after the territory was opened (April 25, 1889) for *La opinión pública* of Uruguay. His sources were articles in the New York newspapers. Martí improved upon his models.
- Ideario separatista. La Habana. Ministerio de Educación, 1947.
Contains a long introduction by Felix Lizaso
- Obras completas. Edición conmemorativa del cincuentenario de su muerte. Prólogo y síntesis biográfica por M. Isidro Méndez. 2 vols. La Habana. Editorial Lex, 1946.
Rev. by Calvert J. Winter in BA 22 (1948). 68-69.
A beautiful edition admirably cross-indexed.
- Schultz de Mantovani. See "Sarmiento."
- Navarro Villoslada.** Obras completas . . . con una semblanza preliminar por Juan Nep. Goy. Madrid. 1947.
- Pastor Díaz.** Leal Insúa, F. Pastor Díaz, príncipe del romanticismo. Lugo. 1943.
- Rivas.** Poemas cortos. Romances. Selección y notas biográficas por A. G. Bosch. Valencia. 1946.

Romero Larrañaga. Romero Larrañaga (1814-1872). Notas y selección de José Luis Varela. Acanto No. 9 (1947). 4 pages, unnumbered.

Contains three poems (1837, 1839, 1840)

Varela, José Luis. De la psique romántica o los grados de subjetividad en Romero Larrañaga. CL 1 (1947). 231-39.

Sarmiento. A Sarmiento anthology. Translated from the Spanish by Stuart Edgar Grummon; edited, with introduction and notes, by Allison Williams Bunkley. Princeton. Princeton Univ. Press.

The introduction describes Sarmiento as "the Romantic titan personified" Sarmiento's efforts to change the Spanish way of life in the Argentine are compared to Larra's desire for the "Europeanization" of Spain The translated selections are from *Recuerdos de infancia*, *Facundo*, and articles on education, politics, and life in the United States in 1847 and 1860

Schultz de Mantovani, Fryda. La infancia mágica y real de Sarmiento y José Martí. CA 7 (Sept.-Oct., 1948). 188-208.

A rhapsodical tribute of admiration to the two great Spanish Americans with some references to Martí's *Edad de Oro*, *Ismaelillo* and *Versos sencillos* and to Sarmiento's *Recuerdos de provincia* and *Vida de Domínguito*.

Sierra. Cantón, Wilberto L. Justo Sierra, héroe blanco de México. CA 7 (May-June, 1948). 194-204.

Discusses incidentally the Romantic novels of Justo Sierra O'Reilly (father) and the numerous short-lived periodicals which he founded Stresses the Romantic traits of the son during his early years.

Cuentos románticos. México. 1946.

Rev. by Aubrey F. G. Bell in BA 21 (1947) 441.

Ferrer, Gabriel. Justo Sierra. México. Xóchitla, 1947.

Rev. by Rubén M. Landa in BA 22 (1948) 258.

The reviewer speaks of the special interest of the chapter on "La bohemia del 70" and Altamirano's interest in the young Sierra.

Warner, Ralph E. Justo Sierra's *El ángel del porvenir*. HR 16 (1948). 242-44.

Some fragments of a Romantic historical novel written by Sierra at the beginning of his career have just come to light

Zorrilla. Centenario del estreno del "Tenorio," por F. Jiménez-Placer, Francisco Cervera y Antonio Sierra Corella. Madrid. 1947(?).

Discusses the plastic qualities of the play, Zorrilla's relations with managers and publishers, box-office receipts from *Don Juan Tenorio*; with bibliography.

Fernández, L. Zorrilla y el Real Seminario de Nobles, 1827-1833.

Con un apéndice de 65 cartas íntimas e inéditas del poeta. Prólogo de N. Alonso Cortés. Valladolid. 1945.

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van Stockum, Th. C. Een vergeten duits Don Juan-Drama. *Neuphilologus* 20 (1945). 21-27.

On Karl von Martini's *Dom Juan oder der steinerne Gast mit Kaspar's Lustbarkeit* Mention is made of Zorrilla's *Don Juan Tenorio*

PORTUGUESE

(By Gerald Moser)

1. GENERAL

Cavalheiro, Edgard. *Romantismo*. Correio da Manhã, Rio, Oct. 19, Oct. 26, and Nov. 2, 1947.

Series of three articles recapitulating the origins and definitions of Romanticism and Romantic: "1. O adjetivo bem fadado, 2. Os pie-românticos; 3. Que é romantismo?"

Cidade, Hernâni. *Lições de cultura e literatura portuguesas*, Vol. 2: Da reacção contra o formalismo seicentista ao advento do Romantismo, contendo o "Ensaio sobre a crise mental do século XVIII" novamente refundido e ampliado. Coimbra. Gama, Sebastião da. *Apontamentos sobre a poesia social no século XIX*. "Licenciatura" dissertation. Lisbon Univ., 1947.

Typewritten dissertation submitted by a young critic well-known in Portugal. The Romantic origin of social poetry is stressed.

Miguel Pereira, Lúcia. *Bovarismo e romance*. Correio da Manhã, Rio, May 30.

The consequences of the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro are characterized as "Bovarism": "Dressing, eating, being housed and thinking in the European way, it did not take Brazilians long before they had illusions about themselves and believed that they were an entirely Mediterranean people, transplanted to America."

Putnam, Samuel. *Marvelous journey. A survey of four centuries of Brazilian writing*. New York. Knopf.

Sketchy survey, prepared for literature-loving intellectuals but, with the exception of the abundant and up-to-date bibliographical notes, not a work for the specialist. Outgrowth of a stay in Brazil during 1946 and of a series of lectures in which the literatures of Brazil and the United States were compared. The third part, in name as well as in size, tells of the literature of "The Romantic liberation," defined as the period from 1825 to 1870. The regionalist literature of the latter half of the XIXth century is included in the period. Putnam seems too dependent in his judgments on Brazilian and Portuguese authorities. Here and there he makes illuminating cross-references to history, to modern Brazilian life, and to North American life and literature; e. g. when he compares poems by Alvares de Azevedo and Poe. Among the Brazilian Romanticists, only Alencar and Castro Alves are adequately treated. Some, such as Rabelo and Junqueira Freire, are dismissed

with a few words. A few poems are translated into English, among them Gonçalves Dias' "Song of exile" and Castro Alves' "The seer."

2. STUDIES OF AUTHORS

a) *Peninsular*

Almeida Garrett. Almeida Pavão Júnior, José de. Sub tegmine fagi. Ensaios. Ponta Delgada. 1947.

Rev. by J. do Prado Coelho in *Revista da Faculdade de Letras*, Lisbon, 13 (1947). Series 2. No. 2. 106-07.

These essays by a "professor de liceu" include one on Greek fatalism as reflected by António Ferreira and Almeida Garrett, one on Júlio Dinis' feeling for reality, and one on Eça de Queiroz' Romantic lack of discipline throughout his literary evolution.

Campos Ferreira Lima, H. de. A filha de Almeida Garrett. Coimbra. 1946.

Reprint from *Biblos* 22 (1946).

Costa Pimpão, A. J. da. O romantismo das "Viagens" de Almeida Garrett. Lisbon. 1947.

Reprint from *Ocidente* 31 (1947).

Ferreira, Ernesto. Os três patriarcas do romantismo nos Açores. Ponta Delgada. 1947.

Saraiva, António José. Para a história da cultura em Portugal. Lisbon. 1946.

An essay on Almeida Garrett is included.

Simões Correia, António. Ensaio de uma análise ao romanceiro de Garrett, I. Gil Vicente (Guimarães) 23. Nos. 9 and 10 (Sept. and Oct., 1947).

Castelo Branco, Camilo. Cabral, António. Homens e episódios inolvidáveis. Cartas inéditas de Camilo. O berço de Eça. Páginas de memórias políticas. Lisbon. 1947.

Régio, José. Camilo. Lisbon.

Long essay in J. G. Simões, ed., *Perspectiva da literatura portuguesa*.

Reis Ribeiro, António dos. O padre Casimiro e Camilo. Lisbon.

Sousa Costa. Os três cireneus da via dolorosa de Camilo. O juiz, o advogado e o médico. Considerações à margem do processo crime por adultério contra Dona Ana A. Plácido e Camilo Castelo Branco. Coimbra. 1946.

Lecture.

Castilho, António Feliciano de. Ferreira, Ernesto. See "Almeida Garrett."

Dinis, Júlio. Almeida Pavão Júnior, José de. See "Almeida Garrett."

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Moniz, Egas. Júlio Dinis e a sua obra, com inéditos do romancista e uma carta-prefácio de Ricardo Jorge. Oporto. Civilização. Sixth, revised edition

Herculano, Alexandre. Ferreira, Ernesto. See "Almeida Garrett."

b) *Brazilian*

Note In addition to the celebrations of the centenary of Castro Alves' birth, mentioned in last year's bibliography, the Brazilian Academy of Letters held a commemorative session on May 13, 1947, during which speeches were read by Pedro Calmon, Clementino Fraga ("A vocação liberal do poeta"), and Manuel Bandeira ("Um poema de Castro Alves"). In Bahia, the poet's native city, bids for the construction of a state-supported theatre, to be known as "Teatro Castro Alves," were solicited in August, 1948

This year the federal government of Brazil planned to celebrate the centenary of the death of Martins Pena with a special edition of the playwright's works and the production of a documentary film.

Alencar, José de. Brito Broca. Documentação carioca. Província de São Pedro 9 (June, 1947). 110-13.

Brief survey of fiction which catches the spirit of Rio de Janeiro. Macedo's, Almeida's and Alencar's contributions are defined

Fusco, Rosário. Alencar, a mulher e o amor. Ensaio.

Lima Barbosa, Mário de. Lamartine e o Brasil. Jornal do Commercio (Rio) April 11, p. 5.

Tells of the kind reception accorded Lamartine's "Cours familier de littérature" in Brazil. Moved by the Frenchman's financial straits, Alencar asked his countrymen for subscriptions. Emperor Pedro II also came to Lamartine's rescue. Three of Lamartine's letters are transcribed. Of these, two were written to Alencar in 1856, the third to the Emperor in 1861.

Linhares, Mário. História literária do Ceará. História da literatura brasileira, Vol. 1. Rio. Rodrigues & Cia.

A chapter is dedicated to Alencar.

Almeida, Manuel Antônio de. Brito Broca. See "Alencar, José de."

Serpa, Phocion. Manuel Antônio de Almeida. RI 9. No. 18 (May, 1945). 325-56.

Álvares de Azevedo, Manuel Antônio. Santamarina, Orvácio. Álvares de Azevedo, o grande romântico. Cultura política 5, No. 48 (Jan, 1945). 158-67.

Biographical information.

Castro Alves, Antônio de. Amado, Jorge. O amor de Castro Alves. Historia de um poeta e sua amante, em um prólogo, três atos e um epílogo. Rio. 1947.

Haddad, Jamil Almansur. Castro Alves, um poeta contra o seu tempo. Província de São Pedro 9 (June, 1947). 50-54.

Haddad argues that contrary to Jorge Amado's assertions Castro Alves' ideas went against contemporary public opinion and taste, which preferred the poetry of Moniz Barreto, Tobias Barreto, Alvares de Azevedo, Varela and the younger José Bonifácio de Andrada. He concludes that Castro Alves contributed less to the victory of the abolitionists than is now commonly thought. It is true that the abolitionist movement became strong in Brazil only after the death of Castro Alves. Jorge Amado's way of thinking was recently echoed by Samuel Putnam "In Brazil Romanticism, in the poems of Castro Alves, was to deal a telling blow to slavery and hasten the coming of abolition." (*Marvelous journey*, p. 104)

Lopes Rodrigues. Castro Alves. 3 vols. Rio. 1947. See ELH 15 (1948). 57.

Rev. in *Jornal do Commercio* (Rio) May 13, p. 2, by Paulo da Silveira: "No one has studied better so far the phenomenon of Castro Alves in the vast and engaging tropical scenario of the Brazilian monarchy." The author is a psychiatrist

Pires, Homero, ed. Poesias escolhidas. Rio. 1947.

Government-sponsored publication on the occasion of the centenary.

Valle, Quintino do. Castro Alves e o verso alexandrino. *Correio da Manhã* (Rio) Oct. 12, 1947.

Valle points out that Castro Alves learnt late how to compose alexandrines, as the classic type of this verse form was not used much in Brazil at the time. It had been first introduced by José Alexandre Teixeira de Melo in "Sombras e sonhos" (1858), and later Pedro Luís Pereira de Sousa used it in his bellicose poem "Terribilis Dea" Castro Alves replied to the latter in 1871, the year of his death, with a pacifist poem, "Deusa incruenta."

Gonçalves Dias, Antônio. Various authors. Gonçalves Dias. Conferências realizadas na Academia Brasileira. Rio. Rodrigues & Cia.

Gonçalves de Magalhães, Domingos José. Cavalheiro, Edgard. O pai do romantismo brasileiro. *Correio da Manhã* (Rio) Nov. 23 and 30, 1947.

"Most historians confer the honor of having fathered Romanticism in Brazil to Domingos Gonçalves de Magalhães, the author of 'Suspiros poéticos e saudades.' Silvio Romero replies that he considers Maciel Monteiro, Baron of Itamaracá (1804-67), the true precursor. Afrânio Peixoto, however, gives this title to José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, the patriarch of Independence. Tristão de Athayde, in turn, maintains that the father of our Romanticism was Ferdinand Denis. If we are not mistaken, the Frenchman Georges Raeder prepares a dissertation in which he defends the same point of view." In the following paragraphs, the various arguments are gone over one by one and impugned in favor of the primacy of Gonçalves de Magalhães

Macedo, José de. Brito Broca. See "Alencar, José de."

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Pôrto Alegre. Olinto Sanmartim. Mensagem. Temas literários. Porto Alegre. 1947.

Rev in *Jornal do Commercio* (Rio) Nov 9, 1947 One of these essays on writers from Rio Grande do Sul is dedicated to Manuel de Araujo Pôrto Alegre, the author of "A voz da natureza" (1835)

Rabelo, Laurindo José da Silva. Peixoto, Afrânio. Livro de horas. Rio. Agir, 1947.

Rev in *Jornal do Commercio* (Rio) Oct 26, 1947.

Among the posthumously collected articles inspired by Peixoto's native Bahia is one about Laurindo Rabelo

Taunay, Alfredo d'Escagnolle. Memórias do Visconde de Taunay. Com prefácio dos Sres. Afonso de E. Taunay e Raul Taunay. São Paulo. Instituto Progresso.

Rev. *Jornal do Commercio* (Rio) Aug 1, p 5

Unpublished until now by the will of the author The memoirs were written by Taunay from 1890 till 1893 They never received the final polish Among the subjects touched upon are the war with Paraguay, the abolition of slavery and the proclamation of the republic, as well as childhood memories and literary pursuits One passage shows the great pride Taunay took in the authorship of "Inocência" "How I crave for 'Inocência,' the destiny of 'Paul et Virginie'! This is my posthumous aspiration."

BARNABY RICH AND KING JAMES

By T. M. CRANFILL

In "The Conclusion" to *Riche His Farewell to Militarie Profession* (1581, 1583, 1594, and 1606), Barnaby Rich relates a story that seems sprightly and engaging indeed to the modern reader of Elizabethan fiction who has found himself exhausted by the stylistic ornaments of *A Petite Pallace of Pettie His Pleasure* and *Euphues* or who has gone hopelessly astray in the mazy interminabilities of the *Aethiopica* and the *Arcadia*. Yet to certain of Rich's contemporaries the tale was displeasing, not to say offensive, for reasons to which a brief summary of it may provide a clue.

A devil of hell named Balthaser marries an Englishwoman, Mildred, settles down to what he hopes will be a life of wedded bliss, and, for his part, makes a very good husband indeed. Mildred, however, crazed by longing to achieve the new look, nags him to keep her in clothes of the latest style. For a time his generosity, patience, and forbearance are exemplary; but eventually, driven to complete distraction by the continual shift in ladies' fashions and, consequently, by Mildred's whining, "lumping, and lowering," he deserts his wife.

Hoping to put oceans between himself and Mildred, he goes to Dover, but finding no passage available, he proceeds to Scotland, to the very court of the King in Edinburgh. There, "forgettyng all humanitie, whiche he had learned before in Englande, he began a freshe to plaie the devill, and so possessed the King of Scots himself."¹ Proclamations offering immense rewards to whoever can cure the King of his devil-induced "diseases" attract many, but all fail. Finally, Mildred's father, Persinus, who has been "compelled" by "some extremitie . . . to practyse phisicke" and has grown famous as a doctor, is summoned for consultation. He modestly declines to take the case, resists the King's offer of huge sums, and agrees to undertake the cure only when the King threatens to have him executed if he persists in his refusal.

When Persinus comes to observe the King "in his fitte," "to see the maner how it helde hym," Balthaser cheerily hails his father-in-law. But to the relieved Persinus' plea, "good sonne, departe the Kyng of Scots; for he hath threatned me for thy cause, to take awaie my life," the devil callously replies, "even so I would have

¹ All quotations of the first edition of the *Farewell* are from J. P. Collier's reprint, Shakespeare Society (London, 1846), pp. 222-224.

betwixt the two crowns.”³ In the spring of 1595 Robert Bowes, the English ambassador to Scotland, doubtless worn out with his tempestuous post, returned to England to confer and rest. He left in Edinburgh his servant George Nicolson to perform the duties of a resident agent and to send what news there was. News of glowing interest to students of Rich soon came. On June 18, 1595, the day before the twenty-ninth birthday of James, now a vain peacock of a man, Nicolson sent from dour Edinburgh a dour message:

In the conclusion of a booke in England called Rich his farewell printed by V. S. for Tho. Adams at the signe of the white lyon in Paules Churchyard 1594 such matter is noted as the *King* is not well pleased thereat; so as one grief comes in thend of another, it wold please the *King* some thinck that some order were taken therewith. The *King* saies litle but thinkes more.⁴

“The *King* saies litle but thinkes more.” Sinister, that! Trembling at the *lèse majesté* even at this date, let us now invade James’ psyche in an effort to discover what he was *likely* to think. Let us ignore such sly, invidious passages as Rich’s “forgettyng [in Edinburgh] all humanitie, which he had learned before in Englande, he began a freshe to plaie the devill,” and “Naie, then, farewell, Scotland; for I had rather goe to hell,” though these would hardly have provided any Scotchman, let alone the King, with food for *sweet* thought. Nor need we linger over the obvious indignity involved simply in including the King in the *dramatis personae* of such a rowdy tale, and, to cap it all, in assigning him the piddling minor role of a dupe. Instead, let us proceed directly to the actual demonic possession of the King and to an examination of a few passages from that cheerless work the *Dæmonologie* of 1597, by the eminent authority on such matters, King James himself. His purpose in writing the book, he declares, is “to preasse thereby, so farre as I can, to resolute the doubting harts of many . . . that . . . assaultes of Sathan are most certainly practized [and] . . . that such diuelish artes haue bene and are.”⁵ However merry Rich’s

³ See W. B. Devereux, *Lives and Letters of the Devereux, Earls of Essex* (London, 1853), I, 310, and CSPS, 1589-1603, p. 648.

⁴ Quoted in *Poems of Alexander Montgomerie*, ed. George Stevenson, Scottish Text Society (Edinburgh, 1910), p. lxiii, n.

⁵ *Dæmonologie*, ed. G. B. Harrison (London, 1924), pp. xi, xii. All subsequent references to James’s work are to this edition.

tale may seem to us, it was no laughing matter to this author. No chapter in his book is more earnestly written than that entitled "The description of the Dæmoniackes & possessed"; but long before he reaches it he warms to his work, growing repetitious and almost incoherent as he warms.

[Demons] can makes folkes to becom phrenticque or Maniacque, which likewise is very possible to their master to do. . . . And likewise they can make some to be possessed with sprites, & so to becom verie Dæmoniacques: and this last sorte is verie possible likewise to the Deuill their Master to do, since he may easilie send his owne angells to trouble in what forme he pleases, any whom God wil permit him so to vse. . . . But will God permit these wicked instruments by the power of the Deuill their master, to trouble by anie of these meanes, anie that beleecues in him? . . . No doubt, for there are three kinde of folkes whom God will permit so to be tempted or troubled; the wicked for their horrible sinnes, to punish them in like measure; The godlie that are sleeping in anie great sinnes or infirmities and weakenesse in faith, to waken them vp the faster by such an vncouth forme and euen some of the best, that their patience may be tryed before the world, as IOBS was. (p. 47)

To which of the three categories, one wonders, did the patient in Rich's story belong? But James proceeds: "there is no kinde of persones so subject to receiue harm of them [demons], as these that are of infirme and weake faith (which is the best buckler against such inuasionen:)." (p. 49)

These grim utterances will perhaps serve to show why James, upon reading Rich's tale, may have taken a horror-induced chill as well as umbrage. The rigor of anger and terror that perhaps seized him as he read might have been less severe had he not witnessed the appalling behavior of a gentleman who was the victim of "diuelish practises." The scene is described in *Newes from Scotland* (1591):

the said Gentleman . . . once in xxiiij. howres . . . fell into a lunacie and madnes . . . and being in his Maiesties Chamber, suddenly he gaue a great scritch and fell into a madnes, sometime bending himselfe, and sometime capring so directly vp, that his head did touch the seeling of the Chamber, to the great admiration of his Maicstie and others then present.⁹

For a man whose opinions had been reinforced, if not formed, by

⁹ *Newes from Scotland*, ed. G. B. Harrison (London, 1924), pp. 20 f.

such gruesome spectacles, merely to say little and think more seems restrained indeed.

"Some thinck" it "wold please the *King*," Nicolson writes, "that some order were taken" regarding Rich's story. Whether any was and the King accordingly pleased unfortunately cannot now be determined. Bowes' reply to Nicolson's letter has not survived. That indefatigable letter-writer Lord Burghley fails to give any information about the matter. The *Stationers' Register* is mute on the subject. And most frustrating of all is the loss of the Acts of the Privy Council for the months in 1595 during which the order, if any, would almost certainly have been issued. The last gathering with its offending story is absent from the only known copy of the edition of 1594, now in the Folger Shakespeare Library. But the mere fact that it is missing, alas, proves nothing. In the copy for all to read remains another dangerous passage to which we shall devote ourselves presently. If an order to suppress a popular book published in 1594 came thundering down upon the censors or the Stationers' Company or Adams, the publisher, *after* June 18, 1595, much of the damage the book could supposedly wreak had of course already been wrought.

If speculation is in order, it should be based on what is known of the English authorities' attitude in such matters. James's desire of November 12, 1596, "that Edward Spenser . . . be dewly tried & punished" for writing the Duessa episode, Book V, Canto IX, of the *Fairie Queene* is well documented, but what action it may have set in motion has never transpired.⁷ On April 15, 1598, the tireless Nicolson again transmits a complaint: "It is regrated to me . . . that the Comedians of London should in their play scorn the K[ing] & people of this lande & wished that it may be spedely amended and staied";⁸ but neither the play nor its possible fate at the hands of English officials has come to light. That Nicolson's efforts were not always unavailing may be proved by the cryptic memorandum dated March, 1598, sent to him from the Queen and asserting pontifically, "her Majesty will have that part left out which

⁷ Quoted by F. I. Carpenter, *A Reference Guide to Edmund Spenser* (Chicago, 1923), pp. 41 f.

⁸ Quoted by Sir Sidney Lee, "Topical Side of the Elizabethan Drama," *Transactions of the New Shakespeare Society, 1887-92, Part I* (1887), p. 8.

mentions the burning of the body of the King's mother [Mary Stuart]."⁹ At almost precisely the same time Rich's story was inspiring some comment and more thought in Scotland one William Leonard was in trouble at home for merely verbal indiscretions. Accused of stating that the King of Scotland was impotent (almost worse than being demonically possessed!), that Queen Anna was solacing herself with Lord Bothwell while James winked at the affair through his fingers, and that the late Mary Stuart had been a whore, Leonard finally confessed on August 14, 1595:

I was accused . . . of having spoken slanderous words to the dishonour of the King and Queen of Scotland, as also of his mother; upon examination of witnesses, it could not be verified, and was aggravated by malice; but inasmuch as I confessed to having uttered somewhat to the effect alleged, I crave pardon of Her Majesty and of the said King, and protest my sorrow for the same.

In a charming postscript to the confession Sir Robert Cecil describes the disposition of the case:

We whose names are hereunder written have strictly examined all circumstances of this case, and do find the man to have spoken foolishly of the State of Scotland, but far from any malicious, slanderous humour, for which (if it could have been so proved), he should dearly have paid for it, according to Her Majesty's absolute direction given to us; but being not proved so, he hath been only committed ["only committed"!—sentenced to prison, I suppose] for his busiosity in matters beyond his calling, a fault very usual in this age.¹⁰

Who can be sure that Nemesis did not overtake Rich and punish him for *his* "busiosity"!

"The *King* saies little but thinkes more." After March, 1603, that he was in a position to think little, say more, and do and do and do must have been clear to everybody in England. It was painfully clear to Ben Jonson and George Chapman, to cite only two celebrated examples. For mild insults to indigent Scotchmen in *Eastward Ho* (1605) they were, as one authority wittily says, "given an opportunity for cool reflection on their jests by a spell of imprisonment."¹¹ With their fate in 1605

⁹ *CSPS, 1580-1603*, p. 748

¹⁰ *CSP, Dom. Ser., 1595-1597*, p. 94.

¹¹ For details of their punishment, in which James interested himself personally,

fresh in his mind, the collator approaches the 1606 edition of Rich's *Farewell* with amused anticipation and turns eagerly to the tale of the devil and the King of Scotland. He is not disappointed with what he finds there. Worn out with his wife's nagging, the devil

not onely auoided himselfe from her presence, but also deuised with speede to flie the Countrey, and comming to *Douer*, thinking to crosse the Seas, finding shipping ready, he toke his course and gat him to *Rome*, neuer staiyng till hee came to *Constantinople*, where the *Turke* kept his Court, and nowe forgetting all humanitie which he had learned before in *England*, he began a fresh to play the deull, and so possessed the *Turke* himselfe. (sig. Y3^v)

Throughout the rest of the story revision of the most careful and consistent kind is evident. The Turk and Constantinople everywhere replace the King of Scotland and Edinburgh.

Three men would presumably have been most eager to see that such replacements were effected, the publisher, the censor, and the author. Since the edition of 1606 was the fourth, it seems unlikely that it should have required another perusal by the censor; and the identity and the fate of the censor who dealt with the first edition of 1581, twenty-five years earlier, are too uncertain to allow much chance of his having interested himself in the matter. Such changes as "depart our Grandseigniour the Turke" from "departe the Kyng of Scots" and, indeed, the whole revision in general would seem to lie beyond the powers or the duties of corrector, printer, or publisher. Only the author is left for serious consideration, and all the evidence points to him. What more natural choice for Rich to make than Constantinople and the Turk? The fourth tale in his *Farewell* contains a reference to the Turk and his seraglio. The hero of the first has won his fame defeating Turks and refurbishes his unjustly tarnished reputation by conquering them anew. The hero of the second spends a year fighting the Turk, and most of the action occurs in Constantinople. The "greate Turke" himself is a principal character in the seventh tale, much of which revolves around his successful attempt to reduce a fortified Christian city and his conversion to Christianity. Incidentally,

see Percy Simpson, *Proof-Reading in the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Centuries* (London, 1935), pp. 22 f., and Ben Jonson, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson (Oxford, 1925), I, 190-200; IV, 498 f.

this lost sheep in Rich's source, a story by Belleforest, is Hadding, the notorious Scandinavian-Norman berserker; but in his place Rich prefers, significantly, the Turk, though in other details he is usually content to follow Belleforest. And in Rich's preface, where he is lambasting the enemies of England, he sandwiches the Turk in a place of signal honor between two other archfiends, the Pope and the devil. Here at last, in the eyes of a man who clearly had Turks on the brain, was a safe candidate for possession by the devil. Let the book begin and end with a scourging of the accursed Moslem!

Cheek by jowl with the Pope, the Turk, and the devil in the prefatory scourging stood certain others whose presence necessitated the only other revision in 1606 which deserves attention here. What friendship, Rich inquires in the editions of 1581, 1583, and 1594, may we English expect from our enemies

if their oportunitie would serve them to be revenged of the dispite, which long agoe thei had conceived against us? First, the Freuche hath ever been our enemies by nature; the Scottes by custome, the Spanyardes for religion; the Duché, although we have stooode them in greate steade, and holpe them at many a pinche, yet I could buye as much freendshipp as thei doe all owe us for a barrell of Englishe beere. If we should goe any further, then wee come to the Pope, the Turke, and the devill, and what frendship thei beare us, I thinke every one can imagine. (pp. 13 f.)

In 1606 the four words "the Scottes by custome" vanish. It would be interesting to know whether their disappearance and the other discreet revisions ever came to James's attention and, if so, whether he was then willing to forgive and forget the grave insults to himself and his nation in Rich's unrevised version.

Any Jacobean writer might have been understandably eager to encourage the King in his forgetfulness of old scores, but Rich's efforts, even before the revisions of 1606, seem almost hysterical. On September 3, 1604, the author who had been so careless of the royal dignity while it was in Edinburgh suddenly discovered an exceedingly tender conscience which troubled him when that dignity, now in London, was flouted. In a long report to Lord Cecil he describes how in the presence of his wife, his sister-in-law, other relatives, friends, and himself a certain Captain Cosnoll spoke irreverently of the new book of statutes, singling out those against sorcerers and bigamists. Worse, he

even went so far as to comment on the King's prowess as a hunter—a hunter of does, a sport which in Cosnoll's opinion James had not long to enjoy: "he grows weak in the back, his date is almost out! . . . hys back is weak, & he is going on his last half yeare."¹² Shades of poor, indiscreet William Leonard with his "busiosity" and his aspersions on James's manhood! To Cosnoll's insults Mistress Rich, righteously indignant, loftily replied

that she had never yet sene the king, but she had heard all the good [about him] . . . & that, she had read in many books that he had ever been a godly and great [prince] & therefore she would both speak wel of him & pray for him as long as she lived. . . . God bless the king said my wife & I hope in God he shall live amongst us yet thes forty years. (pp. 94, 96)

No detail of this episode, which recalls *opera buffa* at its most hilarious, deserves to be scanted. But one must be content to report only that at the trial which Rich's informing precipitated Captain Cosnoll appears to have got the better of Captain Rich. In his frustration Rich addresses to Cecil a bitter lament that would do Iago credit:

Yf all this will not serve to convyct a traitor, god save the king, & send him long to raign over us, for men shoull show more wit to pray for him in secret, then openly to detect any treason conspyred against him. (p. 98)

Rich's labors in behalf of James's honor were not altogether lost, one hopes, for "Y^r ho^r," Rich reminds Cecil,

as you say wil inform the king what hath been done & what . . . hath [been] said & confest, we are likewise with all humblenes to besech you to inform the king what we have already said & what we do further protest. (p. 99)

How James received this information from Cecil is not recorded, but plenty of evidence shows that he was not allowed to forget how devoted a subject Captain Rich could be. In 1604, the year of the Cosnoll case, Prince Henry, only ten at the time, may have been surprised to find both *The Fruits of Long Experiences* and *A Soldier's Wish for Briton's Welfare*

¹² See E M Hinton, *Ireland through Tudor Eyes* (Philadelphia, 1935), pp 95, 96. All quotations of the report and letters involved in the Rich-Cosnoll case are from this volume.

(*The Fruits* again, under a different title) dedicated to him by Rich. Notable in *The Fruits* is as affecting a tribute as one author ever paid another, from the author of the *Farewell* to the author of the *Dammonologic*:

England is made happy in him, whose name is already consecrated to immortality, whose *Magnificence* equalled with *Vertue*, is able with *Caesar*, with one hand to holde the Speare in the rest, and with the other to hold the pen: whose Imperiall seat is no lesse renowned by *Mars*, then beautified by the *Muses*. (p. 61)

With *The Fruits* and *A Soldier's Wish* Rich apparently succeeded in at least getting his foot in the royal door, for in the epistle to *Faults, Faults, and Nothing Else but Faults* (1606), also dedicated to Henry, he says, "I haue . . . humble presumed of that gracious fauour, that hath already tied me with all dutie and zeale, to lay my hands vnder your Highnesse feete."

The blandishments had only begun. Reversing the strategy recommended in the old proverb "Salt the cow to get the calf," Rich dedicated yet another work, *A Catholick Conference*, to Prince Henry in 1612. When Henry died in November of that year, how especially grievous the loss of his prince and patron must have seemed to Rich we can only imagine. There were, however, other calves to be salted: in 1613 his muse, not yet exhausted or blinded by grief, dictated to him *Opinion Deified*, dedicated to Prince Charles (who had of course succeeded Henry as heir apparent), and *The Excellency of Good Women*, dedicated to Princess Elizabeth. Precisely when these attentions to the royal bairns began to tell on their sire no one can say, but on the title-page of the 1612 volume and on two subsequent title-pages appears gratifying news: the works are advertised as being by Barnaby Rich, "Gent. Seruant to the Kinges most excellent Maiestic."

A diligent, never-flagging servant he continued to be. On December 15, 1615, he presented to his sovereign *The Anothomy of Irelande*, a long confidential report in his own hand, cobbled up "for hys Ma^{ties} especyall seruyes." "I am Inioyned by oathe (beynge your Ma^{ties} sworne servant)" to prepare such reports, he reminds the King in the first paragraph.¹³ Nor was *The*

¹³ *The Anothomy of Irelande*, ed. E. M. Hinton, *PMLA*, LV (1940), p. 81.

Anothomy the first of his animadversions on Irish affairs to reach James's eyes. Defending *A New Description of Ireland* (1610), which sorely exasperated many Irish and Anglo-Irish readers, Rich may well have silenced the pained outcries by declaring

[Many condemn the book] that was licensed to the presse by authoritie, that the Kinges maiestie himselfe hath pleased to peruse, that our gracious yong Prince, vouchsafed the like, that was dedicated to the most honorable and worthy *Earll* the Lord high Treasurer of *England*, and to bee shorte, that was both seene and permitted by the most of the Lords of his maiesties most honorable counsaile.¹⁴

For all his labors Rich may have expected no further reward than to be allowed to continue dutifully serving his ruler, defending him from calumny and plying him and his children with advice on how to deal with Ireland, how to conduct military affairs, and how to recognize the faults rampant in a naughty world. Virtue is its own reward. But it *can* attract rewards of a material sort. Rich's virtue did. In 1611 £60 16s 8d from the King's revenues were paid Rich as his pension, which he had apparently been unable to collect since 1602.¹⁵ And, finally, on July 4, 1616, the year before he died, from Westminster came a warrant to pay to Barnaby Rich, the eldest captain of the kingdom, £100 "as a free gift."¹⁶ "The *King* saies litle but thinkes more." At last the thoughts Rich inspired in him must have been kindly and generous.

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¹⁴ *A True and a Kind Excuse* (1612), sigs. B4^r-C1.

¹⁵ *Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts*, V, 185.

¹⁶ *CSP, Dom. Ser., 1611-1618*, p. 378.

THE PLEASURES OF PITY

By A. O. ALDRIDGE

Most eighteenth-century theories concerning the pleasure we find in witnessing painful scenes, whether in dramatic representations or in real life, were based upon pity. George Campbell in summarizing the chief theories reduced them to five categories, that we enjoy the exercise of all the passions, that we recognize the fictitious nature of the representation in tragedy, that we appreciate the talent and skill of the artist, that pity is a form of self-love, and that pity is a natural affection.¹ In *ELII*,² Earl R. Wasserman has given a thorough treatment of the effects of literary tragedy.

The major problem concerning pity in the eighteenth century had to do with its source, whether it was a natural benevolent affection or merely a phase of self-love. The two theories are contrasted in *Spectator* 588 (1714) and *Adventurer* 110 (1753), pity being praised strongly in the first and disparaged in the second. The presentation of pity as a form of self-love is based on Lucretius' famous illustration of pleasure in pain, taken up by Hobbes and nearly all writers on the paradox. Hobbes wonders, "From what passion proceedeth it, that men take pleasure to behold from the shore the danger of them that are at sea in a tempest, or in a fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one another in the field?"³ Although complex, the passion is on the whole pleasurable, Hobbes concludes; otherwise people would not flock to such spectacles. Our feeling is made up of pity, a source of grief, and "novelty and remembrance of our own security present," two sources of delight. "But the delight is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends." Hobbes does not believe that pity in itself is pleasurable. In *Leviathan* he defines it as "grief for

¹ *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, bk. I, chap. 11

² 14 (1917) 293-307. For a brief history of theories of pleasure and pain see Sir William Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* (Boston, 1869), 1. 602-12. For an interesting discussion of some manifestations in the nineteenth century, see Mario Praz, *The Romantic Agony* (Oxford, 1933).

³ *Elements of Law* 1. 9, 19.

the calamity of another" which arises "from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself."⁴

Henry Grove in *Spectator* 588 condemns this hypothesis as the "assigning of an artificial cause of a natural passion" and argues that "children and persons most thoughtless about their own condition, and incapable of entering into the prospects of futurity, feel the most violent touches of compassion." Our impulse to relieve the sufferings of those in distress must be based on a nobler principle than vanity and self-love, because of the natural "conscience of approving oneself a benefactor to mankind." Our sense of satisfaction is far greater when we have acted without an interested design than when we have acted to satisfy the ends of self-love. Joseph Butler in a sermon on "Compassion" also appealed to the common consent of mankind that pity has the distress of another as its object and not one's self only.⁵

Mandeville, however, like Hobbes found no real pleasure in pity and wrote his "Essay on Charity and Charity Schools" against the point of view expounded by Grove. In an earlier essay he had argued that pity is not a virtue.⁶ Although the least harmful of the passions, it is, he maintained, a natural impulse which may produce evil as well as good and which consults neither public interest nor reason. There is no merit in a man's saving an innocent babe from falling into a fire, for the man acts only to save himself from the pain of witnessing the child's suffering. To see a baby devoured alive by a hungry pig would be a source of torture and pity, not only to a humanitarian, but to a highwayman or a murderer.⁷ Every human being would be strongly moved by the scene, but not one would have a right to feel virtuous.

We feel pity Mandeville asserts, only when the suffering object is immediately before our senses. When we see a criminal executed at short range, we are affected by the fears and agonies of his features, but if we see the execution from a distance or merely read about it, we feel no pity.⁸ People with strong

⁴ Part 1, Chap. 6, a definition derived from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 2 8

⁵ Robert Carmichael ed, *Fifteen Sermons* (London, 1856), pp. 81-95. See R. S. Crane, "Genealogy of the Man of Feeling," *ELH* 1 (1934) 205-230.

⁶ F. B. Kaye ed, *The Fable of the Bees* (Oxford, 1924), 1. 56.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1. 255.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1. 256.

imaginings may trump up by artificial means a weak semblance of compassion for absent suffering, but it is as faint as the pity we feel at tragedies, which results from intellectual indolence. "Our Judgment leaves part of the Mind uninform'd, and to indulge a lazy Wantonness suffers it to be led into an Error, which is necessary to have a Passion rais'd, the slight Strokes of which are not unpleasant to us when the Soul is in an idle unactive Humour."

Mandeville defines pity as a counterfeit or inferior imitation of charity, which in turn is the transferring of part of our own genuine self-love to other people not bound to us by ties of friendship or consanguinity. The terms charity or pity cannot be applied to kind acts done to our friends or relatives, for these are partly in our own interest and are an obligation imposed upon us by the opinion of society. This concept is taken over by Hawkesworth in *Adventurer* 110, who defines pity as that passion "which is excited by the sufferings of persons with whom we have no tender connexion, and with whose welfare the stronger passions have not united our felicity." The anguish of a mother whose infant is brutally killed before her eyes is not pity, but the sentiment of a total stranger who should "drop a silent tear at the relation" is. Since pity is absorbed by another passion whenever our love for the sufferer is strong, Hawkesworth argues, "pity is rather an evidence of the weakness than strength of . . . general philanthropy." Here Hawkesworth is contending against sentimentalism, the view prevalent throughout the previous half-century that benevolent impulses and intentions constituted virtue and were in themselves a sufficient passport to a favored place in heaven. In the spirit of Mandeville, he argues that if human benevolence were absolutely pure and social, artificial means would not be needed to arouse our sensibility, and we would deplore the distress of others without any mixture of delight. "That deceitful sorrow, in which pleasure is so well known to be predominant, that invention has been busied for ages in contriving tales of fictitious sufferance for no other end than to excite it, would be changed into honest commiseration, in which pain would be unmingled, and which, therefore, we should wish to lose." To prove his point, which is also Mandeville's, Hawkesworth gives an account of a gathering of people who listen with indifference

to the description of a sanguinary battle in which thousands of lives are lost, but who weep when the particular woes of one tragic victim of the conflict are described in detail. Every heart was afflicted with pity, but each regretted that the story came to an end and each would have listened to another with relish. "Such was the Benevolence of Pity!"

Mandeville and Hawkesworth held a pejorative view of pity because they opposed sentimentalism. Jonathan Edwards took a similar view because he supported Calvinistic theology. By nature Edwards was probably attracted to the benevolent schemes of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, but was led by the doctrine of original sin to distrust such doctrines as the benevolence of pity which exalted human nature. Hence he follows Mandeville in pointing out that men are moved only by extreme anguish at close range.⁹ They may be completely indifferent to suffering they do not see, to the death, or to the positive pleasure of others. Pity may even exist in company with malevolence, for men may pity the suffering of others whom they would like to see dead or whose prosperity they would hate. Edwards concludes that pity is a natural instinct designed to preserve mankind by prompting each individual to give relief and assistance in occasions of extreme calamity.

Edwards affirmed that pity may exist in company with malevolence to refute the view of the sentimentalists that it is founded upon benevolence. The anti-sentimentalists described by Hawkesworth in *Adventurer* 110 with whom he probably sympathized, went even further in attributing our delight in pity to unmixed selfishness and malignity. We are said "to pity no longer than we fancy ourselves to suffer, and to be pleased only by reflecting that our sufferings are not real; thus indulging a dream of distress, from which we can awake whenever we please, to exult in our security, and enjoy the comparison of the fiction with the truth."

Another disparaging view of pity is presented by Oliver Goldsmith, conditioned perhaps by his own somewhat impecunious career. Goldsmith looks upon pity only as a prerequisite condition for the solicitation of funds. Pity and friendship are incompatible passions, he maintains, the latter being composed of esteem and pleasure, the former of sorrow and contempt.

⁹ "A Dissertation concerning . . . Virtue," *Works* (London, 1840), 1. 136.

Though pity may often relieve, it "seldom affords distress more than transitory assistance" and "generally produces but beggarly effects." We may have powerful feelings of sympathy at the first symptom of distress, but "with each repetition, our sensibility decreases, 'till at last, our sensations lose all mixture of sorrow, and degenerate into downright contempt." When we give farthings from the motive of pity, we may give pounds from other motives, such as vanity, self-interest, or avarice.¹⁰

There are three ways of interpreting the selfish system, according to George Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. When a man feels sorrow or sheds tears from seeing another suffer in life or on the stage, he may do so because (1) he conceives that the same calamity may come to him in the future, (2) he conceives himself to be the very person suffering at the very instant his pity is raised, (3) he imagines that he personally is suffering the distress he sees.¹¹ One man seeing Garrick as Lear would say, I know that Garrick is only acting, but I am aroused with the thought that I may someday be in Lear's position; another, I forgot the actor and thought I was watching Lear himself; and the third, I imagine I am personally suffering everything endured on the stage by the actor. Those belonging to the third group who saw a man perishing from hunger would not give him any food in their possession but would immediately devour it themselves. The only way of eluding this objection is to affirm that under the illusion aroused by pity, the man loses all consciousness of identity and fancies that the starving man before him is actually himself. But this hardly deserves serious consideration, Campbell affirms, for such fictions take place only in madness. Campbell finally exposes the system of self-love as a specious hypothesis by showing how a parallel system could be maintained to prove that all men are motivated by self-hate. One could say that the miser denies himself the necessities of life, the sensualist squanders every-

¹⁰ Essay 5, *Miscellaneous Works* (Perth, 1791), I, 86.

¹¹ Book 1, Chapter 11. The last two theories resemble Adam Smith's view of sympathy, which is usually considered as part of the benevolent scheme. "By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him." *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Philadelphia, 1817), Chapter 1.

thing in dissipation, the Fame-seeker gives up comfort and ease for an empty name—all out of a principle of self-hate.

The opposite system of benevolence is usually attributed to Shaftesbury and his followers, but it appears in various writers from Addison to Blair. Addison terms love a most delightful passion and defines pity as love softened by sorrow.¹² Blair defines pity as an affection or instinct which includes benevolence and friendship and partakes of their agreeable and pleasing nature.¹³ We must turn to Hutcheson, however, for a detailed treatment of the esthetics of pity. Hutcheson maintains that every human being is made uneasy by any grievous misery he sees another involved in, and that compassion makes him wish to give relief without imagining that he is thereby serving his own private good.¹⁴ When reflection tells us that our compassion will not aid in relieving misery, self-love tells us to retire from the scene, but when this reflection is missing, we hurry to see objects of compassion. It is this principle which leads us to attend executions and tragedies, the latter furnishing the additional appeal of the “moral beauty of the characters and actions.” The moral appeal existed also in gladiatorial combats, for the combatants revealed vivid instances of courage and the contempt of death. With Hutcheson then, compassion is a natural instinct closely associated with the attraction of moral beauty.

Even Mandeville had granted that pity is a natural instinct, but two other famous literary figures, Lord Bolingbroke and Samuel Johnson, insisted that it is not. The latter in a famous passage in Boswell’s *Life* declares: “Children are always cruel. Savages are always cruel. Pity is acquired and improved by the cultivation of reason.” Johnson insists that a desire to effect relief is essential to pity and states that we may have uneasy sensations from seeing a creature in distress without wishing to relieve him; for example, we may feel uneasiness when horses are whipped, but, being in a hurry, not wish the whipping to stop.¹⁵

¹² *Spectator* 397.

¹³ *Rhetoric* (London, 1793), 3. 314-15.

¹⁴ *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (London, 1753), pp 243 ff.

¹⁵ *Wed*, July 20, 1763.

Johnson's statement appears in a widely-read section of a famous book, but Bolingbroke's is all but unknown. He wrote his rare *Reflections concerning Innate Moral Principles* primarily to show that compassion is not an innate principle.¹⁶ The mere doubt we feel, Bolingbroke declares, is sufficient to prove that compassion is not innate, for, if the proposition is true, it should be as evident as the proposition that all men love pleasure and hate pain. Like the love of children for their parents, compassion is thought to be innate only because we do not remember its birth, but actually both spring from habit and reason. If compassion were innate, it would be universal, but whole nations are insensible to it even when it is strengthened by parental affection. Several American tribes castrate and fatten their children in order to eat them, the Romans eagerly attended gladiatorial contests, and contemporary Europeans delight in the carnage of war. Bolingbroke's conclusion is that reason and education make use of self-love to reveal to us the amiableness of virtue and the horrid nature of vice. Benevolence and gratitude become habitual, and aversion to pain is extended to compassion for the sufferings of others. But "he who relieves the Wretch, whom he doth not know, is governed by the same general and innate Principle of Action [self-love], with him who kills and eats his Son."

Next to Hutcheson, perhaps the most determined defender of the instinctive basis of pity was Lord Kames. This concept was so important to him that he could not accept Adam Smith's theory that moral sentiments are based on sympathy or imagining what we would feel in a similar situation. Kames affirmed against Smith's theory that imagination does not necessarily arouse sympathy and that dull and illiterate people who have little or no imagination yet display sympathy, a fact showing clearly "that sympathy must proceed from some natural

¹⁶ The work which appeared in London in 1752 was written originally in French. The original text and the English translation appear on opposite pages. It was answered by Robert Clayton in *Some Thoughts on Self-Love . . . occasioned by reading Mr. Hume's works, and the short treatise, written in French by Lord Bolingbroke, on compassion* (Dublin, 1753). Clayton agrees with Bolingbroke that self-love is the basis of conduct, but opposes Bolingbroke's view that reason is an element in compassion. He also maintains that our opinions of pleasure and pain, beauty and harmony, are arbitrary.

principle inherent in all human beings, the young as well as the old."¹⁷

The contrary points of view were surveyed at the end of the century by Samuel Parr in his *A Spital Sermon* (London, 1801).¹⁸ He quotes first Sherlock's opinion that compassion is attended with a pain and uneasiness to ourselves which can be allayed only by relieving the sufferer and hence that relieving distress complies with the cravings of nature. This notion may be interpreted to fit either the selfish or the benevolent scheme, but Parr is afraid that it will be used by advocates of the latter. He has similar misgivings about David Hartley's explanation of compassion on his associationalist scheme. According to Hartley, compassion is a complex of feelings based upon childhood experiences.¹⁹ The child learns that the pains of any one member of the household affect all the others; for example, he is laid under restraint during sickness. The signs of misery in another's countenance may also bring up memory of his own misery. Hence he wishes to relieve the suffering of another to prevent himself from experiencing adverse effects. Adults have other sources of compassion such as love for morally good characters and for objects of natural affection as well as the knowledge that compassion is widely praised. We are likely to have most pity for diseases and calamities we have felt ourselves or apprehend the danger of feeling and to pity our friends and relatives more than strangers, the latter being contrary to the notions of Mandeville and Hawkesworth.

Parr accepts Hartley's psychology and admits that the feeling of uneasiness remains after compassion is experienced, but adds that Hutcheson, on the other hand, is right in saying that compassion does not excite us immediately with a desire to remove our own pain. We desire to relieve the distress of another without imagining "that this relief is a private good to ourselves."²⁰ In confirmation, Parr quotes Burke's principle that "we have no small degree of *delight* in the real misfortunes and pains of others."²¹ The creator has given us this delight

¹⁷ *Essays on the Principles of Morality* (Edinburgh, 1779).

¹⁸ Pp 44-45.

¹⁹ *Observations on Man* (London, 1810), 1. 488.

²⁰ *Inquiry*, p. 240.

²¹ *Inquiry* . . . on the Sublime and Beautiful, Part 1, Sec. 14. *Delight* here seems

to keep us from avoiding scenes of misery and to prompt us to relieve ourselves by relieving those who suffer.

Parr admits that both pleasure and pain exist in compassion, but insists "that the agent intends directly neither to obtain that pleasure, nor to remove that pain, but to succour the distressed object." As a finishing touch, he quotes Akenside's lines written to refute the famous ones of Lucretius (*Suave mari magno . . .*), lines quoted in the eighteenth century almost as frequently as Lucretius'.

O deemest thou indeed,
No kind endearment here by nature giv'n
To mutual terror and compassion's tears?
(*P. of Im*, 2. 706-708)

In Parr's survey we see a connection between the dispute over selfish and benevolent impulses and the question whether pity has any elements of pleasure at all. The advocates of the selfish system seem to regard pity as entirely painful; whereas only the advocates of benevolent systems find pleasure in it. Hence the asserters of benevolent instincts could paradoxically be accused of malignity in finding pleasure in the suffering of other people.

Neither side had a really satisfying explanation of our enjoyment of distressing scenes. If pity is entirely painful, the accompanying thoughts which the disciples of Hobbes say we have—that we ourselves are secure from danger and that the same distress may come to us some day (considerations opposite in tendency)—can hardly provide a compensating pleasure. If pity is pleasurable, as the advocates of the benevolent system maintain, there should be some more convincing reason than the mere assertion that God has contrived things that way so that we shall be driven to aid our fellow creatures. Lord Kames, however, presents a more logical solution of the problem. He makes a distinction between agreeable and disagreeable objects and those which raise affection and aversion, and points out that many disagreeable or even painful objects may not raise aversion. Hence the feelings of grief and compassion are both painful, but do not raise aversion. To the contrary, "we cling

to be more than the mere elimination of pains, the definition which Burke gives in the first part of his essay.

to the object that raises our grief, and love to dwell upon it.”²² This explains spite-marriages and masochism. The young woman rejected in love, to rebuke the man who has rejected her and to augment her own distress, throws herself at the first man who will have her. The man who is grieving for a departed friend, rushes headlong toward every new occasion of grief. “Why should I be happy when my friend is no more, is the language of this passion.” In relations with other people, we dwell on objects of misery instead of shunning them, just as naturally as we indulge grief for our own misfortune. Even self-love does not lead us always to avoid pain and distress, for all of the social passions arising from sympathy are painful, but unaccompanied with aversion. We reflect with satisfaction upon the pain occasioned by the social principle “and are willing to submit to it upon all occasions with cheerfulness and heart-liking, just as much as if it were a real pleasure.”²³ We go to public executions out of curiosity, to prize-fights and gladiatorial shows to see examples of courage and bravery, and to tragedy to indulge our compassionate temper.

Burke’s more famous theory that we get a “real delight” from the misfortunes and pains of others is based on the same principle of sympathy, but is less logically expressed. Although Burke at the outset of his essay particularly defines delight as the merely relative pleasure which comes from the removal or moderation of pain, he seems to use delight in its more conventional sense in his discussion of sympathy. The effects of sympathy, defined in the manner of Adam Smith as “a sort of substitution by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected,” lead us, Burke maintains, to take delight in the misfortunes and pains of others, authentic or fictitious, through the kindred passions of terror and pity. “Terror is a passion which always produces delight when it does not press too closely; and pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection.”²⁴ Burke explains the effects of sympathy more clearly by giving its final cause. Our Creator has designed that all human beings should be united by the bond of sympathy, and he has strengthened that bond with a feeling of

²² *Op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 17.

²⁴ *Inquiry*, 1. xiv.

delight in circumstances where sympathy is most needed—in the distresses of others. The measure of delight we experience keeps us from avoiding the miseries of others; the pain we experience causes us to do everything in our power to relieve their suffering. All this occurs “antecedent to any reasoning, by an instinct that works us to its own purposes without our concurrence.”²⁵ The effects of sympathy in witnessing tragedy are exactly the same as in real life except that they are less powerful, but our pleasure is increased on the other hand by the pleasing perception of the imitation. Burke denies Fontenelle’s principle though that our pleasure comes from the realization that the suffering is a deceit, for the closer the representation approaches reality, he maintains, the greater becomes the pleasure. Burke rejects also the Aristotelian-Lucretian principle that pleasure comes from realizing that we are exempt from evil. Our immunity from danger is a necessary condition of pleasure, he says, but not a cause. In order for one person to kill another it is a necessary condition that both be alive, but it is a sophism to argue that their both being alive was the cause of the slaying. It is as much of a sophism to argue that immunity from danger, real or fictitious, is the cause of pleasure.

Burke’s theory may have had some influence upon Campbell, but the theories of Hartley and Kames were stronger. Pity, according to Campbell, is not a simple passion, but a group of passions united by association in which pleasant ones usually predominate.²⁶ One passion engenders another; “sympathy engages benevolence, and benevolence love,” the three emotions in pity. Campbell regards this as the only rational explanation of why mothers generally bestow their greatest love on the sickest child in the family even though it may be far from the

²⁵ Perhaps Wordsworth had this notion of sympathy in mind when he wrote in the preface to the *Lyrical Ballads*, “We have no sympathy but what is propagated by pleasure; I would not be misunderstood; but whenever we sympathize with pain, it will be found that the sympathy is produced and carried on by subtle combinations with pleasure.” By saying, “I would not be misunderstood,” Wordsworth is probably calling our attention to the paradoxical nature of his statement, demonstrating that he has recognized it himself, and asserting his determination to maintain it. Had he taken more pains to be understood, instead of not to be misunderstood, however, he would have explained which one of the many forms of the paradox of pleasure in pain he had in mind.

²⁶ *Loc. cit.*

loveliest in temper or other qualities. Distress diminishes faults, sets off beauty, and makes even enmity relent. Campbell maintains that the principal pleasure from pity arises from its own nature, not from any adventitious circumstances. Love sweetens commiseration or sympathetic sorrow, and commiseration gives a stability to those emotions which might otherwise cloy the mind. Benevolence in itself affords an agreeable occupation to the thoughts by engaging us to devise expedients by which to relieve distress. "Yet the whole movement of the combined affections is not converted into pleasure; for though the uneasiness of the melancholy passions be overpowered, it is not effaced by something stronger of an opposite kind." The combination of passions is not like the blending of colors in which two produce a third containing no trace of the original hues which composed it; it is more like a mixture of tastes in which the different savors of the ingredients are perceptible.

A later critic, Rev. Basil Richard Barrett, surveying the numerous attempts to explain the pleasure in tragedy, all presented by their exponents as highly original, pointed out that the problem had been proposed and well explained in antiquity by Saint Augustine.²⁷ The statement of the problem in Augustine's *Confessions* (Book III, Chapter II) is indeed as full and interesting as that of any of the eighteenth-century estheticians. His explanation, however, which Barrett considers to be similar to Burke's, merely ascribes our pleasure to social love.

Must not . . . the cause of this pleasure be that, though no one loves to be miserable himself, yet he loves to feel pity for the misery of others; and this pity not being unmingled with grief, we may, on this account, be said to like the sensation itself of grief. Our being thus affected, proceeds from a certain degree of friendship, which we naturally, bear one to another.

Barrett fully accepts the principle of social affection as a source of pleasure, but rejects the related theory of Burke that terror in itself also gives delight. Apparently still indulging a taste for antiquity or for well-established concepts, he maintains that in objects of terror, not the terror itself, but merely curiosity is the source of delight.

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²⁷ *Pretensions to a Final Analysis of the Nature and Origin of Sublimity, Style, Beauty, Genius, and Taste* (London, 1812) See the appendix.



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EPICURUS IN UTOPIA

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The whole ethical system of More's Utopians revolves about pleasure. It is, therefore, only natural to ask what relation their doctrine bears to that of the great philosopher of hedonism, Epicurus.

Much has been inevitably said of the debt of More to Vespucci for the idea of making his Utopians the devotees of pleasure. In his *New World*, Vespucci had told how the Indians "live according to nature, and may be called Epicureans rather than Stoics."¹ In his *Four Voyages*, he felt that he had to label as Epicurean the life of the Indians which was completely devoted to pleasure: *horum vitam (quae omnino voluptuosa est) Epycuream existimo*.² The Indians and the Utopians, however, are poles apart in their degree of civilization. To say nothing of the low stage of the cultural and social development of the America then known as compared with the complex organization of Utopia,³ the inhuman cruelty and the passionate lust of the savage Indians, which fill many a page of early accounts, are the antithesis of the humane kindness and reasonable conduct of the Utopians. The latter, on the

¹ *Mundus Novus* (tr G. T. Northrup; Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1916), p. 6.

² *The Four Voyages of Amerigo Vespucci* (tr M E Cosenza; New York, U. S. Cath Hist. Soc., 1907), p. 97; Latin text, p. liii.

³ The Indians "live together without kmg, without government, and each is his own master" (*Mundus Novus*, p. 6).

whole, are humanistic in the best sense of the term. Consequently, if signs of their hedonism are found in the works of antiquity and the Renaissance, humanistic documents, rather than explorative records, should be considered as furnishing the basic material which More's imagination transformed and utilized in the construction of his literary masterpiece.

Epicurus, as always, was in general ill-repute at the time of the composition of the *Utopia*. "There is no Sect amongst them all," observes Spudaeus in Erasmus' "Epicurean," "that is so much condemn'd by a universal Consent."⁴ Writing on the literary level, Barclay had declared in one of his *Eclogues* through the mouth of Cornix:

Forsooth some wretches of maners vile and rude
Hauc counted in lust most hye beatitude.
And namely the sect which folowe Epicure,
Which shamefull sect doth to this day indure.
Whom the Philosophers and clerkes now a dayes
Despise with wordes, yet folowe they his wayes.⁵

In the section entitled "The obiection of lust blamyng vertue" in Barclay's *Ship of Fools*, Lust says of the Epicureans:

All theyr hole sect my quarell doth defende
For all theyr sect to this clause dyd assent
That lust and pleasour was gode most excellent.⁶

The attitude of Antoninus (1389-1459), an outstanding Thomist of the fifteenth century, may be offered as an example

⁴ *The Colloquies of Erasmus* (tr. N. Bailey; London, Reeves and Turner, 1878), 2, 327.

⁵ *Eclogues* (ed. B. White; London, E. E. T. S., 1928), p. 53. The Latin original of Aeneas Sylvius (*loc. cit.*) reads in translation as follows: "The moment now warns us that we should discuss PLEASURES, in which many mortals have placed the essence of happiness, especially Epicurus, a man once great, whom the philosophers of our own time condemn with words more than actions." The latter clause finds an echo in Erasmus' "Profane Feast" where Austin admits: "I recommend Zeno's Rules; but I follow Epicurus's Practice" (*Colloquies*, 1, 123). Note also the following: "The Philosophers of our Time are wiser, who are content to dispute like Stoicks, but in living out-do even Epicurus himself" (*Colloquies*, 1, 129).

⁶ *The Ship of Fools* (ed. T. H. Jamieson; Edinburgh, Wm. Paterson, 1874), 2, 293.

See also Brant, *Stultifera Navis* (Latin tr. J. Locher; Io. de Olpe, 1497), fol. cxxxii verso, where the term *Epicurei* appears in the margin opposite the portion which begins.

Nostra sophi veteres coluerunt numina. quorum
Scripta manent positae me defendentia sectae, etc.

on the level of scholastic philosophy. In discussing pleasures (*delectationes*), he refutes the Stoics, who claim all sensible pleasures are bad, by maintaining that no one can live without some bodily pleasure (*delectatio*). On the contrary, the Epicureans, he says, hold that all pleasures are good. They err in failing to distinguish between simple or unalloyed good (*simplex bonum*) and relative good (*bonum secundum quid*). If the object in which man's desire rests is in accordance with reason, it is simply good (*simpliciter bonum*), and the pleasure received is simply good (*simpliciter bona*). If the object, however, is only a relative good (*bonum secundum quid*), for instance, congenial to sense but contrary to reason, the pleasure will be only relatively good (*bona secundum quid*); for, it will be good in relation to sense, but evil in itself (*mala simpliciter*), although appearing to be good. The example given is that of fornication.⁷

The judgment of many a humanist on Epicureanism is even more severe than that of the Schoolmen. Vives, for example, in his work *The Origins, Sects, and Praises of Philosophy*, describes the fierce battle against the Stoics on the part of the followers of Epicurus. They reject the art of dialectic. In their struggle to place pleasure at the summit of creation, they cast down even virtue, the most excellent and most beautiful of all things, and foully command her, the queen of the universe, to serve as a handmaid to brutish exhilaration of the senses.⁸

But, in spite of such pronouncements by literary men, scholastics, and humanists, the rehabilitation of Epicurus had already begun in the early decades of the fifteenth century. Diogenes Laertius by his *Lives* undoubtedly played an all-important role in bringing the truer version of the doctrine of Epicurus before the eyes of at least the more humanistic in Western Europe.⁹ It was no accident that Valla's momentous

⁷ Antoninus, *Summa Sacrae Theologiae, Iuris Pontifici, et Caesarei* (Venetiis. apud Iuntas, 1581-82), I. 158 verso

⁸ Vives, *Opera Omnia* (Valentiae Edetanorum, in officina B. Monfort, 1782), 3 17

⁹ For favorable comment on Epicurus, or at least a fair-minded defense of his doctrine against false charges, in Boccaccio, Petrarch, Valla, Filelfo, Landino, Ficino, and Erasmus, see Don Cameron Allen, "The Rehabilitation of Epicurus and his

work *De Voluptate ac de Vero Bono*, which is usually assigned to 1431 A. D., appeared after the completion of the most popular Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius by Ambrogio Traversari.¹⁰ From his reading of the *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) was able "to oppose Epicurus to the Epicureans and, in case of need, to combat immorality by the example of the moralist of pleasure himself."¹¹

The great effect of Valla on the northern humanists may be gauged from a letter of Hegius to Agricola in which the former confesses: "I have been reading Valla's book on the True Good, and have become quite an Epicurean, estimating all things in pleasure."¹² The presence of Valla's book in the circle of Dutch humanists allows one to infer that Erasmus read it early in his career.¹³ At any rate, he may have become familiar with Traversari's translation of Diogenes Laertius which had often been reprinted.¹⁴ This seems especially true in view of his statement that he composed *De Contemptu Mundi* as "a young man" and "at the age of barely twenty years."¹⁵ As for Thomas More, he may have read Diogenes Laertius or Valla or some other humanist.¹⁶ Erasmus may have shown him *De*

Theory of Pleasure in the Early Renaissance," *SP*, 41 (1944), 4 sqq. The article contains no discussion of the influence of Latin translations of Diogenes Laertius.

Erasmus mentions or uses Diogenes Laertius sixty-four times in the *Chiliades* of 1526. See T. C. Appelt, *Studies in the Contents and Sources of Erasmus' Adagia* (Chicago, University of Chicago Libraries, 1942), p. 144.

¹⁰ See Richard Hope, *The Book of Diogenes Laertius* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1930), p. 21. For early Latin translations and early printed Greek texts, see pp. 11-12, 21-23.

¹¹ Edmond Vansteenberghe, *Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues* (Lille, Lefebvre Drocq, 1920), p. 439.

¹² Letter from Deventer, December 17, [1481], quoted in P. S. Allen, *The Age of Erasmus* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914), p. 28.

¹³ See especially Paul Mestwerdt, *Die Anfaenge des Erasmus* (Leipzig, Haupt, 1917), pp. 155-57, 234-37. For Valla's great influence on Erasmus, see *ibid.*, pp. 20-78, and Albert Hyma, *The Youth of Erasmus* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1930), pp. 41-45, 157-60, 186-89, 196-99.

¹⁴ See Hope, *Diogenes Laertius*, pp. 21 sq.

¹⁵ *OPERA OMNIA* (Lugduni Batavorum, P. vander Aa, 1703-06), 6: 1239-40. This edition will be designated as *OPERA* or *ERASMI OPERA*.

Epicurus Christianus is mentioned as one of the designations which closely approach the nature of an adage. See Ep. 126, Erasmus to Mountjoy (Preface to first edition of *Adagiorum Collectanea*, A.D. 1500), *Opus Epistolarum Erasmi* (Oxonii, in typographico Clarendoniano, 1906—), 1: 293.

¹⁶ D. C. Allen, "Rehabilitation of Epicurus," *SP*, 41, (1944), 11, n. 50. "We have not been able to find an allusion to Epicurus in the writings of More avail-

Contemptu Mundi and discussed with him the ideas which he was later to develop in the colloquy "The Epicurean."¹⁷ In the latter he defends the paradox that "none are greater Epicureans than those Christians that live a pious Life."¹⁸ At any rate, the documents most akin in spirit to the section on pleasure in the *Utopia*¹⁹ are these compositions of Erasmus. To understand the theory of pleasure of the Utopians, therefore, it is necessary to become familiar with the more important passages on Epicurus and his philosophy in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives* and in Erasmus' two works: *De Contemptu Mundi* and "The Epicurean" in the *Colloquies*.

The first and most important observation to be made on the relation of the hedonism of Epicurus to the ethics of the Utopians is that Epicurus would be among those in Utopia whom "they counte not in the numbere of men, . . . muche lesse in the numbere of their citizens"!²⁰ For Epicurus denies the three fundamental truths which all good Utopians must believe: the immortality of the human soul, the providence of God over men, and retribution in the future life for good and evil.²¹ This denial is an inexorable conclusion from his premises. The happy life of pleasure which is the final end of man is impossible without the elimination of the most serious hindrances to human joy, namely, superstitious fears and the dread of death. To destroy the former, he does not annihilate the gods but makes them absolutely indifferent to human concerns.²² To abolish

able to me" There is an epigram, *Omnia Latina Opera* (Lovanii, apud Ioannem Bogardum, 1566), fol. 23.

Dilemma Epicuri

Dejiciat miseram tibi nulla molestia mentem
Si longa est, levis est si grauis est, brevis est.

Contra

Dejicit heu miseram, prosternit & utraque mentem
Longa nec villa levis, nec grauis villa brevis.

¹⁷ This colloquy first appeared in the edition of March 1533. See P. Smith, *A Key to the Colloquies of Erasmus* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1927), p. 55.

¹⁸ *Colloquies*, 2. 327

¹⁹ *Utopia* (ed. J. H. Lupton Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1895), pp. 176-212. This edition will be quoted as *Utopia*.

²⁰ *Utopia*, pp. 274 sq.

²¹ See especially *Utopia*, pp. 188, 274.

²² See Lucian's reference to this Epicurean doctrine in Erasmus' translation of

the latter, he proves that the soul is not immortal, and thus removes the fear of a shadowy, perhaps wretched, future existence. As Christian philosophers, neither Erasmus nor More could countenance the denial of these three truths. In fact, as is evident from their writings, they felt convinced that the source of highest pleasure lay precisely in the everlasting reward of one's good deeds by God. Independently of these truths, however, they could more or less subscribe, *mutatis mutandis*, to the principles of Epicurus.

One phase of Epicurus which especially appealed to the humanists, however, was his unceasing war against religious imposture and superstition. Lucian, in particular, several of whose works were translated by More and Erasmus, stressed this aspect of Epicurean doctrine.²³ His *Alexander or Pseudomantis*, translated by Erasmus, is rich in reference to Epicurus. Alexander the impostor hated bitterly Epicurus, "that is, the man who saw deep into the nature of things and who alone glimpsed what was true in them." He was well-disposed to Plato, Chrysippus, or Pythagoras, and was on cordial terms of peace with them, but he hated "that intractable fellow, Epicurus" (as he used to call him); and his hate was well-founded, for Epicurus considered all his tricks ridiculous and ludicrous.²⁴ Alexander, therefore, solemnly burned the epitome of Epicurus in the middle of the forum. Lucian continues: "That impious character did not at all consider how great advantages that volume would bring to those who set themselves to reading it, and how great peace, tranquillity, and liberty it would produce in them, for the reason that it would release them from bondage to fears, specters, and portents, and would take away vain

Icaromenippus, OPERA, I, 213 Erasmus calls the view blasphemous in *Symboli Catechesis* 2 OPERA, 5 1148

In *De Quatuor Sectis Philosophorum*, SUPPLEMENTUM FICINIANUM (ed P. O. Kristeller; Florentiae, in aedibus L. S. Olschki, 1937), 2 9, Ficino expounds Epicurus' teaching on the happiness and the indifference of the gods, and then quotes Lucretius (2. 646 sqq.)

Omnis enim per se divum natura necesse est
Immortali vivo summa cum pace fruatur,
Semota a nostris rebus seimetaque longe.

²³ The Utopians, too, "be deleyted wyth Lucianoes merve conceytes and iestes" (*Utopia*, p. 216).

²⁴ Latin tr. Erasmus, OPERA, I, 237. See references to Epicurus and Epicureans in the rest of the dialogue.

hopes and unbridled desires, and would implant a sane mind and the truth, and would thoroughly purify the soul . . . by right reason as well as freedom."²⁵

Epicurus clearly teaches that man's highest good is pleasure and its attainment by each individual. Virtue and knowledge have no absolute value, independent of their relation to pleasure. In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus writes: "Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and every aversion; and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing."²⁶ This fundamental truth was well understood by Cicero, who causes Torquatus the Epicurean to speak in *De Finibus* as follows:

This [the final and ultimate Good] Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to *prove* that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided.²⁷

These aspects of the philosophy of Epicurus were clearly apprehended also by Erasmus. In "The Epicurean," Hedonius labels as "divine" the sentiment of Epicurus who "places the Happiness of Man in Pleasure, and judges that Life to be most blessed, that has most Pleasure, and least Pain."²⁸ Pleasure, in fact, is the only mistress who has all men so firmly devoted to her that no evils can frighten and no arguments can tear them away from her. "And Epicurus does not, perhaps, altogether absurdly make the famous statement that mortals indeed make errors in their judgments on pleasures, yet all of them

²⁵ *Ibid.* 240-41.

²⁶ Diogenes Laertius, "Epicurus," *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (tr. R. D. Hicks; Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1925), 2 655.

²⁷ *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* (tr. H. Rackham; Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1921), p. 33

²⁸ *Colloques*, 2. 327.

For other references of Erasmus to Epicurus' doctrine of pleasure as the highest good, see *Adagia*, 3734 (*Rumor publicus non omnino frustra est*), col. 1257, and *Adagia*, 3890 (*Verbis coquaris*), col. 1268. *Adagia* is used here as the abbreviation for *Adagiorum Opus* (Lugduni, Gryphius, 1541).

with one mind desire and seek them, some in one way, others in another."²⁹

To Epicurus every pleasure is good and desirable, but not every pleasure should be indulged in, either because it can be ultimately the source of greater pain than pleasure or because it can be a hindrance to a greater pleasure. Hence, Epicurus was careful to enunciate to Menoeceus the following principle of selection:

[S]ince pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but oftentimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And oftentimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged.³⁰

Hedonius in "The Epicurean" does not believe that "Epicurus himself would embrace a Pleasure that has more Pain in it, and of longer continuance than the Pleasure itself."³¹ A very clear and important declaration of Epicurean principles of selection as applied to the advantages of the monastic life appears in *De Contemptu Mundi*:

Epicurus denies that one should admit those pleasures from which greater troubles result. As for us we do not commit fornication or adultery. We do not gorge ourselves or carouse after the fashion of profligates; sober we see the rising of the sun, sober we see the setting of the sun, both of which they deny they have seen. All these things never happen without bringing more distress than delight. We are neither capable nor desirous of becoming rich, or of being made illustrious by some official dignity; even in this we are not untrue to the teaching of Epicurus. For, since they are marked by little pleasure and much vexation, we wisely are unwilling to buy a very small convenience at the price of a very great disadvantage. In addition, he teaches that one must sometimes endure

²⁹ *De Contemptu Mundi*, OPERA, 5. 1257.

³⁰ Diog. Laert., *Lives*, 2. 655.

³¹ *Colloques*, 2. 329. Cf. also the following: [*Hedonius*]. Is it not a notable Way of Merchandizing, to purchase a Pleasure, neither real, solid, nor of long Continuance, with so many Evils, greater and longer-lasting?

"Sp[urdaeus]. If there were nothing of Pam in the Matter, I should think him a foolish Trader who should barter Jewels for Bits of Glass."—*Ibid.*, 335.

pains in order to escape greater pains, and likewise that one must forego pleasures in order to achieve greater pleasures. What do we do? We suffer night-watches, fasts, loneliness, silence, and all the other hardships of this kind, lest we have to endure greater pains. . . . Did you believe that we had lost our pleasure? It was a matter, not of loss, but of exchange, and indeed of such an exchange that we received numerous intense pleasures for a few paltry ones.³²

The similarity of these rules of selection to those of the Utopians is obvious. For "in all things thys cautell they vse, that a lesse pleasure hinder not a bigger, and that the pleasur be no cause of dyspleasur."³³ In like manner, it is the hope of a future reward in the form of a greater pleasure which inspires the Utopians to follow hard virtue or to suffer pain and sacrifice for the good of their neighbor.³⁴ The Utopians, it must be noted, add another rule of selection to the two already mentioned. It is the social principle that pleasure must "be gotten without wrong or iniurie" to one's fellow man.³⁵ Epicurus himself, however, does not treat or emphasize this precaution in any way, except in so far as fear of detection of crime vitiates pleasure painfully.

Even in his own lifetime, Epicurus realized that "ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation" had painted him as the defender and high priest of sensual pleasures. "It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry," he insists, "not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produces a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul." By pleasure he himself means "the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul."³⁶ This complete rest is the highest

³² OPERA, 5. 1257.

³³ *Utopia*, p. 209.

³⁴ *Utopia*, pp. 189, 193-94.

³⁵ *Utopia*, p. 194.

³⁶ Diog. Laert, *Lives*, 2. 657.

Erasmus describes picturesquely the evils of drunkenness as follows: "When hard Drinking throws a Man into a Fever, the Head-Ach, the Gripes, Dizziness, a bad Name, Decay of Memory, Vomiting, Loss of Appetite, and the Palsy; would Epicurus himself think this was a Pleasure worth seeking after?"—"The Epicurean," *Colloquies*, 2. 334.

state of happiness that can be attained. In this respect Epicurus disagrees with the Cyrenaics. The latter will not admit a state of rest is a pleasure; they insist that pleasure must be accompanied by motion.³⁷ Under the genus of pleasure, however, Epicurus embraces both pleasures coming from tranquillity and pleasures arising from motion.³⁸ The latter, however, are inferior to the former since they imply the satisfaction of a want and are thus necessarily marred by discomfort, as, for example, eating by hunger.³⁹ The Utopians, too, consider these pleasures, as "the basest pleasures of all, as vnpure and vnperfecte," because "they neuer cum but accompanied wyth their contrary greiffes."⁴⁰

Like the Utopians,⁴¹ Epicurus believes that pleasure and pain adequately divide all human experience. Torquatus the Epicurean in Cicero's *De Finibus* explains that his master asserts that "there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral,⁴² being characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain."⁴³

So far is Epicurus from being the philosopher of sensualism that he tenaciously holds, as Diogenes Laertius informs his readers, that mental pleasures are greater than corporal.⁴⁴ The

³⁷ See Diog. Laert., *Lives*, 2 661.

³⁸ In their defense of health as a true pleasure (*Utopia*, pp. 204-6), the Utopians tacitly uphold the opinion of Epicurus against that of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics.

³⁹ See Diog. Laert., *Lives*, 2 661.

⁴⁰ *Utopia*, p. 208.

⁴¹ This principle is implicit in the argument for health as a pleasure in *Utopia*, pp. 205-6.

⁴² Socrates maintains that there is "such a thing as a neutral state, . . . intermediate between them [pleasure and pain], and in the mean, being a quietude of the soul in these respects" Such is health to sick men and freedom from pain to men afflicted with severe pain. Hence, it is not "right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful." See Plato's *Republic* (tr. P. Shorey; Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935), 2. 381-3.

⁴³ *De Finibus*, p. 43.

⁴⁴ *Lives*, 2. 661-63.

For Epicurus, however, bodily pleasure is indissolubly connected with mental pleasure either as source, or concomitant, etc. This he taught in opposition to the Cyrenaics, who held that the pleasures like friendship or honor are independent of sensation.

Utopians, too, account the pleasures of the mind to be "the chiefist and most principall of all."⁴⁵ Erasmus, as might readily be surmised, feels that the man who should "lose the real Enjoyments of the Mind, for the counterfeit Pleasures of the Body" is similar to the "foolish Trader who should barter Jewels for Bits of Glass."⁴⁶ In his *Contempt of the World*, he exclaims:

Who is so blind that he does not see that the body is not even to be compared with the soul? As inferior, therefore, as the body is to the soul in dignity, just so far the pleasure [*voluptas*] of the soul is superior to the enticements [*illecebrae*] of the body. Mental pleasure, like the soul itself, is true, enduring, never cloying, genuine, virtuous, divine, and salutary. The enticements of the body, on the contrary, are false, passing, full of loathing, having more aloes than honey, foul, and death-dealing. It is impossible for the same person to enjoy both bodily and mental pleasure. One must be lacking. If his counsel were asked, what would Epicurus advise? Of course, that we should banish all those obscene enticements of the body lest they act as an impediment to the attainment of the more excellent and more sweet pleasures of the soul.⁴⁷

A special mental pleasure reserved for the learned is reading or thinking over the works of the most approved authors, among which are the Sacred Scriptures, the volumes of the Fathers of the Church, and even the lucubrations of such Schoolmen as Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great. "The writings of the pagan philosophers and poets are not to be eschewed by anyone who knows how to pick wholesome herbs among the poisonous ones."⁴⁸

What, in the system of Epicurus, is the relation of pleasure to virtue? Prudence, the rational faculty by which man chooses and avoids pleasures and pains, is the greatest of the virtues. It is the source of "all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them."⁴⁹ On the one hand, Epicurus does

⁴⁵ *Utopia*, pp. 206-7

⁴⁶ "The Epicurean," *Colloquies*, 2. 335.

⁴⁷ *OPERA*, 5. 1257-58.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1260.

⁴⁹ Letter of Epicurus to Menoeceus, *Diog. Laert, Lives*, 2. 657.

not hesitate to proclaim that "we choose the virtues too on account of pleasure and not for their own sake, as we take medicine for the sake of health"; on the other hand, he stipulates that virtue is "the *sine qua non* of pleasure, *i. e.* the one thing without which pleasure cannot be, everything else, food, for instance, being separable, *i. e.* not indispensable to pleasure."⁵⁰ After having thoroughly argued and weighed the question, the Utopians, like Epicurus, think "that all our actions, and in them the virtues themselves, be referred at the last to pleasure, as their end and felicitie,"⁵¹ but, at the same time, hold that the greatest part of mental pleasure comes from "the exercise of virtue, and conscience of good lyffe."⁵² The sacrifice of a brief bodily pleasure in order to benefit one's neighbor is more than recompensed by a greater and triple reward: the approbation of one's own conscience, the remembrance of the gratitude of the recipient of the favor, and the firm hope of a future eternal reward.⁵³ Epicurus holds somewhat the same view. In an essay translated by Erasmus, Plutarch writes: "Epicurus, who maintains that the chief end of man is a most deep tranquillity, which is like a quiet haven that is agitated by no waves and roars with no noise, says that it is not only more beautiful to confer a benefit than to receive one, but also more pleasurable, for nothing begets joy as much as beneficence."⁵⁴ In fact, Epicurus stresses the pleasurable value of a good conscience. The man who has committed injustice, even if he succeeds in hiding his crime, is continually fearful that it should be discovered. In this way, the violation of justice cannot be reconciled with a life of pleasure.

In "The Epicurean," Erasmus equates pleasure with piety, not virtue. He maintains that "no Body lives more pleasantly than they that live piously; and no Body more miserably and afflictedly than they that live wickedly."⁵⁵ The basic assumption is that he who lives piously "enjoys the true Good," for it is "only Piety that gains the Favour of God, the Fountain of the chiefest Good, that makes a Man happy."⁵⁶ Then

⁵⁰ Diog. Laert., *Lives*, 2 663.

⁵¹ *Utopia*, p. 194.

⁵² *Utopia*, p. 207.

⁵³ *Utopia*, pp. 193-94.

⁵⁴ *Cum Principibus Maxime Philosophum Debere Disputare*, OPERA, 4 48.

⁵⁵ *Colloquies*, 2. 330.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 332.

Erasmus, toward the end of the colloquy, proceeds to employ much the same *tour de force* which he had used in *The Praise of Folly* and to which many devout persons had objected. Just as he had made Christ the supreme example of foolishness, so here he makes Him the Epicurean *par excellence*:

[N]o Body more deserves the Name of an Epicurean, than that adorable Prince of Christian Philosophers; for *ἐπίκουρος* in Greek signifies as much as an *Helper*. Therefore when the Law of Nature was almost erased by Vice; and the Law of Moses rather incited than cured Lusts, when the Tyrant Satan ruled without Controul in the World, he alone afforded present Help to perishing Mankind. So that they are mightily mistaken that foolishly represent Christ, as by Nature, to be a rigid melancholick Person, and that he invited us to an unpleasant Life; when he alone show'd the Way to the most comfortable Life in the World, and fullest of Pleasure. . .⁵⁷

Erasmus in his *Paraclesis* recognizes the importance given to a good conscience by Epicurus: "Even Epicurus confesses that nothing in life can be sweet to man in the absence of a mind conscious to itself of no evil; from an innocent mind as from a fountain true pleasure [*voluptas*] gushes forth."⁵⁸ In his *Contempt of the World*, in imitation of Epicurus, he names a good conscience as the foremost of the pleasures of the soul: "With Epicurus as our authority (lest we should depart from him), we maintain that freedom from the horrible torture of a guilt-laden conscience is even the greatest of pleasures; for he who has nothing to grieve him, has not a little what gladdens him."⁵⁹ Hedonius in "The Epicurean" insists upon the bitterness mingled with false pleasure, above all, "the Torment of Conscience, Enmity with God himself, and the Expectation of eternal Torment."⁶⁰

According to Seneca, it is the inseparability of virtue from pleasure, espoused by Epicurus and misunderstood by volup-

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 342

⁵⁸ OPERA, 6. *4 recto.

⁵⁹ OPERA, 5 1257

⁶⁰ *Colloquies*, 2 334 "The common People seek for a pleasant Life from external Things, when nothing will produce that, but a good Conscience; for a heavier Stone hangs over the Heads of those that have a guilty Conscience, than hangs over the Head of Tantalus himself; nay, it does not hang over their Heads, but vexes and presses their Minds, nor is their Mind tormented with a vain Fear, but expects every Hour, when they shall be cast into Hell" (*ibid.*, 344).

tuaries, which has drawn many debauchees to the profession of philosophical Epicureanism, "and they do not consider how sober and abstemious the 'pleasure' of Epicurus really is—for so, in all truth, I think it."⁶¹ Seneca continues: "Personally I hold the opinion . . . that the teachings of Epicurus are upright and holy and, if you consider them closely, austere; for his famous doctrine of pleasure is reduced to small and narrow proportions, and the rule that we Stoics lay down for virtue, this same rule he lays down for pleasure—he bids that it obey Nature. But it takes a very little luxury to satisfy Nature!"⁶² It was statements like these in Seneca (and Cicero, as has been seen)⁶³ which undoubtedly helped More to a greater understanding of the true position of Epicurus and his philosophy.

The student of the *Utopia* is now in a better position briefly to evaluate the influences at work upon More when he pictures his Utopians as the upholders of the philosophy of pleasure. The observation of Vespucci on the Epicureanism of the barbarous Indians, at best, could have been only a spark to set fire to the rough material already lying stored in More's humanistic brain. The Greek text and Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius made possible a more correct appraisal of Epicurus after 1430. Valla, in conjunction with the award of final victory to Christianity, allowed an active defense of Epicureanism to form an integral part of his opus, *De Voluptate ac de Vero Bono*. Erasmus in *De Contemptu Mundi* (composed ca. 1490) boasts and proves that the whole way of life of a true monk is Epicurean in its nature.⁶⁴ He employs the selective principles of Epicurus in a thoroughly Christian context. The most important change is to stress the existence of God as man's greatest good and happiness and the joys of reward in a future life, both of which Epicurus had denied. It is to the advantage of Erasmus to say nothing of Epicurus' denial

⁶¹ "On the Happy Life," *Moral Essays* (tr. J. W. Basore; Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1932), 2, 129-31.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 131.

In Erasmus' "Soldier and Carthusian," the Carthusian explains that the body "is satisfied with very little, if we live according to Nature" (*Colloquies*, 1, 264).

⁶³ Note that Seneca and Cicero are the only two Latin authors who are recommended by name in the *Utopia* (p. 27).

⁶⁴ *OPERA*, 5, 1257.

of the providence of God, the immortality of the soul, and future retribution. Later, in his colloquy, "The Epicurean" (1533), he uses the same devices and applies the same tests to the life of pious laymen instead of devout monks. In a word, by interpreting him for the better (*in melius interpretando*), Erasmus christianizes Epicurus in a literary strain just as the writers of the Church had christianized Plato and Aristotle in their apologetical works.

The author of *Utopia* borrows from religion the fundamental truths⁶⁵ which Erasmus had used to correct Epicurus, and then treats the whole question of happiness and pleasure, independently of revelation and Christianity, on the basis of pure reason. More is closer than Erasmus, who consistently emphasizes and extols mental and spiritual delights, to the true spirit of Epicurus, particularly in laying stress also upon bodily pleasures, including health.⁶⁶ He dexterously combats the ill-repute in which Epicurus stands in the popular estimation by appealing to nature, virtue, and religion⁶⁷ in defense of hedonism and by establishing for *true* pleasure criteria which insure the supremacy of ethical and intellectual pleasures. In the final analysis, More's Epicureanism thus becomes as noble in theory and fruitful in practice as Stoicism or Platonism. Far from being really radical, subversive, and corrupting, the Utopian philosophy is revealed underneath to be conservative, beneficial, moral, and salutary—a triumphant tribute to More's powers of rhetoric.

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⁶⁵ See *Utopia*, pp. 188-89.

⁶⁶ If the statement of Diocles as given by Diogenes Laertius, is correct, More and Epicurus differ on a policy basic to *Utopia*, namely, communism. "He [Diocles] further says that Epicurus did not think it right that their property [that of Epicurus and his friends] should be held in common, as required by the maxim of Pythagoras about the goods of friends; such a practice in his opinion implied mistrust and without confidence there is no friendship" (*Lives*, 2, 539-41).

⁶⁷ See *Utopia*, pp. 188-92.

signe of admiration," as Puttenham¹ called it rather than a test, as Cicero² thought, "of whether a matter of worth to the learned has any commonsense value." But in the comprehension of the problem of "Comus" we shall probably be helped if, before we come to the examination of the masque, we observe Milton's poetic method in an earlier work.

The conflict between the esthetic and the intellectual daemons that struggled for superior utterance in Milton may be first seen in the half-light of the "Nativity Ode." The theme is not original just as the poem, in spite of the epodic arrangement of the strophes, is not exactly an ode. Nevertheless, it is by far the most luxurious of English verses on the Incarnation in its erudition and the most sensitively felt. Before it, the prior offerings of Jonson, Drummond, and Beaumont fade into the commonplaceness of theological cliché; and the more original poem of Southwell, which compresses its emotion within the narrow channels of gnomic expression, is companionable mainly in terms of a temperamental epitome. But the power of this poem does not spring from a true reconciliation of its intellectual and emotional disunities, but rather from the fact that they are not reconciled at all, or, better still, that they are erased in a unity of a higher order. When we look at the conflict in its separateness, it seems like a tug-of-war between teams of majestic stallions—the thesis and the antithesis pull oppositely, the synonym and the antonym stretch each other, the metaphor dashes itself into divergent myths. That we accept this amazing procedure as artistically valid even to the extent that we overlook or apologize for such technical flaws as "When such musicke sweet," or the prolix roll call of the gods, or the badly rendered metaphysical excesses, demonstrates the immediate and isolateral reaction to this struggle of our own discordant organs of perception. It is, to use a favorite Renaissance figure, as a struck lyre that sets all others in vibration. But a discord will do this as well as a harmony.

The "Ode" begins with an induction in which time is negated so that the discord between the past and the present, which we clearly recognize, may be rendered into a concord of eternity, or into an essence of time, which is timelessness. To

¹ *The Arte of English Poesie* (Cambridge, 1936), p. 226.

² *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 256.

this end the poem is carefully dated. The title and the induction inform us that it was written in the small hours of December 25, 1620. So that we shall be certain of this fact Milton reinforces us in "Elegia Sexta": "Illa sub auroram lux mihi prima tulit." This is a fact that Milton does not want the reader to miss because he is about to invent the fable that this fact is untrue, that the real time is the last hour of the Pre-Christian era and that he is himself present in a land of palms and snow, a seventeenth-century interloper between the events of the Nativity and the Epiphany. This is the temporal conflict, but what Milton does is to reconcile it by pressing towards the eternal consequences of the Incarnation. By annulling the chronology of this event, he extracts the everlasting from the conflict between the past and the present. This is the first higher compromise.

In the "Hymn" there are two central contentions: the minor dissonance between the two aspects of Nature and the major dissonance between the two kinds of harmony. These contentions are emphasized by the fact that the "Hymn" falls naturally into three sections: stanzas I-VII, VIII-XVIII, and XIX-XXVII. The myth of the sun (a familiar pun with Donne and Herbert) controls the movement of the first section and binds it to the time theme of the induction. As the paramour of pagan Nature, the sun introduces the theme of the first section, and as the discarded and abashed lover, staying in its road to reemphasize the time theme of the induction, it makes a liminary conclusion. The conflict between the flagrancy of pagan Nature prior to the Incarnation and the subsequent shamefastness of the same personification is implied in the first two stanzas. The reconciliation here takes the form of Redemption. Nature, whose story is that of the Magdalene—an intrinsic baroque myth—is redeemed by the greater Sun. So the redemption that arises from this conflict looks forward to the redemption of man in the later stanzas just as Peace, the instrument of the redemption, the *Concordia Christi*, looks ahead to the basic conflict between the *ἀρμονία Christianis* and the *consonantia pagana*. The rescue of Nature by the Peace of the greater Sun from the wanton embraces of the lesser sun is symbolized in the fifteenth stanza, for we know that she is to be registered among the daughters of God

just as the woman taken in adultery was placed in the company of the saints. The conflict between immodest Nature and penitent Nature which results in the higher compromise of redemption is recalled in the latter stanzas of the "Hymn." The lesser sun retires; the creatures of evil—contrary to folklore—depart; and peace comes with darkness and the single star. Milton, who usually accepts the primitive tradition that goodness is light and darkness evil, reverses the formula. But this is artistically logical. Redemption must be associated with the Increate Sun before which the created sun is dark.

The conflict between Christian and pagan harmony that is the theme of the second and third sections makes the "Hymn" an artistic wonder. Man enters at the beginning of the second section, but he enters to provide an audience for the sacred music which has not been heard since Eve succumbed to the wiles of Lucifer. Man seems, in fact, to be almost out of place in this *dramatis personae* which is so evenly divided between personified symbols and beings of a supernatural yet mythological order. But the interesting thing is not that man is attentive to the heavenly choir, but that Milton succeeds in effecting an artistic harmony while describing a spiritual disharmony. When he contemplates the difference between the pagan and Christian world, he finds, like Plato's friend Archytas, a musical explanation. This is totally fitting, for Milton, as a good graecist, must have known that the definition of ποιητής expunges the difference between poetry and music. Likewise he is not unaware that the *concordia* that he will now explicate poetically is the linguistic equivalent of the *pax* of the first section.

It is not surprising to discover that Milton's description of Christian harmony begins with a heraldic blending of clearly recognizable emblems: the circle, the globe, light. By the trick of the oxymoron they all become music, not a music of annotation but the essence of music. To this is joined the intermediate music of the spheres and the lower chant that the poet is composing. For Milton, like the composers of the Psalms, realized that the music of the creatures was a required melody for the base of Heaven's organ; and he knew, too, that at the moment of the Incarnation, the harmony was without flaw for the first

time since Creation.³ Distemperature comes with the death of God and then the full music cannot be heard until after the Day of Wrath. This is the theme of this section.⁴

While the integral metaphor of Christian harmony as Milton conceived it has strong elements of pagan Pythagoreanism and while the poet must have realized how often *concordia*, *consensus*, and *consonantia* appear as moral doublets in classical letters, yet he was unable, even while admiring, to perceive a premier harmony in the ancient philosophy that was the intellectual extension of pagan theology. Throughout his poetry, and especially in *Paradise Regained*, a discrimination is carefully made between Christian and pagan philosophy. Plato and Seneca are great thinkers and noble men when they stand against a non-Christian facade, but they dissolve into nothingness before the Christian revelation. We have, as a result, in the third section of the "Hymn," a pageant of the gods drawn from the Old Testament and garmented by Selden. They have their music, too, but it is a music best described by the "horrid clang" of the Last Judgment. The "Cymbals ring" and call "the grisly king"; and "the dismal dance," which is an awkward contrast to that of the angels⁵ makes their ceremony more dreary. These phrases together with the cacophonous "Timbrel'd Anthems dark" of the devotees of Osiris are inserted by Milton to suggest the nature of pagan music now 'dumm' before the majesty of the Incarnate song. Hence from this conflict between the limited music of the Church Militant and the discordant melodies of pagan theology, Milton

³ The universal character of this harmony is carefully described in Adam's morning prayer; *PL*, V, 145-208

⁴ For an immense amount of important material on this subject see Leo Spitzer, "Classical and Christian Ideas of Harmony," *Traditio*, II (1944), 409-64; III (1945), 307-64. The companion text in Milton is found in "At a Solemn Music". That we on earth with undiscording voice / May rightly answer that melodious noise; / As once we did, till disproportion'd sin / Jarr'd against natures chime, and with harsh din / Broke the fair music that all creatures made / To their great Lord, whose love their motion sway'd / In perfect Diapason, whilst they stood / In first obedience, and their state of good.

⁵ As in *PL*, V, 619-27: That day, as other solem dayes, they spent / In song and dance about the sacred Hill / Mystical dance, which yonder starric Spheare / Of Planets and of fixt in all her Wheeles / Resembles nearest, mazes intricate, / Eccentric, intervov'd, yet regular / Then most, when most irregular they seem / And in thir motions harmonic Divine / So smooths her charming tones, that Gods own ear / Listens delighted.

anticipates the multitonéd yet perfectly matched harmony of the Church Triumphant. This is the third and greatest compromise.

The "Ode" has, then, three series of poetically expressed contrasts, and from each of them Milton draws a compromise that is far more splendid than the parts conflicting. From the variance between the past and the present, he evolves the solution of timelessness; from that between Nature abandoned and Nature redeemed, he creates a Nature as immutable and untarnished as Faith, Hope, and Peace; from the disagreement between pagan and Christian harmony, he derives the harmony of God. Underlying all of this is the conventional modulation of the universal and the particular which is signified, for example, by the movement from the abstract character of Peace to her concrete manifestations, a modulation that is also orchestrated by the epodic contraction and expansion of the metrical line. The result of this artistic procedure is a magnificent unity that greatly affects us.

This method of displaying the opposed unrealities and of drawing from the opposition a high poetic reality is a basic Miltonic technique. It is one of the more obvious methods of the greater poems, and the first two books of *Paradise Lost* afford us an important instance of its use. But Milton is not always successful in this process of bridging the chaos between opposed elements, and it is my contention that his failure to effect a compromise that is both poetically and intellectually greater than the warring opposites is what causes us so much trouble in the elucidation of "Comus."

2

The conflicts in "Comus" are both extrinsic and intrinsic—in structure, in pre-text, in theme, and in orchestration. They are conflicts that for many reasons Milton could not pacify by a higher compromise. For this reason the poem fails and we are baffled. To begin with we should notice that the poem is not a masque at all. The critical eye of Samuel Johnson took this in at once. The poem, he said, is "deficient" as a drama. It is not a masque because it is not "given up to all the freaks of the imagination." The action, though human, is improbable

and unreasonable. The dialogue is not composed of speeches but "declamations deliberately composed and formally repeated, on a moral question." The audience views the works, as a consequence, "without passion, without anxiety." "It is a drama in the epic style, inelegantly splendid and tediously instructive."⁶

All attempts to explain the exterior structure of "Comus" since 1780 have been answers to Dr. Johnson. Warton replied in a note prefixed to his edition of the *Poems*.

We must not read Comus with an eye to the stage, or with the expectation of dramatic propriety. . . . Comus is a suite of Speeches, not interesting by discrimination of character; not conveying a variety of incidents, not gradually exciting curiosity: but perpetually attracting attention by sublime sentiment, by fanciful imagery of the richest vein, by an exuberance of picturesque description, poetical allusion, and ornamental expression. While it widely departs from the grotesque anomalies of the Mask now in fashion, it does not nearly approach to the natural constitution of a regular play. . . . This is the first time the old English Mask was in some degree reduced to the principles and form of rational composition. . . . On the whole, whether Comus be or be not deficient as a drama, whether it is considered as an Epic drama, a series of lines, a Mask, or a poem, I am of opinion, that our author is here only inferiour to his own *Paradise Lost*.⁷

Warton, as we see, is as obfuscated as Johnson. "Comus" is not a masque; it is not a play. It may be a drama in the epic style, a rational masque, a suite of verses, a poem. It is in the last category that the Nineteenth Century placed the work and so avoided the structural issue. Macaulay thought of the masque as a series of "Majestic soliloquies" and lyrics that are spoiled by the dramatic passages. "It is when Milton escapes from the shackles of the dialogue, when he is discharged from the labour of uniting two incongruous styles, when he is at liberty to indulge his choral raptures without reserve, that he rises even above himself."⁸ Macaulay is truly running for a safe wicket and Walter Bagehot is hard on his heels.

Comus has no longer the peculiar exceptional popularity which it used to have. We can talk without general odium of its defects.

⁶ *Lives of the English Poets* (Oxford, 1905), 1 168-9.

⁷ *Op. cit.* (London, 1791), pp 262-3

⁸ "Milton," *The Works* (London, 1871), 5. 13.

Its characters are nothing, its sentiments are tedious, its story is not interesting. But it is only when we have realised the magnitude of its deficiencies that we comprehend the peculiarity of its greatness. Its power is in its style.⁹

The observations of Macaulay and Bagehot are born of an attempt to side-step the real problem of the external structure of "Comus"; yet in modern times we have gone still further and listed the poem among the moralities, contending that it is a sort of belated *Hickscorner* or *Lusty Juventus*. We have failed to notice the testimony of the Latin motto or the variants between the printed poem and the manuscripts to Milton's own dissatisfaction with the work. Granted that we do not know much about the masque and that those which we possess are essentially court entertainments, still we must confess that "Comus" is so different from these as to be another thing. It is much longer than the masque as written by Jonson or Daniel; its cast of speaking characters is much smaller; its locale of action is much less fantastic; its plot, though not exactly more elaborate, is more tense; its theme is more serious; it is totally lacking in humorousness; and its emphasis is more on a dramatic crisis than on spectacle, dance, costume, and even singing. We must also notice that it was given in a narrower hall than the great Jacobean masques, and that it concludes with a mock water pageant that is more properly part of an outdoor entertainment. The want of these qualities disestablishes "Comus" as a true masque although it does not make it into a drama. Nonetheless, I think that we can say that Johnson was right and Warton wrong when the former criticized "Comus" as a drama and the latter denied the validity of this criticism.

To criticize "Comus" as a drama would be to do no more than extend Johnson's remarks, and Tillyard, who has as fine a sense of style as any academic critic of our age, has already made some telling observations about this problem. In addition, Tillyard has also very perceptively pointed out that the poetic texture of the masque is mixed in a fashion that suggests confusion rather than the more desirable quality of variety. "Comus," as he sees it, is a sequence of poetical experiments. The sub-surface technique, he discovers, is Arcadian, but there are also lapses into the manner of Elizabethan dramatists, into

⁹ *Literary Studies* (London, 1879), 1. 219.

pastoral expression, into pure poetry, into Jacobean phrasing, and, in one of the excised manuscript passages, into Restoration realism.¹⁰ But the patchwork of styles does not, it seems to me, end here because the pallium of classical tragedy covers the whole poem. The masque opens with a prologist like Polydore's ghost of the *Hecuba*; and though he should expect the Lady and the Brothers—if the theme is what the commentators say it is—to enter next, we have instead the antistrophic choral of Comus which is a modified form of an antimasque. We then have the declamation of the Lady which ends with a lyric to be followed by the stichomythic section between her and Comus. Other remembrances of an antique nature assail us as we follow the unfolding of the masque, which concludes, we must admit, with as fine an example of the *deus ex machina* as any Athenian could devise. So in its external structure "Comus" is a melange of various tendencies and styles that never merge into anything intensely organic.

Granted that Milton was handicapped by the occasional requirements of the Bridgewater family and by the physical limitations of the hall in Ludlow Castle, I still cannot see that these restrictions necessarily resulted in attempts that fell short of compromise. Having previously written the *Arcades*, a true masque, Milton was not inexpert in the formal technique. Here he intended to transcend current practice by attempting to create a more dramatic form of short entertainment; and though "Comus" has held the stage better than any other masque, it is, nonetheless, an error in artistic judgment, for a conflict between exterior form and style seldom results in a valid compromise. From a compromise between a masque and a short musical drama, one gets either an unstylized masque or an undramatic play. We miss the formality and the ritual of the masque, and we have a play totally wanting in suspense and character alteration. This is the first attempted reconciliation in "Comus" and it fails; but the unsuccessful pursuit of artistic compromise is further verified by the two pre-texts upon which the theme is founded: the Circe story annotated by Peele's version of the Child Roland legend and Spenser's account of Acrasia and Busyrane, and Geoffrey of Monmouth's eponymic history of Sabrina.

¹⁰ *Milton* (London, 1934), pp. 66-75.

The Circe legend is introduced by the Spirit, who is really the Hermes of Homer in seventeenth-century dress. The two brothers are composites of the Wandering Knight, of Ulysses, of Guyon, and of Britomart. Comus is, of course, the son and heir of Circe and the brother of Ariosto's Alcina, Trissino's Acratia, Tasso's Armida, and Spenser's mistress of the Bower of Bliss. Behind this pre-text there are several clear-cut traditions. The Circe story was interpreted during the Renaissance as an allegory of the combat between Reason and Nature. Comes, the most authoritative mythographer of the era, puts it neatly:

Ego Ulyssem rationis participem animae nostrae partem esse crediderim: Circeen esse naturam: Ulyssis socios animi facultates conspirantes cum affectibus corporis, ac rationi non obtemperantes. natura igitur est appetentia rerum illegitimarum. nam recta lex retinaculum & fraenum est depravati ingenii cum deceat existimare beluas, illas facultates. at ratio quae nos facit una Deo similes, invicta adversus eas illecebras appetentia persistit.¹¹

For Spenser the legend of Circe in the Guyon story becomes an allegory of a conflict between temperance and its opposite; whereas the story of the enchantment in the Britomart tale is an allegory of chastity. In the *Old Wives Tale*, which Milton follows so closely, there is little beyond the mood of the satirically horrific. But Milton by attempting to unite all the interpretations obtains only a polyglot translation. We notice, too, that the Miltonic solution does not follow the traditional work-out of the pre-text. Ulysses subdues Circe; Guyon brings down the Bower and captures the enchantress; Britomart breaks the power of Busyrane; and even the Wandering Knight aided by the ghost of Jack procures the death of Sacrapant. The brothers, though they have the advice of the Spirit and the Homeric Moly, do not succeed so well. Comus escapes with his crew; the Lady remains frozen in her chair. The fact that Milton again is trying to combine the masque and the drama makes in the case of this pre-text an unsolved conflict between well-established dramatic and allegorical traditions. Something similar happens to the pre-text of *Sabrina*.

I have a feeling that when the masque was first commissioned Milton intended to write a true masque based on the

¹¹ *Mythologia* (Patavia, 1616), p. 309

Sabrina story. The Bridgewater estate was washed by a tributary of the Severn, and everyone living in that district must have known how the river came by its name. Some years before, Drayton had elaborated the myth poetically in the *Poly-Olbion* and added a touch of pathos, suggested perhaps by the account in the *Mirror for Magistrates*, to the end of Locrine's natural daughter.¹² But the Sabrina of "Comus" is not the Sabrina of Geoffrey of Monmouth or of the *History of Britain*. The history as Geoffrey and, as subsequently, Milton recount it is that Gwendolen, having defeated Locrine and captured his mistress Estreldis and her daughter Sabrina, caused the daughter, offspring of adultery, to be cast in the river and ordered that thereafter the river be called by the name of the unfortunate child. Caught once again by the requirements of the allegory and by the need for a compliment, Milton is first forced to change the first pre-text so that he can bring in the Sabrina myth and then he is forced to alter the myth to fit the revised first pre-text. In all previous accounts except "The sad virgin innocent of all" of the second book of the *Faerie Queene*, the emphasis is placed on the betrayal of Gwendolen and this is Milton's emphasis in the *History of Britain*.¹³ Here it is changed. Sabrina becomes "a virgin pure" and a "guiltless dame" who, flying the "mad pursuit of her enraged stepdam," commends "here fair innocence" to the river. Milton converts what seems to be history into a saint's legend and governs it in part with the accounts of Circe's anointing of Ulysses and of Florimell in the caverns of Proteus. This modification, though suggestive, can only bother those who have the original history in hand. It is the intellectual texture of the masque that baffles readers on all levels, and it is Milton's failure to bring about a higher compromise again that produces this effect.

Although a surprising amount has been written about "Comus," A. S. P. Woodhouse¹⁴ alone has made an attempt to untangle its meaning. In his cogently written essay he describes

¹² *Works* (Oxford, 1933), 4 114-5.

¹³ *History of Britain, The Works* (New York, 1932), 10. 15, see Geoffrey of Monmouth, 2 2-5. See also R. Blenner-Hassett, "Geoffrey of Monmouth and Milton's 'Comus,'" *MLN* (1949), 64 315-8.

¹⁴ "The Argument of Milton's Comus," *University of Toronto Quarterly* (1941-2) 11. 46-71. See also J. C. Maxwell, "The Pseudo-Problem of 'Comus,'" *Cambridge Journal* (1948), 1. 376-80.

the several planes of meaning that we are to see in the poem. The central conflict, according to Woodhouse, is between Nature and Grace; under the first is Temperance and Continnence, under the second Virginitv. Sharing in both and connecting them is the essential doctrine of Chastity. There is little doubt about the correctness of most of Woodhouse's analyses, but again no effective compromises are made and it does not seem to me that Milton's artistic emphasis coincides with his intended moral emphasis.

After the opening chorals, the two brothers enter. The Second Brother is in a fret for fear that his sister has fallen victim either to the hunger of an animal or the lust of a wild man. "Within the direful grasp / Of savage hunger, or of savage heat?" The First Brother hypothesizes on the nature of her virtue and recommends the wilderness as a place for moral contemplation. The Second Brother admits that all of this may be true for the lonely anchorite, but he reminds his elder that the Lady is beautiful and, consequently, a desirable prey for the incontinent. The First Brother says that she has hidden strength, and the Second Brother asks whether this is the strength of Heaven. The First Brother then lectures on chastity and virginitv, virtues defended by both classical allusions and angelic guardians. His homily is belied almost at once by the Spirit, who—in spite of his announcement in the prologue that he is sent as the "defence and guard" of wanderers in Comus' territory—is forced to report that the Lady has fallen into the hands of Circe's son before he could prevent it. The brothers are now told how to overcome Comus, but it is shortly made obvious that the Second Brother's original fears are sound. Comus escapes unpunished with all his crew, and the Lady is finally released not because of her virginitv or through the offices of one of "the thousand liveried angels" but through the magic powers of a pagan water spirit, whose myth was renovated for this purpose.

The failure of this part of "Comus" to come off according to promise is further complicated by Milton's unsuccessful attempt to establish a true intellectual conflict in the debate between Comus and the Lady. This is the most dramatic part of the poem and we are quite ready to agree with Johnson that it "wants nothing but a brisker reciprocation of objections and

replies to invite attention and detain it." Its effectiveness as a dramatic episode is destroyed by a double flaw. Though it starts out with a certain amount of dramatic excitement, the scene quickly degenerates into a philosophic dialogue as eclectic as one of the dialogues of Cicero; and the initial excitement is immediately quieted by the fact that we know almost at once that there is no danger of the Lady's accepting the offer of Comus. The ethical premises of the debate are, in the second place, so mixed that the intellectual colors run together and are never well marked. Comus adopts a modified Neo-Epicurean argument that is reminiscent of the argument of Valla in the *De Voluptate* and for which we are somewhat unprepared because he had earlier been charmed by the Lady's song of "all Heaven's harmonies"—"a sober certainty of waking bliss"—and had talked of making her his queen. The Lady meets the first half of Comus's proposition with statements that he properly labels as "stoic," and she refells the second half with the quasi-Christian concept of virginity. She is half-rational, half-intuitive. Her character, like that of Comus, also undergoes a forest-change, for the innocent young maiden of the early poem becomes a *mulier doctissima* with the stern frigidity of an adolescent Isabella.

We feel that if Comus had maintained his character, he would have countered the Lady's objection with the rationalistic-materialistic premise of Valla: "Nullum in rebus humanis intolerabilius virginitate tormentum est"; but to our surprise he stands tongue-tied before the dogmatic rhetoric of the Lady. He falls back on the formula of the official Christian tempter and says, "Be wise and taste." If dramatic logic had been allowed to control this scene, Comus would have made his point. The Lady's victory seems as much a tour de force as the final half-Christian, half-Platonic admonition of the departing Spirit.

Denis Saurat put his finger on the central difficulty when he wrote: "There is little that is Christian about *Comus*."¹⁵ That is an accurate observation, and yet in recent times the masque has been too often read as a treatise on Christian morals. The virtues celebrated in the poem, as Milton and any other seven-

¹⁵ Milton: *Man and Thinker* (New York, 1925), p. 16.

teenth-century man knew, are Christian only by adoption. Both the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries were aware that Virtue existed before Grace. They noticed that among the pagans there were temperate nations like Sparta, temperate classes like the Magi, and many temperate individuals like Plato and Seneca. Not all the examples of this virtue dwelt in the circle of Saturn. Any Englishman of this era could also recount the virtuous lives of the chaste Penelope, Lucretia, Sophronia, Zenobia, and Timoclea or of the virginal Biblia, Daria, Spurina, and Euphrosyna. So the core of the theme is Christian only in terms of modern prejudice.

If the theme is not exclusively Christian, the time of the action is not necessarily fixed in the Christian era. The temporal circumstances are set by the pre-texts of Sabrina and Comus. Sabrina is the grandchild of Brute; she lived a generation after the fall of Troy and a great time before the birth of Christ. Though the dramatic time is nowhere stated, there is every reason to believe that Milton thought of the action as taking place in Pre-Christian Albion. The Spirit, for example, is not a guardian angel but a daemon (as he is called in the Trinity MS) from the *Timaeus*. He comes from "the starry threshold of Jove's court," talks constantly of the pagan pantheon, of nymphs of wood and steam, and, when he finally leaves the stage, goes off to a pagan paradise. Comus is no refugee from Pandaemonium but a true son of Circe and Bacchus—notice how contemporaneous he is with Sabrina—who is well-acquainted with the upperclass members of the pagan underworld. The Lady and her brothers spend most of their time in a Pre-Christian ambient and their conversation is studded with classical mythology. When the First Brother wishes to illustrate his lecture on chastity, he calls "Antiquity from the old schools of Greece" and tells us about Minerva and Diana and not about the virgin martyrs of the Primitive Church. So the hands of the dramatic clock point to pagan time.

But Milton refuses to maintain the obvious chronology. He tries for a temporal compromise by scattering Christian metaphors through the masque in order, I think, to accent the utilitarian fiction—as indicated by the first speech of the Spirit and the second or presentation song—that all of this actually hap-

pened to the Bridgewater children on their way to join their parents. This is a conflict similar to that of the "Ode" but it cannot be compromised by means of unassimilated Christian metaphors. The two chronological divisions simply cannot be washed together and the metaphors confuse the modern reader. Though the characters in general speak like pagans, they become momentarily Christian. The Spirit uses expressions like "sainted seats," and "sin-worn"; Comus mentions "the path to Heaven"; the First Brother capitalizes "Heaven" and refers to armored "angels"; and the Second Brother comes out with a Roman figure: "For who would rob a hermit of his weeds,/ His few books, or his beads, or maple dish." The Lady has most of the metaphors: "soft votarist in palmer's weeds," "Conscience," "Faith," "Hope," "hovering Angel," "He, the Supreme Good," who "would send a glistening guardian, if need were,/ To keep my life and honour unassailed." Instead of effecting a higher compromise, this method leads us to believe that the characters are uncertain about their theology and their chronology. But perhaps we have missed the real point of the masque.

In the printed and manuscript versions the title is "A Mask presented at Ludlow Castle." This may come as a surprise to some readers because the earliest critics refer to it as *Comus* and few twentieth century readers think of it under any other title. The reason for this is clear; the character of Comus dominates the masque whether Milton intended it to or not. One cannot imagine *Macbeth* if it were untitled getting the popular title of *MacDuff* or *Hamlet* becoming *Claudius*. Likewise if Milton's theme of chastity had been firmly brought home, this masque might be known as *The Mask of Chastity* or *The Mask of the Virgin*. There is, I believe, a reason for this.

Though chastity or virginity or temperance triumphs in the masque, the thing that is really interesting is the process of temptation. This is a theme dear to Milton's heart and one on which he elaborated in all of his greater works. If we can assume that the time is Pre-Christian, "Comus" takes a place as part of a tetralogy. In *Paradise Lost* we witness temptation at the beginning of things in heaven, in hell (the temptation of Sin), and on earth. In *Samson* we see temptation of an adumbrator of Christ under the Old Law and how it was withstood.

In *Paradise Regained* we watch the temptation of Godman and the ordination of the New Dispensation. In "Comus" we are spectators at a pagan temptation. From all of these vicarious experiences we can draw lessons for our own guidance. The masque seems to me to be an experimental piece in this respect, a prolegomenon to the three great poems. But the conflict between the dramatic theme and the moral theme is never made quite clear and never artistically compromised.

Because in the "Ode" the conflicts eventuate in higher compromises whereas in the masque the conflicts in external structure, in pre-text, and in thematic texture continue to struggle for an equation that cannot be written, the "Ode" satisfies us esthetically and the masque does not. The cause for the failure of Milton to achieve this compromise in the masque results, I suspect, from Milton's constant artistic indecision which, as Waldock has demonstrated, accounts for ruptures in the logical technique of *Paradise Lost*. The history of "Comus" among the critics suggests that Milton was unable to convey his meaning through a dramatic form; hence it is probably a good thing that "Adam Unparadiz'd" became *Paradise Lost*. Perhaps Milton, too, learned from his experience with "Comus."

MILTON AND METAPHYSICAL ART: AN EXPLORATION

By ARNOLD STEIN

The traditional *Descriptio Rei* of Renaissance rhetoric was associated with painting. It was ideally a kind of speaking picture, to be presented, not simply, but with rhetorical "colors." It was meant to be looked at, and so executed that it should seem as if the writer had painted rather than told, and as if the reader had seen rather than read. When such descriptions had no strictly functional purpose, it was expected that the artist would make the most of his chance to luxuriate in a display of his craft—as Homer and Virgil had done.

I want to begin by looking at one such display of Milton's craft—or rather, at one aspect of that craft, the control of the tenses of the verbs. Satan has just ordered his standard raised.

All in a moment through the gloom were seen
Ten thousand Banners rise into the Air
With Orient Colours waving: with them rose
A Forrest huge of Spears: and thronging Helms
Appear'd, and serried Shields in thick array
Of depth immeasurable:

(*Paradise Lost*, I, 544 ff.)

It is in the past tense; *were seen* sets the time. But the effect of *rise* and *waving* is to move the action out of the past and make it seem out of time. (The infinitive *rise* dominates the passive *were seen*: partly because the preposition is omitted, and partly because *rise* is rhythmically the climax of its line and the preceding line.) Then the action returns definitely to the past with *rose*. One might look at it this way: the two verbs in the past tense are a kind of framework preceding and following the two verbs that give the impression of being in the present tense. Or look at it this way: all the details in a picture cannot be seen at once. The picture was there before the details could become discernible, so start it in the past tense, but tactfully. The banners rise with a kind of active immediacy that thrusts aside for the moment abstract logical time. For another moment time is suspended in the flutter

of the orient colors waving. Then the next details come into focus; their approach to us is in the past tense. We must remember that the past tense *is* the real tense of these lines, and that the present tense *was* an illusion. To the eye, the first details perceived seem to be happening as they are seen. But the details that emerge later, since they are later, are more easily subject to logical order. What seemed to be happening all at once, assumes a pattern of sequence.

We have been considering the picture dramatically, in terms of the impact upon us of the details. But what we have seen so far is only the background of the picture. Once the details have made their impact, and have emerged "through the gloom," they move no longer. They are the static background, and quite properly in the past tense. For this picture, we are now able to observe, is a verbal one; and we must not expect to see the details in quite the same order that we should expect if this were an actual painting before our eyes. When the background is finished the tense changes:

Anon they move
 In perfect *Phalanx* to the *Dorian* mood
 Of Flutes and soft Recorders; such as rais'd
 To highth of noblest temper Hero's old
 Arming to Battel, and in stead of rage
 Deliberate valour breath'd, firm and unmov'd
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat,
 Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
 With solemn touches, troubl'd thoughts, and chase
 Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
 From mortal or immortal minds.

They and their music move towards us, in the active present. But the heroic mood suggests other pictures (and sounds and feelings) to the mind, and these rise from the past. Part of the richness of the present procession moving forward are these associations with things that are past, and yet, when evoked, seem more present than past, more intensely present because they bring with them the richness of the past. Perhaps one ought to think of this as part of the depth of the foreground, part also—for the poet as painter—of the past inextricably involved in the present. This sense of time, as we have already seen, works both ways. Some of the participles have, I think,

a modifying effect that suggests the present. If this, together with my treatment of *rise* and *waving*, seems an unwarranted piece of subtlety, consider the following lines, which continue the quotation:

Thus they
Breathing united force with fixed thought
Mov'd on in silence to soft Pipes that charm'd
Thir painful steps o're the burnt soyle: and now
Advanc't in view they stand, a horrid Front
Of dreadful length and dazling Arms, in guise
Of Warriors old with order'd Spear and Shield,
Awaiting what command thir mighty Chief
Had to impose:

This too appears to be following the same kind of pattern of sequence that we observed in the first passage. Once the detail has become fixed in focus, it is put in the past tense. But the effect is not quite so simple as that. Present and past are woven together. The present participle *breathing* (undefined in time) introduces the past verb *moved*; and then the past participle *advanced* (undefined in time) introduces the present verb *stand*. There they are, brought forward and motionless, awaiting the command their chief "*Had* to impose!" (In its magnificent defiance of mere logic *had* confirms the complex depth of the picture.)

Then, with the emergence of new details, the present tense is used unequivocally:

He through the armed Files
Darts his experienc't eye, and soon traverse
The whole Battalion views, thir order due,
Thir visages and statures as of Gods,
Thir number last he summs. And now his heart
Distends with pride, and hardning in his strength
Glories: For never since created man,
Met such imbodied force, as nam'd with these
Could merit more then that small infantry
Warr'd on by Cranes:

The historical allusions lead us once more into the past tense, and by the time we have wound our way through a dozen lines and returned to Satan the tense of the foreground has become definitely past. It remains so through a passage of extended description not concerned with motion. And then:

He now prepar'd
To speak; whereat their doubl'd Ranks they bend
From Wing to Wing, and half enclose him round
With all his Peers; attention held them mute.
Thrice he assay'd. . . .

The device of the historical present is familiar enough in Milton, and in other writers. What I believe to be unusual is the shifting back to the past tense immediately after the present tense has been used to bring a part of the picture forward. But even this, in the example under consideration, is a piece of relatively simple technique compared with the complicated effects of the earlier passages.

To look backward then: the description is a painting, and plainly not a photographic one in its characteristics. It skilfully arranges depths and chiaroscuro; it is vague and sharp, suggestive and defined, real and unreal. It secures all these effects while it is obeying literary laws, and this though the final effects may approximate those of painting.

Something has been gained, I think, by isolating the verbs. But I do not want to suggest that I have illuminated more than a single important device in this literary painting. Before proceeding to more important considerations, I want to comment briefly on some matters that I cannot settle but do not wish to ignore. For one thing, the phrase "Of depth immeasurable," in the first passage, confirms the effect of the verb tenses, and gives the impression of depth so frequent in the backgrounds of Renaissance paintings. Another phrase, "in guise/Of Warriors old"—especially the *in guise*—brings in the note of strangeness, the imaginative unreality through which art achieves the real. Another observation that deserves note is the fact that for the poet a picture, however rich in details, need not be confined to one frame. The picture may move imperceptibly into a second picture and then into a third, the foreground of one becoming the background of the next, and so on. And yet the effect (except perhaps for the technique of the close-up) may remain closer to the effect of painting than of cinema.

Another, and more important, problem I have not considered is this: the way the art of music contributes to the verbal painting. I should say that, though there are special musical

effects, in general the music is conveyed after the manner of painting. But some qualifications are necessary. It is true that the verse is delicately sensitive to the kinds of music being played by the "Flutes and soft Recorders": a calm noble march at the beginning, a rhythm and verbal music more personal and tentative and consoling at the end. But though we have something of the immediate effect of "Flute and soft Recorders," the effect is less definite and less complete than some of the immediate effects of painting that we have already studied. Perhaps we have an approximation of the range and rhythm of the pipes, but little more. Another musical effect may be observed. The poetry, more in the manner of music than painting, can repeat the theme, altered and enriched:

Mov'd on in silence to soft Pipes that charm'd
Thir painful steps o're the burnt soyle. . . .

But this must be qualified too, for painting also can work by repetition, of color or line. (All this must be understood as tentative, for I am basing my generalizations upon personal experience of effects rather than upon intimate knowledge of technique.) The distinction I think I see is partly a matter of space: in music (as in a literary picture) you cannot take in the whole outline at once; you must wait for development; and in this sense it is possible to arrange a longer interval for the ear than for the eye. At least this seems to be so in the lines under consideration, where the return to the original theme occurs after the long development has erected the implications into a kind of musical architecture. To me this musical enrichment of the theme is an effect parallel with the poetic richness of the procession that moves forward in the present while evoking associations with things that are past.

These, I think, are the chief effects that are close to the art of music. But the lines just quoted illustrate the really closer affinity with painting. The illusion of music is neither so immediate nor so complete in its details as the illusion of painting. In verbal painting we seem to be seeing the pictures, but we seem less to be hearing the music than to have heard it. A man with eyes, but no knowledge of painting, could still visualize these verbal paintings. But he could not, if he had not been a listener who had experienced music, imagine these musi-

cal effects; though *we* can, through the poet's mediation in these lines, hear music with our inner ear, by means of the esthetic memory. The painter could do most of this too. And Milton, in creating the illusion of music (though my qualifications are disproportionately long), has worked mostly in the visual manner of the painter. By the movement of his figures and by their faces, the painter could suggest the effects of the "Deliberate valour" and the power (perhaps on different faces) "to mitigate and swage." Also more available to the painter than to the composer of Milton's day is the art that can create the sensations of walking with painful steps over burnt soil—and all while being charmed by music.

2

So far I have been trying to convince myself and the reader that I have worked over these lines diligently. By mastering some of the externals I have been trying to earn the right—to qualify, as it were—to make statements about the internal qualities of the poetry. I want to say something about why I feel this to be great art and great poetry. Reasonable caution would avoid the word *great*. But I have gone almost as far as I can with reason and caution. I am reminded of the chronology of my experience with the passage: I *felt* it to be great poetry before I had much reasonable confirmation that it was even great art. (I am using the word *art* arbitrarily: to refer to the technique, the management of the materials, the form. I am quite aware that it is a critical error to separate form and content; but I am equally aware that it is a more serious distortion to act as if form were everything, and this is what often happens when critics reverentially refuse to consider content. Critics who insist that form and content are indissoluble—even for the temporary convenience of critical purposes—should stop talking about technique; which I do not propose to do.) Perhaps the preceding analysis helps confirm the feeling that the passage is great art. But I have no illusion that anything important has been said about the poetry.

Let us return to the art. One possible standard of greatness has been implicit in the discussion—the richness of the complexity; and more important, the degree to which one can

significantly analyze the complexity and still not reach any essential mysteries. By this standard the first stanza of Mr. Wallace Stevens' *Sunday Morning* is great art.

Complacencies of the peignoir, and late
 Coffee and oranges in a sunny chair,
 And the green freedom of a cockatoo
 Upon a rug mingle to dissipate
 The holy hush of ancient sacrifice
 She dreams a little, and she feels the dark
 Encroachment of that old catastrophe,
 As a calm darkens among water-lights.
 The pungent oranges and bright, green wings
 Seem things in some procession of the dead,
 Winding across wide water, without sound.
 The day is like wide water, without sound,
 Stilled for the passing of her dreaming feet
 Over the seas, to silent Palestine,
 Dominion of the blood and sepulchre.

And so it is. The intricate complexity of attitudes is woven into its pattern of sounds, rhythms, meanings, and suggestions, with the essential attitude controlling all, yet allowing the other attitudes their due measure of freedom, but no more. I quote this stanza because of the attitudes, which give the significant depth to the complexity. Of course the attitudes cannot be separated from the suggestions in the words and rhythms. That is always true, but the reverse is not necessarily true: the words and rhythms can very easily be separated—they are in many poems—from any genuine and significant complexity of attitude. Then we have a surface complexity.

Let us look at an example, for the distinction is of course a relative one. This is the third and concluding stanza of a poem about the "perfect square" of a city block. It is one of Mr. Karl Shapiro's early poems.

O neat, O dead, what feeling thing
 Could buy so bare! O dead, O neat,
 What beating heart could sink to buy
 The copy of the die complete.

It is certainly not just verbal in its complexity, and the ideas are inseparable from the expression—as in great art. But a

principle of balance is violated. Here the expression flauntingly dominates the ideas, as in another kind of minor art the ideas dominate the expression. The complexity is meretricious; it annoys us when we see through it, for the contrivance is not justified by the results. In this sense all ingenuity, all complex art, runs a risk: it compels us to admiration and study. In these lines, once we have picked the rhetorical devices apart, we cannot recognize even the *disiecti membra poetæ*; and somehow we cannot put the pieces together again, for there was no inviolable mystery that we could not get at. Everything came apart, for it was all surface; and what ingenuity and will can put together, ingenuity and will can take apart.

I am dwelling on this because there are kinds of complexity that must not be allowed to pass for great art. I am not discarding—I merely am not discussing—poetry that gets complicated effects through “simplicity.” That is a great art which does not come within the scope of this discussion. I am, however, rejecting surface complexity. It is apparent that there are formulas for being complex; and many modern poets have mastered them, just as poets in every age have deceived themselves with formulas. One may, for instance, believe that poetry develops and enriches language without regarding that benefit as more than a kind of by-product of poetry. And though one certainly should not minimize the importance of medium, neither should one elevate the medium over the art. To push this a little further: there is a distinction between variations on a theme and variations on variations. It is plain enough which kind of complexity works by surface multiplication.

Milton’s variations are on a theme, a traditional rhetorical theme. His basic method, though not necessarily better than Mr. Stevens’ in *Sunday Morning*, is certainly different. The subtleties do not advertise themselves as subtleties, though they do, and quite rightfully, in *Sunday Morning*. Milton gets his great effects through making the ordinary extraordinary. The natural habits of the English language are made to yield miracles without seeming to. But, I repeat, that is only one method of art; it is not a standard. More significant is Milton’s not really trying to paint or make music with words. It is true that he did not have easily available—as do modern

poets—the techniques for such enterprises (though baroque artists were dabbling in that sort of thing). But it is clear that he had no major interest in such a performance. He wished to get some effects of painting and music, but for a purpose in poetry; and the other arts are perfectly subordinated to poetry. Could Milton have known the symbolists we might have had more and different musical effects; or from Mr. Stevens he might have learned some important devices for suggesting the effects of painting in verse. But would he have done much more in this passage? And would that have made the art greater?

These questions cannot of course be answered. But they are worth asking and, even indirectly, trying to answer. What *is* the purpose of this passage? To return to our rhetorical definition: it is a *descriptio rei*, not serving any immediate functional purpose and therefore an opportunity for the artist to display his skill. Milton has done this, though he has—if we wish to speak more precisely—rather displayed the effects of his skill and concealed the causes. He has, incidentally, been providing pleasure, not unimportant in a long poem. Part of the pleasure lies in our recognizing the concealed art, as the pleasure in another kind of art might lie in recognizing and apprehending the obscure, or in appreciating the brilliance of ingenious new tricks of style that say what has been unsayable. A value-judgment is not strictly relevant. Milton simply preferred certain kinds of technical triumph that suited his art and its purposes. But this passage is not merely a technical performance, a virtuosic piece. As Milton subordinated the arts of painting and music to the art of poetry—I risk the tedious—he subordinated the art of poetry to something else.

The immediate goal in this passage (it is really involved in the pleasure, for without Ciceronian “pleasing” there could be no “moving”) is to create an important kind of realism—to make Satan and his cohorts real and credible antagonists. But a larger goal—the whole poem—helps free the poet from any over-anxiety to make the immediate goal a striking success in itself. He can work with a large hand that does not have to linger trembling over the fine effects, trying to make them finer. If Milton performs a minor miracle of craftsmanship,

the reader is not invited to pause in admiration and study. Nor is the reader of Milton compelled to pause or else miss what is most important in the poem—a surface complexity which must be unraveled, and which, when unraveled, tells all, and so loses the newness that was indispensable to its charm. Such an art—the opposite, exaggerated, of Milton's—makes exquisite variations on itself, saying its few things over and over, perhaps beautifully, with no integral pattern of growth and enrichment, but only a peripheral growth, in shades of perception, in cobweb-fine nuances of words; it waxes old like a garment, and the disenchanted reader must, if his taste is that of the writer's, pass on in search of new newnesses.

Perhaps the most distinctive quality of this passage of Milton's is the sense of bigness that informs it. Subordination is one sign of the bigness. Painting and music, the miracles of craftsmanship—these are securely smaller than the part, and the part is smaller than the whole. It is a sense of the whole that makes for the bigness: that allows the poet to create the exquisite without stopping there, that allows him his free and reckless development of larger implications which pass beyond the immediate goal of achieving realism. Milton's realism needs further definition, but we can best approach that indirectly.

Consider two quite different poems that illustrate the same important kind of realism that distinguishes Milton's lines: One is immediate and sensual, Yeats' *Leda and the Swan*; the other is the fairy-tale reality of the child's world, Mr. John Crowe Ransom's *Bells for John Whiteside's Daughter*. They both have something very significant in common—a concern for more than the immediate, for more than the sensuous perception of things. Had Yeats' poem ended after the first half dozen lines, it would have been, not a greater poem, but a more surprising accomplishment in realism. Such realism—not photographic perceptions of the surfaces of things—seems to come from realizing the inner qualities of things; and such realization apparently cannot be gained from the things alone. It is the pattern, the framework, the larger meaning of Leda's experience—all this and chiefly this that permits Yeats to apprehend so greatly the brute immediate: for it is more than immediate. It is a critical distortion, but still illuminating, to compare with

it Edmund Spenser's accomplished art of soft drowsy sensuality. It has its framework, the moral purpose, but that is for the most part carefully kept from putting pressure on the immediately sensual; and it is usually cached safely several stanzas ahead, to reappear at the right or wrong moment.

If what I have said about *Leda and the Swan* holds, then the basic observation also applies to these stanzas from *Bells for John Whiteside's Daughter*:

Her wars were bruited in our high window.
We looked among orchard trees and beyond
Where she took arms against her shadow,
Or harried unto the pond

The lazy geese, like a snow cloud
Dripping their snow on the green grass.
Tricking and stopping, sleepy and proud,
Who cried in goose, Alas,

For the tireless heart within the little
Lady with rod that made them rise
From their noon apple-dreams and scuttle
Goose-fashion under the skies!

How did everything in this childish world come to be so real, so clear and sharp before us that it can quite disregard the realities of a grown-up world? Not because it is a pure fragmentary vision; but because it is the terrible memory of an adult, of one who is trying to find a way to deal with his grief over the death of the child. The pressure of his need gives him insight, though the insight cannot afterwards carry over completely into the grown-up world of death and funeral. He returns, from his memory, with some evidence of relief, but the special quality of his insight was part of the child's world, not of the adult's: only as an adult tormented by the mystery of the child's death could he enter the kingdom of the child. It was a painful seriousness (which, too easily, can blind the moralist to moral values in literature) that prevented Mr. Winters from recognizing the larger meaning of this poem. For it is not a lovely fragment but a perfect poem—and because of the mutual relationship between the larger meaning and the specific memory.

To return to Milton: his realism is distinguished by this same concern for more than the immediate. His subordination, with its sense of the whole, is one external sign of the

bigness that can record the immediate and yet transcend it. I said earlier that one possible standard of greatness in poetry was involved in the extent of significant complexity one could discover without reaching any essential mystery. We are arrived at a place where this problem must be grappled with; for one mystery, as I see it, is in the sense of bigness that comprehends, but is not limited by, the immediate. The lines most directly concerned are these:

Anon they move
 In perfect *Phalanx* to the *Dorian* mood
 Of Flutes and soft Recorders; such as rais'd
 To highth of noblest temper Hero's old
 Arming to Battel, and in stead of rage
 Deliberate valour breath'd, firm and unmov'd
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat,
 Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
 With solemn touches, troubl'd thoughts, and chase
 Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
 From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they
 Breathing united force with fixed thought
 Mov'd on in silence to soft pipes that charm'd
 Thir painful steps o're the burnt soyle.

The opening lines are a noble expression of one powerful attitude towards life. It is an attitude of stern self-discipline, not dependent upon the undisciplinable energy of rage. It is one answer to the challenge of life, but it is an answer that affirms its superiority by shutting out all alternatives and qualifications. It offers the discipline, complete: *deliberate valor, united force, fixed thought*. It is noble, as superiority to self, as quiet certainty, always are. Though it is an answer best maintained while marching, it can shame into silence him who would argue or qualify. For men marching under discipline towards a goal are willing to sacrifice their lives; and that is an argument difficult for other men to contradict, except by marching themselves. And yet, if we are not marching we recognize this answer as a limited one. The lines, beginning "Nor wanting power," and through "From mortal or immortal minds," express another attitude. This is not so much an answer as an acceptance of what the earlier lines deny, by willed suppression: an acceptance, neither defiant nor submissive, of the human condition.

This whole passage has an important purpose to fulfil. The fallen angels, and their leader, are full of doubts and fears, but they still desperately wish to be defiant. The only certainty they are capable of feeling is that of marching men. Yet this feeling is for fallen angels more a refuge than a strength. They stiffen *in* this feeling; the verse tells us so through the fiction of describing the music; and also tells us, with a wonderful indirectness, that the music is not "wanting power to mitigate and swage"—in the context a tremendous admission. Such comforts are necessary. The artist is great enough in his sympathy, and in his art, to feel his way into the villains of his piece. Suddenly they are angels, though fallen; and like us, underneath our various exteriors, they are dependent upon comforts that are outside themselves. Satan and his legions of devils, the fallen angels, all humanity—for a moment they fuse and become one in their strength and weakness. It is only for a moment, but it is a bold moment.

It is instructive to compare with Milton's line, "Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain," another distinguished series of nouns:

For the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain.

This isn't the same thing, and the difference is not merely a matter of *neither-nor* instead of *and*. If we accept what is said it is big enough and final enough. But is it more than a point of view, a desperate evasion proposed as an answer?—understandable certainly, but so is the answer of marching men. The realism of the "darkling plain" is impressive enough, but a desperate thrust at finality is almost always impressive. We can accept, in art, many possible views of life; but if a limited and precise view is presented, it can hardly escape judgment in terms of both the validity of the view and the validity of the presentation. I do not want to become involved in this problem now; I want only to emphasize this distinction between the reality of Arnold's lines and the reality of Milton's. The view presented by Milton is of a different and bigger quality. It sees the human situation "steadily" and "whole." It recog-

nizes the tangible and intangible pains, but recognizes too that they can be—not ended but *chased*; and from mortal *or*—this is the peak, suddenly and quietly mounted, from which all human horizons move magnificently back!—immortal minds. It is a reality for anyone who has not hardened into absolute certainties his human apprehension of things.

3

I have some generalizations to make, some earned by the preceding discussion, some not. This passage of Milton's measures up to the most important standards of metaphysical art, and helps put some unimportant standards in their place.

It has the kind of complexity that counts—an inner and functional complexity. If it is not elliptical, compressed, and intense in every phrase, that does not matter much. For that is not an important standard—it may suit the strategy of *The Waste Land* very well, but not that of the *Four Quartets*. What is important is that this passage has genuine tension. Nor is irony the only possible test, the only means by which a poet can "earn" his vision. (I say this with sincere respect for the valuable work done by some of our modern critics. Perhaps they have done their work too well. There is point in Mr. Ransom's witty remark: "We should be so much in favor of tragedy and irony as not to think it good policy to require them in all our poems, for fear we might bring them into bad fame.") Milton's view of the way to earn a vision does not exclude irony, as we use the word today, but it is closer to what we call "the drama of structure": "As therefore the state of man now is, what wisdom can there be to choose, what continuance to forbear, without the knowledge of evil? . . . that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary."

Tension is like complexity: it can be inner tension, or it can be surface tension. In many a modern metaphysical poem every line has tension. And all the shocks and dissonances may, in Mr. Joseph Warren Beach's phrase, "cancel" each other out. An esthetic that puts a premium on small ironies may not follow the separate ironies far below the surface. And so all the lively variations will proceed from the one theme; the theme itself is just accepted: everything proceeds from it,

lively and illuminating, but no more. The theme itself remains static, though the details may not. But the implications of the details do not really trouble and work the theme to make it a rich imaginative thing, greater and more significant by the suggestive evolvment of its implications. The difference is that between illustrating an idea and developing it with artistic imagination. It is the difference between using the esthetic of tension as a formula and using it as a standard.

The greater the faith perhaps the greater the challenge that can be afforded, the greater "recklessness," the greater tension. This faith, of course, is quite different from a settled commitment not earned *in* the work of art. Perhaps a settled core of belief is necessary for such tension. I do not know. But certainly essential is faith in the validity of the artist's view, and in the reality that can be reached through the ordered—yet miraculously independent—struggle of a dramatic structure. The poet who could produce his lines about music, and as accompaniment to the forward march of the legions of devils, achieved a great tension. Compared with it, the minor devices of irony make a tinkling sound.

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WHIG AESTHETICS: A PHASE OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TASTE

By SAMUEL KLIGER

1

The close correlation of political party-ideals with aesthetic appreciation of the fine arts constitutes an interesting chapter in the history of "taste" in England during the eighteenth century. What may be called "Whig aesthetics" represents an eighteenth-century system of critical apologetics or a new canon of taste in which Tories and Whigs, in accordance with their respective political principles, found themselves divided in their judgments on the qualities in a work of art which constitute its beauty.

The political bias affecting the critic's taste was especially strong in architecture. Elsewhere, I have been able to show that the Gothic taste was a Whig taste.¹ The Gothic edifice came to stand for the entire liberalizing tendency of the Whig movement towards parliamentary supremacy unfettered by monarchical control. What is important in the discussion of architectural theory is the association formed in some eighteenth-century minds between Whig principles of popular government and the freedom from neo-classical restraints displayed in the inexhaustible imaginative energy of the Gothic building; from the opposing Tory point of view, the symmetry and balance of the Grecian building apotheosized the Tory aim of maintaining national stability through a vested aristocratic interest and a strong monarchy. In short, the movement towards freedom from neo-classical restraints in architecture found the same advocates and opponents as that towards freedom in political matters. The purpose of this essay is to show the parallel which the eighteenth century discovered—or pretended to discover—between parliamentary freedom and artistic freedom in garden-design.

At the very outset of any discussion of eighteenth-century

¹ Samuel Kliger, "The 'Goths' in England: an Introduction to the Gothic Vogue in Eighteenth Century Aesthetic Discussion," *MP*, 43 (1945). 107-17.

aesthetic theory, it is important to remind oneself again of the pitfall to be avoided in the classic-romantic dichotomy embalmed in the older text-books of eighteenth-century literature. Two ideas, as a necessary minimum, are essential to the understanding of the eighteenth-century critical mode. In the first place, no neo-classicist ever existed who taught that great poetry could be created by simply following the "rules," that art could dispense with the imagination; the neo-classicism represented basically an equilibrium of opposites in which "reason" and "nature" were the opposed terms, "reason" standing for judgment, decorum, regularity, the "rules," where "nature" stood for imagination, novelty, inspiration, a pleasing irregularity.² The equilibrium of opposites was more or less stable, but its constant tendency was towards instability in the direction of undue emphasis on either "reason" or "nature," especially when such exterior forces as Tory politics with its intrenched beliefs in security and the *status quo*, or contrariwise, the force of Whig politics with its stress on progress and an expanding future, tended to upset the equilibrium in either of the two directions.³ In the second place, the classic-romantic dichotomy can not answer satisfactorily questions it raises itself about the tendency in the period to correlate art and morals bi-laterally. Because of the equilibrium of opposites, the century took as its "religion" a rational compromise between extremes; the period sought, therefore, for a rational norm common to art and morals alike. In this way only, could politics (or religion, as Lovejoy has brilliantly shown) intervene at all in the discussions of the beautiful.

On both sides, Tory and Whig, of the question of style in gardening, much if not all of the discussion was so much critical shadow-boxing in response to a need for overcoming what the Tories affected to think were Whig prejudices for excessive aesthetic irregularity or, on the other hand, what the Whigs

² R. S. Crane, "English Criticism neo-classicism," in *Dictionary of World Literature*, ed. by Joseph T. Shipley (New York, 1943); the annual bibliography of eighteenth-century studies in the April number of *Philological Quarterly* since 1926 frequently questions the stale formula provided by the classic-romantic dichotomy and calls for a re-valuation of eighteenth-century literature.

³ Deism in religion, as Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy has shown, tended to shift the balance (and maintain it there) towards the neo-classical pole; see A. O. Lovejoy, "The Parallel of Deism and Classicism," *MP*, 29 (1932). 281-99.

thought were Tory prejudices for excessive aesthetic regularity. In reality, the Tory Chambers and the Whig William Mason, in their actual pronouncements on gardening style, were largely in agreement on the fundamental principle of combining "art" and "nature" suitably in an equilibrium of the opposing terms without undue emphasis on the one and corresponding neglect of the other. The arguments, therefore, for a Tory or a Whig taste, proceed largely on the basis of the mere accident that Chambers, having been appointed to tutor the young Prince of Wales in art, antagonized the Whigs as a result. If Chambers had not received a royal appointment, the Whigs might never have found fault with his principles of design.

2

The *World*, in two essays dated 1755 and 1756, condemns the irregularity of Gothic architecture and the exotic Chinese style of decoration. The two passages reveal the association formed in the Tory mind between aesthetic irregularity and the Whig clamor for popular liberty. Whitehead, in essay no. 153, connects the debased Gothic taste with "our modern notion of liberty which allows everyone the privilege of playing the fool, and of making himself ridiculous in whatever way he pleases." Essay no. 171 is also ironic on liberty in art and in politics:

. . . gives anyone the right to exalt the divinities of Pekin to the same degree of honour in his gallery paid to the Grecian Venus and Apollo, it would be an infringement upon British liberty to check his devotion.⁴

Samuel Bowden similarly detects an agitation set up by political factionalism:

But there is a party spirit and bigotry of taste, in matters of literature, and polite knowledge, as well as in religion, and politics.⁵

George Mason connects more directly than Bowden new tastes with Whig principles of liberty:

⁴ The *World* in Alexander Chalmers, *British Essayists* (London, 1802-03), Essays no. 153, Dec 4, 1755, vol 28; Essay no 171, April 8, 1756, vol 29

⁵ Samuel Bowden, *Poems on Various Subjects* (Bath, 1754), p xviii.

In this country, the spirit of liberty extends itself to the very fancies of individuals. Independency has become as strongly asserted in matters of taste, as in religion and government, it has produced more motley appearances, than perhaps a whole series of ages can parallel. Yet to this whimsical appearance of caprice, the modern improvements in gardening may chiefly be attributed.⁶

John Aikin, writing on gardening (1793), also reflects the current pattern of ideas which equated political liberty with a taste for "natural" art and tyranny with formal art:

Even moral ideas are brought in to decide the preference; and a taste for nature is said equivalent to a love for liberty and truth; while the votaries of art are pronounced slaves to formality and constraint.⁷

Washington Irving wrote home to America the amusing story of an embattled English squire defending his formal garden against the romantic "republican" garden:

He admired this fashion in gardening; it had an air of magnificence, was courtly and noble, and befitting good old family style. The boasted imitation of nature in modern gardening had sprung up with modern republican notions, but did not suit a monarchical government; it smacked of the leveling system. I could not help smiling at this introduction of politics into gardening, though I expressed some apprehension that I should find the old gentleman rather intolerant in his creed. Frank assured me, however, that it was almost the only instance in which he had ever heard his father meddle with politics; and he believed that he had got this notion from a member of parliament who once passed a few weeks with him. The squire was glad of any argument to defend his clipped yew-trees and formal terraces, which had been occasionally attacked by modern landscape gardeners.⁸

The term "nature" is the most sacred word in the eighteenth-century vocabulary of philosophic and aesthetic ideas;⁹ it is also the most multivocal of the period's terms, combining meanings which are very often in direct opposition to each other.

⁶ George Mason, *An Essay on Design in Gardening* (London, 1795), pp 50-1; originally published in 1768.

⁷ John Aikin, *Letters from a Father to his Son* (London, 1794, 3rd edition), "Letter XV," pp 148-9.

⁸ Washington Irving, "The Sketch Book," in *Works* (Nottingham Society ed'n, N. Y., n d), I 161.

⁹ Arthur O. Lovejoy, "'Nature' as an Aesthetic Norm," *MLN*, 42 (1947), 445-50.

As the passages quoted show, the term "nature" in the sense of irrepressible energy, novelty, formlessness, and antithetical to the same word in the sense of uniformity, decorum, regularity, is now also seen to stand in a Whig political perspective, bi-laterally covering moral and aesthetic meanings.

3

None of the passages quoted refers specifically to William Mason's poem *The English Garden*, but it offered a clear illustration of the parallel between parliamentary freedom and freedom in landscape design. The poem echoes an abiding faith in popular liberty, which in Mason's mind evidently is joined to aesthetic freedom.

The reference to Boston and the concluding lines on liberty point to Mason's American sympathies and his opposition to George III's policies:

the sons of Peace
Await the day, when, smarting with his wrongs.
Old England's Genius wakes; when with him wakes
That plain integrity, contempt of gold,
Disdain of slav'ry, liberal awe of rule
Which fixt the rights of people, peers and prince,
And on them founded the majestic pile
Of British Freedom;¹⁰

In Book II, Mason deals with the question of a fence to surround the garden. Mason's libertarianism is shown in the statement that the animals of the forest "proclaim their hate of thralldom," whereas

Nothing brooks
Confinement, save degenerate man alone,
Who deems a monarch's smile can gild his chains.¹¹

The formal garden is fenced with "tonsile yew," and Mason elevates his objection to this feature of the formal garden to a political level. In a second passage, he makes even clearer his preference for the wild, natural garden on a political basis:

¹⁰ William Mason, "The English Garden," in *Works* (London, 1811), I. 310-11; J. W. Draper, *William Mason: a Study in Eighteenth Century Culture* (N. Y., 1924)

¹¹ I. 248.

Each plant that springs
Holds, like the people of some free-born state,
Its right fair franchis'd;¹²

It is in some such sense as expressed in these lines that Washington Irving's squire objected to republican notions in gardening.¹³

Mason's satirical poems, the *Heroic Epistle* and the *Heroic Postscript*, and Walpole's notes thereon (printed for the first time by Paget Toynbee from the Harvard College manuscripts) continue the debate over Whig aesthetics. Walpole's notes on Mason's satirical poems make perfectly clear that the object of attack was not so much the landscape-designer and court-hireling Sir William Chambers as it was the Tory group who had persistently attacked all of Mason's poetical productions:

Sr William Chambers was a harmless Innovator on Taste; but Shebbeare, Sr John Dalrymple, Macpherson and Dr. Johnson were Assassins pensioned to asperse the Champions and Martyrs of Freedom, & to recommend the chains & massacres prepared for America.¹⁴

Additional notes by Walpole make clear the political connection of Mason's *English Garden*:

In Mr. Mason's Georgic of which the Subject is more elegant than the Roman's the living landscapes of Kent, Hamilton, & Brown will be preserved, when their groves are felled, & their lawns restored to the ploughshare, or desolated by Tyranny and Tax-gatherers.

¹² l. 268.

¹³ For another view of an eighteenth-century republican garden, see T Newcomb's *Mr Hervey's Contemplations on a Flower-Garden* (London, 1757), pp 16-7.

Frugal republic this, how neat, how plain?
Whate'er resembles the proud pomp of kings,
All ensigns of vain royalty that blaze
In princely palaces are banish'd hence,
Ne'er welcom'd in this modest green abode.

The poem goes on to describe a social chain-of-being in a garden which the poet somehow reconciles with his republicanism

Nor has the florist's care forgot to range
Each family in its distinct abode;
To different classes different spots assign'd.

For a similar chain-of-being in an eighteenth-century garden, see Henry Jones, *Clifton* (Bristol, 1767)

¹⁴ Paget Toynbee (ed.), *Satirical Poems Published Anonymously by William Mason with Notes by Horace Walpole* (Oxford, 1936), p. 32

His Poem will preserve the Science, or restore it should no specimens remain. At least it will show what a Paradise was England while she retained her Constitution—for perhaps it is no paradox to say, that the reason why Taste in gardening was never discovered before the beginning of the present century is, that it was the result of all the happy combinations of an Empire of Freemen, an Empire formed by Trade, not by a military & conquering Spirit, maintained by the valour of an Independent Property, enjoying long tranquility after Virtuous struggles, & employing its opulence & good sense on the refinements of rational Pleasure¹⁵

Striking obviously at the King's policy towards the American colonies, Walpole points out that the Romans did not cultivate "the amenities of the country" for the pleasure in gardening but "to facilitate the marching of legions against insurrection." Continuing, Walpole declares:

Considered in this light, Mr. Mason's *English Garden* is a beautifull Set of Cuts to a Commentary on our once-blessed Constitution. . . . The English Taste in Gardening is thus the growth of the English Constitution, & must perish with it.¹⁶

Swayed by their strong libertarianism, Mason and Walpole conspired, therefore, to establish, whether they knew it or not, the notion of a Whig taste in gardening to match the Whig taste for the Gothic style in architecture. Certainly the opponents of the informal garden associated, as we have seen, the new style of garden-design with Whiggism.

There is a good deal of aesthetic confusion in Mason's *English Garden*. As Draper points out, the notes which Mason supplied to his poem tend to place emphasis on rules and regularity whereas the scenes described in the poem itself are "romantic."¹⁷ Either political factionalism (in the two passages where it seems to be affecting the viewpoint) or a generally muddled aesthetics, or both, explain Mason's failure to see that in point of fact the Tory Chambers also held the equilibrium of opposites:

a judicious mixture of art and nature, an extract of what is good in both manners, would certainly be more perfect than either.¹⁸

¹⁵ Pp 43-5.

¹⁶ P. 45.

¹⁷ Draper, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

¹⁸ Sir William Chambers, *A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening* (London, 1772), p. viii.

was mellowed and softened by long experience and successive trials; and not less improved in spirit and energy. Such was the progress of our constitution, such is its character; such also was the progress of painting, such the character of its highest productions, at its brightest period.²⁰

Richard Payne Knight, the friend of Price, came to his defense in a poem entitled *The Landscape*. The poem includes lines deploring the Reign of Terror in France. Although Repton had not explicitly compared the excessive naturalness of Price's "picturesque" theory of gardening to the Reign of Terror, Knight reads the comparison into Repton's remarks. In rebuttal, Knight declares:

I assure Mr. Repton, however, that I will never follow the example which he has set, in his Letter to Mr. Price, of endeavouring to involve speculative differences of opinion, upon subjects of mere elegant amusement, with the nearest and dearest interests of humanity; and thus to engage the popular passions of the times in dispute, which I am certain that he, as well as every other candid and liberal man will, upon more mature reflection, wish to keep entirely free from them. To say that his own system or rural embellishment resembles the British constitution, and that Mr. Price's and mine resemble the Democratic tyranny of France, is a species of argument which any person may employ, on any occasion, without being at the expense either of sense or science.²¹

Thus it was that the movement in aesthetics towards a freer, more natural style of gardening became a party-issue between Whigs and Tories, between friends and enemies of the Ameri-

²⁰ Pp. 442-43

²¹ Richard Payne Knight, *The Landscape* (London, 1795, 2nd edition), p. 101. It is noteworthy that Knight, like his friend Price, has an evolutionary insight towards the growth of political institutions. Both Knight and Price see primitive wildness or excesses as a necessary initial stage. Growth, in their view, is ameliorative towards more liberty which preserves the original primitive ardor for liberty, restraining it without destroying it. Knight condemns (p. 93) the excesses of the French revolutionary rabble, but he makes his ultimate point

"Yet, from these horrors, future times may see
Just order spring, and genuine liberty"

Knight and Price, therefore, fasten on the element of restraint or regularity in Repton's balanced theory of design and attack it as premature, leading to tameness. Actually Repton and his opponents are in basic agreement on the need for a balance except that they express it in different ways. Knight's and Price's evolutionary point of view may possibly be interpreted as Rousseauistic, see A. O. Lovejoy, "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*," *MP*, 21 (1923), 165-86.

can and French struggles for liberty. The distinctive features of the entire dispute between Whigs and Tories (aside from the light it throws on the eighteenth century equilibrium of opposites) was, in the first place, its correlation of art and morals (political morals in this case). To understand the phenomenon, we must go back to Shaftesbury at least, if not to his philosophical mentors, the Cambridge Platonists, to see how the rational idea of "taste," bearing simultaneously ethical and aesthetic meanings entered into the stream of philosophic ideas in England.²² In the second place, the Whig appropriation of a freer aesthetic style, as if they had created it alone, is actually a transfer to the party of a contrast drawn earlier in the period between French servility under tyrants and English parliamentary liberalism, the inference being that the French were doomed to classical art. Sir William Temple's discovery of a *rapport* between English liberty and England's pre-eminent success in comedy; Dryden's attack on the excesses of French classical drama; Pope's sneers at French despotism; Shaftesbury's idea of an English national taste not yet crystallized but being created by analogy with English liberal government; Hurd's idea that blank verse was more suited to English freedom than rhyming verse—all these are elements in the movements which, while condemning "rule-ridden" France, paved the way for a Whig aesthetics.

4

Pope, in the *Essay on Criticism*, condemns rule-ridden France. Assimilating art to politics, he is making an appeal for liberalizing the rules in the name of English constitutional growth:

But critic-learning flourish'd most in France;
The rules a nation, born to serve, obeys;
And Boileau still in right of Horace sways.

²² For Shaftesbury's correlation of art and morals, see "Advice to an Author" (Robertson, 2 225-30), p. 237. "And thus the sense of inward numbers, the knowledge and practice of the social virtues, and the familiarity and favor of the moral graces, are essential to the character of a deserving artist and just favourite of the Muses. Thus are the Arts and Virtues mutually friends; and thus the science of virtuous and that of virtue itself become, in a manner, one and the same. . . For the accomplishment of breeding is, to learn whatever is decent in company or beautiful in arts. . ." See also W. G. Howard, "Good Taste and Conscience," *PMLA*, 25 (1910). 486-97.

But we, brave Britons, foreign laws despis'd,
 And kept unconquer'd and uncivilis'd;
 Fierce for the liberties of wit and bold,
 We still defied the Romans, as of old.²³

The passage, almost by itself, compels us to revise the antiquated notion of Pope as a rigid neo-classicist since it is plain that it speaks against the rules. But aside from this important consideration—to be dealt with later—Pope's scorn of rule-ridden France is an offshoot of a theory of climatic conditioning which will be interesting to trace.

In 1659, John Evelyn published anonymously *A Character of England*, pretending that he was a visiting Frenchman criticizing the "asymmetrie" of London's congested housing. The tract proceeds, however, to defend English architectural practice on the ground that the houses,

by their diversity of frontings do declare a freedome of our Subjects, that what they acquire by industry, may be bestowed at pleasure; not obliged to build so for the will of the Princes. Whereas the Citizens of Paris are so forced to uniformity, that their structures seem to be only one continued magnificent wall loop-hol'd.²⁴

In 1664, Evelyn relates the diversity of English architectural style to national temperament:

It is from the Asymmetry of our Buildings, want of decorum and proportion in our Houses, that the irregularity of our humours and affections may be shrewdly discerned.²⁵

A climate theory of humours was widely prevalent during the seventeenth century. It was even observed by both foreigners and natives that England's suicide rate was high because of the instability of English character. Evelyn thus traces, without mentioning the "rules" as such, aesthetic irregularity to the humours.

Sir William Temple combines, in one discussion of English

²³ Pope, *Essay on Criticism*, 3 711 ff

²⁴ *The Character of England* appeared in two editions in 1659 and was soon after attacked in a tract entitled *Gallus Castratus*. Evelyn published in the same year a third edition which is, however, merely a re-issue of the second edition with a new title page. See G. Keynes, *John Evelyn: A Study in Bibliography* [Cambridge, University Press, 1937], pp. 61-68). I quote from page 9 of the "third edition."

²⁵ John Evelyn, tr., *A Parallel of the Antient Architecture with the Modern by Roland Fréart* (London, 1707, 2nd edition), "Epistle Dedicatory" (signed 1664).

comedy, Evelyn's separate viewpoints toward English political liberty and English temperament as the anterior explanations of English aesthetic inventiveness. In the essay *Of Poetry* Temple undertakes to show that England was pre-eminent in comedy because of its pre-eminence in achieving political freedom. Temple's argument, briefly, is that in a free country there is more latitude for the development of eccentricities and "humours"; consequently, the outstanding success of English comedy is in its portrayal of humour-types. Temple says:

It may seem a defect in the antient Stage that the Characters introduced were so few, and those so common, as a Covetous Old Man, an Amorous Young, a Witty Wench, a Crafty Slave, a Bragging Soldier. The Spectators met nothing upon the Stage, but what they met in the Streets and at every Turn. All the Variety is drawn only from different and uncommon Events, whereas if the characters are so too, the Diversity and the Pleasure must needs be the more. But as of most general Customs in a Country there is usually some Ground from the Nature of the People or the Clymat, so there may be amongst us for this Vein of our Stage, and a greater Variety of Humor in the Picture, because there is a great Variety in the Life. This may proceed from the Native Plenty of our Soyle, the unequalness of our Clymat, as well as the Ease of our Government, and the Liberty of Professing Opinions and Factions, which perhaps our Neighbours may have about them, but are forced to disguise, and thereby they may come in time to be extinguish't. Plenty begets Wantonness and Pride, Wantonness is apt to invent, and Pride scorns to imitate. Liberty begets Stomach or Heart, and Stomach will not be Constrained Thus we come to have more Originals, and more that appear what they are; we have more Humours because every Man follows his own, and takes a Pleasure, perhaps a Pride, to shew it.²⁶

Temple does not mention France, but he describes the inhibiting effect of tyranny on comedy:

On the contrary, where the People are generally poor, and forced to hard Labour, their Actions and Lives are all of a Piece; where they serve hard Masters, they must follow his Examples as well as Commands, and are forced upon Imitation in small Matters as well as Obedience in the great: So that some Nations look as if they were cast all by one Mould, or Cut out all by one Pattern,—at least the common People in one, and the Gentlemen in another. They seem all of a sort in their Habits, their Customs, and even

²⁶ J. E. Spingarn, *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1908-09), 3. 104.

their Talk and Conversation, as well as in the Application and Pursuit of their Actions and their Lives.²⁷

Concluding his discussion with some recollections of choice humour-types he has personally known such as a laundress given to the reading of Epicurus, Temple says:

What Effect soever such a Composition or Medly of Humours among us may have upon our Lives or our Government, it must needs have a good one upon our Stage, and has given admirable Play to our Comical Wits. So that in my Opinion there is no Vein of that sort, either Antient or Modern, which Excels or Equals the Humour of our Plays.²⁸

Following Temple, other writers similarly detected a *rapport* between liberty and comedy. Congreve, in his essay *Concerning Humour in Comedy* (1695), remarks:

I look upon Humour to be almost of English Growth, at least, it does not seem to have found such increase on any other soil. And what appears to be the reason of it is the Greater Freedom, Privilege, and Liberty which the Common People of England enjoy. . . .²⁹

Temple's influence was exerted directly on Steele as the *Guardian* paper no. 144 shows:

It is a very just and common observation upon the nations of this island, that in their different degrees, and in their several professions and employments, they abound as much and perhaps more, in good sense than any people; and yet, at the same time there is scarce an Englishman of any life and spirit, that has not some odd cast of thought, some original humour that distinguishes him from his neighbor. Hence it is that our comedies are enriched with such a diversity of characters, as is not to be seen upon any other theatre in Europe.

Steele continues, quoting Temple at length, and ends by asserting English liberty. In condemning popery, he may mean France:

So long as our wit and humour continue, and the generality of us will have their own way of thinking, speaking, and acting, this nation is not like to give quarter to any invader, and much less

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp 104-5

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p 106

²⁹ *The Complete Works of William Congreve*, ed Montague Summers (Soho, 1923), 3. 167.

to bear with the absurdities of popery, in exchange for an established and a reasonable faith.³⁰

Neither Temple, Congreve, nor Steele have importunate doubts concerning the "rules," although the implication left by their admiration of English comic practice is on the side of liberalizing the "rules." It was left to John Dryden in his *Essay of Dramatic Poesy* to develop more systematically and thoroughly their observations on the liveliness of English humours-comedy in terms of a sharp contrast with the regularity of French drama. Neander constantly compares the liveliness of English drama with the dulness of French drama:

And this leads me to wonder why Lisideius and many others should cry up the *barrenness* of the French plots, above the *variety* and *copiousness* of the English . . . by their [the French] *servile* observations of the Unities of Time and Place, and integrity of scenes he means by the latter, their avoidance of the English practice of mixing tragedy and comedy in tragi-comedy, they have brought on themselves that *dearth of plot* and *narrowness of imagination*, which may be observed in all their plays. . . . For, if you consider the plots, our own are more *quick* and *fuller of spirit*. . . .³¹

Dryden offers a curious version of the theory of national temperament. The even and dull regularity of French plays, he says,

may suit well enough with the French; for as we, who are a more sullen people, come to be diverted at our plays, so they, who are of an airy and gay temper, come thither to make themselves more serious. . . .³²

What Dryden is really seeking is a balance of "art" and "nature," regularity and liveliness; both qualities are present in the best art. Therefore, Neander says:

To conclude on this subject of relations; if we are to be blamed for showing too much of the action, the French are as faulty for discovering too little of it: a mean betwixt both should be observed by every judicious writer. . . .³³

Pope's sneer at political France has led him, in the passage

³⁰ Steele, *Guardian*, no. 144 (1713).

³¹ *Essays of John Dryden*, ed W. P. Ker (Oxford, 1. 70, 76, 78. Italics are my own.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

quoted above, to overstate the case against the "rules" in the line:

We still defied the Romans, as of old.³⁴

But, if we read further, we note that Pope, like Dryden, redresses the balance in favor of the art-nature equilibrium:

Yet some there were, among the sounder few,
Of those who less presumed, and better knew,
Who durst assert the juster ancient cause,
And here restored the Wit's fundamental laws.³⁵

No one of the writers we have discussed is an Aristotelian, that is, a critic treating formal aspects of art independent of makers or readers. The readers are not treated as mere readers but as climatically or politically conditioned readers. The critics overstate their cases, of course, since they would probably have admitted under question that the qualities of a work of art are dependent only in part on conditions of milieu or political affiliation, the rest being a problem of formal structure and design. The period's tendency to correlate art with politics, religion, and morals drew criticism out of the orbit of Aristotelian exegesis.

5

It would be a simple matter to show that numerous writers (including Percival Stockdale, Lewis Theobald, Alexander Gerard, Oliver Goldsmith) during the eighteenth century connect English political liberty with relaxed "rules," but no use-

³⁴ The line refers to ancient British history, to Boadicea's defiance of the Romans.

³⁵ Pope, *Essay on Criticism*, 3 718 ff.; Roscommon is higher in his praises of France than either Dryden or Pope but even so Roscommon has reservations on the point of English superior "energy":

And Europe still considerably gains
Both by their France good example and their pains
From hence our generous emulation came,
We undertook and perform'd the same.

However, Roscommon adds:

But who did ever in French authours see
The comprehensive English energy?
The weighty bullion of one sterling line
Drawn to French wire, would through whole pages shine.

(Roscommon, *Essay on Translated Verse*, in *Chalmers*, 8 261 ff.)

ful purpose would be served. However, three additional manifestations of this association stand out. First, foreign observers take it up.³⁶ Secondly, Shaftesbury's *Letter Concerning Design* is outstanding for its sensitive treatment of the idea. Shaftesbury believes that an English national taste had not yet crystallized, but he is certain that the political freedom granted to Englishmen will be the determining factor shaping the national taste.³⁷ Thirdly, Hurd argues against blank verse by citing the example of Milton. He connects Milton's Whiggism with the deplorable practice: "So that his love of liberty, the ruling passion of his heart, perhaps transported him too far."³⁸ Apparently, Hurd had distorted Milton's own remark in the prefatory note to *Paradise Lost*:

This neglect of rime . . . is to be esteemed an example set, the first in English, of ancient liberty recovered to heroic poem from the troublesome and modern bondage of riming.

There is not a tinge of political coloration in Milton's statement except the bare, non-political term "liberty." The connection formed in Hurd's mind between Milton the poet and Milton the secretary to Cromwell is only one reflection among the several we have seen of the contrast between Tory conservatism and Whig liberalism, French despotism and English freedom, which, in their aesthetic cognates, argued, in some English circles at least, for freedom from the more restricting elements of neo-classical aesthetics.

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³⁶ The French translator of Thomas Whately's *Observations on Modern Gardening* remarks "Parmi les singularités que nous offrent les Anglois dans tous les genres, et qui caracterisent leur génie libre, et ennemi de toutes les regles . . ." (*L'Art de Former les Jardins Modernes*, Paris, 1791, preface by the translator)

³⁷ "When the free spirit of a nation turns itself this way, judgments are formed . . . So much, my Lord, do we owe to the excellence of our national constitution and legal monarchy. . . ." (*A Letter Concerning Design* [written 1712, printed in 1732 in the 5th edition of the *Characteristics*, pp 22-3, in *Second Characters*], ed Benj. Rand, Cambridge, Mass, 1914)

³⁸ Richard Hurd, "On the Idea of Universal Poetry," in *Works* (London, 1811), 2. 24.

WILLIAM DEAN HOWELLS' THEORY OF CRITICAL REALISM

By EVERETT CARTER

Vernon Louis Parrington gave the name "critical realism" to that type of fiction which reports truthfully warped social relationships so that men may study and improve them; and until recently, critical realism has dominated modern American fiction. Yet William Dean Howells, whom Parrington called "the prophet"¹ of the new movement has been disowned by his disciples. Dreiser thought Howells well-meaning but ineffective; Sinclair Lewis said he was a piece of deadwood which Dreiser had to clear from the path of American literature before it could progress; and historians of literary theory have either ignored Howells, as Norman Foerster did,² or have repeated charges that he was a Victorian moralist³ or an uncritical optimist.⁴ Was Howells genteel and complacent, or was he truly a critical realist? Did he believe in and fight for the theory of fiction which is a major theme in contemporary American letters?

A clue to the answer to these questions, one observer has already sensed, must lie in the slender volume called *Criticism and Fiction* which Howells published in 1891. This is the work which is most frequently quoted in critical appraisals of Howells. This is the book in which appeared the statement that has haunted critics of Howells to this day—the assertion that in America "the wrong from class to class has been almost inappreciable," and that the American novelist therefore confines himself to "the more smiling aspects of life."⁵ E. H. Cady, sensing the inapplicability of the phrase to Howells' later life, has tried to explain it away.⁶ But despite Cady's efforts,

¹ Vernon Louis Parrington, "The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America," *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1930), 3 241.

² Norman Foerster, *American Criticism* (New York, 1928)

³ George De Mille, *Literary Criticism in America* (New York, 1931), 184

⁴ Bernard Smith, *Forces in American Criticism* (New York, 1936), 165

⁵ *Criticism and Fiction* (New York, 1891), 128

⁶ E. H. Cady, "A Note on Howells and 'The Smiling Aspects of Life,'" *American Literature* (May, 1945), 17 175-178. Mr Cady has called attention to the ubiquity of this phrase in American scholarship on Howells.

the phrase and its implications remain. Now a theory of realism which defines the aim of fiction as the criticism of existing social forms must be the product of a mind dissatisfied with the society of which it is a part. Before it is possible seriously to consider Howells as the advocate of critical realism, then, it is necessary to explain this strange statement regarding "the smiling aspects." Fortunately the explanation is there, hidden away beneath the maze of complicating circumstance surrounding the composition of the volume of critical essays which heretofore has been assumed to be the manifesto of realism in America.

1

The history of *Criticism and Fiction* begins with the series of monthly critical essays in *Harper's*, a series which appeared as the regular department called "The Editor's Study." The department had been suggested to Howells by H. M. Alden in a conversation at the beginning of 1886, at the same time that Howells concluded a contract with the firm calling for "at least one short novel every year, with at least one farce, and as much more as I could or liked in the various kinds I was supposed to be expert in." Howells understandably balked at committing himself to a several-thousand-word monthly essay in addition to this staggering amount of work. For, as he wrote further of the commitment:

I had distinctly objected to it as forming a break in my fictioning . . . the effect would be detrimental to me as a novelist. I still think I was right, and that turning aside to critical essaying at that period of my career, when all my mind tended to fictioning, had the effect I feared.⁷

Nevertheless, he agreed to do the job, and he regularly turned out his monthly stint until 1892. In the last essay, which appeared in March, he announced the intended publication of *Criticism and Fiction*:

Not content with the passing result of his monthly ministrations of gall and wormwood, the ill-advised Study-presence thought to bottle a portion of it and offer it to the public, with the label "Criticism and Fiction."⁸

⁷ Howells, writing in J Henry Harper, *The House of Harper* (New York, 1912), 321.

⁸ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's* (March, 1892), 84. 642

Criticism and Fiction, then, was avowedly a product of the scissors and pastepot. Howells made a book up of reprints from articles which he had not wanted to write in the first place, and which he regarded as a vexing distraction from his main job of writing fiction. When it came to wielding the scissors, therefore, it is not surprising that he used them with haste; and this haste explains why much of the book is vague. It also precludes acceptance of the work as a unified piece of writing.

The general technique he used was to clip passages from the "Studies" which dealt in general terms with either criticism or the art of fiction. He then arranged those excerpts dealing with criticism under the Roman numerals I-XIII, and those dealing more with the art of fiction under the numerals XIV-XXVIII.⁹ And he reprinted these excerpts with only the very minor changes needed to take them out of the magazine and into a book—the transformation of the editorial "we" to the personal "I," and the elimination of references to the "Study." The amount of new material written for the book is negligible, and consists entirely of short transitions which he supplied, in eleven passages, to bridge the jump from section to section. Elsewhere, he begins new thoughts and new sections without transitions.

This policy of organization, in itself, makes for lack of direction and total impact. But even more prejudicial to the coherence of the work is his surprising custom of taking paragraphs out of essays written at widely spaced intervals and about widely different subjects, piecing them together—sometimes with a word or two of transition, sometimes without—and placing them all together under one Roman numeral heading. Such jerry-built essays are XII, XVII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, and XXVIII.

Section XVII, for example, is made up of:

- (a) a criticism of Valera's *Pepita Jimenez*, which first appeared in November, 1886, plus a short transition leading to
- (b) a statement about the good faith of the novelist, which appeared in April, 1886, plus

⁹ The edition used is the 1891 edition. The 1910 edition telescopes XXI and XXII into one essay, and the numbering is one less from that point on.

(c) a criticism of Goethe, from June, 1886, plus a review of General Grant's *Memoirs*, from March, 1886.¹⁰

Similarly, in Section XX, we are at a loss to bridge the gap between a discussion of romance and a detailed evaluation of the art of Henry James until we realize that the first paragraphs of this essay appeared in May and August of 1886, and the paragraph about James in September, 1890.¹¹

In section XIX, the fault of *non-sequitur* is pointed up by Howells himself. In the *Harper's* of February, 1888,¹² he praised Tolstoi, and analyzed the great Russian's power as stemming from his conscience. This conscience, Howells declares, commanded him to portray life truthfully. Howells then stops, starts a new section headed by a Roman numeral, and then discusses the new subject of Emerson's criticism of Shakespeare.

But when it came to composing essay XIX of *Criticism and Fiction*, Howells clipped a passage from September, 1887,¹³ which dealt with popularity as a test of merit. In it, he had declared that public approval is no yardstick of literary worth, yet had hastened to add that he does not despise the "unthinking multitude" but rather finds every man interesting. He then had said: "For this reason we cannot thank the author who teaches us not to know, but to unknow our kind." Now let us go back for a moment and remember that when, in *Harper's* of February, 1888, he wrote an essay on the value of truth in literature, and then added some comments on Emerson's criticism of Shakespeare, he recognized the disparity between the themes by inserting a Roman numeral heading between them. In the essay in *Criticism and Fiction*, however, he adds the paragraphs about Emerson and Shakespeare to the paragraphs about truthfulness to life in literature without so much as a paragraph break, simply adding the transition: "Yet I should by no means hold him to such strict account as Emerson who felt. . . ." ¹⁴

¹⁰ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 73 962-3 (November, 1886); 72 809 (April, 1886); 73. 154 (June, 1886); and 72 649-650 (March, 1886).

¹¹ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 72 972-973 (May, 1886); 73. 478 (August, 1886); 81. 639 ff. (September, 1890).

¹² "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 76. 480 (February, 1888).

¹³ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's* 75 638-639 (September, 1887).

¹⁴ *Criticism and Fiction* (New York, 1891), 113

Howells' scissor-work, it is clear, resulted in a number of essays the vagueness of which is the natural product of their hasty construction out of prefabricated materials. The result of his method is a forceless and pointless book. Nowhere is this more evident than in the concluding essay. Here, we feel, Howells recognizes the need to analyze the writer's place in a democratic society, and he makes a somewhat incoherent effort to express a faith and a creed. But the effort is fumbling, and we realize why it is inept when we see that he again relied on the sort of patchwork which characterizes the rest of the volume. And in the case of the last essay, he goes one step further in his too-ready use of the pastepot. For he actually takes words, sentences, and paragraphs which were not originally concerned with the place of the writer in society, and by artful cutting and patching tries to make these old sentences carry the burden of new ideas.

He begins the concluding section with a hundred new words which serve as a bridge between the preceding essay on holiday literature and the conclusion. Then he adds a paragraph from the August, 1889, *Harper's* about the Americans realizing the plight of the struggling masses. To this he directly pastes a paragraph from December, 1888, in which he had declared that literature devotes itself to the service of humanity by affirming that "men and women who do the hard work . . . have a right to pleasure in their toil." Then follows an excerpt from the January, 1888, *Harper's*¹⁵ which begins: "I do not think the fiction of our own time even always equal to this work. . . ."

Now in its original context, this sentence had read: "we do not think the fiction of our own time . . . always equal to this test . . ." ¹⁶ and Howells had made it abundantly clear that the "test" he was referring to was the simplicity, naturalness and honesty which is found in Valdes' *Maximina*. But in *Criticism and Fiction* he uses "work" instead of "test" and forces this paragraph into an entirely new context—proving that fiction should affirm man's right to find pleasure in his toil.

To the essay now formed of three excerpts from different

¹⁵ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 79. 479-80 (August, 1889); 78. 159 (December, 1888); 76. 320 (January, 1888)

¹⁶ Italics mine.

sources, Howells adds: "The art which in the meantime disdains the office of teacher is one of the last refuges of the aristocratic spirit." Then follows, verbatim, a paragraph from the September, 1887, *Harper's*.¹⁷ In this original article, however, Howells had not been talking about didactic art at all. He had been discussing the work of Miss Murfree, whose position was that characters should be drawn realistically. Howells then had observed: "It appears to us that the opposite position is one of the last refuges of the aristocratic spirit. . . ."

It is clear that Howells, in his conclusion, was taking an old set of phrases and was attempting to reconvert them to carry a new message. The message was an important and exciting one. But the medium in which it was carried is necessarily feeble and incoherent.

When we see how *Criticism and Fiction* was composed, when we observe that it is a compilation of snatches of articles written over a period of five years, we are immediately struck by the necessity of weighing the various judgments passed in it on the basis of the dates on which they were first written. This would be true even of a five-year period in an author's life during which his ideas were subject only to the normal fluctuations of mood and fortune. But these five years were the most important and soul-shaking in Howells' life. During them his mind was wrenched by "heartache and horror," he was torn by an anguish at "an atrocious piece of frenzy and cruelty," he was haunted by visions of a "hideous scene . . . forever damnable before God and abominable to civilized man."¹⁸ The event which evoked these bitter cries from the usually gentle Howells was the execution of the Haymarket anarchists in Chicago in 1887. It has already been shown how influential this event was in Howells' career,¹⁹ and Howells himself flatly declared that it changed his entire outlook. He wrote Hamlin Garland in 1888:

You'll easily believe that I did not bring myself to the point of openly befriending those men who were civically murdered in Chi-

¹⁷ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 75 639 (September, 1887).

¹⁸ *Life In Letters*, 1 404, and 1 401-402.

¹⁹ Walter Fuller Taylor, *The Economic Novel in America* (Chapel Hill, 1942), 279 ff. See also Mr. Taylor's "The Origin of Howells' Interest in Social Reform," *American Literature*, 2 3-14 (1930), and "William Dean Howells and the Economic Novel," *American Literature*, 4 103-113 (1932).

cago for their opinions without thinking and feeling much, and my horizons have been indefinitely widened in the process.²⁰

It would be wise, then, to fix the date of Howells' first interest in the event which so deeply moved him, and to review the judgments which he passes in *Criticism and Fiction* on the basis of whether they preceded or followed this critical date in his life. Materials now available enable us to establish only two possible limits for this date. Howells wrote Thomas Perry that he became convinced of the anarchists' innocence "through reading their trial."²¹ The trial did not end until August 20, 1886, and thus August 20, 1886, is established as the earliest date upon which Howells could have become affected by the event. On November 18, 1887, Howells wrote that "the last two months have been full of heartache and horror for me, on account of the civic murder committed last Friday at Chicago."²² The latest possible date for the beginning of his interest in the affair is therefore September, 1887. Sometime, then, between August 20, 1886, and September, 1887, Howells underwent mental torture at the sight of a grave social injustice. Now let us review the "smiling aspects" section of *Criticism and Fiction* and see whether it was composed before or after he underwent this anguish. The oft-quoted passage reads:

It used to be one of the disadvantages of the practice of romance in America, which Hawthorne more or less whimsically lamented, that there were so few shadows and inequalities in our broad level of prosperity; and it is one of the reflections suggested by Dostoevsky's novel, *The Crime and the Punishment* [*sic*], that whoever struck a note so profoundly tragic in American fiction would do a false and mistaken thing. . . . Whatever their deserts, very few American novelists have been led out to be shot, or finally exiled to the rigors of a winter at Duluth; and in a land where journey-men carpenters and plumbers strike for four dollars a day the sum of hunger and cold is comparatively small, and the wrong from class to class has been almost inappreciable, though all this is changing for the worse. Our novelists, therefore, concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of life, which are the more American. . . .²³

²⁰ Howells to Garland, January 15, 1888, in *Life In Letters*, 1. 407

²¹ *Life In Letters*, 1. 413

²² *Ibid.*, p. 404

²³ *Criticism and Fiction* (New York, 1891), 127-128.

Here, then, is the paragraph which has been so vexing to scholarship. But was it written before or after August 20, 1886? It originally appeared in the September, 1886, issue of *Harper's*.²⁴ In the same number there is a note under the "Monthly Record of Current Events" which says: "Our record is closed on the 15th of July." Since a department of late news such as this would be held until the latest possible deadline for the magazine to go on the presses, it is safe to say that a contribution such as "The Editor's Study" must have been in the forms before July 15. As we have already shown, Howells' interest in the Haymarket Affair could only have begun after August 20, 1886. The "smiling aspects" paragraph was therefore written at least one month before the verdict in the Haymarket trial, and therefore at least one month before Howells could have been affected by it. There is, then, no question of "why did Howells write this atypical statement?" For the answer is that he wrote it before the event which changed his outlook and which therefore made the statement atypical. The question is, rather, "why, when he was using his scissors, did he not cut away this vexing statement?"

The new question can be answered when we examine the nature of the successive contexts in which this paragraph appeared, and when we note two significant changes which Howells made in the passage in its later forms.

In *Harper's* for September, 1886, Howells discussed the bitter and tragic life of Dostoievky, and then added the paragraph under consideration. When it came to the issue of *Criticism and Fiction* in 1891, Howells clipped a passage from the February, 1890, "Editor's Study" which had originally discussed the differences between American and English novelists. To it he added a description of the differences between the physical and social settings of the two countries which had originally appeared in the October, 1890, issue of *Harper's*.²⁵ Then to the essay formed by these two, he added "the smiling aspects" passage. It is clear that in the hasty process of building essays out of prefabricated materials Howells felt that the

²⁴ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 73 641 (September, 1886)

²⁵ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 73. 641 (September, 1886); 80. 481 (February, 1890), 81. 803-804 (October, 1890).

"smiling aspects" paragraph fitted in nicely with the new essay about the difference between the American and the English art of fiction. But even then, he felt compelled to make two changes in the text of his original declaration, and these changes loom large in the perspective of the fact that in no other instance did Howells make significant additions or alterations in the wording of the original material. The first change was made where the original read: "We invite our novelists, therefore, to concern themselves with the more smiling aspects. . . ." This he changed to: "Our novelists, therefore, concern themselves with the more smiling aspects. . . ." The sense was thus changed from one of exhortation to one of observation. Secondly, after the words "the wrong from class to class is inappreciable" Howells added "though all this is changing for the worse."

When the Library Edition of *Criticism and Fiction* was issued in 1910, a peculiar circumstance enabled this "smiling aspects" passage to assume greater importance in the format of the work than originally intended. This circumstance was Howells' decision to excise most of the derogatory remarks about English criticism and English fiction. Such an excision meant the removal of the passages from the February and October, 1890, "Studies" and left the "smiling aspects" section standing alone and naked, and exceedingly stimulating to the curiosity of the scholar.

Another passage in *Criticism and Fiction* which needs to be reviewed in light of its original dates of composition is the concluding essay XXVIII, which somewhat vaguely advocates humanitarianism in literature. Howells says that the humane impulse is present in fiction, especially in America where the height that the race has reached is an eminence which "enables more men than ever before to see how the vast masses of men are sunk in misery that must every day grow more helpless." Art, he declares, must make friends with "Need." The art which "disdains the office of teacher is one of the last refuges of the aristocratic spirit. . . ."

Strange words from the man who in 1886 invited his fellow writers to concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of life! But not so strange when we see that the dates of first appearance of these words were August, 1889, December, 1888,

January, 1888, and September, 1887. The last date is possibly later than Howells' first interest in the Haymarket Affair. The other three dates certainly are.

It is when reading this last essay that one feels the full regret at Howells' method of composing *Criticism and Fiction*. Hidden beneath these inadequate and poorly connected sentences are the deeply felt and sincerely conceived beliefs of one of the most sympathetic figures in American literature. But after examining this essay, and other sections of the volume, one is compelled to reject it as a hastily contrived product of the scissors and the pastepot, and to look elsewhere for the best expressions of the critical opinions of William Dean Howells. Meanwhile, one must recognize that the various sections of the volume were originally composed over the most critical five-year period in Howells' life, and one must therefore view the opinions it contains in the light of whether they were written before or after the event which changed Howells' social outlook.

2

Once *Criticism and Fiction* has been disposed of as the definitive statement of Howells' mature beliefs, the task of charting his development as a social and literary critic becomes simplified; once the vexatious "smiling aspects" ghost is laid to rest, the picture of Howells is resolved into one of a man who, during most of his life, was an optimistic believer that existing American institutions had produced a satisfactory way of life, but who changed, under the impact of a national tragedy, into a loud voicer of "the everlasting nay." In the two years after 1886, when his social and political "horizons" were "indefinitely widened," his literary horizons were also extended to include realistic literature which had a purpose. This purpose was to disperse "the conventional acceptations by which men live on easy terms with themselves," and to force readers "to examine the grounds of their social and moral opinions."²⁶ In other words, Howells developed the theory of critical realism.

Of course, even before the Haymarket Affair, there had been some indications that Howells had been widening the scope of his fiction to include areas of society which he later treated

²⁶ The quotations are from an article by Howells on "Henrick Ibsen," *North American Review*, 183 3 (July, 1906).

critically. Both *The Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885) and *The Minister's Charge* (1886) had dealt with larger problems of the relation of the individual to the economy of America. And in both works there had been specific passages of a critical nature.²⁷ But in September, 1887, Howells first made a tentative formulation of the theory of critical realism which inspired the writing of the economic novels, *Annie Kilburn* (1889), *A Hazard of New Fortunes* (1890), and *The World of Chance* (1893). The writer, he said in the fall of 1887, should make men "know one another better, that they may all be humbled and strengthened by a sense of their fraternity." This humbleness and strength somehow will "tend to make the race better," and only in so far as the arts tend to "make the race better and kinder," are they to be regarded as a "serious interest."²⁸ There is here, of course, still some vagueness, still some lack of explicit directions as to how literature is to improve the race and its social conditions. But none of this vagueness is apparent a year later, when Howells devoted an entire "Study" to the mission of critical realism. This was the essay from which Howells snipped a paragraph for the conclusion of his jerry-built *Criticism and Fiction*. Had he used the entire essay instead, he would have left no doubt in anybody's mind as to the scope and intensity of his doctrine of critical realism.

The point of departure for the essay was a discussion of the new Christmas literature which, he declared, "appeals to no sentimental impulse, but confronts its readers with themselves, and with the problem which it grows less and less easy to shirk." The problem which this literature has to make its readers face is not only "turkeys to the turkeyless, with celery and cranberries galore . . ." but the "ineffably better" task of making the reader "take thought somehow in our social, our political system to prevent some future year, decade, century, the destitution which we now relieve." Lyof Tolstoi, he declared, was the foremost of the writers of Christmas literature, because "The whole of his testimony is against the system by which a few men win wealth and miserably waste it in

²⁷ See, for example, *The Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885), 273, and *The Minister's Charge* (1886), 240-241

²⁸ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 75. 639 (September, 1887).

idleness and luxury, and the vast mass of men are overworked and underfed."

Then he made it clear that he had been using "Christmas" in the sense of "Christian," for "... all good literature is now Christmas literature." He went on: "The old heathenish axiom of art for art's sake is as dead as the great Pan himself, and the best art tends to be art for humanity's sake." Then, in its context of the foregoing paragraphs, the following statement becomes pointed and meaningful:

Art, indeed, is beginning to find out that if it does not make friends with Need it must perish. It perceives that to take itself from the many and leave them no joy in their work, and to give itself to the few whom it can bring no joy in their idleness, is an error that kills.

He continued: "It has been left for [our age] to perceive . . . and express . . . somehow in every form of literature" that "the men and women who do the hard work of the world . . . have a right to pleasure in their toil, and that when justice is done them they will have it." Howells then declared that realistic fiction must achieve its goals of human betterment by painting the victims of society in their true colors, and not in the sentimental pastels of the romantics. At its best, the romantic school, he said, "recognized the supreme claim of the lowest humanity." But, he added, "its error was to idealize the victims of society, to paint them impossibly virtuous and beautiful." Realism, however, which

has succeeded to the highest mission of romance, paints these victims as they are, and bids the world consider them not because they are beautiful and virtuous, but because they are ugly and vicious, cruel, filthy, and only not altogether loathsome because the divine can never wholly die out of the human.

And he concluded his essay by calling on all people not to end their Christmas obligations with the lighting of the Christmas candles. Light them, he said,

but let us not forget the lesson of the new Christmas literature; let us realize that . . . infinitely deeper than their soothing can reach festers the plague that luxury and poverty, that waste and want, have bred together in the lifeblood of society. Let us remember this, and take thought for its healing.²⁹

²⁹ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 78 159-160 (December, 1888).

A month or so before he had written these deeply-felt words, Howells had explained to Edward Everett Hale that *Annie Kilburn* was written "to set a few people thinking."³⁰ The novel is concerned with the insufficiency of charity in an unjust society. "Those who do most of the work in the world," Annie Kilburn tells her friend, "ought to share in its comforts as a right. . . ."³¹ Several months later, Howells wrote Hale that he was tortured by the problem of "Words, words, words! How to make them things, deeds. . . ."³² He told Hale that his words were running into the story which was to be *A Hazard of New Fortunes*. This novel, full of bitter criticism of the "chance-world" of a competitive society, became the work which Hamlin Garland, William Allen White, and a host of his contemporaries thought his most significant.

When, in 1889, Howells returned to a critical discussion of one of his earlier literary affinities, Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, he described how the Norwegian turned from an early period of "unmoralized idylls of peasant life" and "began to own his responsibilities to the larger life around him." In owning these responsibilities through his literature, Howells went on, Bjørnson's "political radicalism has assumed the social and economic phase, apparently inevitable in the evolution of those who profoundly sympathize with the people."³³ He had much the same appraisal to make of the social significance of newer converts to realism. "Have you read Harold Frederic's novels?" he asked Sylvester Baxter. "Very good central New York country life, done with roughness and force, and full of an indirect groping toward the new economic and artistic truth."³⁴ When Hamlin Garland's *Main Travelled Roads* appeared, he wrote:

. . . these stories are full of the bitter and burning dust, the foul and trampled slush of the common avenues of life: the life of the men who hopelessly and cheerlessly make the wealth that enriches the alien and the idler, and impoverishes the producer. If anyone is still at a loss to account for that uprising of the farmers in the

³⁰ Howells to E. E. Hale, August 30, 1888, in *Life In Letters*, 1. 416

³¹ *Annie Kilburn* (1889), 261.

³² Howells to E. E. Hale, October 28, 1888, in *Life In Letters*, 1. 419.

³³ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 78. 491 (February, 1889).

³⁴ Unpublished letter to Sylvester Baxter, July 11, 1890, in the Huntington Library.

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West, which is the translation of the Peasant's War into modern and republican terms, let him read *Main Travelled Roads* and he will begin to understand. . . .³⁵

By 1893 he had reached the conclusion that any "conscientious and enlightened fiction" in some way points the need for and the way toward socialism. "I have not seen the report that I am writing a socialistic novel," he wrote Howard Pyle, "and I do not believe it is true, except so far as every conscientious and enlightened fiction is of some such import; and that is the kind of fiction I try to produce."³⁶ He found it despicable not to "hit the fancy of our enormous commonplace average," but to "hit the popular fancy and not have done anything to change it. . . ." The cardinal sin in writing became, for Howells, the flattering of the popular mind "with false dreams of splendor in the past, when life was mainly as simple and as sad-colored as it is now."³⁷

Ibsen, in drama, Howells thought, was trying to do exactly what the writer of fiction should try to do in the novel—give us the "truth about ourselves, hard and dry indeed, but immensely wholesome and sanative." And then he wrote the best single definition of critical realism—the "power of dispersing the conventional acceptations by which men live on easy terms with themselves, and obliging them to examine the grounds of their social and moral opinions."³⁸ A few years later he found that the novels of Robert Herrick were fulfilling this function of critical realism. Herrick's fiction, Howells wrote,

. . . will give him [the reader] something to think about: himself, for instance, and his relations to other men very like himself in their common human nature. If his thoughts are not altogether pleasant, it will appeal to his sense of justice to declare why, and it ought to set him about seeing how he can make his thoughts pleasant.³⁹

In the waning years of his life, Howells surveyed American literature from the perspective of his new doctrine of critical

³⁵ "The Editor's Study," *Harper's*, 83 639 (September, 1891)

³⁶ Howells to Howard Pyle, October 30, 1893, in *Life In Letters*, 2 40

³⁷ William Dean Howells, "The New Historical Romances," *North American Review*, 171 943 (December, 1900).

³⁸ William Dean Howells, "Henrik Ibsen," *North American Review*, 183 3 (July, 1906).

³⁹ William Dean Howells, "The Novels of Robert Herrick," *North American Review*, 189. 812 (June, 1909).

realism. And typically, he regarded American literature as inseparable from American life, declaring that terms such as "romantic" and "realistic," "accurately state facts of character and springs of action as no other terms can state them." After describing this equivalence of life and art, he analyzed the whole course of American literature and society as passing successively through the stages of classicism, then romanticism, and then finally realism—a realism which wears "the patient face of enduring doubt." Each one of these periods, he declared, was connected with some struggle for a better society: the literature of Classicism was concerned with the war for national independence, and the literature of Romanticism with the fight to free the slaves. Then "the Realistic sense of things began to penetrate the hearts and minds of men," Howells said; and he continued:

People began to see that life and the pursuit of happiness had their difficulties even in the universal liberty we enjoyed, that even the darkling, forgotten brethren whom the Union had been re-established to free, were not in the possession of rights so inalienable that they could not be deprived of them. With the expansion of great industries, great industrial troubles began to rear their awful forms. . . .

And because of this knowledge that the struggle to end black slavery had not affected industrial slavery, the artist must be aware

that in the day that is and is to come the life stories must be homelier, simpler, sadder. Hereafter it cannot be that as soldiers of an army with banners, triumphing with drums and trumpets, the servants of the cause of man shall arrive at their goal. The tragedy of the struggle will not be of the old, obvious cast of the revolutions of the past when resistance to tyrants could show gloriously as obedience to God, but it will hide the patient face of enduring doubt till something like science brings the time when His will shall be done on earth as it is in heaven.⁴⁰

This was Howells talking from his "Easy Chair" of *Harper's* in 1914. The "reader" who figured in these imaginary conversations interjected: "That sounds like the I. W. W." And Howells replied: "So much the better for the I. W. W. then!"

At the age of seventy-five, Howells faced a ballroom full of

⁴⁰ "Editor's Easy Chair," *Harper's*, 129 310 ff. (July, 1914).

banqueters who had gathered to do him honor, and told them about critical realism. He told the assembly, which included William Howard Taft, Winston Churchill, and William Allen White, that "Literature, which was once the cloister, the school, has become more and more the forum and incidentally the market-place. In becoming the forum, he declared, "it is actuated by a clearer motive than before." Then he had some words to say about poetry, which, for the moment, seemed to him a generic representation of all literature. The poets of the "romantic age," in American literature—the age before and during the Civil War—


. . . belonged to an idealistic period when men dreamed of human perfectibility through one mighty reform. Their dream was that if the slaves were freed, there could hardly be sorrow on the earth which our good-will could not easily assuage. Now long ago the slaves were freed, but through the rift of the poet's broken dream the faces of underwaged women and overworked children stare at us; and it does not seem as if it were a sufficient change that now these faces are white and not black.

The poets who "dreamed that beautiful dream in other days were realists in their lives as they were idealists in their art," Howells declared. "Each according to his gift laid his offering on the altar of freedom; but," he asked, "has each of our later poets, according to his gift, laid *his* offering on the altar of justice?" This is the mission of the true poet, the writer who is a man of his age and his times—to lay his art upon the altar of justice. "For equality, which is justice writ large, is now the hope of humanity and its service is the condition which has effected itself even in the mystical sources where the inspirations of art have their rise."⁴¹

The reports of the banquet have it that Howells' address was greeted with a great ovation; presumably William Howard Taft was among those who rose to his feet and applauded. Taft possibly thought he was cheering the mild dean of genteel, optimistic American letters. If he had listened to Howells' words carefully, and if critics since had listened to them, he and they would have realized that they were hearing the manifesto of a theory of realistic literature whose first function is to criticize society so that men may reform it.

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⁴¹ "Mr. Howells' Speech," *North American Review*, 212. 6-14 (July, 1920).



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CANTUS TROILI

By ERNEST H. WILKINS

Chaucer's *Cantus Troili*—*Troilus and Criseyde*, I, 400-420—
is as follows: ¹

If no love is, O god! what fele I so?
And if love is, what thing and which is he?
If love be good, from whennes comth my woo?
If it be wikke, a wonder thynketh me,
Whenne every torment and adversite
That comth of hym may to me savory thynke;
For ay thurst I the more that ich it drynke.

And if that at myn owen lust I brenne,
From whennes cometh my waillynge and my pleynte?
If harme agree me, whereto pleyne I thenne?
I noot, ne whi unwery that I feynte.
O quike deth! O swete harme so queynte!
How may of the in me swich quantite,
But if that I consente that it be?

And if that I consente, I wrongfully
Compleyne, iwis; thus possed to and fro,
Al steereles withinne a boot am I
Amydde the see, bitwixen wyndes two.
That in contrarie stonden evere mo.
Allas! what is this wonder maladie?
For hete of cold, for cold of hete, I dye.

Its unquestioned source, Petrarch's sonnet *S'amor non è*—

¹ *The Book of Troilus and Criseyde*, ed by R K Root, 3rd printing, Princeton, 1945, p 22. The heading *Cantus Troili* appears in several Mss.

No. 122 in the *Canzoniere*—is, in the text contained in the final form of the *Canzoniere*, as follows: ²

S'amor non è, che dunque è quel ch'io sento?
 ma s'egli è amor, per Dio, che cosa e quale?
 se bona, ond'è l'effetto aspro mortale?
 se ria, ond'è sì dolce ogni tormento?
 S'a mia voglia ardo, ond'è 'l pianto e lamento?
 s'a mal mio grado, il lamentar che vale?
 O viva morte, o diletto male,
 come puoi tanto in me, s'io no 'l consento?
 E s'io 'l consento, a gran torto mi doglio.
 Fra sì contrari vènti in frale barca
 mi trovo in alto mar, senza governo,
 sì lieve di saver, d'error sì carica,
 ch'i' medesimo non so quel ch'io mi voglio,
 e tremo a mezza state, ardendo il verno.

Certain questions regarding Chaucer's knowledge and use of Petrarch's sonnet are still current. From what text did Chaucer work? How well did he understand that text? How does it happen that Chaucer appears to have used only this one of the many poems of Petrarch? When and where could it have come to his knowledge?

1 ³

The transcription of *S'amor non è* into the final Ms. of the *Canzoniere* took place probably within the period October, 1366—January, 1367. At some time within the years 1359-1362 Petrarch had released a shorter form of the *Canzoniere* known now as the Chigi form. The text of the sonnet as contained in the Chigi form shows only one significant difference from the final text: the last words are *e ardo il verno* instead of *ardendo il verno*. Since Chaucer derives from Petrarch's line only the general heat-cold idea, the difference is of no Chaucerian interest.

From time to time before the release of the Chigi form of the *Canzoniere*, Petrarch released copies of single poems or of small

² *Le rime sparse e i trionfi*, ed by E. Chiòrboli, Bari, 1930, p. 117. Chiòrboli reproduces Petrarch's spelling, but conforms to modern custom in respect to punctuation, the division of words, and the use of apostrophes and accents

³ The material of this section is taken very largely from my forthcoming article, "Toward the Discovery of Early Texts of Poems contained in the *Canzoniere* of Petrarch," in *Studi Petrarceschi*, II (1949).

groups of poems. There exist a good many manuscripts that contain single poems or small groups of poems or relatively small collections of poems of the *Canzoniere*. These manuscripts may reflect either (1) early releases of single poems or small groups of poems, or (2) later selections from the *Canzoniere*. They constitute (with a few exceptions, only one of which, to be mentioned presently, is of possible Chaucerian interest) our only source for the discovery of early texts of poems of the *Canzoniere*. The sonnet *S'amor non è* appears in eight such manuscripts. I have recently obtained copies of all eight occurrences. These copies show that Petrarch did in fact release an early text of this sonnet: but in the respects in which the two texts differ Chaucer agrees with the final text. In the early text, for instance, line 7 begins *o vita o morte*, not *o viva morte*: Chaucer's "O quike deth" agrees obviously with the later reading.

One other theoretically possible source remains. Coluccio Salutati made a Latin verse translation of this sonnet, beginning *Si fors non sit amor*.¹ But this translation was made from the early text of the sonnet, and Chaucer agrees with the final Italian text rather than with Salutati at the points at which the Italian and the Latin versions differ.

It is clear, therefore, that the text which Chaucer had before him was either the Chigi text or the final text of the sonnet—that is, the text as printed above, with the irrelevant possibility that the last words were *e ardo il verno*, not *ardendo il verno*. It is of course possible that the particular manuscript Chaucer used had individual scribal errors: but it may be noted that no one of the manuscripts referred to above shows any scribal error that could have any relation to the points, next to be mentioned, at which Chaucer misunderstood his Italian text.

2

Since Chaucer had before him a copy of either the Chigi or the final text of the sonnet, it would seem that he misunderstood that text in several respects.

(1) *S'amor non è* and *s' egli è amor* mean respectively "if

¹ Printed in A. Zardo *Il Petrarca e i Carraresi*, Milan, 1887, pp. 306-307.

this be not love " and " if it be love," not " if no love is " and " if love is."

(2) *Che cosa e quale*, which is merely a variant for *che . . . è quel ch'io sento*, means " what is this experience of mine," not " what thing and which is he."

(3) Similarly, *bona* and *ria* refer to the particular experience of Petrarch, not to the general nature of love.

(4) *A mio mal grado* means " in spite of myself," not " if harme agree me."⁵

(5) *Come puoi tanto in me* means " how is it that thou hast so much power over me ": not " How may of the in me swich quantite."

3

As far as I am aware, the only current suggestion that Chaucer may have made use of any other poem of the *Canzoniere* is Root's remark that the closing line of the *Cantus Troili* suggests Petrarch's

Trem' al piú caldo, ard' al piú freddo cielo

—the fifth line of the sonnet beginning *Amor, che 'ncende*, No. 182 in the *Canzoniere*. This line, however, is merely a re-phrasing of the last line of *S' amor non è*: Chaucer's line is no closer to the line just quoted than to the line:

e tremo a mezza state, ardendo il verno.

If Chaucer made use of only one of the poems of the *Canzoniere*, that circumstance is explicable either (1) on the supposition that he knew many or all of the poems of the *Canzoniere*, but did not find occasion to make use of any of the others, or (2) on the supposition that *S' amor non è* came to

⁵ Root (*ed. cit.*, p. 419) suggests that Chaucer may have had before him a manuscript in which line 6 began *Se mal mi agrada*. There is no manuscript evidence for such a possibility; and it is highly improbable that an Italian scribe, to whom the contrast between *a mia voglia* and *a mal mio grado* would have been evident, could have made such a mistake. The Italian clause corresponding to " if harme agree me " would have been not *se mal mi agrada* but *se 'l mal mi agrada*, with the definite article. it is virtually impossible that an Italian scribe could have made *se 'l mal mi agrada* out of *s' a mal mio grado*. Root nods in his translation of the last word of the sonnet: *verno* means " winter," not " spring."

his knowledge as a single poem circulating independently, or as contained in some small collection.

It has been pointed out that some poems of the *Canzoniere* did circulate independently or in small groups. Such circulation may have resulted either from early release of the poem or poems concerned, or from the activity of some admirer who, having seen the poem or poems in some form of the *Canzoniere*, sent copies to some of his friends.

It is highly probable, also, that small personal collections of Petrarchan poems were made, either on the basis of early releases or on the basis of selections from the *Canzoniere*; and it is probable, furthermore, that personal collections of *rime varie*, containing lyrics by Petrarch and lyrics by various other writers, were in circulation before or soon after Petrarch's death in 1374.⁶

4

Petrarch's sonnet might have come to Chaucer's knowledge almost anywhere and at almost any time. Specifically, it might have come to his knowledge in England, France, or Italy.

Many Italian bankers and merchants were in England in Chaucer's day: it is inherently probable that some of them were men interested in the poetry of their most famous Italian contemporary.

It is noteworthy that Coluccio Salutati, writing on January 28, 1377, to Petrarch's son-in-law and heir, Francesco da Brossano, says that he had expected, on receiving a copy of Petrarch's *Africa*,

pluribus sumptis exemplis et per me ipsum correctis et diligenter revisis, unum ad Bononiense gignasium, unum Parisius, unum in Angliam cum mea epistola de libri laudibus destinare, et unum in

⁶ For a full treatment of this subject see my article "On the Circulation of Petrarch's Italian Lyrics During his Lifetime," in *Modern Philology*, XLV (1948), 1-6. Although *S'amor non è* appears to be the only poem by Petrarch of which Chaucer made direct and conscious use, a distant reflection of another Petrarchan poem is to be found in *Troilus and Criseyde*, V, 561-581 this passage is derived from stanzas 54-55 of Part V of the *Filostrato*, which were in turn derived from Petrarch's sonnet *Sennuccio, i' vo' che sapi*, No. 112 in the *Canzoniere*. Boccaccio had made similar use of another Petrarchan sonnet, *Benedetto sia 'l giorno*, No. 61 in the *Canzoniere*, in stanzas 83-85 of Part III of the *Filostrato*, but of these stanzas Chaucer made no use. See Section VI of the article mentioned at the beginning of this note.

Florentia ponere in loco celebri, ut per omnes mundi plagas tantum opus tantique vatis nomen splendidissimum volitaret.⁷

Petrarch had numerous friends and devotees in France.

On either of his Italian journeys—one that took him to Genoa and Florence in the early months of 1373, and one that took him to Milan in 1378,⁸ Chaucer might have seen Petrarchan poems in any of the cities he visited. Friends and devotees of Petrarch were to be found almost everywhere.

The probabilities are that Chaucer never saw Petrarch himself, or Boccaccio, or Salutati.

The possibility that Chaucer visited Petrarch at Arquà in the spring of 1373 has been much discussed. There is no positive evidence for such a visit;⁹ and the absence of any reference to such a visit in the letters of Petrarch constitutes fairly good evidence that no such visit took place. It is conceivable that Chaucer could have started home from Florence via Arquà. But Arquà is only a dozen miles southwest of Padua, and Padua and Venice were at war in the spring of 1373. That warfare had driven Petrarch out of Arquà and into Padua on November 15, 1372: he returned to Arquà within the period February 9-April 27, 1373.¹⁰ The warfare continued, however, into July, 1373.¹¹ Even though it would in fact have proved safe for Chaucer to visit Arquà in April, 1373 (he was back in England on May 23), it is highly improbable that he, while still in Florence, could have been certain of such safety. He was on government service; and it would have been foolhardy for him to have attempted such a visit.

Boccaccio, as far as we know, was in Certaldo throughout the spring and summer of 1373.¹² A letter begun in Certaldo on

⁷ *Epistolario*, ed. by F. Novati, Vol. I, Rome, 1891, pp. 251-252.

⁸ For references to material on these two journeys see R. A. Pratt and K. Young, "The Literary Framework of the *Canterbury Tales*," in *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's 'Canterbury Tales'*, ed. by W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster, Chicago, 1941.

⁹ This statement assumes that the assertion of the "Clerk of Oxenford," in the prologue of his tale, that he had learned it "at Padua of a worthy clerk" is merely fictional.

¹⁰ *Ep. sen.* XIII 6, XV. 11, and XVI. 1.

¹¹ Zardo, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

¹² See R. A. Pratt, "Chaucer and Boccaccio," in *The (London) Times Literary Supplement*, February 28, 1935, p. 124.

August 10, 1373, indicates that he had been seriously ill for a long time.¹³

It remains possible, though not probable, that Chaucer and Salutati met in Florence. There is no certainty that Salutati was in Florence in the early months of 1373. His service as Chancellor of Lucca had ended on July 27, 1371: his election as *notaro delle tratte* in Florence did not take place until February 21, 1374. His home was in Stignano, which is about thirty miles northwest of Florence. It is probable, though not demonstrable, that he came to Florence now and then.¹⁴ The chances are that if he had met Chaucer he would later on have written to him, or at least referred to him in his voluminous correspondence. This he did not do—unless he was thinking of Chaucer when he wrote to Francesco da Brossano, in 1377, that he had been expecting to send a copy of the *Africa* to England. It is more likely, however, that he was thinking of Oxford.¹⁵

Harvard University.

¹³ Boccaccio, *Opere latine minori*, ed. by A. F. Massera, Bari, 1928, pp. 205-206.

¹⁴ D. Marzi, *La cancelleria della repubblica fiorentina*, Rocca S. Casciano, 1910, pp. 106-117.

¹⁵ This study was undertaken in response to an inquiry by Professor R. A. Pratt, to whom I owe thanks for several helpful suggestions.

THE ROUTE OF CHAUCER'S FIRST JOURNEY TO ITALY

By GEORGE B. PARKS

In the light of more complete information about English medieval travel to Italy, we may now presume to supplement Professor Tatlock's decisive study.¹ It was his conclusion that Chaucer's journeys took five weeks each way, leaving therefore considerably more time for the sojourn in Italy than had been supposed. It is now possible to say something more about the routes followed in the first journey, and therefore to reconsider the duration of it in specific terms rather than general.


Chaucer's route from London to Genoa and Florence in December 1372 might normally have followed that of Prince Lionel in 1368: that is, by Paris, Savoy, and the Mount Cenis. But England's war with France was revived in 1369, and one other English diplomatic journey during that war makes it likely that the route through France was closed to Chaucer's party.

The other journey was undertaken in the summer of 1373, after Chaucer's return to England. A mission from London to the papal court at Avignon traveled by the Low Countries and the Empire rather than by France. Presumably the travelers followed the Rhine route to Basel and thence to Geneva, thus avoiding French territory; then they came south from the Lake to Chambéry in Savoy. When some of the envoys tried to cross the border from Savoy into the Dauphiné to reach Avignon, they were detained by the French governor of the province. The others waited at Chambéry until the pope's intervention with the king of France and the court of Savoy, together with the dispatch of a papal sergeant-at-arms to escort the envoys, brought safe-conducts.²

This episode is bracketed by other examples of the arrest of travelers by reason of the war. In June 1372, before Chaucer's journey, Richard de Drayton, rector of Cleve in Worcester

¹ JEGP 12 (1913), 118-121.

² *Calendar of Papal Registers: Papal Letters IV*, 125-6-7; discussed by Edouard Perroy, *L'Angleterre et le Grand Schisme d'Occident* (1933), 32.



diocese, was arrested by French officials on his way to Avignon, though we are not told where.³ In September 1373, shortly after the arrest of the English mission crossing from Savoy, a German nobleman on his way to Avignon was arrested at Lyon on the suspicion that he was English.⁴

These travel events of 1372 and 1373 are meant to illustrate two conclusions: that English envoys might in fact avoid France in wartime, and that they had reason. If there were laws governing travelers' habits, we could be sure that Chaucer's journey to Genoa avoided France. But travelers are unpredictable, and all we can say is that the traveler Chaucer almost certainly went by Germany. For hostilities between France and England were overt through 1372 and 1373. Actual warfare was carried on only in the west of France, to be sure, but the repercussions extended to Calais and beyond.⁵ An English fleet was destroyed off La Rochelle in late June of 1372; from August on, Duguesclin captured one English stronghold after another in the west—Poitiers, Angoulême, La Rochelle, Thouars (the last on December 1). Meantime the Welsh patriot Owen had blocked off a large part of the Channel by capturing Guernsey in June. The English counter-moves assembled a fleet at Sandwich and an army at Calais. The fleet, with the king aboard, returned in October after a futile attempt to reach La Rochelle,⁶ and the Calais army planned to cross France. Neither fleet nor army really got under way, but their mobilization must have made it unlikely that travelers would venture from Calais in the direction of Paris in advance of a threatened invasion. It is likely therefore that the several individual Englishmen who were licensed that autumn to travel to the court of Rome, that is Avignon, went from Calais eastward by the Rhine route.⁷ We have seen what had happened earlier, in June 1372, to one English cleric who went through France.

Chaucer presumably went then by the Low Countries and

³ *Papal Letters*, IV, 116.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 125

⁵ T. F. Tout, *The History of England* (1216-1377), 414-17.

⁶ Thomas Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, I 315, *ut cit.* W. Hunt, "Edward III," in DNB Froissart's *Chronicles* (Lord Berners tr., ch. 305) has the fleet sail from Southampton.

⁷ *Calendar of Close Rolls 1369-1374*, 467, 71, 77

Germany: that is, by the merchants' way from Calais to Bruges, and on to Ghent, Maastricht, and Aachen to the Rhine at Cologne or Bonn, and thence up the Rhine to Basel.⁵ Continuing south to the Lake of Geneva at Lausanne, he had three routes to choose from. He could go to Geneva and around the west end of the lake to Chambéry, and thence over the Mount Cenis. This was not a usual route, but it was the one that English travelers to Avignon must now take as far as Chambéry, and we know that it had been followed on over the Alps on at least one specific earlier journey, that of the Emperor Henry VII in 1310.⁶

The second and most direct route from Lausanne over the Alps was by the Great St Bernard pass: around the east end of the lake, and up the Rhône to St Maurice and Martigny, and thence over the pass to Aosta; and thereafter by the Dora Baltea river to the Po at Chivasso or Turin. This was one of the oldest and most frequented routes to and from Italy. Moreover, the route beyond the pass in Italy stayed within the bounds of the Count of Savoy, and thus avoided the active zone of warfare in that land.

The third pass across the Alps was the Simplon.¹⁰ By continuing up the Rhône valley beyond Martigny, where the route over the Great St Bernard turned south, the traveler would arrive at Brig, 45 miles beyond, and prepare to climb the Simplon. But for this route we can find here no justification. As it led down to Lake Maggiore, it could bring the traveler into Milan, and safely enough if he kept out of the way of the Savoyard armies which had invaded the Milanese territory; but once in Milan, he would run the risk of crossing the lines at Pavia or farther west, and be held up by the enemies of Milan. An alternative would be, once he had crossed the Simplon, to

⁵ The specific itineraries are those of the fifteenth century e.g. those included in the Roxburghe Club *Itineraries of William Wey* (1857), xx-xxiii, 79-80. The Rhine route is earlier indicated in the pilgrim itineraries of Nikulas of Munkathverá in 1155 (tr. F. P. Magoun Jr. in *Mediaeval Studies* 6 349 [1944]) and of Albert of Stade in 1236 (*M. G. H. Scriptores* 16.340).

⁶ The itinerary is given in Friedrich Ludwig, *Untersuchungen über die Reise- und Marschgeschwindigkeit im XII und XIII Jahrhundert* (Berlin 1897), 75. The emperor put in thirteen days of actual travel from Lausanne to Turin.

¹⁰ Its first known use (1368) by English travelers was discovered by the late Professor Edith Rickert, and is recorded in her *Chaucer's World* (1948), 272-3.

Turin before turning southeast to cross the maritime Alps toward Savona and Genoa: this was the route of an anonymous English pilgrim who crossed the Mount Cenis in 1422.¹⁵ Or a diagonal would lead from Turin to Alba and Cortemilia, and so to Genoa: this was the reverse of the route taken by Sir Hugh de Ver on his way home from Genoa in 1298.¹⁶ Many variants are possible if the usual route by Asti and Alessandria was avoided. Very likely the travelers went from Turin due south a dozen miles to Carignano, which was the home of Chaucer's companion Jacopo di Provano.¹⁷ Professor Manly suggested that they might have continued south through Saluzzo, which is described at the opening of the *Clerk's Tale*:

A lusty playne, habundant of vitaille,
Where many a tour and toun thou mayst biholde. . . .
And many another delitable sighte,
And Saluces this noble contree highte.¹⁸

But all this is in Petrarch's original,¹⁷ and Chaucer need not have seen the country himself. Saluzzo is indeed somewhat to the west of his best route, which I surmise went by Carignano diagonally to Savona, and thence along the coast to Genoa.

To sum up our probabilities: Chaucer went from Calais to Genoa by way of the Rhine, the Great St Bernard (or the Mount Cenis), and Piedmont. The route followed at first the merchants' way:¹⁸ along the Channel from Calais to Ostend, and inland to Bruges, Ghent, Maastricht, and Aachen; thence to the Rhine at Cologne or Bonn, and up the river to Mainz and Speyer. At the last city, the merchants' way to Venice cut off to the southeast for Ulm and the Tyrol. Travelers for western Italy would follow the Rhine up to Basel, as did Adam of Usk in 1402,¹⁹ who however then headed for the St Gotthard

¹⁵ *Purchas his Pilgrimes*, VII, 540

¹⁶ The itinerary is reconstructed by L. F. Salzman, *Mediaeval Byways* (London 1913), 54-65; cf. G. P. Cuttino, *English Diplomatic Administration 1259-1339* (London 1940), 125-26.

¹⁷ As noted by Professor John M. Manly, ed. *Canterbury Tales* (New York 1928), 592

¹⁸ E 59-60, 61-62.

¹⁹ *Ep Sen XVII*, iii: ed J. Burke Severs in *Sources and Analogues* (Chicago 1941), 296.

¹⁸ See note 36 below for the full list of itineraries.

¹⁹ Ed. Sir E. M. Thompson (2d ed. London 1904), 242

and Milan rather than away from Milan and back toward Turin. From Basel we may use instead the itinerary of the Icelandic abbot Nikulas of Munkathverá in 1155, who went from Basel to Vevey by way of Solothurn and Avenches (west of Bern), and who found at Vevey, near Lausanne, the meeting-point of travelers from the west (France, Flanders, England) with those from Germany who were bound for the St Bernard.²⁰ The abbot took ten days of travel from Basel to Aosta and Ivrea. From Ivrea the abbot continued on the normal pilgrim-route to Vercelli and Piacenza which we suppose Chaucer avoided. Instead Chaucer went on to Turin, to Carignano, and thence diagonally, perhaps by Alba, to strike the coast west of Genoa.

How long did this journey probably take? The distance was almost exactly 1000 miles (on today's roads) from Calais to Genoa by the route I infer. The merchant couriers took some 23 to 30 days to go from Genoa to London:²¹ this, to be sure, by way of France. Chaucer probably would not travel at that speed. Adam of Usk, doing a comfortable journey via Germany to Rome in 1402, traveled from Bergen-op-Zoom to Rome, some 1205 miles, in 45 days, at 27 miles per day average; at the same rate, Chaucer might have taken 37 days from Calais, or at least 40 from London. He probably would not have gone as slowly as Sir Hugh de Ver, who, with a company of sick men, took 44 days from Genoa to Calais via France. An intermediate between the rapid rate of the couriers and the comfortable rate of Adam of Usk might be that of the Boni itinerary.²² This merchant schedule covered the 736 miles from Avignon to Rome, by the Mount Cenis and the usual Apennine pass, in 22 days, at 35 miles per day. At this intermediate rate, Chaucer would have gone from Calais to Genoa in 28 days, plus three or more days from London, or 31 days. I conclude that Chaucer's journey took him from 30 to 40 days: from December 1, 1372,²³ to January 1-10, 1373, not counting possible delays for the holidays. Professor Tatlock's five weeks remains a good estimate.

²⁰ Tr. F. P. Magoun Jr., *ut cit. sup.*, 349

²¹ Giovanni di Antonio de Uzzano, *La Pratica della Mercatura* (written 1442), in L. A. Pagnini, *Della Decima e delle altre Gravezze* (Lucca 1766), IV 103.

²² *Archives Historiques de la Gascogne*, fascicule 20 (1890), p. xix

²³ 2 Chaucer Society 32 (1900), 184

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For the return journey, in April and May, it is simplest to suppose that Chaucer went back as he had come. Milan was still under attack, and the Savoy troops had pushed one flanking movement north of the city and beyond it as far as Bergamo. On the south of Milan, the papal troops pressed from a base at Bologna toward Piacenza; from Mantua on the east they were presently to try to join with the Savoy army on the north to form a virtual ring around Milan. Presumably the western front was stable from Asti to Vercelli, and the road therefore clear to the west of it from Genoa to Turin and thence over the Mount Cenis or the Great St Bernard. The way home through France was still presumably closed, especially because John of Gaunt was preparing his summer march across France from Calais to Bordeaux. The way home by sea was presumably out of the question also, partly because it took too long and partly because the enemy might well stop a ship bound for England. The way through the Empire seems again indicated.

If he went back the way he came, Chaucer would have gone to Florence earlier, and returned to Genoa. We know from the brief Exchequer record that he went to Genoa and Florence; how many times he moved from one city to the other we do not know, though it has been supposed that the Florence mission was much more important than the Genoa one, and that the sending home of three different messengers indicates a considerable importance which cannot well be ascribed to the Genoa mission alone.²⁴ We do not know, however, that the messengers went from Florence; indeed, they received 50 shillings each, while a messenger sent back from Pavia in 1368 earned 52/6,²⁵ and we might think that the money would not reach to Florence; as it happens, the Pavia messenger took a long 46 days to get to London, which were enough to bring a messenger home from Florence or even Rome. The messengers seem inconclusive.

I had thought that we might fix the date of one journey from

²⁴ A. S. Cook, "Chaucerian Papers," in *Transactions Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences* (1919), 23, 39-44.

²⁵ Edith Rickert, *Chaucer's World* (1948), 273

a date in the meagre accounts. On March 23 Chaucer drew on his colleague Jacopo di Provano for a considerable sum of money,²⁶ and it might be guessed that he then left Genoa. This date was something more than ten weeks after the arrival in Genoa, and, as will be seen, some three or four weeks before the latest possible date of his departure homeward. If he were through with Genoa and going on to Florence, he might have been drawing money for the purpose, especially if Provano did not go home with him. It would be tempting to suppose that Chaucer thus went on to Florence in the spring, and was able to stay there some three weeks.

Unfortunately this guesswork will not hold. I am warned by Professor G. P. Cuttino, who is expert in the Exchequer accounts, and who is kind enough to permit me to quote him, that the date when Chaucer drew the money has no special meaning: that we may infer only that Chaucer ran out of money on March 23, not that he drew money in order to leave town.

So we do not know when Chaucer went to Florence, or whether he went more than once. We know that the couriers took 5 or 6 days from Genoa to Florence,²⁷ and that a week would be ample for other travelers. Chaucer may have taken the shore road from Genoa more than once, and returned to Genoa at some time between the 13th and 23rd of April if he was to reach home on May 23rd. Is it possible that he went home another way?

Part of the interest in the question lies of course in the possibility of his passing through Arquà, where Petrarch was living. We cannot say whether he did see Petrarch. We can say whether he could have seen him. The answer is that he could. Indeed, a route home by or close to Arquà turns out to be almost the only alternative route open to him if he did not go home as he came out.

To go home from Florence, Chaucer could not think of the usual Via Romea or pilgrims' (and merchants') way. This led back from Florence to the shore at Pisa or near Lucca, and thence over the Apennines via Pontremoli and the Cisa pass to Parma and the broad highway of the Po valley to Turin and

²⁶ *Chaucer Society* 32, 184.

²⁷ Giovanni di Antonio da Uzzano, *ut. cit.*, IV. 103.

beyond. But war raged along this highway. In February 1373 Hawkwood advanced along it from Bologna northwest to Modena and Parma and Piacenza, and made himself master of the Piacenza region for the Church in its war against Milan, forcing the Visconti to fortify the outposts of Milan itself. Chaucer might risk entering the war zone occupied in part by English mercenaries; but he would then risk running into Milanese troops beyond Piacenza, and beyond them Savoy troops at Asti. He would be wise, we would think, to avoid crossing the lines, and not only once but twice. It is almost certain that he would not go this way. He would go back to Genoa instead.

If he did wish to go another way, he was virtually limited to the route from Florence to Bologna. This was obviously clear, except as Bologna was the base of the papal army. Beyond Bologna, he could not of course turn northwest toward Piacenza and Milan, as has just been explained; but there was a way open. At Florence or Bologna he was on the great eastern road to Rome²⁸ from Germany, the road which ran north from Florence to Bologna and thence to Verona, Trent, and beyond, and by either the Brenner pass or the Reschen-Scheideck pass to the Tyrol, Bavaria, and ultimately the Rhine. This straight road north lay before him, probably well east of the Milan war zone, and clear also of danger from a smaller war zone to the east.

For another war was under way, this between Padua and Venice, which may have given the traveler pause if he thought of taking the eastward loop away from the direct road, the loop by Venice or Padua. This war began effectively in April 1372, when Venetian troops destroyed an outpost on the Adriatic lagoons which the tyrant of Padua, Francesco da Carrara, had built opposite Venice itself. Throughout the summer and autumn, Paduans raided the Venetian mainland in the Treviso region north of Venice, and Venetian troops raided Paduan territory from the same side, and indeed a Venetian army all but surrounded Padua in November.²⁹ It was forced to withdraw by the arrival in early December of Hungarian allies of Padua,

²⁸ See note 36 below for the itineraries noting this route

²⁹ An almost day-by-day record is given in the *Cronaca Carrarese* of Galeazzo and Bartolomeo Gattari in L A Muratori, *Reum Italiae Scriptores* (ed Carducci e Fiorino), vol. 17, part 1, pp 42-104 (as far as the May battle)

and thereafter the Venetian attack on Padua came by sea from the east rather than by land from the north. Venetian ships could disembark raiders in the marshes, and the villages to the southeast of Padua were the victims. But the Hungarians helped to pin the Venetians down to their bases on the shore, and in the winter and spring, Padua extended a line of forts and earthworks between the Brenta and the Adige. In a battle in May 1373, Padua maintained its position of defense. The summer campaign continued in surprise thrusts from both sides, until in September peace was arranged by the mediation of other powers.

If Chaucer went home by Bologna and the eastern road, he would have left there about the middle of April. His safest way was the direct way, a little west of north from Bologna straight to Verona, passing through Mirandola and Isola della Scala and avoiding both Ferrara on the east and Mantua on the west. This road would bring him within forty miles of Petrarch at Arquà, and this is probably as close as one poet came to the other. But Chaucer could probably have gone to Arquà safely if he had wanted to, by the eastward loop.

From Bologna to Ferrara, across the Po and the Adige rivers on the way to Padua, the road was safe. At the Adige crossing above Rovigo, the road entered the domain of Padua, which was at war. It is true that the road beyond Rovigo, through Monselice to Padua, had not in fact been attacked, though Venetian cavalry raids in March had reached within ten miles of it;³⁰ but the road must have been occupied by troops, Paduan and Hungarian, and was therefore at least annoying to travel. Much might depend on the news available at Bologna or Ferrara. Chaucer would be in one of those cities at latest by Easter, which was the 17th of April: and the Venetian attacks from the sea on the Paduan defenses by the sea were delivered on the 16th and the 24th.³¹ The war must have seemed close at hand, close to the Padua road.

And yet there was a somewhat safer way by which to reach Arquà, if Chaucer really planned to go there. From Ferrara he could try what are now back roads, some ten miles to the west of the Padua road, to reach Este, five miles west of that road,

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 92-93.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 96-97.

and thence take the hill road to Arquà; returning to Este, he could then cut back to west and northwest to reach Verona. This route would take planning and guides, and it would run the risk which travelers in wartime run on less frequented roads, the risk of alarming the civilians behind the front more than the soldiers in the active zone. It could have been done, however, and Chaucer might have been at Arquà at some time between the 17th and the 27th of April, 1373.

I have been assuming hitherto the presence of Petrarch at Arquà that spring. President Wilkins is kind enough to note that he had been in Padua on November 15, 1372, and on February 9, 1373, and that he was again in Arquà on either March 28 or April 27, the alternative dates of a letter he wrote there (*Ep. Sen. XVI, 1*). If he had not returned to Arquà, Chaucer might still have managed to go all the way in to Padua on the presumably congested highway from Ferrara. He may indeed have traveled with troops, like those which Marsilio, brother of the ruler of Padua, led into the city on the 27th of April,³² and thus been protected against Venetian raids. Here was no question of crossing the lines, but only of avoiding a chance raid. Once at Padua, the traveler would find a clear road on to Vicenza, well protected since the withdrawal of Venetian land forces north of Padua. Chaucer could have visited Petrarch at either Arquà or Padua.

We do not know that he did. We know that he could have returned to England via Bologna and either the direct road to Trent or the eastward loop through Paduan territory. The time needed for the journey from Florence to England would not vary greatly by either alternative. What that time was must be figured. We have many itineraries of Englishmen traveling by the German way to Venice or Rome, but we have few indications of the time they took. Florence to Bruges by merchant couriers took 20 to 25 days,³³ though we do not know that the route passed through Germany. Venice to Bruges by courier took 22 days,³⁴ a comparable time. The pilgrim William Wey needed 39 days to go from Antwerp to Venice, with some

³² Gatari, 97

³³ Giovanni di Antonio da Uzzano, *ut cit.*, 103

³⁴ Cited H. G. Rawlinson, "The Flanders Galleys," *The Manner's Mirror* 12, 146 (1926)

detours, and seven weeks to return from Venice to Dover: ³⁵ these seem to be very slow journeys. The distance from Calais to Florence by the Tyrol on modern roads is 1047 miles, 47 miles farther than the distance to Genoa as Chaucer must have gone, or 1½ days more of travel. We may guess that Chaucer's return from Florence, if he went by Bologna, would have required 32 to 42 days. He would have left Florence at some time between the 12th and 22d of April, and reached Arquà or Padua, if he went there, between the 17th and the 27th.

The rest of his way home would follow one of the best-marked English travel-routes of his time, though it was probably only just coming into the popularity which it owed to its leading to Venice as the port of embarkation for the Holy Land. We have nine English itineraries of the fifteenth century which agree on the route.³⁶ The long valley of the Adige led through Verona and Trent up to Bolzano, and continued in a westerly curve to Merano and the Reschen-Scheideck pass. For the Brenner pass, which lies due north of Bolzano, was not the one normally followed by the English, appearing on only one itinerary as an alternative route through the Dolomites to Venice.³⁷ All nine records agree on the western or "upper" pass, as distinct from the "lower road" of the Brenner to the east.³⁸

Having crossed the watershed at the headwaters of the Adige then, the route known to the English crossed the valley of the Inn to Landeck, whence it proceeded northwest through Bavaria to Ulm and Stuttgart, and eventually reached the Rhine at Speyer. Thence it retraced the merchant's way down the Rhine and across the Low Countries to Ghent and Calais.

³⁵ *Itineraries*, 82-83

³⁶ The "Musical Pilgrim" in 1422 (*Purchas his Pilgrimes*, VII 570-1, Glasgow ed.); John Whethamstede in 1423 (*Annales Monasterii Sancti Albani*, Rolls series, 118-183); anonymous undated (Tanner Ms 2, in Roxburghe Club ed of William Wey, xx-xxiii); William Wey, three routes 1458 and 1462 (*ibid.*, 79-80, 81, 82); William Brewyn in 1469 (*A Fifteenth Century Guide Book to the Principal Churches of Rome*, London 1933, pp 70-74); anonymous undated (in Huntington Library MS El 26 A 13, fol 120 verso), *Informaçõ for pylgrymes* (printed guide, London 1498, sigs. A 5-A 6) Only the last mentions the Brenner.

³⁷ *Informaçõ*, sig. B 1

³⁸ Cf Otto Stolz, "Zur Verkehrsgeschichte des Inntales im 13 und 14 Jahrhundert," in *Festschrift Hans v. Voltelini* (*Veröffentlichungen des Museum Ferdinandeum* 12, Innsbruck 1932), p 97.

To recapitulate: Chaucer left London on December 1, 1372, traveling probably through Germany and across the Great St Bernard to reach Genoa between January 1 and 10, 1373. If he went back the same way, he must have left Genoa between April 13 and 23 to arrive in London, at the same rate of travel, on May 23. If he went back by Florence and Bologna, he would have left Genoa at latest by April 5 to 15, if he stayed there that long, and left Florence between the 12th and the 22nd.

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GEOFFREY CHAUCER, ESQ., AND SIR JOHN HAWKWOOD

By ROBERT ARMSTRONG PRATT

The publication, from time to time, of various facts and theories, has slowly increased our understanding of the mission to Lombardy undertaken in 1378 by Edward de Berkeley and Geoffrey Chaucer on behalf of Richard II.¹ To this gradual accumulation of evidence and suggestion, I now offer an additional detail. In the record of payment to Chaucer before the journey, and in his enrolled account after the journey, mention is made of his being sent "in nuncio Regis versus partes Lombardie, tam ad Dominum de Melan, quam ad Johannem Haukewode, pro certis negociis expedicionem guerre Regis tangentibus."² These English records clearly indicate that Chaucer's mission was intended to take him, and did take him, both to Bernabò Visconti, Lord of Milan, and to the English condottiere Sir John Hawkwood, then in Lord Bernabò's employ. These records, however, leave us in ignorance of the circumstances under which Chaucer and Hawkwood conferred, of the probable time of their meeting, and whether they may

¹ See, for example, R. E. G. Kirk, *Life-Records of Chaucer*, Part IV ("Chaucer Society Publications, Second Series," No. 32 [London, 1900]), pp. xxviii-xxix, and *Life-Records* Nos. 118, 120, 121, 122, 140, Addition No. 8; J. S. P. Tatlock, *The Development and Chronology of Chaucer's Works* ("Chaucer Society Publications, Second Series," No. 37 [London, 1907], 41-2, Tatlock, "The Duration of Chaucer's Visits to Italy," *JEGP*, XII (1913), 118-121, Arthur Stanley, "Sir John Hawkwood," *Blackwood's Magazine*, CCXXV (1929), 405; J. M. Manly (ed.), *Canterbury Tales by Geoffrey Chaucer* (New York, 1931), p. 17; Édouard Perroy, *L'Angleterre et le Grand Schisme d'Occident étude sur la politique religieuse de l'Angleterre sous Richard II (1378-1399)* (Paris, 1933), pp. 137-139, 51-52, Haldeen Braddy, "New Documentary Evidence concerning Chaucer's Mission to Lombardy," *MLN*, XLVIII (1933), 507-511; Manly, "Chaucer's Mission to Lombardy," *MLN*, XLIX (1934), 209-216, R. A. Pratt, "Chaucer and the Visconti Libraries," *ELH: A Journal of English Literary History*, VI (1939), 191-199, E. P. Kuhl, "Why Was Chaucer Sent to Milan in 1378?" *MLN*, LXII (1947), 42-44.

² See the record of payment before the journey (Life-Record No. 121), which in these words describes the mission of Sir Edward de Berkeley, and then for Chaucer says: "Galfindo Chaucer, Armigero Regis, misso in Comitatu eiusdem Edwardi ad easdem partes in nuncio Regis predicto . . ." Practically the same words that I print in the text appear also in the record of Chaucer's enrolled account after the journey (Life-Record No. 122).

have met in the field, at Milan, or elsewhere. These questions are answered in part by certain Italian records which tell something of Hawkwood's activities during the period of Chaucer's sojourn in Lombardy. It is to these Italian records, not previously brought forward in connection with Chaucer, that the present paper directs attention.

Chaucer left London on May 28, 1378, and returned to that city on September 19. Allowing five weeks for travel in each direction, we may assume that he was in Lombardy roughly a month and a half, or from about July 1 to about August 15. During the summer of 1378, Hawkwood's company was besieging Verona, a city on which Lord Bernabò had designs because of the claim of his wife, Regina della Scala, on the Scaligeri dominions. Hawkwood's approach to Verona was through the narrow corridor lying between Lake Garda on the north and the territory of Mantua on the south. While Chaucer was in Lombardy, Hawkwood's camp was in the valley of the Mincio River, which flows in a southerly direction from Lake Garda to Mantua and then south-easterly to the River Po beyond. The precise location of his headquarters during most of this period was at Monzambano, on the right bank of the Mincio, about six miles south of Lake Garda and sixteen north of Mantua, but almost on the border of the Mantuan dominion. Fifteen miles to the east was Verona; Milan lay some seventy-five miles to the west.

In the course of their activities in the valley of the Mincio, Hawkwood's men were perpetually violating the nearby territory pertaining to Mantua. Although Hawkwood had orders from Bernabò to respect this neutral Mantuan territory, the continuous violations were virtually inevitable, and the frequent protestations of the Marchese Lodovico Gonzaga of Mantua were apparently of little avail. Gonzaga's concern has been described in the following terms.

Pe' Signori di Mantova lo spauracchio dell'Acuto et delle sue soldatesche era divenuto in certi momenti una vera ossessione: si seguiva con trepidazione ogni lor mossa anche quando eran lontane, perchè non si era mai sicuri che prima o poi non capitassero di nuovo a perpetrare saccheggi ed estorsioni.'

* A Luzio (ed.), *L'Archivio Gonzaga di Mantova. La corrispondenza familiare, amministrativa e diplomatica dei Gonzaga*, Pubblicazioni della R Accademia

Thus Gonzaga complained of the pillaging and extortions perpetrated against his land and people, but mostly in vain. Yet his protests have served one useful purpose, for they elicited from Hawkwood and his officers a series of letters, now in the R. Archivio di Stato di Mantova, providing evidence concerning Hawkwood's whereabouts during the summer of 1378. From April 16 to October 17 of that year, Hawkwood, John Thornbury, and William Gold, constable-general in the English camp, wrote to Gonzaga⁴ at least twenty-six letters, as the following list indicates; most of them are dated from various places near the Mincio;⁵ the last was written from Hawkwood's autumn quarters at Cremona.

Of these twenty-six letters, seventeen are listed by Rawdon Brown in his *Calendar of State Papers*,⁶ while I have seen nine (Nos. 4, 9, 11, 20-25) which Brown does not give. On the other hand I have been unable to locate two letters (Nos. 1 and 26) seen and described by Brown; this suggests that further search will perhaps reveal still other letters of the period in which we are interested, and thus make possible an even more accurate check on precisely where Hawkwood was during Chaucer's

Virgiliana di Mantova, Serie I Monumenta, II (Verona, 1922), 119-120. For a useful view of the relative positions of the territories of the Visconti, the Scaligeri, and the Gonzaga in 1378, see either W. R. Shepherd, *Historical Atlas* (4th ed., rev.; New York, 1924), pp. 78-79 "Central Europe in 1378", or D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, *Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan* (Cambridge, 1941), "Map IV Eastern Lombardy and the Veneto in 1385" (opposite p. 69); each of these maps shows clearly why Hawkwood's men violated the Mantovano while attacking Verona. For a sketch of Hawkwood's activities in the summer of 1378, see G. Temple-Leader and G. Marcotti, *Giovanni Acuto (Sir John Hawkwood) storia d'un condottiere* (Florence, 1889), pp. 115-118.

⁴ No. 13 is addressed to Gonzaga's captain, Jacopo de Cobagnatis.

⁵ Most of these places may be located in *Carta d'Italia del Touring Club Italiano*, ed. L. V. Bertarelli, Istituto Geografico de Agostini-Novara, Foglio 12: Verona Castelgrimaldo, for example, lies about 9 miles south-southwest of Monzambano, and Castelgoffredo about 13 miles southwest of Monzambano. According to Brown (p. 21, see footnote 6, *infra*), Publice is La Piubega in Mantuan territory on the Seriola Pubblica. I have not been able to locate Montissorte, or any locality with a similar name, but I think we may safely conjecture that it lay in the somewhat hilly country surrounding Monzambano for a distance of roughly five miles, rather than in the extremely flat plains which predominate elsewhere in the general territory with which we are concerned.

⁶ Rawdon Brown, ed., *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English Affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice, and in other libraries of Northern Italy*, Vol. I, 1202-1509 (London, 1864), pp. 19-24, see also p. lxxviii.

mission to Lombardy. In the following list of these letters, I give Brown's numeration (59-75) in parentheses.⁷

NO	DATE	PLACE	WRITER
1378			
1 (59)	April 16	Camp against Verona	John Hawkwood
2 (60)	April 17	Piadena	John Hawkwood
3 (61)	April 20	Villafranca	John Hawkwood, Jacopo de Ca- valli, and Con- rad D'Este
4	April 26	Camp against Verona	John Hawkwood
5 (62)	May 15	Publice	John Hawkwood
6 (63)	May 19	Piubega	John Hawkwood
7 (64)	May 20	Piubega	John Hawkwood
8 (65)	May 30	Villafranca	John Thornbury
9	July 11	Castelgrimaldo	John Hawkwood
10 (66)	July 29	Camp against Verona	William Gold
11	July 30	Camp against Verona	William Gold
12 (67)	July 30	Monzambano	William Gold
13 (68)	July 31	Monzambano	William Gold, to Captain Jacopo de Cobagnatis at Volta
14 (69)	August 2	Monzambano	William Gold
15 (70)	August 4	Camp against Verona	William Gold
16 (71)	August 6	Camp against Verona	William Gold
17 (72)	August 6	Monzambano	John Hawkwood
18 (73)	August 8	Monzambano	John Hawkwood
19 (74)	August 9	Camp against Verona	William Gold
20	August 13	Camp on the Mincio	William Gold
21	August 18	Castelgoffredo	John Hawkwood
22	August 20	Castelgoffredo	John Hawkwood
23	August 25	Montissorte	William Gold
24	August 25	Montissorte	William Gold
25	August 29	Castelgoffredo	John Hawkwood
26 (75)	October 17	Cremona	John Hawkwood

⁷ For the location of each letter Brown says merely "Mantuan Archives." For each of the 24 letters I have located, I here give first the number of the *Busta* in the Archivio di Stato in Mantova, and then any further designation assigned to the letter. No 2 2388, 642 No 3 1595, 1378 A 3 No 4 1595, 1378 A 4. No 5 2388, 643 No 6 2388, 644 No 7 2388, 645 No 8 1595, 1378 A 6. No 9 2388 No 10 1595, 1378 A 15 No 11 2388 No 12 1595 1378 A 16. No 13 1595, 1378 A 17 No 14 1595, 1378 A 18 No 15 1595, 1378 A 19. No 16 1595, 1378 A 21 No 17 1595, 1378 A 22 No 18 1595 1378 A 23. No 19: 1595, 1378 A 24. No 20 1595, 1378. No 21 2388 No 22 2388 No

This list of letters, our only precise check on Hawkwood's activities during Chaucer's sojourn in Lombardy, offers no evidence that Hawkwood was with his company from July 12 until August 5. That he was actually away from his headquarters for at least part of this time is revealed by letter No. 18, written to Lodovico Gonzaga on August 8 from the camp at Monzambano. This letter, moreover, gives specific information regarding where Hawkwood had been; I therefore present it in full.

Al Magnifico et potente domino, domino Lodovico
de Gonzaga Mantue et cugino carissimo.⁸

Magnifice et potens domine: Recepi vestre dominationis literas, quarum intellecto tenore respondeo Bertolinum de Codelupo venisse ad me Mediolanum ex parte vestre dominationis, et michi inter cetera exposuisse dampna vestris subditis et in vestris territoriis ablata per meas gentes, de quo non modicum secum dolui et doleo usque ad mortem quoniam acerto tenere potestis quod vestros subditos, territoria et bona tamquam bona magnifici et excelsi domini mei domini Bernabovis pro posse defenderem et gubernarem; set secum remansi in concordia, quod dum essem in loco congruo et ⁹ acto taliter facerem quod briata in totum vel in partem dampna ¹⁰ data in vestris territoriis et vestris subditis emendaret; set quia tempus de presenti non est dictos nostros socios gravandi pro dictis ¹¹ solvendis dampnis, quia briata nunc egena est et etiam oportet quod in nonnullis servitiis dicti mei domini ipsos operer, igitur vestra dominacio pro malo non habeat si nunc dicta dampna non emendantur, promictens indubie ¹² vestre dominacioni, quod cum eo in aliqua civitate seu loco in quo ipsos costringere possem ad emendationem dictorum dampnorum, infallibiliter fatiam ita quod vestra dominacio poterit merito contentari; super hec et omnibus aliis informavi vestrum Capitaneum Volte; ¹³ supplicans vestre dominationi, quod si siqua valeo michi tamquam vestro mandare dingnetur quoniam continuo paratus sum ad omnia vestra

23 1595, 1378 No 24 1595, 1378 No 25 2388 I express my gratitude to Dr Giovanni Praticò, Director of the Archivio di Stato in Mantova, for his courtesy in having certain of the letters photographed for me

⁸ This heading appears on the back, or cover side, of the paper containing the letter This letter is summarized by Brown, p 23.

⁹ et] et et (MS)

¹⁰ dampna] Over the m is a superfluous stroke (MS).

¹¹ dictis] dictis debitis with debitis crossed out (MS).

¹² indubie] Here the MS is slightly torn

¹³ Evidently Captain Jacopo de Cobagnatis, the recipient of letter No. 13. Volta lies about 7 miles south-southwest of Monzambano

mandata. Data in campo Montiszambani, die viij. Agusti prime Indictionis.

Iohannes Hawkwood capitaneus et cetera

In this letter we are offered not only a typical view of the perpetual problem faced by Hawkwood because of damages by his men in the Mantovano, but also the information that he had recently been away from his headquarters in the field, had been in fact at Milan. Furthermore, we are given the impression that Hawkwood had been in Milan for more than just a few days, since it had seemed worth while for Bertolino de Codelupo, in order to see him on behalf of Gonzaga, to travel the ninety miles to Milan from Mantua, normally a journey of three or four days each way. Indeed, when Hawkwood left camp to go to Milan, he probably knew that it was for a fairly long stay. Unless he rode post-haste, Hawkwood's journey presumably took three rather than two days each way. Accordingly, we can be fairly certain of this much: that Chaucer and de Berkeley saw Hawkwood at Milan rather than in the field or elsewhere; that Hawkwood was sent for shortly after their arrival in Milan from London; that they conducted their negotiations with him during some period between July 15 and August 2; and that the three forgathered under the auspices of Hawkwood's employer and father-in-law, Bernabò Visconti, to whom likewise Chaucer and de Berkeley had been sent. So far the Mantuan archives have offered no help in revealing the nature of Chaucer's business in Lombardy, but until positive evidence to the contrary is brought forward, I think it is wholly reasonable to suppose that he and de Berkeley were sent "pro certis negociis expedicionem guerre Regis tangentibus."

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NATURE AND GRACE IN *THE FAERIE QUEENE* *

By A. S. P. WOODHOUSE

I am to present for your consideration an hypothesis regarding Spenser's *Faerie Queene*.

Historical criticism is, I believe, more than a mere corrective. It may have for its object to restore, so far as possible, the conditions essential to a full communication between artist and audience, which include a common understanding of the potentialities and limits of the genre and, for the purpose of the poet's argument, the acceptance of a common frame of reference. Historical criticism, thus conceived, entails the use of hypothesis, which must submit to experimental verification. Besides the obvious tests of covering the principal phenomena and not running counter to any of the known evidence, a critical hypothesis is verified whenever it serves to bring into clearer relief the poem's aesthetic pattern and demonstrate its consistency. This is a criterion which we shall have occasion to apply. It involves, of course, an assumption, frequently rejected as hampering to scholarly ingenuity, that a great poet is a conscientious artist and knows what he is about.

The particular hypothesis which I am to advance turns upon one of the intellectual frames of reference common to Spenser and many other writers of the Renaissance, namely, their recognition of two levels of existence and experience, traditionally known as the order of nature and the order of grace. A few years ago I found that to read Milton's *Comus* in the light of this frame of reference was to sharpen, and also to modify, one's sense of the poem's pattern and its meaning;¹ and I promised myself that some day I would try the experiment of re-reading the *Faerie Queene* with this frame of reference, this apportionment of experience to the order of nature and the order of grace, in mind, and would see whether here also it might not serve to sharpen, and perhaps to modify, one's sense of the poem's pattern and its meaning. Let this be my excuse for the present

* Annual Tudor and Stuart Club Lecture, April 29, 1949

¹ The Argument of Milton's *Comus*, *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 11 (1941) 46-71.

delivery of coals to Newcastle, and for the temerity of a mere Miltonist in lecturing on the *Faerie Queene* in the home of the great *Variorum Spenser*.

In Spenser's day, as still in Milton's, the two orders of nature and of grace were universally accepted as a frame of reference, whether they were specifically named or not. Within this frame of reference² there was room for every degree of difference in attitude and emphasis: it was a frame of reference, not a body of doctrine. To the Christian, of course, both orders were subject to the power and providence of God, but exercised in a manner sufficiently different to maintain a clear-cut distinction between the two. In the natural order belonged not only the physical world, what is commonly called the world of nature inanimate and animate, but man himself considered simply as a denizen of that world. The rule of its order was expressed not only in the physical laws of nature, but in natural ethics (in what was significantly called the *law of nature*), and even in natural as opposed to revealed religion. This order was apprehended in experience and interpreted by reason; and it had its own wisdom, for upon the law of nature had been erected the ethical system of a Plato, an Aristotle or a Cicero. It had its own institutions, of which the highest was the state, but this is an aspect of the order of nature which need not detain us here. . . . To the order of grace, on the other hand, belonged man in his character of supernatural being, with all that concerned his salvation, under the old dispensation and the new. The law of its government was the revealed will of God, received and interpreted by faith, and it included a special kind of experience called religious experience. The order of grace had also its appropriate institution, the Church, which, like the state, need not concern us here.

The relation between the order of nature and the order of grace was a problem which admitted of various solutions. One group of answers insisted on the contrast and wide divergence of the two orders, and these answers were returned by individuals and sects of opposite tendencies.

The ascetic and rigorist would emphasize the divergence, in order to depress nature and exalt grace; the naturalist, in order

² The account of the frame of reference is adapted from my article on *Comus*.

to exalt nature and depress grace, finding the demands of the higher order "unnatural" and denying their validity. Still in the same group were others who insisted on the divergence of nature and grace with the intention of accepting them both, but at the same time of avoiding inferences from the one to the other: such was the fideist, who took the order of grace on authority, but in the order of nature pursued his experimental and sceptical way, the Baconian, with his two philosophies, natural and divine, and (though this lies outside our present scope) the Puritan extremist, reactionary in the realm of grace, progressivist in the realm of nature. All these, though for different ends, apply what I have elsewhere called the *principle of segregation*.³

Opposed to them were all those thinkers who, with many different shades of emphasis and inference, agreed in responding to the profound human instinct for a unified view of life. They insisted that the order of grace was the superstructure whose foundations were securely laid in nature; that there was no interval between the two orders; that grace came to perfect nature, an idea including discipline and a miraculous remedy for man's fall; that well-being must be defined in terms of the two orders simultaneously, and that what was for man's good as a natural being could not be to his detriment as a supernatural, or *vice versa*.

These, with varying degrees of modification, were the assumptions of Christian humanism, whose dominance in the Renaissance, and whose importance for Spenser, will hardly be questioned. These were the assumptions of that long tradition which was about to receive its most majestic English expression in the first book of Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1593). But the stormy waters upon which the Church of England was already entering are alone sufficient to warn us not to underestimate the variety and strength of opposing currents of Christian thought released and accelerated by the Protestant Reformation, and specifically by the impressive formulations of Calvin, whose influence upon Spenser Padelford has demonstrated.⁴ Underlying the struggle of parties in Church

³ *Puritanism and Liberty* (London, 1938), introduction, pp. 57-60.

⁴ F. M. Padelford, *The Spiritual Allegory of the Faerie Queene*, Book One, *Journal of English and German Philology*, 22 (1923). 1-17. Cf. P. N. Siegel,

and state were opposing ideals of the Christian life, and supporting these ideals were divergent views of the character and the relation of the order of nature and the order of grace.

The frame of reference is everywhere, explicit or implied; and if we ignore it, we neglect an important part of Spenser's, as of Milton's, intellectual background, and a valuable instrument of critical analysis. Such at least is the contention of this lecture, which asks, and (so far as time permits) will try to answer the following questions: What light does this frame of reference throw upon the *Faerie Queene*? How does it sharpen and perhaps modify our sense of Spenser's aesthetic pattern (for, whatever be true of some other poets, the aesthetic patterning of Spenser and Milton is based upon ideas, upon conceptual thinking)? Does a recognition of the frame of reference help us at some points to see further into Spenser's allegory? Does it help us to appreciate relations of parallel with contrast (for similarity with dissimilarity, parallel with contrast, are of the essence of an aesthetic pattern)? Does it even serve to explain more adequately than heretofore the significance, intellectual and aesthetic, of certain characters and episodes? Does it, finally, give us any indication of the direction which the poem may have taken in those last six (or is it five and five-sixth?) books which have not come down to us? I would ask you to remember that whatever I assert is tentative, and that the purpose is exploration and the testing of an hypothesis.

2

Some fifty years after Spenser published the second instalment of the *Faerie Queene*, an eloquent contemporary of Milton's, whose name has not come down to us, wrote:

Spenser and the Calvinistic View of Life, *Studies in Philology*, 41 (1944) 201-22
In effect, though not explicitly, Padelford discriminates between nature and grace
In pursuance of his own principle that "in studying the relationships and interconnections of man's intellectual history, it is well not to be too schematic" (p 215), Siegel confuses the two orders, finding Puritanism in Guyon's rejection of Mammon's offers of wealth as, "above all, distraction from the pursuit of a righteous life" (p 203), and talking of Calidore's return, after his pastoral interlude, "to the service of Gloriana and God" (p 204). Obviously the principle is wrong. What is required is the highest degree of precision (which involves schematism) in the formulation of positions and their consequences, and the ability to determine when an author recognizes these consequences and when he does not.

Christ Jesus, whose is the kingdom, the power and the glory both in nature and in grace, hath given several maps and schemes of his dominions . . . both of his great kingdom, the world, . . . and also of his special and peculiar kingdom, the kingdom of grace. Which kingdoms, though they differ essentially or formally, yet they agree in one common subject-matter, man and societies of men, though under a diverse consideration. And not only man in society, but every man individually, is an epitome either of one only or of both these dominions. Of one only: so every natural man (who in a natural consideration is called *microcosmus*, an epitome of the world), in whose conscience God hath his throne, ruling him by the light of nature to a civil outward good and end. Of both: so every believer who, besides this natural conscience and rule, hath an enlightened conscience, carrying a more bright and lively stamp of the kingly place and power of the Lord Jesus, swaying him by the light of faith or scripture, and such a man may be called *microchristus*, the epitome of Christ mystical.⁵

I suggest that some such relation between the order of nature and the order of grace is likewise present in Spenser's mind, and some such distinction between the motives and sanctions of virtue on the natural level and on the specifically religious, and that these are consistently applied in the part of the *Faerie Queene* which we possess; or, to be quite concrete, that Book I moves (as has been generally recognized) on the religious level, or (as I should prefer to describe it) with reference to the order of grace, and the remaining books (as has *not* been recognized) on the natural level only: that the Redcross Knight is indeed *microchristus*, but Guyon, and each of the other heroes of individual books, *microcosmus* alone.

This hypothesis runs completely counter to one recently put forward,⁶ that each of the knights is, as it were, the heir of his predecessors' victories, and together they form a composite picture of the Christian gentleman, or that Guyon, for example, achieves his virtues of temperance and continence, and is able to discharge his task, because he starts from the vantage point of holiness achieved by the Redcross Knight. Few perhaps will accept this hypothesis, which ignores the obvious fact that while the motivation and sanctions of the Redcross Knight's

⁵ *The Ancient Bounds* (London, 1645) reprinted in my *Puritanism and Liberty* (spelling, etc., modernized), pp. 247-8

⁶ By Professor Fredson Bowers, at the M L A., December, 1948, Group English IV (see multigraphed summary)

virtue are specifically religious, those of Guyon's, just as clearly, are not. But there is still a middle course, the refuge of vagueness, which recognizes the religious character of the Redcross Knight, and the impossibility of finding in Aristotle, or in Aristotle read in the light of Plato, any equivalent for holiness, which further recognizes the essentially Aristotelian character of Guyon and his virtues, but which breaks down when it comes to Britomart and, in the effort to account for the evident difference between her and Guyon, decides that she must represent a religious virtue, a specifically Christian conception of chastity and love.⁷

We are concerned with testing my hypothesis, and in the degree to which it is verified it will, of course, disprove the other two. All recognize the necessity of some synthesis between the contentions of the various books, but the other two try to provide for the synthesis piecemeal as the poem moves along, while mine, remembering that we have only the first half of the pattern of the *Faerie Queene*, is content that synthesis should be prepared for, but held in solution, perhaps even till Book XII. Spenser's preparation for his final synthesis, as it appears to me, consists, first, in sharply differentiating between the two orders; secondly, in presenting the virtues of natural ethics in a form which Christianity can assimilate, and has in fact assimilated, and, thirdly, in indicating the limits of nature and the points at which it requires to be supplemented or corrected by grace. It is the second of these three steps that has led the critics without exception to conclude that all or some of the heroes and their virtues are specifically Christian. But the question is not whether the natural virtues can be ratified by religion before being transcended by it (for all of them can), but whether in the particular instance the motivation and the sanctions of the virtue are from nature or from grace.

In the part of the poem which has come down to us, such is my hypothesis, Spenser is careful to differentiate the two orders of nature and grace. He emphasizes the parallels between them, and the differences which only these parallels can bring into relief, and he builds both into his pattern; for parallel with

⁷ Thus Padelford in *The Allegory of Chastity in the Faerie Queene, Studies in Philology*, 21 (1924) 367-81: *Variorum Spenser* 3.324

difference is (as we said) of the essence of aesthetic patterning. No doubt he interprets the virtues of the natural order as a Christian would interpret them; but he scrupulously abstains from assigning to them a religious motive and from invoking in their behalf the supernatural sanctions so freely drawn upon in Book I; nor does he bespeak in their support any infusion of divine grace. The natural order, the level on which the remaining books move, is also, it is true, under the power and providence of God, which may intervene to protect the natural man from external evil; but nowhere save in Book I (as we shall see) does Prince Arthur figure forth the grace that works inwardly upon the heart and will.

3

Though it sometimes seems to raise as many problems as it solves, every re-examination of the *Faerie Queene* must commence with the Letter to Raleigh. For whatever its relation to the composition of the poem, the Letter is clearly Spenser's introduction to a reading of it. As such the purpose of the Letter is severely limited. It is not to anticipate the whole meaning of the work, that would be an almost impossible task, and so far as it were successfully executed, an error of judgment; it is simply to set the reader's feet on the right path, to make clear that the poem is an allegory, that each book deals with one of the private virtues (holiness in the person of the Red-cross Knight, temperance in the person of Guyon, chastity in the person of Britomart), that Prince Arthur represents in the whole poem the sum of the virtues, or (as it is called in the Aristotelian scheme) *magnanimity*,⁸ and in the separate books its application to the particular virtue under discussion, and, finally, to give a very necessary indication of the structure of the poem and the occasion of the various adventures recited. The incompleteness of the Letter is evident from the absence of any allusion to the historical allegory, whose existence, and whose importance to Spenser, no one can doubt. This, and much else, the reader is left the pleasure of discovering for himself. The Letter tells him what he needs to know at start-

⁸ Spenser's word in the Letter is, of course, *magnificence*, but in the poem *magnanimity*.

ing: it does not tell all he will know when he has finished the twelve or even the three books. Thus Spenser may well have foreseen a function for Book XII, which it would have been premature to disclose. Perhaps, in addition to supplying belated explanations, the twelfth book was to have completed the pattern of the whole and, like the Epilogue in *Comus*, to have furnished the vantage point from which all that went before might be seen in its true relations and its full significance.

It is not surprising, then, that in the Letter the frame of reference is merely hinted, not set out in detail. The reader is told that the virtue of Book I is holiness, which he would instantly recognize as a specifically Christian virtue, outside nature and belonging to the order of grace; that the armour which the Redcross Knight assumes "is the armour of a Christian man specified by Saint Paul," and that this fact alone marked him off, set him above, all the other knights, for when he had donned the armour, this clownish young man, this son of nature, innocent of any cultivation, "seemed the goodliest man in all that company." The reader is then told of Sir Guyon, the knight of temperance, a virtue which (though it had certainly been adopted, like the other natural virtues, into the Christian scheme) belonged in origin and essence to the order of nature, and was, in fact, with justice and magnanimity, the most characteristic of the Aristotelian virtues. He would observe the absence of any reference to religion, and might be expected to take the hint that Books II and I moved upon different levels, and to be rendered sufficiently alert for the contrast which the two books present, and which is an essential element in the aesthetic pattern of the poem.

4

It need no longer be argued in detail that Book I moves upon the level of grace. Padelford's demonstration is conclusive, that holiness is a purely Christian virtue, and that the *Institutes* of Calvin furnishes a relevant gloss, while the *Ethics* of Aristotle does not.⁹ The attempt of DeMoss to extract Spenser's holiness from Aristotle, and of Miss Winstanley to extract it

⁹ As cited in n 4.

from a blend of Aristotle and Plato, patently break down.¹⁰ It will suffice to recall in rapid summary the essential features of Spenser's first book: (i) the emphasis upon the Christian's armour, and especially upon the shield of faith; (ii) the character of the Knight's companion and guide, Una, the single and all-sufficient religious truth, in whose presence alone he is safe; (iii) the whole tenor of the Knight's adventures up to canto 10, which are not an education in virtue in any ordinary sense, but an illustration of the bankruptcy of the natural man and of the essentially Christian doctrine that only grace can save; (iv) in conformity with this, the special role assigned in this book to Prince Arthur, who certainly does not represent the Aristotelian magnanimity, but on the contrary the operation of divine grace; (v) the completion of the Redcross Knight's education in the House of Holiness: ¹¹ cleansed by repentance, taught by Faith,¹² healed by Hope, led through the works of Charity to the hill of Contemplation, vouchsafed a vision of the New Jerusalem and his own niche as a saint therein, and returned to the world, prepared at last for active service. When Bunyan read the first Book of the *Faerie Queene*, and especially this episode of the House of Holiness, he did not mistake their purport, but recognized it as purely evangelical and gathered from Spenser hints for his own allegory of salvation.¹³

Something of the relation between the two orders of nature and grace is already apparent in Book I, whose central episodes all move upon the level of grace. The lion which accompanies Una to the dwelling of Abessa, and there slays Kirkrapine, represents (it has been suggested) the law of nature, and the action symbolizes the agreement between natural ethics (so

¹⁰ W. F. DeMoss, Spenser's Twelve Moral Virtues 'according to Aristotle,' *Modern Philology*, 26 (1918). 23-8, 245-70; Lilian Winstanley, in introduction to her edition of Book II (Cambridge, 1914).

¹¹ I 10.

¹² It has not, I think, been noticed that in Spenser's description of Faith the serpent in the chalice (I 10.13) bears a double significance, both in the order of grace: besides being the symbol of healing (the emblem of Aesculapius) and of salvation (Moses' serpent on the staff—Numb. 21.9—the type of Christ on the Cross), it is also a symbol of menace, doubtless with reference to I Cor 12 27-9. and its doctrine as repeated in the *Book of Common Prayer*.

¹³ Harold Golder, Bunyan and Spenser, *P. M. L. A.*, 45 (1930). 216-37.

far as natural ethics can go) and true religion: their joint condemnation of a superstitious asceticism and of the corruptions which inevitably attend it.¹⁴ A different relation appears in the two encounters of the Redcross Knight with pride. Spenser is sometimes criticized for suffering his hero to escape from the palace of Lucifera, who represents pride, only to fall a victim to Orgoglio, who also represents pride.¹⁵ A clearer sense of the two orders would show how idle such criticism is, and how sound and consistent is Spenser's allegory. For Lucifera represents worldly pride which leads alike to vice and to disaster. But the vices, the seven deadly sins, are such as the moral sense is perfectly competent to detect and condemn: they impinge upon religion only as religion adds its prohibitions to whatever is condemned on grounds of natural ethics, just as religion (in Spenser's view) assumes and ratifies all the natural virtues before transcending them. And for the disasters, they are such as the world regards: the loss of position, of possessions and of life. It is significantly the Dwarf, who represents worldly prudence or common sense, and no celestial visitant, that warns the Redcross Knight of his danger and prompts his escape. The pride represented by Orgoglio, however, is of a very different sort. It is spiritual pride, which assails the Knight in his religious character when he has laid aside the armour of a Christian man. From it he is powerless to rescue himself. The keyless prison-house will yield to nothing but the onslaught of Prince Arthur, that is, to the violence of grace.¹⁶

There are subtler relations between the two orders than the rather obvious examples which I have chosen; and these relations will, I hope, become apparent as we proceed. But to turn now to the comparison of Book II with Book I.

¹⁴ 1.3; H S V. Jones, *Spenser Handbook* (N. Y., 1930), 159. The two orders are again brought face to face in the meeting of Una with the satyrs and Sir Satyrane (1.6), which yields a similar result: the friendship of uncorrupted nature for grace, but the limits, nevertheless, of merely natural perceptions.

¹⁵ 1.4-5; 1.7.

¹⁶ 1.8.37-9. Another and less significant juxtaposition of the two orders occurs in the encounter with Despair (1.9). Sir Terwin is reduced to despair and impelled to suicide by a sense of earthly misfortune: it is an offence against nature (and of course against religion, which is not invoked), the Redcross Knight, by a sense of sin and spiritual shipwreck: it is an offence against religion (and of course against nature, which is not invoked).

5

Every reader must recognize the similarities of the second Book to the first, in structure and episode, and must believe, when he contrasts them with Books III and IV, that Spenser intended each group to form one of the larger units in the pattern of the whole.

In each of the first two books, a knight (the Redcross Knight and Guyon) is assigned a task by Gloriana and is accompanied as companion and guide by the person at whose instance the task was assigned (Una in the one case, the Palmer in the other). Each knight passes through a series of adventures which are, in one sort or other, an education in the virtue for which he stands and a preparation for his final task. The adventures involve conflicts with single adversaries (the brothers Sansfoy, Sansloy and Sansjoy in Book I, the brothers Pyrochles and Cymochles in Book II), the temporary separation of the Knight from his companion, the encounter with some analogous temptations (the palace of Lucifera, and the cave of Mammon), the rescue of the hero by Prince Arthur, the completion of his education in a retreat (the House of Holiness in Book I, the Castle of Alma in Book II), which affords the final preparation for his assigned task (the slaying of the Dragon by the Redcross Knight, the overthrow of Acrasia and her Bower of Earthly Bliss by Guyon). These are commonplaces of criticism; for the parallels are so obvious as to be inescapable.

But what of the differences which the parallels should bring into relief, and which should rescue the parallelism from monotony? They likewise (as I believe) are so obvious as to have seemed to Spenser inescapable; but to them less than sufficient attention has been paid, and the reason is not far to seek. All the differences depend upon, and derive their significance from, the fact which has been generally overlooked: that whereas what touches the Redcross Knight bears primarily upon revealed religion, or belongs to the order of grace, whatever touches Guyon bears upon natural ethics, or belongs to the order of nature.¹⁷

¹⁷ Guyon's encounter with the Redcross Knight (2 1 26-34) has for its general significance a further note on the relation of the order of nature to the order of grace the harmony of natural ethics with religious, so far as the former can go

This difference leaves its mark upon the whole character of the education which the two knights receive. Guyon's trials and temptations, for the most part successfully surmounted, have the effect of rendering his virtue habitual. At an early stage, in the episode of Medina and her two sisters, Spenser sets forth the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean—the idea that virtue and well-being lie in a mean between the two extremes of excess and defect—a doctrine applied, indeed, throughout the *Faerie Queene*, but especially in the treatment of temperance.¹⁹ The episode of Medina has been recognized, however, as having a second significance: it is an allegory of the Platonic doctrine of the soul, with Medina and Guyon standing for the rational soul, and the sisters, with their knights, for the two divisions of the irrational, the irascible and appetitive, or (as we might say) for wrath and desire.²⁰ Temperance and continence (for Spenser combines the two Aristotelian virtues²¹) can be

(cf 1 3, as explained above, and n. 14) and the recognition of the claims of the higher order by the lower and by reason (cf. 7.59 as explained below, and n. 54) Guyon is more swift to recognize and bow to the symbol of the cross on St. George's shield than is the latter to recognize Guyon as the worthy representative of one of the natural virtues. The Palmer (reason), coming up later, confirms Guyon's judgment. Guyon's reference to "The sacred badge of my Redeemers death" might seem at first to run counter to our hypothesis that Guyon stands for natural as distinguished from Christian virtue, but the distinction is not between pagan and Christian, but between unconverted (natural) man and converted (regenerate). Though denied by some extreme Calvinists (cf. Prynne, in my *Puritanism and Liberty*, p. 233), Christ was generally held to have died for all men and so might be referred to, even by the unconverted, as "my Redeemer," though confessedly Spenser momentarily obscures his pattern by the phrase. It is but momentarily, however; for, as I shall argue below, a large part of the significance of Book II turns on the assignment of Guyon to the order of nature, consistently maintained throughout. And to deny it in this early episode would be to rob the episode itself of much of its meaning. Observe that the Palmer recognizes the Redcross Knight for a saint, a being of a different order, but characteristically attributes his reward to his own merit, which the Redcross Knight, also characteristically, is swift to deny, with gentle reproof, "His be the praise that this achievement wrought." The Palmer speaks of Guyon as having to set out from the point at which the Redcross Knight started, not from the point which he reached (i. e., not with his virtue achieved) as would be demanded by Professor Bowers' hypothesis, and he prays that God may guide him in his task, the God (no doubt) who presides over the order of nature as well as over the order of grace.

¹⁸ 2 2.

¹⁹ Medina's house is described as "wondrous strong by nature. and by skilful frame" (2 2 12).

²⁰ J. S. Harrison in *Variorum Spenser*, 2 416.

²¹ Cf. F. M. Padelford, *ibid.*, 420

achieved only by the ascendancy of the rational over the irrational soul, and it is this ascendancy that becomes habitual. Reason dominates Book II as revealed truth dominates Book I, and these are personified in the companion figures of the Palmer and Una.

The education of the Redcross Knight differs markedly (as we have implied) from Guyon's. It proceeds by trial and error—principally by error: indeed until his entry into the House of Holiness he appears to have learned almost nothing, but to have blundered on, despite his innate nobility, from one error into another. The sum total of his education to this point has been one lesson: the bankruptcy of the natural man and his utter dependence for spiritual virtue upon the grace of God:

What man is he that boasts of fleshly might
And vain assurance of mortality,
Which all so soone as it doth come to fight
Against spirituall foes, yields by and by,
Or from the field most cowardly doth fly!
Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill
That thorough grace hath gained victory:
If any strength we have it is to ill,
But all the good is Gods, both power and eke will ²²

Only as this conviction is borne home to him is St. George ready for the education of the House of Holiness, the vision of the New Jerusalem, and the fulfilment of his task. There is nothing remotely like it in the experience of Guyon.

Fortified by the practice of temperance and continence, Guyon comes to the Castle of Alma, not for correction, and not to receive a vision of higher things, but simply that he may understand more fully the humanistic ethic which has been his guiding principle from the beginning and which will suffice him to the end:

Of all Gods workes which do this world adorne,
There is no one more faire and excellent
Then is mans body both for powre and forme,
Whiles it is kept in sober government;
But none then it more fowle and indecent,
Distempred through misrule and passions bace:
It growes a monster and incontinent
Doth loose his dignity and native grace.²³

²² 1. 10. 1.

²³ 2. 9. 1.

One must observe in passing that by Spenser the word *grace* is used in different senses, which are always sufficiently clear from the context: (i) it may refer to the grace of God working inwardly upon the will and infusing power, as in the stanza quoted above from Book I, and this sense alone is peculiar to the order of grace; (ii) it may refer to God's overflowing bounty in bestowing outward benefits or in intervening as providential care in the natural order; (iii) it may refer to native endowment or to natural excellence, as in the stanza last quoted, from Book II; or (iv) it may refer to grace of disposition, bearing, or manner.²⁴ But to return.

²⁴ It is significant that virtually all the instances of "grace" meaning the grace of God in its full extent (i.e., (i) and closely related senses) occur in Book I. For example: "heavenly grace" (which supports) (1.7.12; 1.8.1); "of grace" (doctrine of grace) (1.10.19); "Where justice growes there grows eke greater grace" (1.9.53), "perfection of all heavenly grace" (state of grace) (1.10.21). In the more extended sense of (ii) and related meanings (God's bounty in bestowing temporal gifts or providential protection, in the natural order), "grace" occurs in all six books. For example: "heavenly grace" (divine protection) (1.5.31); "wondrous grace" (providential intervention) 1.6. argmt, "God's sole grace . . . To send her succour" (6.4.10), Britomart is saved from disaster "by God's grace and her good heednesse" (5.6.34); "grace" intervening to check the natural man for his protection, without external instrument (1.9.26), with external instrument (2.11.30); "Providence hevenly passeth living thought, / And doth for wretched mens reliefe make way, / For loe! great grace or fortune thither brought / Comfort to him" (3.5.27) (interesting as suggesting that what is really God's providence is sometimes mistaken for chance by the natural man); "his Creators grace . . . The gifts of soveraine bounty" (2.7.16); "The grace of his Creator [he] doth despise / That will not use his gifts" (4.8.15); "If goodnesse find no grace [divine favour] nor righteousness no meed" (3.11.9). The meaning (iii) of natural endowment is not frequent, and in its examples it is probable that the word "grace" actually refers to some natural quality (as goodness of disposition or beauty) 2.9.1 (quoted above); Belphebe was born with "all the gifts of grace and chastity" (3.6.2); Radigund seemed a "miracle of natures goodly grace" (5.5.12); "deckt with wondrous giftes of natures grace" (6.7.28); "Whether such grace were given her by kynd" (6.6.43). In what is the commonest meaning, (iv) grace of disposition, bearing, manners, or simply beauty, the adjective "heavenly" is sometimes added thus of Una's "grace" (1.3.4, 1.6.18) where the primary reference is certainly to her beauty; Belphebe was a "goodly Maide full of divinties / And gifts of heavenly grace" (3.5.34). Our classification is not exhaustive. There are a few doubtful examples to be noted. Mercy is born in heaven and "thence pou'd down on men in influence of grace" (5.10.1), probably to be classed under (ii); God planted the flower of chastity in Paradise, "to make ensample of his heavenly grace" (3.5.52), and thereafter did it "in stocke of earthly flesh enrace / That mortall men her glory should admyre" (probably to be classed under (iv), but as a disposition which God specially approves); "Nepenthe is a drinck of soverayne grace / Devized by the Gods" (4.3.43) as also in the preceding example, the phrasing appears to be so calculated

At the same crucial point in each of the two books, the poet pauses to sum up in a single stanza the purport of all that has gone before, and thus to prepare for what is to follow, for the orientation afforded by the Castle of Alma and the House of Holiness respectively: in the one, virtue achieved by man's own effort, by establishing the rule of reason over the passions, and thus realizing the potentialities of his nature; in the other, man's impotence to rise above himself, and thus his utter dependence upon the grace of God. Our knowledge, or rather our faith, that for Spenser these two positions were not incapable of final reconciliation must not blind us to their strong opposition until that reconciliation is reached. If it does, feature after feature of Spenser's pattern will be blurred for us, and we shall fail to appreciate his art as well as his thought. We shall miss the consistent contrast of Guyon with the Redcross Knight, and the dual or (as I would suggest) the triple role of Prince Arthur in the poem. We shall fail to recognize how fully Spenser exploits what I will call the difference in vertical range between the classical and the Christian scheme of things: in the one, man can rise to the specifically human or sink (like the followers of Acrasia) to the level of the beasts; in the other, he can rise (like the Redcross Knight) securely to heaven or fall irrecoverably, and forever, to the bottomless pit. We shall fail, furthermore, to understand why in Book I the supporting imagery comes from the romances *and the Bible*, with scarcely a single draught on Spenser's large accumulations of classical lore, and in Book II, from the romances *and the classics*, with no significant reference to the Bible at all. Finally, we shall misapprehend the purport of Book II itself. For besides the contrast of nature and grace established by the first two books, Book II commences to explore the realm of nature with a new contrast in that realm between nature truly and nature falsely conceived, and this contrast (as we shall presently observe) carries us on from Book II to Book III.

as to make it available for shadowing forth a religious meaning, which renders it difficult to classify; "grace" would here seem to mean native property (in), but with the added idea of a divine cause; similar is the remark about fountains, how some have natural properties, and others special properties "by gifte of later grace" (2.2 6).

6

We have mentioned the dual role of Prince Arthur, now very generally recognized, and have suggested that in reality he plays not a dual, but a triple role.

In those books of the poem which deal with the classical or natural virtues he stands for magnanimity, but just as clearly he stands in Book I for God's grace in its inward operation upon the heart and will. Here then are two distinct roles. What is the significance of each, and where is the propriety of having them discharged by the same person?

How does magnanimity, the crowning and inclusive virtue in the natural order, parallel heavenly grace in the religious order, which is clearly not man's virtue, but (if we may use the term at all) God's? The point of comparison, and the justification of the parallel, lies in the respective roles played by magnanimity and grace in the two systems. Magnanimity, in its Aristotelian sense, means knowing yourself equal to anything, and being so: knowing yourself worthy of the highest things, and being so. It is of the essence of grace, on the other hand, that, in a terrifyingly literal sense, you know yourself equal to nothing and in yourself utterly without worth. The classical scheme of ethics turns upon self-reliance: there is nothing else to rely upon; but the Christian relies upon God. Thus it is in Spenser's poem.

It might be argued that while the roles of magnanimity and grace in the two contrasting systems justify the emphasis on each and a parallel treatment of the two, this very fact would rather suggest the propriety of assigning them to different persons. But Spenser is, no doubt, preparing for an ultimate synthesis of nature and grace in the person of Prince Arthur. Clearly, Spenser would not have been the first to attempt a reconciliation of nature and grace: a long tradition of Christian humanism had worked out a Christian conception, not only of temperance, justice and the other natural virtues, but of magnanimity itself.²⁵ This fact is certainly relevant to Spenser's final synthesis, but it can obscure his pattern if too early invoked.

²⁵ H S V. Jones, *The Faerie Queene and the Medieval Aristotelian Tradition*, *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 25 (1926). 283 ff.; V B Hulbert, in *Variorum Spenser*, 2. 424-6

It is not the specifically Christian version of temperance that Guyon represents, nor is it Christian magnanimity that intervenes in his rescue, because in neither case is a religious motive or a religious sanction introduced. When this fact is clearly established, it is safe, and necessary, to recognize another. There were features in the hard self-sufficiency of Aristotle's magnanimous man which were incompatible as well with the chivalric as with the Christian ideal: ²⁶ at moments one feels that he would have been more at home with Lord Chesterfield than with either St. Paul or Sir Lancelot; and these features Spenser wisely alters in his portrait of Prince Arthur, in whom self-reliance is never arrogant, and who is always a very perfect gentle knight. But Prince Arthur *as magnanimity* is not a specifically Christian figure: at most, he is a figure rendered compatible with the ideal of Christian knighthood. When he intervenes to rescue Sir Guyon from the stealthy attack of Pyrochles and Cymochles,²⁷ it is no longer as the symbol of heavenly grace intervening to save from inward evil, but as the symbol of magnanimity, swift to recognize a kindred spirit and to protect him from the outward depredation of his foes. For this attack of the brothers upon the unconscious Guyon has evidently a very different symbolic value from the attack of Orgoglio upon the Redcross Knight, and from Guyon's earlier battle with Pyrochles, where that embodiment of irascibility menaces, not Guyon's life, but his integrity, damaging his shield and inflicting a slight wound.²⁸ Spenser, it would seem, was

²⁶ The highminded man (Aristotle, *Ethics*, 4 8) is apt to appear supercilious, though affable to his inferiors, he is justified in his contempt for ordinary people, whom he is apt to treat with irony "He is not given to admiration as there is nothing which strikes him as great" He is in the highest degree comageous, of course, when stirred to action, but "there are few things which he values enough to endanger himself for them" He would rather confer than receive benefits; and those received he tries to repay with interest and then forget, "for the recipient is inferior to the benefactor, and the highminded man always aspires to superiority" He is dignified in his movements, with a deep voice and a sedate speech, and is never in a hurry It seems evident that by a Christian standard he would be condemned as self-sufficient and proud, and by a chivalric, as lacking in generosity and a spirit of adventure

²⁷ 2 8 23 ff.

²⁸ If one is to interpret correctly the allegories of the *Faerie Queene*, one must bear this obvious distinction in mind. Some encounters are dramatic projections of an inward struggle in the mind (e.g., the Redcross Knight's meeting with Despair, 1 9); others are conflicts with some outward evil (e.g., his fight with Error, 1. 1).

perfectly well aware that the effects of evil are not confined to the human heart: it stalks abroad with fire and sword to plunder and slay the innocent.

But though this be true, is it not also true, it may be asked, that Prince Arthur's intervention is *providential* in the strictest sense, so that Spenser has merely exchanged one religious conception for another? It is indeed true that the intervention is providential; and this, I submit, is the third role of Prince Arthur, *to figure forth the power and providence of God in the natural order.*

Here, as occasionally in the *Faerie Queene*,²⁹ Spenser offers in rapid succession two symbolic presentations of the same truth. For the angel who stands guard over the unconscious Guyon³⁰ is likewise, and even more obviously, the minister of God's providence, of the overflowing grace which extends its protection even to the natural man:

And is there care in heaven? And is there love
In heavenly spirits to these creatures bace,
That may compassion of their evils move?
There is; else much more wretched were the cace
Of men then beasts. But O! th' exceeding grace
Of highest God that loves his creatures so,
And all his workes with mercy doth embrace,
That blessed Angels he sends to and fro,
To serve to wicked man, to serve his wicked foe.³¹

Such a description would apply only to the natural man, and would by evangelical standards apply to him equally whether morally virtuous, like Guyon, or the reverse.³²

Prince Arthur, it would seem then, represents, in the order of grace, the grace of God in its fullest extent as it works upon the will of the converted; in the order of nature he represents the virtue of magnanimity, which is as central in classical ethics

²⁹ The most striking example is the twofold presentation of the principle of generation in the whole natural order, in 3.6, first in the account of the operation of the Genius with matter and forms, then in the myth of Venus and Adonis, which effects the transition to the human level in the myth of Cupid and Psyche

³⁰ 2.8.1-8

³¹ 2.8.1.

³² Legouis (*Variorum Spenser*, 2.271) complains bitterly of Spenser's thoughtlessness in applying these terms to the virtuous Sir Guyon. It is not the poet who is thoughtless.

as is grace in the Christian scheme; but, also in the order of nature, he represents the power and providence of God as they intervene to protect his creatures from outward evils.

7

Only after the elementary distinction between the two orders of grace and nature has been accepted will one be prepared to appreciate the complexity and consistency of Spenser's findings respecting the second realm, the order of nature, as these are developed in the second and subsequent books of the poem.

In Book II there is (as we have remarked) a contrast between nature truly and nature falsely conceived, and this contrast is carried on in Books III and IV and serves to connect them with Book II. Acrasia's Bower of Bliss represents nature falsely conceived. For there nature's provision for the replenishment of life is prostituted to sensual pleasure and is without issue. The Genius of the Bower is a lord of misrule, and in truth no Genius at all, no spirit of nature, though falsely so called by Acrasia and her followers;³³ and the contrast with nature truly conceived is emphasized (as Mr. C. S. Lewis has shown) by the intrusion into the Bower of a false art whose aim is to deceive³⁴ and whose effect is to heighten and at the same time to misdirect natural impulse. But if one paused at the end of Book II, one might easily mistake Spenser's meaning. Whatever part nature really has in the Bower of Bliss is rescued and rehabilitated in Book III, in Spenser's account of the Garden of Adonis.³⁵ There, under the auspices of the true Genius, the veritable spirit of nature, life replenishes itself. It is an allegory of the principle of generation in all things, and

³³ 2. 12. 46-9

³⁴ 2. 12. 46, 50, 55, 58, 59, 61; C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love* (London, 1936) pp. 324 ff.

³⁵ 3. 6. 29-50. I have deliberately refrained in this lecture from going into the details of Spenser's allegory of matter and the forms, since it would carry me too far afield. The rival interpretations are summarized in the *Variorum Spenser*, 3. 340-52. Of these I still prefer, as a basis for further consideration, Dr. Brents Stuling's (*ibid.*, 3. 347-52). I have already recorded my reasoned conviction that Spenser's treatment of the myth of Venus and Adonis refers simply to the principle of generation in the natural order, and his treatment of the myth of Cupid and Psyche to the operation of this principle at the human level in the institution of marriage, in other words, that both are in the order of nature (*The Argument of Milton's Comus, University of Toronto Quarterly*, 11 (1941). 67-9).

pleasure, rejected when it usurps the role of end, is frankly admitted in its proper role of natural accompaniment. The Garden of Adonis thus furnishes the cosmic setting, not indeed for the ideal of chastity represented by Britomart, but for the view of love and marriage associated with it, which is likewise presented in terms of the order of nature and without reference to grace.

As compared with Guyon (representing temperance and continence) Britomart is positive and dynamic, representing the chastity which is coupled with love, which finds its principal motive in love, and which reaches its goal in marriage. But if this is true, and if it is Spenser's sufficient reason for proceeding from the subject of Book II to that of Book III, it is not because the argument is shifted from the order of nature to the order of grace, but because it is more fully elaborated, and under proper qualifications, on the natural level. Granted that the ideal presented in Britomart can be assimilated by a Christian view of love and marriage, it still remains true that at this stage it is not thus assimilated. In other words, there is no more reason to regard Britomart as an embodiment of a specifically Christian ideal of chastity and love than to regard Belphebe as the embodiment of a Christian ideal of virginity. For in neither case is there the slightest hint of a religious motivation or sanction.

Since Spenser presents his idea of nature in connection, more or less immediate, with his treatment of love, it is desirable to scrutinize carefully his argument on this subject, which extends from the final canto of Book II through Books III and IV, and includes the journey of Britomart in rescue of her lover Artegall, in Book V, cantos 6 and 7, an episode too seldom related to the argument of the preceding books. In broadest outline, then, there are four representations of chastity in these books, Britomart, Belphebe, Amoret and Florimell, and each is also a representation of beauty and its evocative power.

Of these representations Belphebe is the simplest, stemming (as her name implies) from the Diana of classic myth, and embodying, like Diana, all the beauty, all the free activity and all the positive human development that the ideal of chastity conceived as virginity, and moving on the natural level, without motivation and direction from religion, will permit. The situa-

tion is, if you will, artificially narrowed: the response to it is not artificial, but natural; and Belphoebe, certainly, is no starved and thwarted personality. She and her twin sister Amoret are (as the story of their birth is intended to symbolize) children of nature;³⁶ but Belphoebe is adopted by Diana and brought up among her nymphs, while Amoret is placed by Venus in the Garden of Adonis, there to be brought up by Psyche with her daughter Pleasure "In all the lore of love and goodly womanhead."³⁷

If Belphoebe and Amoret are contrasted in their fortunes, each is again contrasted with Britomart, the central figure of the whole argument. Britomart is as positive and dynamic as Belphoebe, but over a far wider range of experience: as perfectly adjusted but to a far more complex situation. For she is as chaste as Belphoebe, by including in theory and action the principle of generation and its human expression, wedded love, and not by excluding them. From the first Britomart is dedicated to the love of Artegall,³⁸ and like a Shavian heroine (or, for that matter, Shakespeare's Helena) she sets out to get him, obedient to a principle at work through all nature and symbolized for Spenser by the myth of Venus and Adonis and, on the human level, by the myth of Cupid and Psyche. Like other central figures in the *Faerie Queene*, Britomart has her companion, old Glauce, who certainly does not symbolize any religious directive,³⁹ as does Una, but moves, like the Palmer,

³⁶ 3 6.4-11.

³⁷ 3.6 28, 51.

³⁸ 3 2 22 ff; 3.3 26.

³⁹ It is perhaps unnecessary again to emphasize the fact that the natural does not necessarily connote the pagan Britomart and Glauce go to church, Britomart thinking only of Artegall, and Glauce only of Britomart, or (as Spenser remarks) "With great devotion, and with little zeale" (3 2.48) Glauce's appropriation for Britomart of armour, captured from the pagan Angela, and deposited in a church (3.3 58-9), certainly does not mean that Britomart is clad, like the Redcross Knight, in the armour of the Christian, but perhaps symbolizes the idea that the natural principles (available even to the pagan) on which Britomart proceeds harmonize with, and can be assimilated by, Christianity. This is not Spenser's synthesis of the two orders, but necessary in preparation for any synthesis. It is important that we should be clear on this point. For in her rescue of Amoret, Britomart's shield protects her from the flames, and her sword parts them and makes way for her (3 11 25); but it is not "the shield . . . wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked," nor "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God" (Ephes. 6.16, 17). But this too may prepare for the final synthesis in another way, which I shall suggest at the end of the lecture, by rendering nature eligible as a symbol of grace.

on the natural level, though with a significant difference. For Glauce does not represent reason or any principle of control, but rather yields to the motive force of love which drives Britomart forward, and from which nothing but Britomart's own spirit, passionate but pure, can derive a principle of control and direction. It is sufficient; and Britomart not only passes scatheless through every danger, and unassailed by any temptation, but wherever she goes brings rebuke to the unchaste and aid to the incomplete or insecure in virtue. The crowning instance (as Padelford has shown) is her rescue of Amoret from the wicked enchanter Busyrane.⁴⁰

Amoret is as deeply in love with Scudamour as Britomart with Artegall. By nature she is as chaste as Britomart, or as the twin sister Belphoebe. But here education in the Garden of Adonis, while true to nature, has yet been incomplete: it has not contained all the elements requisite for love true and chaste *at the human level*. There is some failure in integration. She cannot securely transcend the merely physical in her passion for Scudamour; hence her imprisonment by Busyrane. Her natural chastity insists that she must do so; hence her tortured resistance to the enchanter. Assigned the task of her rescue, her lover is powerless to effect it. Perforce he resigns the task to Britomart, who thus in Book III assumes the function of Prince Arthur, or something more, but in his role of magnanimity, not of heavenly grace, and with this role his pursuit of glory:

Ah! gentlest knight alive (sayd Scudamour)
 What huge heroicke magnanimity
 Dwells in thy bounteous brest! . . .
 Life is not lost (said she) for which is bought
 Endlesse renown, that, more then death, is to be sought.⁴¹

Britomart is able to effect the rescue because she has by nature the attitude which Amoret must struggle to attain. In Amoret what is required is transcendence, but transcendence on the way to unification. Essentially, it is this unification that Britomart represents.

⁴⁰ F. M. Padelford, *The Allegory of Chastity in the Faerie Queene*, *Studies in Philology*, 21 (1925) 367-81; to whose exposition I am deeply indebted.

⁴¹ 3. 11. 19

secure achievement of the specifically human. It means (to borrow Arnold's phrase) the development of our humanity proper as distinct from our animality. Nature, said Renan, knows nothing of chastity. And of nature on her sub-human level, this statement (as Spenser would agree) is perfectly true. She knows no more of chastity than she does of temperance and continence, of friendship, of justice, of courtesy or constancy or magnanimity. She does not know them because she does not need them, having her own sure law, adequate to each level of existence. But this does not mean that the human virtues are unnatural. On the contrary, they are natural in a double sense: because they belong to the nature of man, and because nature, adequately conceived, is seen to furnish their base and to lend them her sanction. Nowhere does this fact appear more strikingly than in Spenser's conception of love and chastity as represented by Britomart. Here the principle of generation common to the whole natural order reaches its appropriate human expression in wedded love, and here it meets and is harmoniously united with the specifically human virtue of chastity.

The cause of Amoret's predicament, from which only Britomart can rescue her, is not that her education in the Garden of Adonis has run counter to nature, as it would have done, for example, had it been carried on in the garden of Acrasia. The cause is that it has failed sufficiently to distinguish the different levels in the natural order. Her education has failed to unite the human virtue of chastity to the natural principle of generation because it has failed to recognize that on the human level the virtue is as natural as the principle: that the virtue is as natural is attested by Amoret's instinctive and tenacious hold upon it, as well as by the triumphant naturalness of Britomart.

The fourth and final character, Florimell, is dedicated, like Britomart and unlike Belphoebe, to love as well as chastity. But she altogether lacks the magnanimity (in Aristotle's and Spenser's sense of the word) which distinguishes these two heroic figures: she is always in flight from danger and always in danger, real or imagined. Florimell has, however, a second role in the poem. In special degree she represents beauty and its evocative power, so that everyone whose path she crosses is drawn after her, impelled by love in some one of its forms,

impure or pure, base or exalted, according to his own nature: the witch's son, the boatman, old Proteus, Sir Guyon, even Prince Arthur, who believes or hopes that she is (or at least is like) the Gloriana of his dreams, and at last the resistance of Marinell himself is broken down. Beauty, as Spenser sings in the first two of his *Fowre Hymnes*, is the universal principle which evokes the universal passion, love. In the *Faerie Queen* it is Florimell pre-eminently who illustrates this principle and its evocative power.

All these ideas, and more, Spenser develops in his treatment of love and chastity on the natural level, and one result is to give us our principal insight into the poet's reading of the order of nature.

8

Under the term *nature* is comprehended the whole range of existence from formed but still inanimate matter up to and including man, save as man in his religious character belongs also to the order of grace. Nature, thus conceived, is an ascending scale, at whose successive levels are added, first, life, then consciousness, then rationality and a moral sense, and finally religious feeling, which last marks the transition to the order of grace. At every level nature connotes a principle of dynamism, a law and a norm; and on the human level the law and the norm are recognized as rational and moral. Thus, as Hooker was soon to argue, the law of nature holds sway over the whole natural order, though its rational character can be apprehended, and its dictates consciously consulted, only at the highest level, that is, by man. Everything seeks its appropriate perfection, and man finally can achieve his, only by a reference on to the order of grace; but so far as it goes nature is a sure guide and her law part of the divine law. These assumptions, made familiar to us by Hooker, Spenser in some measure shares. They underlie his antithesis between the natural and unnatural, and between nature adequately and nature inadequately conceived. Everywhere in the *Faerie Queene* the unnatural is condemned as absurdity, as defiance of fact or as perversion of the appointed order of things; and, avowedly or by implication, the natural is accepted and approved.⁴³

⁴³ The pronounced vein of idyllicism in Spenser has been often remarked. It

Acceptance, however, and approval are not unqualified. There is in Spenser a much sharper line of demarcation between nature and grace than any that can be discovered in Hooker: there is a Calvinistic sense of the bankruptcy of the natural man, and a conception of grace as entailing not so much a perfecting of nature as a new start. Even in his treatment of the natural order, there is more than a suspicion that nature may on occasion prove for man a delusive guide. In the garden of Acrasia the antithesis between nature and the unnatural as represented by an art intended to deceive, is crossed by another idea: up to a point nature herself seems willing to second Acrasia and her art.

The joyous birdes, shrouded in chearfull shade,
 Their notes unto the voice attempred sweet. . . .
 The silver sounding instruments did meet
 With the base murmure of the waters fall. . . .
 The gentle warbling wind low answered to all.

Such is the accompaniment furnished by nature to the singer of the Rose Song; and, when he ceased,

then gan all the choir of birdes
 Their diverse notes t'attune unto his lay,
 As in approvaunce of his pleasing wordes.⁴⁴

And in the Garden of Adonis itself, where nature alone prevails, the lesson taught, as Amoret proves to her cost, is insufficient for life on the human level until the ideals peculiar to that level are recognized as likewise natural, and as modifying for humanity the principles common to the whole order of nature.

At certain points, moreover, natural and humanistic ethics require to be rectified by Christian. A striking instance is

influences his treatment of nature, especially in Book VI, but also at other places, as in 2 7.15-16, where a reference to nature as norm suggests the reflection that "At the well-head the purest streames arise" and leads on to the famous description of the "antique world in his first flowing youth" In a characteristic reference to the unfallen state (1 11 47) the doctrine differs (since one passage bears a reference to nature only, the other to nature and grace), but not the tone. Spenser describes Eden as

that soile where all good things did grow,
 And freely sprong out of the fruitfull grownd,
 As incorrupted Nature did them sow,
 Till that dred Dragon all did overthrow.

⁴⁴ 2 12 71, 76

furnished in Book V. There Spenser's treatment of justice is strictly Aristotelian, and justice, the justice of natural ethics, is stated to include equity. But natural ethics, unrectified by the example of Christianity, is incapable of furnishing the principle which must temper justice. By itself human nature cannot rise above the uncertain and unorganized sentiment of pity. Only Christian teaching and example can afford the principle of mercy. Thus in the court of Mercilla there is introduced a specifically Christian note. Mercilla (who represents Elizabeth in her judicial function) administers justice tempered by mercy, and Artegall (who represents natural justice) and Prince Arthur (who represents magnanimity) visit her for instruction. Spenser makes his point by one of his happy adaptations of classic myth. With the daughters of Jove and Themis, Justice, Good Order and Peace, who attended upon Mercilla, he associates the *Litae*, whose office is to plead the cause of human frailty and to turn aside the wrath of Jove.

They also doe, by his divine permission
Upon the thrones of mortall princes tend,
And often treat for pardon and remission
To suppliant, through frayltie which offend.⁴⁵

Lest we should miss in this symbolism the Christian reference, Spenser introduces it with an allusion to the angels that encompass the throne and support the canopy of Mercilla, who herself is angel-like.⁴⁶ And of mercy indeed he categorically declares that

in th'Almighties everlasting seat
She first was bred, and borne of heavenly race,
From thence pour'd down on men by influence of grace.⁴⁷

Thus Christian teaching must on occasion be called in to rectify natural ethics, just as grace must intervene in rescue of nature. Book II (as we have seen), in contrast to Book I, moves on the natural level: Spenser's treatment of temperance and continence, like his treatment of justice, is strictly Aristotelian. But there is one episode, baffling to the commentators, which becomes, I think, perfectly plain and highly significant if one reads it as symbolizing the limit of man's natural powers

⁴⁵ 5. 9. 32.⁴⁶ 5. 9. 29.⁴⁷ 5. 10. 1.

and the necessary intervention of grace. In canto 11, Prince Arthur, in his character of magnanimity, is defending the Castle of Alma (that is, the human mind and body) against the assaults of sin and sensuality led by Maleger. It is in this strange and sinister figure that the difficulty of interpretation is met. He bears upon him every mark of disease and death, and is attended by the two hags, Impatience and Impotence; but he is a swift and resourceful adversary who all but overcomes Prince Arthur himself. The sword Morddure proves useless, and Arthur, attacking the fiend with his bare hands, crushes the life from him and casts the dead body to the ground. But, like the giant Antaeus, at the touch of earth Maleger leaps to his feet and resumes the fight. Repeatedly he is slain and as often revives, till at last Arthur, recognizing the cause, bears the body to a standing lake and hurls it in. Maleger has been variously interpreted: ⁴⁸ his name (it has been contended) means *evildoer* and he represents sensuality or perhaps sin in general or perhaps Satan himself; his name (say others) means *sick unto death*, and he represents disease which results from the sins of the flesh, or again disease, not as the result of sin, but as a circumstance favourable to it, as lowering resistance to temptation. But none of these interpretations is satisfactory.

What is required is something that will draw the ideas of disease and perennial evil into more intimate relation, and will cover all the details, including Arthur's narrow escape of defeat, the fruitless effort to destroy Maleger, repeatedly restored by the touch of earth, and device by which the destruction is finally compassed, with water standing in symbolic antithesis to earth. I suggest that Maleger is original sin or human depravity, the result of the fall, and that the marks of physical disease and death are the symbols of the inherited taint, the moral and spiritual malady, which man is powerless to remove, and which may betray the strongest and most secure in the natural virtues. It is in his character of magnanimity (of natural virtue) that Prince Arthur barely escapes defeat, and then only by providential intervention. The rescuer stands in need of rescue. How better could the limits of nature be

⁴⁸ See *Variorum Spenser*, 2 343.

enforced? But this is not all. Nothing can destroy Maleger, nothing can finally remove the inherited taint, but the exercise of grace in its fullest extent. The manner of his destruction by water is significant. It is intended to suggest baptismal regeneration, that is to say, it moves in the same area of symbolism as does the sacrament of baptism. This I am persuaded is the correct interpretation of the episode of Maleger and the only one which will cover all the phenomena.⁴⁹ The image of earth is as significant as that of water. Maleger, though momentarily brought under control, revives at the touch of earth. As water symbolizes grace, earth symbolizes nature; and among the various ideas shadowed forth in the *Faerie Queene* is the presence of some principle of evil in nature itself, and especially in matter, a relic of the dark forces which ruled in the chaos before it was reduced to cosmos, and which still struggle to reassert their sway.⁵⁰ With these forces of evil in nature, the evil in fallen man enters into alliance, and in them it finds a support. Hence the necessity of grace to rescue and rectify nature.

Apart, however, from this suggestion of forces of evil in

⁴⁹ Throughout this episode Prince Arthur retains his role of natural virtue, of magnanimity. Even at the end, it is the water, and not the Prince, that symbolizes grace. The providential intervention which earlier effects the temporary rescue of the Prince is described as an act of grace in the second meaning of the term (see n. 24, above). Its instrument is the Prince's Squire, and, like the treatment of Depair (1.9), the allegory adds to the firm handling of a proposition genuine psychological insight. The Prince is almost borne down by his subtle inward foes, when the Squire appears, and it is his example that recalls the Prince to himself and to the pursuit of virtue and honour which is the mark of the magnanimous man.

The whiles the Prince, prickt with reprochful shame,
As one awakke out of long slombring shade,
Reviving thought of glory and of fame,
United all his powers to purge him selfe from blame (2.11.31).

And Spenser's comment makes it clear that the Squire's arrival is the effect of Providence, which can on occasion use the weak to save the strong.

So greatest and most glorious thing on ground
May often need the helpe of weaker hand,
So feeble is mans state, and life unsound,
That in assurance it may never stand,
Till it dissolved be from earthly band:
Proofe be thou, Prince, the prowtest man alive, . . .
That, had not grace thee blest, thou shouldest not survive (2.11.30).

⁵⁰ 1.5.20-3; 4.2.47; 7.1.37.

nature, which must not be overemphasized, the two orders of nature and grace are contrasted in another respect: the order of nature is temporal and transient; the order of grace is eternal. In the much debated Cantos of *Mutabilitie*, which I am inclined to accept as furnishing the cosmic setting for Spenser's treatment of the Aristotelian steadfastness or constancy in the *Faerie Queene*, three important points about the order of nature are clearly made. First, that mutability holds sway through all the natural order, not even the stars and their courses being exempt from change. Secondly, that change, however, does not connote dissolution merely, but also replenishment. It is true, says Nature,

that all things steadfastnesse do hate
And changed be; yet, being rightly wayd,
They are not changed from their first estate,
But by their change their being do dilate,
And turning to themselves at length again,
Do worke their own perfection so by fate:
Then over them Change doth not rule and raigne,
But they rule over Change and do their states maintaine.⁵¹

If change is the rule of death, it is also in the natural order the rule of life. In Spenser's account of the Garden of Adonis, in Book III, the true Genius presides at once over the two processes of dissolution and replenishment, of death and life.⁵² But this is not the end. Man is in nature, but not wholly of nature: man the immortal spirit craves for permanence, and not in vain. For—and this is the third point that is abundantly clear—nature, by her very deficiency, points on to that time when

all shall changed bee,
And from thenceforth none no more change shall see.⁵³

To this pointing on from time to eternity, from change to permanence, from nature to grace, Spenser instantly responds. He feels, like Shelley, the pathos of change, but he does not conclude that "Nought may endure but Mutability." Like Wordsworth, he hears its rhythm as a "musical but melancholy chime," yet recognizes that amid the ruins "Truth fails not." But the truth to which Spenser has final recourse is the truth of another order:

⁵¹ 7. 7 58.

⁵² 3. 6. 31-3.

⁵³ 7. 7 59

Then gin I thinke of that which Nature sayd
 Of that same time when no more change shall be,
 But stedfast rest of all things, firmly stayd
 Upon the pillours of Eternity,
 That is contrayr to Mutabilitie;
 For all that moveth doth in change delight:
 But thenceforth all shall rest eternally
 With him that is the God of Sabaoth hight:
 O that great Sabaoth God, grant me that Sabbathis sight!⁵⁴

By accident indeed, not design, these are the last words we have of Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. And, like the first words, they are about the order of grace.

9

This, like the other facts we have adduced, seems to support our hypothesis that Spenser wrote with the concept of the two orders as a principal frame of reference. Nor is this all. At some points (as we have noticed) a recognition of the frame of reference enables us to see further into Spenser's allegory and, what is more important, to appreciate more fully his aesthetic pattern by understanding its conceptual basis. Not only does it help us to explain, that is, to see more significance in, Maleger and Mercilla, in Britomart as contrasted with Amoret, in the Redcross Knight as contrasted with Guyon and Artegall, in Prince Arthur, and by implication perhaps even in Gloriana herself: it also tends to justify the poet where his art has been called in question. It completely justifies the parallel structure of Books I and II, and the repetition in episodes; for parallel is necessary to bring out the essential difference. Or, to take a single example of the clearing of the aesthetic pattern in Book II considered alone: critics have complained of the division of labour in the final cantos, with Guyon going forward to his destruction of the Bower of Bliss while Prince Arthur is left to defend the Castle of Alma against Maleger and his host.⁵⁵ But once we invoke the frame of reference, and understand the meaning of Maleger, we see that the episodes are complementary, and one as necessary as the other. For Guyon, moving upon the natural level, and guided only by reason, can dis-

⁵⁴ 7.8.2. I adopt the correction Sabbathis for Sabaoth; but see D. C. Allen "On the Closing Lines of the *Faerie Queene*," *M.L.N.*, 64 (1949), 93-4.

⁵⁵ J. W. Bennett, *The Evolution of the Faerie Queene* (Chicago, 1942), p. 134

charge his particular task; but nature and reason have their limits, and when these limits are reached, as by Arthur in his battle with Maleger, only grace can save. And this use of contrast is highly characteristic of Spenser's whole mode of patterning in the *Faerie Queene*.

In broadest outline (as we have observed) Book I moves upon the level of grace and deals with a specifically Christian experience and virtue (call this Spenser's thesis); and the subsequent books which we possess move upon the level of nature and concern themselves with the natural virtues (call this the antithesis). Somehow, before the poem was completed, Spenser must achieve his synthesis, and a synthesis that would, of course, recognize the priority of the order of grace.

No doubt the task was rendered more difficult by Spenser's partial adherence to two different traditions. If, like Hooker, he had been content to emphasize the unity of the whole creation under God, and the steady and relatively unimpeded ascent through nature to grace: if he had simply emphasized one law of perfection operating throughout the whole natural order, as physical law, as biological and, on the human level, as rational and moral: if he had regarded revelation as merely supplementary, as completing this natural law by pointing man on to that fuller perfection which his nature demanded but to which the order of nature could carry him only part of the way: if, unequivocally, Spenser had taken his stand in this tradition, his task would have been easier, though his record of human experience would have been less complete. To this tradition indeed he did respond, and strongly (let there be no mistake about that). But in him it was crossed and partly cancelled by another: by the tradition which we may associate with Calvinism, and which tended to emphasize the insufficiency of nature, and indeed, since the fall, its depravity, and to regard grace as necessary, not merely to complete, but to correct nature and to supply its patent deficiencies. In the one tradition grace could build on the sure foundation of nature. In the other it seemed, rather, to demand a new start. Spenser tries to do justice to the facts of human experience which support these two rival views. And the synthesis at which he aimed in the *Faerie Queene*, whatever its precise character, must somehow have included them both.

That it did so, we have sufficient indication in the part of the poem we possess. Guyon, Artegall and Britomart achieve their natural virtues of temperance, justice and chastity just as surely as does the Redcross Knight his supernatural virtue of holiness; and just as successfully they fulfil their tasks. In so doing they are supported by nature adequately conceived, that is, by a nature in which human wisdom, deliberate or instinctive, can find a guide; but the manifestations of nature are multifarious, and the guide therein must be sought with discrimination. Once it is found, Spenser emphasizes the harmony of nature with grace so far as nature goes, and extorts from nature herself a recognition of the higher order and its claims. Here, plainly, are facts relevant to any attempted synthesis. But there are others. Despite the success of Guyon and Artegall in achieving temperance and justice as natural virtues and without recourse to grace, Spenser's sense of the limitations of nature comes out in their books. In Book V, the natural law of justice includes equity, but has no place for mercy, which can be learned only from the Gospel. In Book II, the sufficiency of nature in Guyon is balanced by the necessity of grace for Prince Arthur's destruction of Maleger.

In Books III and IV, however, this pattern is not maintained. In Britomart, as in Guyon and Artegall, nature is sufficient, but here there is no added appeal from nature to grace, either to modify the ideal of chastity and love or to remove obstacles to its fulfilment: the whole story moves on the natural level, without reference to grace. Yet in some ways Britomart seems more readily adoptable into the Christain scheme than does either Guyon or Artegall, and the ideal of wedded love which she represents seems to require an addition merely. In *Paradise Lost* Milton, adapting to a conception of Christian marriage the Platonic scale of ascent, sees the possibility that chaste love, such as that of the unfallen Adam and Eve for each other, may become a ladder leading to the heavenly love. In Britomart nothing of the sort is suggested. For all we are told, Spenser might here entertain the opinion strongly suggested by the last two of the *Fowre Hymnes*, that heavenly love could not be based on earthly, but required a new start. Clearly it was a problem for the poet, as not only the *Fowre Hymnes* but the

hesitations and contradictions of the *Amoretti* show. But despite the studied silence of the Britomart-Artegal story on this subject, there is perhaps the hint of a solution if we bring that story into relation with the very different one of the Redcross Knight and Una. At the end of Book I, as a symbol of holiness achieved, and a reward for his task accomplished, the Redcross Knight is betrothed to Una. It is, of course, a common device in moral allegories, which Spenser has here adopted; but it clearly presents earthly love as a symbol of heavenly and so far prepares for, if it does not effect, a synthesis of the two.

This, I believe, illustrates a possible relation of the order of nature to the order of grace, which was essential to Spenser's synthesis. One thing that we miss in his explanation of allegory in the Letter to Raleigh is any allusion to Dante's four levels of meaning: possibly because, like other things omitted, it is unnecessary to an intelligent commencement upon the poem: more probably, because Spenser did not adopt in its entirety the Dantean scheme. But the idea that the earthly is a symbol of the heavenly, he clearly does adopt. It is of the very texture of Book I;⁵⁶ and, noting the evidence of symmetry in the half of Spenser's pattern which we possess, we should expect this relation to be reasserted in or before Book XII. If there was to be a book devoted to wisdom, with Sophy as hero, where more appropriately could the reassertion occur, since there is a heavenly wisdom as well as an earthly? There is also an earthly and a heavenly glory. The magnanimous man, says Aristotle, desires glory because he alone is worthy of it. Thus Prince Arthur is in search of Gloriana, of whom he has had a vision. But Arthur has his role in the order of grace as well as in the order of nature, and there Gloriana must signify not the undifferentiated glory of the Letter to Raleigh, but that glorification which cannot be achieved by man's worthiness, but only through God's grace. Book XII (as we said) must do more than furnish

⁵⁶ Because the action of Book I (as of the other books) takes place in the material world, the order of nature, while its allegorical content is experience in the order of grace, the lower order stands to the higher throughout the book in the relation of shadow to substance. In his "Spenser and the Enchanted Glass" (*Johns Hopkins Alumni Magazine* 19 (1930) 23-8; *Variorum Spenser* 1 442-5) Professor C. G. Osgood has shown how penetrating and consistent is the psychology of Spenser's story on the literal (i.e., the natural) level.

belated explanations: it must complete Spenser's synthesis, and with it his pattern: like the Epilogue in *Comus*, it must furnish a vantage point from which everything falls into relation. Among the resources which Spenser had at his disposal was one peculiarly adapted to poetry, the sense that the inferior order stood (as Newman was to phrase it) in a sacramental relation to the higher order: that nature in one aspect might be viewed as "the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace."⁵⁷

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⁵⁷ In his Anglican days Newman had developed this idea (with, of course, no thought of Spenser) as a corollary of Bishop Butler's concept of analogy, read in the light of Keble (see Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, Everyman edn., p. 42). The quoted phrase is not Newman's, but from the *Book of Common Prayer*, added thereto after Spenser's death, but from Nowell's *Catechism* (1570). Apart from Book I (see n. 56), we can, in the unfinished state of the poem, have only scattered hints of this last relation between the two orders which I have suggested. They would be best gathered by a close reading of the other books in relation to Book I, as we saw in considering the parallel between the Britomart-Artegal and Una-Redecross Knight stories. That the parallel may extend to some of the details we observed in noting the similarity in the description of Britomart's natural equipment to the Christian's armour (see n. 39).

EXPLICATION DE TEXTE APPLIED TO WALT
WHITMAN'S POEM "OUT OF THE CRADLE
ENDLESSLY ROCKING" *

By LEO SPITZER

I may state first that our poem treats the age-old theme of world harmony within which the bird is one voice, the sea another, and the poet the third. The classical and Christian ideas of world harmony have been treated by me in *Traditio* (II and III, 1945-6) and it may be apposite for me to extract from this article a brief survey: Pythagoras and Plato had defined music as an art practiced not only by human musicians, but also by the cosmos. According to Plato's *Timaeus*, the music of the spheres is produced by Sirens each of whom, in her particular sphere, sings notes whose pitch is conditioned by the velocity of the revolution of her sphere. The totality of these notes produces that world harmony, or symphony inspired by loving rivalry, ἔρις καὶ φιλία, which is inaccessible to human ears, and which is willed by the demiurge, the world spirit. It was not difficult for the Christians to replace the pagan world spirit by the Christian God of Love and thus to associate the music of the spheres with Christian *Caritas*. In Dante, the Pythagorean world harmony will be sung, not by the Sirens of the *Timaeus* but by the pure intelligences, the angels vying with each other in the different revolving heavens through the physical and spiritual attraction of that Divine Love "che muove il sole e le altre stelle." Already Augustine had seen the world as a "magnum (musicum) carmen creatoris et moderatoris." The theme that the music of nature blends with

* Since I have no thorough acquaintance with Walt Whitman's sources, I am forced to place him, not within the framework of his American *ambiente*, but somewhere in the cold space of world literature (as far as I know it), to treat the poem "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking" as one among other poetic monuments belonging to the Western tradition, apart from the question of Whitman's familiarity or non-familiarity with these monuments. My ignorance, however, may in the end be redeemed to some degree: for I feel that the direct, concrete sources which may be established for a particular work of art, are generally somewhat petty and trivial in comparison with the parallels to be found in international art, together with which the particular work combines in an eternal pattern. I have used Stovall's *Walt Whitman*, N. Y. 1934.

human voices in praise of the Lord is first developed in an exegetic text of Saint Ambrose, intended to interpret the line of *Genesis* in which God is presented as satisfied with his creation of the sea. In surging prose Ambrose offered a powerful acoustic description of the harmony (*concentus* = συμφωνία) in which are fused the song of the waves and the choirs of the devout congregation in an island sanctuary: the voices of men, women, children chanting psalms. "Quam dulcis sonus, quam jucundus fragor ('refraction'), quam grata et consona resultatō (= 'harmonious echo')!" With Ambrose we find for the first time in our occidental literatures the fusion of nature and humanity into one *Stimmung*, into a unity of tone and atmosphere prompted by Christian feelings. It is this transcendental unity which permits the single objects to lose their matter-of-fact identity and to melt into the general atmosphere of piety; whereas in the pantheism of the ancients, though the single phenomenon may even change into another form (as in the metamorphoses of Philomela or Echo), clear-cut forms still continue to exist individually, not fused into an all-embracing atmosphere.

After Ambrose we find birds presented in Latin medieval poetry as psalmists of God, Nature's singers introduced into the more sophisticated company of human singers. Among these birds the nightingale figures predominantly. The classical Philomela, the ravished, mutilated, sorrowing woman-become-songbird (in accord with the ancient tendency to explain the healing effect of music by tragic suffering overcome), becomes in Christian poetry the singer, naturally endowed with divine Grace, who sings to testify to Grace. In a tenth-century Latin poem the nightingale sings at Eastertime, inviting all believers to join with her in praise of the resurrected Christ. From now on medieval love songs reflecting the theological theme begin with a picture of nature revived in spring, with the birds and the poet vying in grateful song (the *Natureingang* of the Minnesingers and troubadours). The word *refrain* (lit. 'refraction'), which in Old French was applied to the twittering of birds as well as to the musical or verbal *refrain*, must be explained by the concept of the echo which is represented in the response of the birds to the music of the world. Similarly, the

modern word *concert* (lit. 'musical contest'), and the Elisabethan word *consort* ('concert') = *consortium* ('association'), are late derivatives from this same idea of peaceful strife, of musically harmonious emulation in the praise of God. The thirteenth-century Spanish poet Gonzalo de Berceo goes so far as to portray learned birds that serve as preachers of religious orthodoxy. Church-fathers and prophets of the Old Testament, Augustine, Saint Gregory, and Isaiah, are presented as nightingales in an earthly paradise competing under the dictation of the Virgin Mary. A one-man concert is Saint Francis' famous canticle: "Altissimo onnipotente bon signore, / tue so le laude, la gloria e l'onore e onne benedizione." This minstrel of God, feeling that one human being alone would not be worthy of praising the Lord, brings into his poem all creatures which may testify with him to the greatness of the Creator: "Messer lu frate Sole" (the Lord my brother Sun), my brother the wind, my sister the water, my sister the earth—and my sister Death. According to legend, the last stanza was added by Saint Francis on the day of his death. The Saint does not mention his brother the bird, but we remember the painting of Giotto in which Francis is depicted as preaching to the birds.

In the Renaissance, the original classical concept of Pythagorean and Platonic World Harmony was revived by poets and scholars: Marsilio Ficino, Kepler (*Harmonices mundi*), and others. The Christian implications, however, which had come to be associated in the Middle Ages with that ancient theory, were not disregarded by the Platonists whether Catholic or Protestant. This we see in the *Musurgia* of the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher and in the writings of the Protestant Leibnitz. Thus when Shakespeare stresses the unmusical in Shylock or Cassius, he means that these characters are untouched by Christian grace. The Renaissance painter *par excellence*, Raphael, shows us Saint Cecilia, surrounded by such figures as Saint Augustine and Saint Mary Magdalen (the Christian theoretician of music and the representative of love rewarded by grace), in a moment of ecstasy when she, an earthly being, gifted for music, or endowed with grace, is privileged to hear the music of heaven. Dryden's "Song for St. Cecilia's Day" and Milton's "At a Solemn Music" celebrate the reunion in

heaven with God's music from which we earthly singers have been estranged through original sin.

Disproportioned sin
 Jarr'd against nature's chime, and with harsh din
 Broke the fair *music that all creatures made*
 To their great Lord.
 O may we soon again renew that song,
 And keep in tune with Heav'n till God ere long
 To his celestial consort us unite,
 To live with him, and sing in endless morn of light.

To die with the expectance of heavenly, Pythagorean-Christian music is sweet. Not only the sweetness of musical reunion with Christ, but the sweetness of a musical death for Christ is expressed by a seventeenth-century German mystic Friedrich von Spee who, in a language that has the simplicity of the folk-song, gives a baroque twist to the classical motif of the tragic death of Philomela. He combines this motif with that of the Echo that we found in Ambrose, although the scenery here is not the all-embracing ocean, but a German forest. A nightingale exultantly sings out the name of Christ to which the echo responds with equal enthusiasm:

Da recht, du fromme Nachtigal,
 Du jenem Schall nit weiche,
 Da recht, du treuer Widerschall,
 Du stets dich ihr vergleiche,
 Zur schönen Wett'
 Nun beide tritt,
 Mein Jesum lasst erklingen.

Then the ' risings and fallings ' of the two voices that descend in order to ascend to ever-higher pitch suddenly cease. The nightingale has died in the praise of " mein Jesum,"—a martyr of love and strife for God.

The English Romantics introduce into poetry their selves and their problems of disenchantment, caused by the waning of faith in the eighteenth century. Now the poet is isolated from the musical birds; no concert materializes. Shelley is startled to hear a lone nightingale " answering him with soothing song " when he sits " pale with grief beneath the tower." Or else he will address the skylark: "*Teach* us, Sprite or Bird, What sweet thoughts are thine. . . Teach me half the gladness / That

thy brain must know." The bird is here a teacher as in medieval poetry, but not a teacher of a firmly established orthodoxy which is shared by bird and poet alike, nor a brother in the love of God. The teaching which the poet requests of the strange visitor ("sprite or bird") from another world is apparently concerned with the knowledge of ultimate things inaccessible to the poet. Keats who apostrophizes the Nightingale ("Thou wert not born for death, immortal bird") feels himself to be immediately thrown back "from thee to my sole self," and as the bird's voice fades away, the poet is left, unlike his medieval confrère, in "forelorn" uncertainty. Was this a vision or a dream?

The German pre-Romantics and Romantics do not express the felling of basic isolation from nature. On the contrary, the Germans wished to recognize themselves in articulate nature. Along with the discovery of folk poetry and of Ossian there went the resurrection of those elemental spirits or sprites, those degraded demi-gods of antiquity who, in spite of the ban of the Church, had been able to survive in popular superstition and in whom were incarnated the irrational cosmic fears of man and the daemoniac magic by which man may be seduced at any moment. Whereas Plato's Sirens sang their symphonic chorus in accord with a Pythagorean mathematical order, now the sirens of the folklore, the daemoniac daughters of the *Erlkönig* in Herder and Goethe sing to lure innocent children away from their parents. The mermaid by her singing and pleading attracts the fisherman toward the abyss (Goethe, *Der Fischer*: "Sie sang zu ihm, sie sprach zu ihm, da war's um ihn geschehn"), and Heine's *Loreley*, by dint of singing and combing her fair German hair, sends the boatsman down to the deep. Thus, as man, gradually dechristianized, realizes his own daemoniac nature—we may remember Goethe's belief in his (and Napoleon's) *daimonion*—, an ambiguous folkloristic religion of underworld Gods tends to replace the truly religious world of order and clarity that had produced the concept of musical world harmony. But though the orderly picture of the world has faded by the eighteenth century, the original desire of the individual to fuse somehow with nature has survived, particularly with the Germans, who always feel their own individu-

ality to be somehow incomplete. This desire may assume two forms: the pantheistic and the religious. Werther, so much torn in his feelings, is never shaken in his craving for pantheistic union with nature; in fact, to integrate with the whole of nature is the purpose of his suicide. The religious variant is represented by Eichendorff. This Catholic poet is not a narcissistic intellectual mirroring himself in nature, but an unproblematic, gaily bird-like being, somewhat puerile perhaps, but living in unison with the aimless beauty of the world. No German poet has identified himself so thoroughly with the German forest and its denizens. He speaks in the first person in the name of the skylark which sings bathed in sunlight, feeling its breast bursting with song. His nightingale is called upon to announce the meaning of his poetic universe:

. . . in der Einsamkeit verkünde
 was sie alle, alle meinen:
 dieses Rauschen in den Bäumen
 und der Mensch in dunkeln Träumen.

The rustling of the dusky leaves of the forest as well as the dark confused dreams of man carry the same message: the affirmation of the aimlessness of nature (human and non-human), whose inexplicability should be respected. It remained for the French Romantics, the seraphic Lamartine and the gigantic Victor Hugo, to celebrate pantheistic world harmony with their French articulateness, with the rhetorical grandiloquence and sonority of their voices. One was the flute, the other the organ. Victor Hugo's *Satyr* (*Le satyre*) dethrones the serene Gods of the Olympus and reveals himself with a stentorian voice as Pan, before whom Jove must abdicate. There is no doubt that Hugo saw himself as that animal-God, as the incarnation of a strange Gallo-Greek earthiness which owes more to Rabelais than to Theocritus. Never since the time of the early Christian hymns had one heard such powerful songs of world-harmony nor since the time of Horace such strong affirmation of the rôle of the poet as *vates*, as Bard. In 1830 Victor Hugo writes:

C'est que l'amour, la tombe, et la gloire, et la vie,
 L'onde qui fuit par l'onde incessamment suivie,
 Tout souffle, tout rayon, ou propice ou fatal,
 Fait reluire et vibrer mon âme de cristal,
 Mon âme aux mille voix, que le Dieu que j'adore
 Mit au centre de tout comme un écho sonore.

The poet himself is both the echo and the crystal placed in the center of the universe by a God whom he, so to speak, crowds out. Victor Hugo is the almighty sensorium that unites, reflects, and speaks for the whole of creation. Obviously the tiny voice of a bird would be superfluous in the concert of thousand voices, or in the pandemonium set in motion by the Bard alone. For, unlike Saint Francis, Hugo believes that the poet may give voice to the world concert. Less optimistically and more modestly, de Musset saw in the poet the voice of suffering incarnate; he offers humanity his bleeding heart for food as the pelican does to her young. "Les plus désespérés sont les chants les plus beaux, / Et j'en sais d'immortels qui sont de purs sanglots." For Baudelaire the poet is the albatross, an exile from heaven plodding clumsily on this earth. Similarly for Mathew Arnold Philomela is a "wanderer from a Grecian shore" and her song is, as in Greek times, "eternal passion, eternal pain." The function of the Hugoian "sonorous world-echo" was taken over in the second half of the nineteenth century by the greatest sorcerer-artist of all times, the musician Richard Wagner. With him operatic art is used to express the will to love and death, which, according to Schopenhauerian philosophy, animates all of creation, man and nature alike. The opera which had been created in the Baroque period as a demonstration of the soothing power of music on all creatures—it is not chance that Orpheus, the tamer of animals and the conqueror of hell, was its original main protagonist—is called upon by Wagner to express the religion of the nineteenth century: pantheism, the voice of the forest in *Siegfried*, of fire in the *Walküre* and of the individual striving for dissolution in death in *Tristan and Isolde*. Wagner gave to his concept of world harmony an orchestration which interpreted the togetherness of voices in the world, each singing its own *unendliche Melodie*, in a novel density of design and compactness of texture which has overpowered millions of listeners on a scale never attained by any artist working with the medium of sound.

After this rapid and over-simplified survey it should have become clear that in the poem "Out of the Cradle" Whitman has offered a powerful original synthesis of motifs which have been elaborated through a period of 1500 years of Occidental

poetry. The poems I have mentioned are not necessarily his immediate material sources; but I am convinced that his "bird or demon" is a descendant of Shelley's "Sprite bird," that the brother mocking-bird is one of Saint Francis' brother creatures, that his "feathered guests from Alabama" is a derivative from Arnold's "wanderer from a Grecian shore," that the conception of "a thousand singers, a thousand songs . . . a thousand echoes" all present in the poet is a reelaboration of Victor Hugo's "âme aux mille voix" and "écho sonore." Be this as it may, the basic motifs in which the idea of world harmony has taken shape in Europe must be in our mind when we read Whitman's poem, which becomes greater to the degree that it can be shown as ranking with, and sometimes excelling, the great parallel poems of world literature.

Our poem is organized in three parts: a *prooemium* (l. 1-22), the tale of the bird (l. 23-143), and the conclusion in which the influence of the bird on the 'outsetting bard' is stated (l. 144—to the end). Parts one and three correspond to each other and occasionally offer parallel wording.

The proem, composed in the epic style of *arma virumque cano*, not only defines the theme of the whole poem clearly but translates this definition into poetry. The proem consists of one long, "oceanic" sentence which symbolizes by its structure the poetic victory achieved by the poet: "Out of the Cradle . . . down . . . up . . . out . . . from . . . I, chanter of pains and joys, uniter of here and hereafter . . . A reminiscence sing.' Out of the maze of the world, symbolized by those numerous parallel phrases, introduced by contrasting prepositions, which invite the inner eye of the reader to look in manifold directions, though *out of* and *from* predominate—out of the maze of the world emerges the powerful Ego, the "I" of the poet, who has extricated himself from the labyrinth (his victory being as it were sealed by the clipped last line "a reminiscence sing").

The longer the sentence, the longer the reader must wait for its subject, the more we sense the feeling of triumph once this subject is reached: the Ego of the poet that dominates the cosmos. It is well known that this is the basic attitude of Walt Whitman toward the world. "Walt Whitman, a kosmos, of Manhattan the son, turbulent, fleshy, sensual . . .", he says in the "Song of Myself." He felt himself to be a microcosm re-

flecting the macrocosm. He shares with Dante the conviction that the Here and the Hereafter collaborate toward his poetry, and as with Dante this attitude is not one of boastfulness. Dante felt impelled to include his own human self (with all his faults) because in his poem his Ego is necessary as a representative of Christendom on its voyage to the Beyond.¹ Walt Whitman felt impelled to include in his poetry his own self (with all his faults) as the representative of American democracy undertaking this worldly voyage of exploration. "And I say to mankind, Be not curious about God. . . I see God each hour of the twenty-four, . . . In the faces of men and women I see God, and in my own face in the glass." "I am of old and young, of the foolish as much as the wise, one of the Nation of many nations . . . A Southerner soon as a Northerner . . . Of every hue and caste am I, of every rank and religion."² But in contrast to Dante who knew of an eternal order in this world as in the Beyond, Whitman finds himself faced with an earthly reality whose increasing complexity made correspondingly more difficult his achievement of poetic mastery. Therefore Whitman must emphasize more his personal triumph. The complexity of the modern world finds its usual expression with Whitman in the endless catalogues, so rarely understood by commentators: in what I have called his "chaotic enumeration" ("La enumeración caótica en las literaturas modernas," Buenos Aires 1945), a device, much imitated after him by Rubén Daris, Claudel, and Werfel. This poetic device consists of lumping together things spiritual and physical, as the raw material of our rich,

¹ Cf. my "Note on the poetic and empirical 'I' in medieval authors" in *Traditio* IV, 414

² Whitman has expressed the encessity of his Ego for his poetry in the following prose lines of his "Backward glance o'er travel'd roads": "I saw, from the time my enterprise and questionings positively shaped themselves (how best can I express my own distinctive era and surroundings, America, Democracy?) that the trunk and centre . . . must be an identical body and soul, a personality—which personality, after many considerations and ponderings, I deliberately settled should be myself—indeed could not be any other. 'Leaves of Grass,' indeed . . . has mainly been . . . an attempt, from first to last, to put a person, a human being (myself in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, in America.) freely, fully and truly on record" Whitman could not realize that he was repeating Dante's procedure, that the poet of democracy must impersonate this sublime abstraction with the same consistency that made Dante impersonate the universal Christian quest for the Beyond. The sea must whisper its oracle 'privately' to Whitman just as Beatrice in the Beyond calls Dante by his personal name

but unordered modern civilization which is made to resemble an oriental bazaar. In this poem it is only one specific situation whose material and spiritual ingredients Whitman enumerates: the natural scene (Paumanok beach at night), the birds, the sea, the thousand responses of the heart of the boy-poet, and his "myriad thence-arous'd words,"—they are all on one plane in this poem, no one subordinated to another, because this arrangement corresponds to Whitman's chaotic experience. Similarly the two temporal planes, the moment when the boy felt the "myriad words" aroused in him on Paumanok beach, and the other when the mature poet feels the rise of "the words such as now start the scene revisiting," are made to coincide because, at the time of the composition of the poem, they are felt as one chaotic but finally mastered experience: the boy who observed the birds now has become the poet. When defining his creative rôle here in the poem, Whitman does not indulge in chaotic enumeration of his qualities as he does in the passage from the "Song of Myself" in which he appears as a Protean demigod. Now he presents himself simply and succinctly as: "I, chanter of pains and joys, uniter of here and hereafter." Out of hydra-like anarchy he has created unity; and, as we see, he has gained not only an emotional, but an intellectual triumph; he represents himself as "taking all hints, but swiftly leaping beyond them" like a master philologist or medieval glossator (later he will insist on his rôle as cautious "translator of the birds' cry," 31 and 69). Whitman takes care to impress upon us the intellectual side of the synthesis he has achieved; a claim that is not unjustified and an aspect that should be stressed more in a poet in whose work generally only the sensuous and chaotic aspect is emphasized.

His "uniting" powers have been revealed to us in his first stanza; in fact in the first line of the poem which gives it its title. With its rocking rhythm, the line suggests the cradle of the infinite sea from which later, at the end of the poem, *death* will emerge. At this stage, however, death is already a part of the situation. It is present in the phrase "From a word stronger and more delicious than any," which the reader is not yet able to understand. Now we can visualize only the ocean, the main instrument in the concert of world harmony with which the

song of the bird and the thousand responses of the poet fuse. Whitman restores the Ambrosian fullness and the unity of *Stimmung* of the world concert of love, music, and ocean (but obviously without Ambrose's theism). There will be no dainty *Vogelkonzert* in a German romantic nook, no dolorous dialogue between a soul estranged from nature and a bird-sprite in an English countryside; the American ocean, "the savage old mother" will provide the background and the undertone to the whole poem. In this Ambrosian concert of world harmony we may distinguish also the Hugoian voice of the poet consisting of a thousand voices; but the insistent repetitions "a thousand singers, a thousand echoes" give rather the effect of a struggle on the poet's part, a struggle with the infinite, than that of a complacent equation ("I am the universe!") such as we find in Hugo.

After the organ- and tuba-notes that resound in the proem, the tone changes entirely in the main part, which is devoted to the reminiscence proper, to the singing of the mocking-birds and the listening of the boy. Here we find a straightforward narrative interrupted by the lyrical songs or "arias" of the birds. Given the setting of nature within which the boy and the bird meet, the term *aria* (130, 138) with its operatic, theatrical connotation as well as the musicological term *trio* (140) that immediately follows (applied to the ears, the tears, and the soul of the boy), may seem too *précieux*. In *Song of Myself*, we recall, Whitman speaks of the tree-toad as "a *chef-d'œuvre* for the highest." But we must also remember that Whitman's world-embracing vision is able to contain in itself opposite aspects of the world at once together. In this vision the man-made or artificial has its genuine place near the product of nature and may even be only another aspect of the natural. The song of the mocking-bird, so naturally sweet, is an artefact of nature that teaches the human artist Whitman.

To return to our narrative, this offers us a development in time of the theme that had been compressed to one plane in

³ But we should keep in mind that Whitman's pantheistic unification of the cosmos, as is true of all similar modern attempts, is informed by a pantheism that comes *after* Christianity, a pantheism-that-has-absorbed-Christianity. The Christian felling for the unity of the world in God can never be lost in modern times, not even when God Himself is lost.

the proem: the boy become poet. In such a development, we would expect, according to conventional syntax, to find the historical flow of events expressed by verbs. But to the contrary, this narrative section offers throughout an almost exclusively nominal style, that is, the coupling of nouns with adjectives or participles, without benefit of finite verbs or copulas. This is an impressionistic device known in French as "écriture artiste," which was introduced by the Goncourts in their diary in the 1850's; for example, "Dans la rue. Tête de femme aux cheveux retroussés en arrière, dégageant le bossuage d'un front étroit, les sourcils remontés vers les tempes . . . ; un type physique curieux de l'énergie et de la volonté féminines" (*Journal des Goncourt*, [1856], I 134). This we call impressionistic because with the suppression of the verb the concatenation and development of happenings gives way to the listing of unconnected ingredients, or, in pictorial terms, to touches of color irrespective of the units to which the colored objects belong. Accordingly, we find with Whitman: "Once Paumanok . . . two feathered guests . . . and their nest . . . and every day the he-bird to and fro . . . and every day . . . I cautiously peering . . .", a procedure that is brought to a high point of perfection in that masterpiece of the last stanza of the second part: "The aria sinking, all else continuing, the stars shining . . . The boy ecstatic . . . The love in the heart long pent . . ." I see in these participles nervous notations of the moment which serve not to reenact actions, but to perpetuate the momentary impressions which these have made on the boy when he was perceiving them. When the boy sensed that the melancholy song was subsiding, he jotted down in the book of memory the words: "Aria sinking," and we the readers may still perceive that first nervous reaction. The development of the boy is then given the style appropriate to a "reminiscence." The style here chosen is such as to impress upon us the fragmentary nature of the naked "reminiscence." Because of the non-finite form of the participles, single moments are forever arrested, but, owing to the verbal nature of these forms, the moment is one of movement, of movement crystallized. Of course, such vivid rendering of a reminiscence is possible only in languages, such as

English or Spanish, that possess the progressive form, of which the simple participle may represent the elliptical variant.⁴

Now, from line 138 on, while the initial rhythm of the stanza seems to continue, there appear strange inversions such as "The aria's meaning, the ears, the soul, swiftly depositing" (for "the ears, the soul swiftly depositing the aria's meaning" and similarly in 140 and 141), inversions quite unusual in English, even jarring upon the English *Sprachgefühl*. We must evidently suppose that the "extasis" (l. 136) of the boy is working in an effort comparable to travail toward an intellectual achievement. It is "the aria's meaning" that is now being found by him and the jarring construction is the "impressionistic" rendering of the difficulty with which this inner event is made to happen. It has already been noted that the activities here reflected by the sequence of participles and other modifiers are all of equal weight. We have not yet stressed the extent to which the "enumerative" procedure has been carried out in our stanza, which indeed consists only of detached phrases of the type "the -ing (-ed)." The chaotic enumeration offered us here is intended to show the collaboration of the whole world ("all else," "the stars," "the winds," "the fierce old mother," "the yellow half-moon," "the boy extatic," "the love," "the ears, the soul," "the strange tears," "the colloquy, the trio," and "the undertone of the sea") toward that unique event—the birth of a poet out of a child who has grasped the meaning of the world. The nervous, impressionistic enumeration is symbolic of the travail of this birth. On the other hand, the repetition in this whole stanza of the atonic rhyme *-ing*, an

⁴ One will notice that in the sentence quoted above from the *Journal des Goncourt* the style of the diary is applied to a static picture, not to an action in the making. *Dégageant le bossuage* stands in attributive relationship to *tête de femme* whereas *sinking* offers a predication about *the aria* (in other words, *the aria sinking* contains a double beat). Moreover, the participles of the Goncourts are all grouped under one heading *tête de femme* finally summed up as *un type physique . . .*, whereas in Whitman's stanza we have a list of different actions, all of equal weight. Accordingly, the Goncourt passage offers a tighter sentence structure. This quality was evidently perceived by Lanson who, in his *Art de la prose*, p. 265, discussing this passage, remarks of the *Journal* in general: "Ce Journal est très écrit; on n'y sent jamais l'abandon, la furie de la notation improvisée." There is then a pose of diary-writing in the Goncourts. With Whitman, on the contrary, the sequence of nominal sentences gives the effect of genuinely improvised notation, such as the boy himself might actually have made at the moment in his 'note-book,' the book of memory.

ending that appeared already in the first line with the suggestion of *rocking*, evokes the all-embracing rhythm and permanent undertone or counterpoint of the sea, whether fiercely howling or softly rocking, as it comes to drown out the chamber-music, the *trio* of ears, soul and tears in the boy. The rhyme in *-ing* is a *leitmotif* that orchestrates the arias of boy and bird and gives the poem a Wagnerian musical density of texture.

As for the songs of the birds, let us note first that Whitman has chosen to replace the hackneyed literary nightingale by a domestic bird of America, the mocking-bird, compared to which, Jefferson once declared, the European nightingale is a third-rate singer. The manner in which Whitman has "translated," to use his modest expression, the song of the mocking-bird into words deserves boundless admiration. I know of no other poem in which we find such a heart-rending impersonation of a bird by a poet, such a welding of bird's voice and human word, such an empathy for the joy and pain expressed by nature's singers. The European poets we have listed above have accurately defined or admiringly praised the musical tone of the bird-notes issuing from tiny throats, but no one attempted to choose just those human articulate words⁵ which would correspond to birds' song if these creatures had possessed the faculty of speech (Eichendorff had he bird sing in the first person, but it sang conventional Romantic lines): the simple, over and over repeated exclamations of a helpless being haunted by pain, which, while monotonously repeating the same *oh!* or giving in to the automatism that is characteristic of overwhelming emotion ("my love, my love"), call upon all elements to bring back the mate. Thus in one common purpose the whole creation is united by the bird in the manner of Saint Francis, but this time in a dirge that associates the creation ("Oh night,"—"Low-hanging moon," "Land, land, land," "Oh rising stars," "Oh darkness") with the mourner, with his elemental body and his elemental desires "Oh throat," . . . "Oh throbbing heart," . . . "Oh past," "Oh happy life," "O songs of joy."⁶ The mournful bird shakes out "reckless de-

⁵ Onomatopoeas (for example *tweet-tweet*) such as occur in folk-poetry would be stylized phonetic approximations, neither human nor bird-like, of the inarticulate sounds of the birds

⁶ On this point, cf Hermann Pongs, *Das Bild in der Dichtung* I, pp 223 seq

spairing carols," songs of *world disharmony* in which love and death are felt as irreconcilable enemies ("carols of lonesome love,"—"death's carols"). The long outdrawn refrains of despair ("soothe soothe soothe," "land land land," "loved loved loved . . .") alternate with everyday speech whose minimum of expressivity becomes a maximum in a moment of tribulation that is beyond words ("so faint, I must be still, be still to listen, but not altogether still, for then she might not come immediately to me," or "O darkness, O in vain! O I am very sick and sorrowful"). The most dynamic American poet has here become the gentlest. We remember Musset's lines quoted above; Whitman's bird's song is a *pur sanglot*.

We may surmise that this lyric section (within a lyric poem) has been somewhat influenced by Mathew Arnold's "Forsaken Merman," ("Come dear children, let us away, down and always below. / Come dear children, come away down, call no more . . ."). But Arnold's merman is one of the last offsprings of that futile masquerade of elementary spirits revived by the Romantics, a pagan demon who is presented as *defeated* by Christianity instead of a figure dangerously seductive to Christians. But Whitman's mocking-bird, the spirit become human, who symbolizes all earthly loveliness subject to grief and death, will live forever. It is one of those historical miracles we can not explain that in the age of machines and capitalism there should arise a poet who feels himself to be a brother to nature as naturally as did Saint Francis, but who at the same time was enough of an intellectual to know the uniqueness of his gift. To *him* the bird poured forth the "meanings which I of all men know, Yes my brother I know, the rest might not." This is again no boasting; this is the simple truth, a perspicacious self-definition of one who has a primeval genius of empathy for nature.

Now let us turn to the last part of the poem which begins with the words "demon or bird" (143), an expression followed later (175) by my "dusky demon *and* brother." The Shelleyan ambiguity disappears here. This marks the end of the parabola that began with "the two feathered guests from Alabama" (26) and was continued sadly with "the solitary guest from Alabama" (51) and "the lone singer wonderful" (58). While the mood of the birds develops from careless rapture to 'dusky'

melancholy, a contrary change takes place in the sea. "The fierce old mother incessantly mourning" (134), the "savage old mother incessantly crying" (141) becomes the "old crone rocking the cradle,"⁷ "hissing melodious," "laving me all over." The two opposite developments must be seen in connection. To the degree that the bird is crushed by fate, the sea develops its soothing qualities; to the degree that beauty fades away, wisdom becomes manifest. The sea represents the sweet wisdom of death. The forces of nature are thus ambivalent, Janus-like. Nature wills sorrow and joy, life and death, and it may be that death will become or foster life. "Out of the cradle endlessly rocking," that is (we understand it now), out of the cradle of *death*, the poet will sing life. By presenting, in the beginning, the sea only as a cradle gently rocking, there was suggested the idea of birth and life; but now, the gently rocking cradle is seen as the symbol of recurring death and re-birth. A poet is born by the death of the bird who is a brother and a demon. A brother because he teaches the boy love; a demon, because he "projects" the poet, anticipates, and heralds him, stirs up in him those creative faculties which must partake of the frightening and of the daemonic. But while the bird was destined to teach the boy love ("death" being a reality the bird was not able to reconcile with love), the sea, wiser than the bird and the "aroused child's heart," has another message to bring to the boy: "Death, death, death, death, death" (173). This line is

⁷ Professor Anderson has drawn my attention to the fact that the parenthetic mention of the "old crone" is not contained in the first versions of the poem. In fact, the whole inversely parallel development of the bird and the sea is missing in them. The 'Shelleyan' expression *demon or bird* occurs only from 1867 on, the 1860 edition having only *bird* in the passage in question, although this is followed by two allusions to (*dusky*) *demon*. Similarly the expression "dusky demon and brother" appears in final form only after several rewordings and owes its form to a meticulous carefulness on the part of that supposedly rather careless stylist Whitman, comparable indeed to that of the French classicist Malherbe who changed his first draft "Et ne pouvait Rosette être mieux que les roses qui ne vivent qu'un jour" into the exquisite lines "Rose, elle a vécu ce que vivent les roses, L'espace d'un matin" (cf. my *Stilstudien* II [1928], p. 18).

⁸ This term must be understood in the light of what Christian theologians call 'prefiguration' or 'adumbration' (e.g. David, by his existence, announces or anticipates Christ who will be the *final king*). The bird in its song of grief attempts to unite the whole universe and thereby anticipates the poet who, having absorbed the teaching of the sea (he is not land-bound like the bird), will be able *truly* to 'unite' the cosmos in his poem.

the counterpart of the mocking-bird's "loved loved loved loved loved!", and it is couched in the same exclamational style, as though it were the organic continuation thereof. The word *death* is "the word final, superior to all," "the key," "the clew" which awakes in the boy the thousand responses, songs, echoes, and the myriad of words; and once he has discovered this *meaning* of life, which is death, he is no longer the boy of the beginning ("never again leave me to be the peaceful boy I was before"). He has become the poet, the "uniter" of here and hereafter," able to fuse the voices of the *musica mundana* into one symphony, and we the readers can now understand his words in their full depth. In the conclusion we recognize certain lines of the proem textually repeated but now clarified and deepened by the keyword; we understand at last the symphonic¹⁰ value of "that strong and delicious word" alluded to in the proem. The liquid fusion suggested by the sea of death is symbolized by the fluid syntax of the last three stanzas; the relative constructions which we find in l. 163 "Whereto answering the sea . . ." and l. 174 "Which I do not forget" weld the three stanzas together into one stream or chain which comprehends the question of the boy, the answer of the sea and his choice of avocation, into one melody in which inspiration flows uninterruptedly from the watery element to the poet. The

⁹ The "will to unite" in Whitman is reflected by his habit of leaping from the particular to a comprehensive *all* as in "the word of the sweetest songs, and all songs" or in a discarded version of our poem: "O how joys, dreads, convolutions, human shapes, and all shapes, spring as from graves around me!" One feels here the impatience of the 'uniter'.

¹⁰ It must be noted that the "symphonic fusion" in our poem was achieved by Whitman only in the process of time (cf. also note 7). The title of the poem in the first versions, 1860 and 1867, was "A Word Out of the Sea"; the oracular word *Death!* appeared in two passages, repeated five times in each, and the climactic line: 'the word final, superior to all' was preceded by a passage of six lines, in which was repeated several times the exclamation "oh, a word!" The original versions show then the orchestra of the world concert dominated by the monody of the oracle; the fierce old mother "out of" whom 'the word' was to come, was in the exalted position of the Delphian Pythia. It may be added that Whitman showed himself then also more conscious of the new "chaos" opening up before him as a consequence of his new awareness of his destination "O a word! O what is my destination? (I fear it is henceforth chaos)." This line is deleted in the final draught, because it would have jarred with the rôle of the 'uniter' assumed by Whitman in the beginning, but its original presence confirms our view that the poet has felt it indeed to be his task to create cosmos out of chaos.

bird and the poet have been given their respective solos in the symphony. The bird's solo is the *aria* and the boy's the *trio* of ears, soul, and tears; the endless counterpoint and contrabasso of the sea has accompanied their detached musical pieces. Now all voices blend in an "*unendliche Melodie*," an infinite melody, the unfixed form of nineteenth-century pantheism, with Wagnerian orchestration. "But fuse the song of my dusky demon and brother . . . with the thousand responsive songs, at random, my own songs . . . and with them the key, the word up from the waves." The last word in the poem, however, is the personal pronoun *me*. Though placed inconspicuously in an unstressed position in the short line "the sea whispered to me," this personal word nevertheless represents a modest climax. It is to Whitman that has been revealed the musical meaning of the world, the chord formed by Eros and Thanos, the infinite cosmos created from infinite chaos, and, finally, his own micro-cosmic rôle in the creation. It is the knowledge of death that will make him the poet of life, of this world, *not* of the Hereafter. The promise in the beginning to sing of the Here and Hereafter can be said to have been fulfilled only if the Hereafter is understood as comprised in the Here.¹¹ We will note that no reference is made in Whitman's poem to the world harmony of the Christian Beyond in the manner of Milton. The fullness of life of which Whitman sings can come to an end only in the sealike, endlessly rocking embrace of nothingness, an end that is sweet and sensuous ("delicious" is Whitman's epithet), and, indeed, he appears sensuously to enjoy the sound of the word *death* that he so often repeats. We may pause at this point to remember that in 1860, one year after our lyric was written, Whitman gives expression to the same feeling in the poem "Scented herbage of my breast":

You [the leaves] make me think of death,
 Death is beautiful from you (what indeed is finally
 beautiful except death and love?)
 Oh I think it is not for life I am chanting here
 my chant of lovers,
 I think it must be for death . . .

¹¹ Cf the line in "Walt Whitman," 48: "No array of terms can say how much I am at peace about God, and about death?"

Death or life I am then indifferent, my soul
 declines to prefer
 (I am not sure but the high soul of lovers welcomes
 death most).

The same feeling for the voluptuousness of death and the death-like quality of love we find not only in Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde* (1857), in which we hear the same words applied to the love-scene and to the death-scene, *unbewusst—hochste* (*Liebes-*) *Lust*. There is also the same motif in Baudelaire's *Invitation* of 1857, in which the 'invitation' is the lure of death, described as voluptuous hashish and scented lotus. Perhaps powerful personalities crave death as a liberation from the burden of their own individuality, and sensuous poets wish to have a sensuous death. Perhaps also the concurrence in one motif of three poets not in direct contact with each other means that their subtle sensitivity instinctively anticipated the death-germs implanted in a luxuriant, sensuous, worldly civilization of "Enrichissez-vous," of Victorianism, and the Second Empire. This was long before the *fin de siècle* generation of D'Annunzio, Barrès, Hofmannsthal and Thomas Mann, when the theme of love-death, inherited from Baudelaire and Wagner, finally became the theme *par excellence*. But Whitman, unlike his two sickly European contemporary confrères will remain for us not the poet of death (although the idea of death may have perturbed him more than once), but the unique poet of American *optimism* and love of life, who has been able, naturally and naively, to unite what in other contemporary poets tends to fall apart, the life of man and that of nature.¹²

A last question arises. To what sub-genre does our lyrical poem belong? It is obviously an *ode*, the genre made famous by Pindar, Horace, Milton, and Hölderlin, if the ode may be defined as a solemn, lengthy, lyric-epic poem that celebrates an event significant for the community, such as, with Pindar, the victory of a champion in the Olympic games. Ancient poems belonging to this very aristocratic genre are filled with erudite mythological allusions since the origin of the heroes must be traced back to gods or demigods. These odes are also written

¹². . . And in addition to all that—though this peculiarity is not represented in our poem—the vitality of the machine.

in a difficult language that can not easily be sung, for they are replete with whimsical breaks and changes of rhythm and tone that reflect the fragmentary nature of the inspiration of the poet, carried away as he is by his divine enthusiasm or *θεία μανία*. Of course, as is true of all ancient poetry, the ode had no rhymes. In the period of the Renaissance this ancient genre was revived, but enjoyed only a precarious existence in modern literatures because the social set-up of Pindar's Greece was missing in our civilization, filled as it is with social resentment, and because the travesty involved in presenting contemporary figures as ancient heroes could only be sadly disappointing. The genre fared relatively better in Germanic than in Romance literatures because the Romance languages are not free enough in word-formation to offer coinages worthy of Pindar and because Romance needs the rhyme as a constitutive element of verse. Ronsard's Pindaric odes were signal failures. Whitman has acclimated the ode on American soil and democratized it. The lyric-epic texture, the solemn basic tone and the stylistic variation, the whimsical word-coinages and the chaotic fragmentariness are preserved. The latter feature has even found a modern justification in the complexity of the modern world. For the rhymeless Greek verse, Whitman by a bold intuition found an equivalent in the Bible verset, but he used this meter in order to express a creed diametrically opposed to that of the Bible. Theoretically, he could have borrowed expressions of his pantheistic beliefs from the mythology of the Greeks, but in reality, he did away with *all* mythology, pagan as well as Christian. He replaces the pagan Pantheon by the deified eternal forces of nature to which any American of today may feel close. The Ocean is the old savage mother, not Neptune with the trident (a mother, a primeval chthonic goddess) and the bird is not Philomela, but the mocking-bird who is a demon of fertility (only in the phrase "feathered guests of Alabama" do we find a faint reminiscence of Homeric expression, the *epitheton constans*).¹³ The Neo-Catholic poet Paul Claudel

¹³ It may be noted that even this is no pure case of an 'epitheton constans' since it does not reappear in later situations; on the contrary, as we have said, the gay epithet 'feather'd guests from Alabama' will lead us to the melancholy 'lonely singer wonderful.' In the case of 'the savage old mother incessantly crying' there is from the start no indication of 'constancy' of attribution, *crying* is not

who, as recently as the last decades, gave the French for the first time a true ode and was able to do so only by a detour through America, by imitating Whitman (even the metric form of his free verse), found it necessary to discard Whitman's pantheistic naturalism and to replace it by the *merveilleux chrétien* which a hundred years ago Chateaubriand had introduced into French prose.¹⁴ But it can not be denied that Whitman's ode can reach a wider range of modern readers than can Claudel's orthodox Catholic *grande ode*. As for the solemn event significant for the community which the ode must by its nature celebrate—this we have in the consecration of Walt Whitman as a poet, the glorification, not of a Greek aristocratic athlete born of Gods, but of a nameless American boy, a solitary listener and singer on a little-known Long Island shore who, having met with nature and with his own heart, becomes the American national poet, the democratic and priestly *vates Americanus*.

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an attribute, but a predicate. But that Whitman had the Homeric epithet in mind is shown by the line quoted above from 'Song to myself' 'Walt Whitman of Manhattan the son' which is a travesty of the ancient type 'Ajax the Telamonian son.'

¹⁴ Cf. my interpretation of an ode by Paul Claudel in *Linguistics and Literary History* (Princeton 1948, pp. 193 seq.). This ode, one of five intended "pour saluer le siècle nouveau," and reminiscent of Horace's *Carmen saeculare*, also glorifies the achievements of modern industry and in this manner replaces the *fin de siècle* pessimism of the poetic schools that preceded Claudel by a "siècle nouveau" optimism which harks back to Whitman



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JOHNSON ON A FREE PRESS: A STUDY IN LIBERTY AND SUBORDINATION

By EDWARD A. BLOOM

"I would rather trust my money to a man who has no hands, and so a physical impossibility to steal, than to a man of the most honest principles."¹ These words in the year before his death are the distillation of Samuel Johnson's philosophy of a free press and of the broader but basic problem of human liberty upon which it is founded, two eighteenth-century issues that were to provide much of the groundwork of future liberalism in Europe and America. Thus he summed up his typical distrust of democratic privilege and his insistence that rulers apply prerogatives for the good of the many. Essentially Johnson believed that human rights must be respected but closely defined by a humane, authoritarian government which legislated for the best interests of the people. No revolutionary group, he believed, could achieve this purpose because revolutionists are the rabble and the rabble are necessarily irresponsible. By the same token he believed that an unrestrained press is dominated by the selfish masses whose interest is in the individual rather than in the social group. Inevitably capricious, such a press can produce only sedition and disorder, in Johnson's opinion. And such disorder, he felt, must lead from benevolence to tyranny. He believed the government

¹ James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (ed. Hill, Powell; Oxford, 1934), IV, 224.

must impose certain restraints and that the press must obey them, if order is to be maintained.

To comprehend Johnson's views on freedom of the press we must comprehend his attitude toward human liberty and the scope that he would accord it. His thoughts were always tempered by veneration of the established authority of the state, which to him was the only justifiable guardian of the citizens' rights. The individualism of popular government he decried as a step toward anarchy and chaos. In an age of order Johnson insisted upon the absolute order that he believed could be maintained only by the rigidly centralized control of a monarch and his parliament. This insistence, then, was not out of an arbitrary worship of monarchical rule but out of a feeling that man's survival and happiness can result only from an enforced regimen.

It is essential to recall that Johnson's fearful view of democracy is typical of an idea prevalent in the eighteenth century prior to the French Revolution. According to this notion, the principle of individual representation was equated with mob rule, which Johnson dreaded would magnify the benefit of the individual above the good of the whole. Although he was aware that some English rulers might attempt tyrannical breaches of liberty, his general faith in the monarchy led him to minimize such peril. Indeed, he even implied that an excess of freedom was permitted in England to such a degree as to provoke danger of licentiousness.² Despite his apprehension of the masses, furthermore, Johnson contended that they cherished their existent liberties to such a degree as to render ineffectual any attempted serious limitations of their rights.

His entire attitude presupposed that the institutions of government and public expression in England were as liberal and as free as they could possibly be for the greatest beneficence of the many. Johnson, like any careful observer of society, saw the parallel between a free government and a free press. And like any careful observer of society he saw the need

² *Ibid.*, II, 130. Ironically Townshend in 1774 attacked both Johnson and Shebbeare for writing licentiously against the government. Charles Fox defended Johnson against the charge. See *Parliamentary History of England*, XVII, 1054-58. Johnson defined licentiousness as "Boundless liberty; contempt of just restraint" (*A Dictionary of the English Language*, London, 1852).

for transigence. The common error of many evaluators of Johnson is that they present him as an absolutist on social problems. Far from that, indeed, Johnson recognized the essentiality of liberty to man's gregarious state. He differed from the relatively few radical thinkers of his day only in degree. All admitted the value of a certain amount of restraint in government and in the press. Because of his bearing toward the masses, Johnson was especially insistent upon a careful enforcement and imposition of curbs. Nevertheless, he resented extremes of authoritarian rule even as he resented extremes of democracy.

Samuel Johnson was not alone in believing in the desirability of the quiescent form of English government. Oliver Goldsmith and David Hume, for instance, held that the parliamentary system, by offering a happy medium between a democracy and a monarchy, was most conducive to liberty. With a conservatism like that of Johnson's, Goldsmith suspiciously declared:

[E]very step . . . the constitution takes towards a democratic form, every diminution of the legal authority, is, in fact, a diminution of the subject's freedom; but every attempt to render the government more popular not only impairs natural liberty, but even will at last dissolve the political constitution.³

Johnson, then, is one of a group of distinguished moderate thinkers who abhorred the excesses to which lack of restraints could lead.

In his own day Johnson had in some circles acquired an unhappy notoriety for intolerance and opposition to liberty. "What!" observed John Wilkes, "does *he* talk of liberty? *Liberty* is as ridiculous in *his* mouth as *Religion* in mine."⁴ Another contemporary, Joseph Baretti, shared this notion of Johnson's lack of tolerance.⁵ Yet at various time in his career

³ Oliver Goldsmith, *Citizen of the World*, Letter 50, in *The Works of Oliver Goldsmith* (ed. Cunningham; Boston and New York, 1900). See also David Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary* (ed. Green and Grose; London, 1912), I, 94-98, 306 ff.; Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (ed. Edwin Cannan; New York, 1937), p. 141; Voltaire, *Letters on the English*, No. VIII; Horace Walpole, *The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole's Correspondence* (ed. Wilmarth Sheldon Lewis; New Haven, 1937-1944), III, 192, Plato, *Laws*, III, 701.

⁴ Boswell, III, 224.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 252 n.

accord the people relative, not absolute freedom. His opinion did not embrace the natural-rights theory of John Locke or of Rousseau. Despite his mistrust of individualism, Johnson reveals some flexibility in establishing the bounds of individual freedom.

Every society has a right to preserve public peace and order, and therefore has a good right to prohibit the propagation of opinions which have a dangerous tendency. To say the *magistrate* has this right, is using an inadequate word: it is the *society* for which the magistrate is agent. He may be morally or theologically wrong in restraining the propagation of opinions which he thinks dangerous, but he is politically right. . . . Every man has a right to liberty of conscience, and with that the magistrate cannot interfere. People confound liberty of thinking with liberty of talking; nay with liberty of preaching. Every man has a physical right to think as he pleases; for it cannot be discovered how he thinks. He has not a moral right; for he ought to inform himself and think justly. But, Sir, no member of society has a right to *teach* any doctrine contrary to what that society holds to be true. The magistrate, I say, may be wrong in what he thinks: but, while he thinks himself right, he may, and ought to enforce what he thinks.⁹

In effect, then, Johnson argued that every man has the liberty to think as he pleases but not to act as he pleases, if his proposed action is not consonant with public good. This same idea he incorporated in his theory of a free press: the writer may be permitted to express only those ideas which authority has deemed good for the citizenry.

In his belief in the satisfactory current state of British liberty, Johnson was inclined to brand quests for additional privileges as marks of immaturity. Furthermore, he frequently associated such dissatisfaction with the uncultivated and un-

⁹ Boswell, II, 249 For comparable ideas on individual rights of conscience and religion, see John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (ed J. W. Gough; Oxford, 1946), *passim*; Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (trans Henry J. Tozer; London, 1924), Ch 4, Section 8. On the economic level Adam Smith recognized the existence of natural liberty and objected to its abuse. Man, he said, is entitled to free enterprise as long as he conforms to the laws of society (*Wealth of Nations*, p 651, and *passim*). See also John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (ed R. B. McCallum; Oxford, 1946), pp. 11 ff. According to Johnson, conscience is a generally infallible check on those in authority, for "it is a conscience very ill informed that violates the rights of one man, for the convenience of another" (Boswell, II, 243). In his insistence upon obedience to a central authority, Johnson also expected religious restraints by the state and by the clerics (Boswell, III, 59 ff.).

knowing hordes of the "rabble." Of the writings of George Lyttelton, an advocate of reform in parliament and of an unrestrained press for reporting public matters, Johnson observed:

[T]he Letters have something of that indistinct and headstrong ardour for Liberty which a man of genius always catches when he enters the world, and always suffers to cool as he passes forward.¹⁰

Even more harshly did he view Mark Akenside's activities on behalf of liberty, showing his own antipathy to change and attributing to Akenside's efforts the qualities of irresponsibility.

He certainly retained an unnecessary and outrageous zeal for what he called and thought liberty; a zeal which sometimes disguises from the world, and not rarely from the mind which it possesses, an envious desire of plundering wealth or degrading greatness; and of which the immediate tendency is innovation and anarchy, an impetuous eagerness to subvert and confound, with very little care what shall be established.¹¹

Despite his personal dislike for Sir Robert Walpole, Johnson did not join those who accused the prime minister of restricting liberty within the nation. On the contrary he wrote:

At this time a long course of opposition to Sir Robert Walpole had filled the nation with clamours for liberty, of which no man felt the want, and with care for liberty, which was not in danger.¹²

Not only did Johnson rebuke those who pursued a will-o'-the-wisp in liberty, but he also generalized that "it has been observed that they who most loudly clamour for liberty do not most liberally grant it."¹³

The demands of the masses for liberty, whether in government or in journalism, Johnson regarded as the nugatory caprice of adolescent people. "The notion of liberty," he wrote, "amuses the people of England, and helps to keep off the

¹⁰ *Lives of the English Poets* (ed. Hill; Oxford, 1905), III, 446.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, III, 411. Johnson first wrote "a furious and outrageous zeal" (Boswell, IV, 56). Mrs. Thrale comments on Johnson's "hatred for Innovation & Reverence for the old feudal Times" (*Thraliana, the Diary of Mrs. Hester Lynch Thrale*, ed. Katherine C. Balderston, Oxford, 1942, I, 207).

¹² *Lives of the English Poets*, III, 289

¹³ *Ibid.*, I, 157. Cf. *Taxation no Tyranny*, in *The Works of Samuel Johnson* (ed. Robert Lynam; London, 1825). "[H]ow is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?" (V, 474).

taedium vitae. When a butcher tells you that *his heart bleeds for his country*, he has, in fact, no uneasy feeling.”¹⁴ Johnson’s utter contempt for the participation in government of the “rabble”—as he consistently termed the masses—parallels his scorn for their demands for a liberated press. In either case he suspected the citizenry would forget the prior claim of the state and turn unrestricted liberty to their individual selfish uses. His attitude of superiority and distrust becomes particularly apparent in those political tracts dedicated to his attacks on John Wilkes, Junius, and the American colonists.¹⁵ In each instance he reasserted his suspicion of the degree to which the commoners could be trusted. Particularly did he rebuke those who in his opinion demanded exorbitant democratic privileges. Furthermore in the same tracts, he strongly implied criticism of the press whose newswriters abused their license and thus evinced their irresponsibility. Johnson’s orderly sensibilities were offended by what he considered extravagant attacks upon the established, necessary system. He thought that John Wilkes had mesmerized the mobs into supporting him during the Middlesex election by holding out to them extravagant promises of liberty. But Johnson refused to believe that any issue of English liberty was at stake. Instead, he felt, Wilkes had resorted to a cheaply emotional display to enhance his own power and notoriety. Junius’ popularity he could not vindicate, holding the anonymous pamphleteer to be an idol of the masses in an unadmirable cause. The defection of the American colonists, Johnson felt, was typical of that of any mob dazzled by a glittering bauble labeled “Liberty,” even though they had no true conception of the meaning of the term. In making his strictures, Johnson allied himself with an ever-narrowing intellectual minority, including such writers as Tobias Smollett, Horace Walpole, and David Hume.¹⁶

¹⁴ Boswell, I, 394.

¹⁵ *The False Alarm, Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falkland’s Island, Taxation no Tyranny*, in *Works*, Vol V. According to Harold J. Laski (*Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham*, London, 1925, p. 178) Johnson and Edward Gibbon were the only first-rate thinkers in eighteenth-century England not to recognize the importance of conciliating the colonists.

¹⁶ Lewis Melville, *The Life and Letters of Tobias Smollett* (London, 1926), p. 193. Walpole, *Correspondence*, XI, *passim*; *Memoirs of the Reign of George III* (London and New York, 1894), II, 48-49 and III, 83. Walpole in particular shared Johnson’s

Johnson's minority position is emphasized by a flood of anonymous pamphlets denouncing the prosecution of Wilkes.¹⁷ Although many are, of course, by paid anti-administration writers, they serve to illustrate growing discontent with an arbitrary government and insistence upon greater individual liberty. It was for fear of ultimate violence that Johnson was so implacably opposed to the disquieting influence of Wilkes and Junius and the American rebellion. At best he could but deplore such disruptive activities. For to Johnson any disruption of established order is a violation of every concept of civilized society.

2

Basic to Johnson's concept of human rights is his belief that man's liberty is a social grant from the government which protects and represents him. Stemming from this view is his hierarchical principle of authority involving a superior with subordination by an inferior. That is, he saw society as a necessary framework for the protection and maximum happiness of man. And no society may exist, Johnson was careful to emphasize, if individual whim is permitted to dictate the operation of that society. For the good of the many, therefore, there must be absolute if enlightened authority. Or as Johnson himself worded the idea:

In sovereignty there are no gradations. . . . There must in every society be some power or other from which there is no appeal, which admits no restrictions, which pervades the whole mass of the community, regulates and adjusts all subordination, enacts laws or repeals them, erects or annuls judicatures, extends or contracts privileges, exempt itself from question or controul, and bounded only by physical necessity.¹⁸

To the argument, "Liberty is the birthright of man, and where obedience is compelled there is no liberty," Johnson replied,

dread of mobs and violence. *The Letters of David Hume* (ed. J Y T Greig, Oxford, 1932), II, 244-245. See *The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield* (ed Bonamy Dobrée; London and New York, 1932), pp 2563 ff. Chesterfield approved of Wilkes' activities.

¹⁷ In one, *A Letter to Dr. Samuel Johnson occasioned by his late Political Publications* (London, 1775), the author attacked Johnson for *Falkland's Islands* and *The False Alarm*.

¹⁸ *Taxation no Tyranny*, in *Works*, V, 446-447. See Boswell, II, 244.

"Government is necessary to man, and where obedience is not compelled, there is no government."¹⁹ By these same precepts, Johnson sternly insisted absolute freedom of the press was impossible. Since he had already established in his own mind the fallibility of individual representation in public matters, he was equally convinced of the dangerous folly of individual unrestrained expression, whether in speech, in writing, or in the pulpit. He insisted that the individual must always subordinate himself to the will of the state which has defined his maximum good; and, by the same principle, that he must accept the reasonable proscriptions of the acknowledged heads of the state.

Johnson is at one with much of the intellectual temper of his century in the insistence upon subordination—though in varying degrees—for mutual protection. He shared his belief with such diversified philosophers as John Locke, Adam Smith, and David Hume.²⁰ There was, thus, a general belief in this period joined in by Johnson that in view of the essentiality of government, all men must be willing to forego certain of their rights and suffer certain inconveniences in exchange for the advantages of living in society.²¹

Johnson was not so jealous of the powers of the monarchy that he blinded himself to the dangers of despotism and tyranny. But because he did not believe that human nature would tolerate unusual subjugation, he assured himself that the citizenry would act as a check upon any overly ambitious rulers.

Sir, the danger of the abuse of power is nothing to a private man. . . . Why all this childish jealousy of the power of the crown? The crown has not power enough. When I say that all governments are alike, I consider that in no government power can be abused long. Mankind will not bear it. . . . There is a remedy in human nature against tyranny, that will keep us safe under every form of government.²²

¹⁹ *Taxation no Tyranny*, in *Works*, V, 469

²⁰ Locke, *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*, p. 13. Despite the polarity of their political beliefs, both Locke and Johnson insisted that there must be no legislation that is not for the good of the citizenry and that no man may act arbitrarily as he pleases. See Plato, *Republic*, VIII, 557 B and *Laws*, III, 698; Aristotle, *Politics*, V, 9; Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, pp. 670 ff; Hume, *Of Refinement in the Arts*, in *Essays*, I, 306 ff

²¹ Boswell, II, 374.

²² *Ibid.*, II, 170.

Thus he respected the united opinion of the masses if it would serve to deny those undue attempts at repressions that were contrary to the moral right of the many. So remote from him was fear of British tyranny that throughout his writings and conversations Johnson reasserted his conviction that the English government exercised too little authority and that compulsion is a necessary condition of government.²³ He reflected, indeed, that tyranny is encouraged by unreasonable demands for liberty; heads of states tend to impose excessive restrictions when discontent threatens their rule.

With considerable misgiving Johnson observed that the people of his day no longer had any reverence for government. Because of increasing circulation of money which was bringing about economic power in the middle classes, "Subordination is sadly broken down in this age. No man, now, has the same authority his father had,—except a gaoler."²⁴ These views led him to an abhorrence of any kind of opposition, which he associated with an unintelligent fear of power by a seditious, factious rabble.²⁵ How strongly he felt that the masses were impairing their own benefit by acting contrary to the necessary state of subordination, he best expressed when he said:

Convenience may be a rule in little things, where no other rule has been established. But as the great end of government is to give every man his own, no inconvenience is greater than that of making right uncertain. Nor is any man more an enemy to publick peace, than he who fills weak heads with imaginary claims, and breaks the series of civil subordination, by inciling the lower classes of mankind to encroach upon the higher.²⁶

For reasons like these Johnson held Milton's love of independence in the same low esteem as that of the American colonists, charging to both the unreasonable fear of authority rather than true desire for liberty.

²³ Especially in *Taxation no Tyranny*. He said that there must be subordination and authority even in education. (*Works*, IV, 559, *Letters of Samuel Johnson*, ed Hill, New York, 1892, II, 110) See *Thraliana*, I, 207; Hume, *Letters*, II, 244-245.

²⁴ Boswell, III, 262. Cf. Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, pp. 670 ff. Civil government is for the protection of property, for the defense of the rich against the poor. Subordination is therefore essential.

²⁵ Boswell, II, 153; *False Alarm*, in *Works*, V, 373.

²⁶ Boswell, II, 244.

Milton's republicanism was, I am afraid, founded in an envious hatred of greatness, and a sullen desire of independence; in petulance impatient of controul, and pride disdainful of superiority. He hated monarchs in the state and prelates in the church; for he hated all whom he was required to obey. It is to be suspected that his predominant desire was to destroy rather than establish, and that he felt not so much the love of liberty as repugnance to authority.²⁷

Against all foes of subordination Johnson was unflagging in his determined belief that subordination of personal liberty is the chief means of human happiness and that equality is an impossible condition because it will lead to brutishness.²⁸ Opposition to established forms of government, he maintained, "is always loudest, as majority of the rabble will be for Opposition."²⁹ That arbitrary government must exist and thrive against all dissent, he hypothesized in the statement:

If the possibility of abuse be an argument against authority, no authority ever can be established: if the actual abuse destroys its legality, there is no legal government now in the world.³⁰

3

As an eighteenth-century journalist Johnson had considerable opportunity to see the practical application of contemporary theories of liberty as they related to the press and to give voice to his own opinions. The entire period was a test of how free a press may be and ultimately provided the modern framework for liberty of the press. Significantly there was little if any question that a relatively free press is both the essential and moral right of the people. Johnson himself did not deny this. The issue in the eighteenth century, indeed, was not of whether the press should be free, but of the maximum limits of its freedom. The issue further involved the problem of whether the press itself should fix the scope of its freedom or whether restraints should be defined by the government and faithfully obeyed by the press. Johnson was strongly in favor of restrictions laid down by authority in accordance with his principle of subordination. He vehemently denounced the

²⁷ *Lives of the English Poets*, I, 157.

²⁸ Boswell, I, 408, 442; II, 219; III, 26; V, 106.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, IV, 81.

³⁰ *False Alarm*, in *Works*, V, 373.

extremes of press liberty suggested, for instance, by Milton in his *Areopagitica*, or by the American colonists.³¹

The struggle for free expression was an ancient one, but one that in England did not actually acquire widespread support until the Revolution of 1688. Despite the impetus of this uprising, a full century was to pass before freedom of the press was to become secured in Fox's Libel Act of 1792. John Locke's enunciation of the principles of human liberty with his emphasis upon the rights of the common man was much more theoretical than applied. Not until Edmund Burke protested against George III's attempted abuses of human rights were the people as a whole to become keenly appreciative of the value of a representative government and press.³² In Johnson's own day, the attitude, now current, was developing, that "self-government and a free press are inseparable."³³ And to this notion Johnson took forceful exception.

When Johnson began to write for Edward Cave's *Gentleman's Magazine* in 1738, he saw many evidences of agitation for a free press. Yet the agitation, owing to a paucity of private enterprise, was sporadic. Despite a growing reading public which stimulated private ownership of newspapers, political patrons continued very influential in the control of news organs. Although licensing regulations had expired in 1695, the government was able to use devices as restrictive as censorship. These included such subtle methods as taxation and prosecution under due process of law.³⁴ Parliament contributed to the restraints. It heavily penalized news writers and publishers who committed breaches of privilege by illegally publishing reports of the legislative body's proceedings.³⁵

³¹ The prevailing American attitude during the Revolution was later summarized in the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and by Alexander Hamilton, who said that liberty of the press must "depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the Government" (*The Federalist*, No. 84).

³² Laski, *Political Thought*, p. 15.

³³ William Ernest Hocking, *Freedom of the Press* (Chicago, 1947), p. 12. The aristocratic Horace Walpole showed a liberal interest in a free press while denying the ability of the people to govern their own liberty (*Correspondence*, III, 232; II, 89).

³⁴ F. S. Siebert, "Taxes on Publications in England in the Eighteenth Century," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXI (1944) 12-24, *Journals of the House of Commons*, XXVII (1754-1757) 769 ff.

³⁵ *Parliamentary History of England*, X (1737-1739) 799-811, XIV (1747) 59-61

The outlook for a free press, however, was not entirely bleak. Recognition of proprietary rights of authors under the Copyright Act of 1709 was an extremely important step in liberating the press. Copyright security helped to stimulate private initiative by providing authors of books some measure of financial independence. By at least partially obviating the economic function of political patrons, the Act of 1709 aided immeasurably in the freedom of the press.³⁶ Then there were early individual spokesmen for a free press, including Defoe, Swift, and Addison, who had attacked the Stamp Act of 1712 as a deliberate restraint of the press.³⁷ Another factor that helped to determine the liberation of the press was an active nucleus of opposition newspapers that voiced criticism of the government, thus emphasizing the function of a free press in a free society.³⁸ Still another extremely important aspect of opposi-

³⁶ "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning," *Statutes at Large*, 8 Ann. Cap., XIX, 82-87. For Johnson's part in the copyright controversy see my article, "Samuel Johnson on Copyright," *JEGP*, XLVII (1948) 165-72. An excellent general treatment of the problem is A. S. Collins' chapter, "The Copyright Struggle," *Authorship in the Days of Johnson* (New York, 1929).

³⁷ Daniel Defoe, *The Review*, preface to Volume 7, Facsimile Book 17 (ed. Arthur W. Secord for the Facsimile Text Society, New York, 1938); see also Defoe's *A Vindication of the Press*, 1718. Joseph Addison, *Spectator*, No. 445; see *Spectator*, No. 451. Jonathan Swift, *Journal to Stella*, entry under August [5?], 1712. Numerous anonymous pamphleteers, however, obviously in government pay voiced their favor of restraining devices; e.g., *The Press Restrained: A Poem occasion'd by a Resolution of the House of Commons, to consider that Part of Her Majesty's Message to the House, which relates to the great License taken in Publishing false and scandalous Libels* (London, 1712) [J. Asgill], *An Essay for the Press* (London, 1712). *Arguments relating to a Restraint upon the Press, fully and fairly handled in a Letter to a Bench, from a young Gentleman of the Temple With Proposals humbly offer'd to the Consideration of both Houses of Parliament* (London, 1712). Throughout the second half of the century other notable figures, like David Hume and Thomas Erskine, recorded their beliefs in the importance and existence of an "unusual degree of liberty" of expression in the British commonwealth, without necessarily approving of unbounded freedom. See Hume, *Of Liberty of the Press, Essays*, I, 94-98; T. Erskine, *The Celebrated Speech of the Hon. T. Erskine in support of the Liberty of the Press Delivered at Guildhall, December 18, 1792* (Edinburgh, 1793).

³⁸ Some of the leading anti-ministry periodicals at the time of Johnson's entry into journalism were *Common Sense*, *Country Journal*, *Old England Journal*, *The Craftsman*. For reprints in which these journals concerned themselves with freedom of the press, see the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *London Magazine* between 1732 and 1745. Responses were usually made by the *Daily Gazetteer*, Walpole's "official" newspaper. Many pamphleteers took sides for and against the *Craftsman's* writing on behalf of a free press; e.g.: *The Case of Opposition stated, between the Crafts-*

tion was the disguised reports of parliamentary proceedings published in the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *London Magazine*, contrary to the will of parliament.³⁹ It is interesting to observe that Johnson wrote his "Parliamentary Debates" as an editorial chore. Yet, at the same time, he was lending his pen to the cause of opposition which he so frequently denounced. He compromised with his principles for two obvious reasons: (1) He edited and wrote the "Debates" because of financial necessity. (2) He used any opportunity to condemn the Walpole administration.⁴⁰

As early as 1744 in his introductory essay to the *Harleian Miscellany*, Johnson had asserted his belief in the existence of a free press in England. Writing that pamphleteering on political and religious subjects was possible only in such a country where liberty of the press flourished, he explained that British citizens could write on any subject they chose.

The form of our government, which gives every man, that has leisure, or curiosity, or vanity, the right of inquiring into the propriety of publick measures, and, by consequence, obliges those who are intrusted with the administration of national affairs, to give an account of their conduct to almost every man who demands it, may be reasonably imagined to have occasioned innumerable pamphlets, which would never have appeared under arbitrary governments, where every man lulls himself in indolence under calamities, of which he cannot promote the redress, or thinks it prudent to conceal the uneasiness, of which he cannot complain without danger.⁴¹

man and the People. Occasioned by his Paper of December the 4th, 1731 (London, 1731). [A pro-Bolingbroke attack.] *The Craftsman's Doctrine and Practice of the Liberty of the Press, explained to the meanest Capacity* (London, 1732). [An interesting commentary on the trials of Defoe and Steele and a refutation of Bolingbroke's espousal of a free press.] Viscount Henry St. John Bolingbroke, *A Final Answer to the Remarks on the Craftsman's Vindication*, etc. (London, 1713). Hocking (*op cit*, p. 27) has said, "The characteristic of what we regard as a free press is the journal of opposition."

³⁹ See fn. 35.

⁴⁰ Late in life, if we wish to accept the testimony of Sir John Hawkins (*The Life of Samuel Johnson*, second ed., revised and corrected; London, 1787, p. 514), Johnson called Walpole a "fine fellow," lauding his peace program and his personal equanimity. Nor did Walpole—again on Hawkins' disputable evidence—long bear Johnson a grudge for his invectives in the "Debates."

⁴¹ *Essay . . . on the Harleian Miscellany, Works*, V, 177. For discussions of restrictions by "arbitrary governments" see Kingsley Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (Boston, 1929); Albert Bachman, *Censorship in France from 1715 to 1750: Voltaire's Opposition* (New York, 1934); Walpole,

Here we see once more Johnson's consistent belief in the generous absence of restraint, both in government and in journalism, which for him constituted a broad degree of liberty. The passage is significant, also, in revealing Johnson's clear understanding that statesmen are the servants of the people and may be criticized by the press within reasonable limits to prevent their abuse of authority. Such an attitude is indicative of an open-minded if cautious spirit that avoids extremes of freedom or tyranny, an inquiring spirit that is always typical of Johnson.

Certainly Johnson was aware that the press was far from being absolutely free. His connection with the "Parliamentary Debates," which he edited and wrote (1738-1744) under a thin guise of secrecy, is substantial evidence that he himself was exposed to government censorship. But as the introduction to the *Miscellany* indicates, he assumed a condition of adequate press freedom in England. Because he was not merely an idle theorist of subordination to the state but an actual practitioner, Johnson saw no virtue in the absence of all restraints. Consistently, he deemed absolute liberty less essential to the well-being of mankind than obedience to acknowledged authority. Somewhat paradoxically, then, Johnson was able to use the "Debates" as a mean of attacking the Walpole administration, which had extended its abuses to the press.⁴² At the same time he was silent about the restraints imposed upon the press by the ministry. His general feeling seems to have been that as long as he and other journalists were able to use any means, moderate if devious, of stating their objections to governmental

Correspondence, V, 92 Even in 1771 Mme. du Deffand was impressed by the English love of a free press. Henry Fielding commented on the almost superfluous degree of liberty in England as compared with that in other nations (*Covent-Garden Journal*, Nos. 55 and 60).

⁴² G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England* (London, 1937), p. 506. D. N. Smith, *The Newspaper*, in *Johnson's England* (Oxford, 1933), II, 336-339. A. S. Collins, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 164-165. Basil Williams, *The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760*, in *The Oxford History of England* (ed. G. N. Clark, Oxford), XI, 173. H. R. Fox Bourne, *Chapters in the History of Journalism* (London, 1887), I, 123-124. Johnson in 1739 attacked the Walpole administration for censorship of the theater in an ironical pamphlet, *A complete vindication of the Licensers of the Stage, from the malicious and scandalous Aspersions of Mr. Brooks, Author of Gustavus Vasa; with a Proposal for making the Office of Licensor more extensive and effectual By an impartial Hand.*

abuses, then liberty of the press existed to a reasonable and necessary degree.

Outwardly Johnson's attitude toward the problem of a free press has a curiously disinterested cast. But that is not because he felt it to be an unimportant matter. Rather, as his frequent allusions indicate, he considered it an indissoluble part of his entire philosophy of human liberties. His suspicion of popular government is not to be dissociated from his lack of faith in popular expression. He, therefore, felt implicitly that the British press was as free as it should be for the good of the citizenry.

Now, Sir, there is the liberty of the press, which you know is a constant topick. Suppose you and I and two hundred more were restrained from printing our thoughts: what then? What proportion would that restraint upon us bear to the private happiness of the nation? ¹³

At the same time he urged the distinction between the universal or popular liberty of the state and private liberty. Although Johnson found private liberty the only kind that "can be enjoyed by individuals," he judged it relatively unimportant. Meanwhile Boswell, fearing that Johnson's seeming indifference toward individual liberty would be mistaken for callousness, suggested that his attitude "was a kind of sophistry in which he delighted to indulge himself, in opposition to the extreme laxity for which it has been fashionable for too many to argue, when it is evident upon reflection, that the very essence of government is restraint." ⁴⁴ But Boswell in his zeal to show Johnson in the most liberal light failed to associate these remarks with the consistency of Johnson's political and philosophical doctrines of liberty.

Like many other rational thinkers of his day, Johnson suspected the motives of those who most vehemently sought for unrestrained press freedom. He feared the abuses to which they might put the press for personal advantage, and the irresponsibility of their insistence upon such a privilege.⁴⁵ Thus in his

⁴³ Boswell, II, 60.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ See above, Johnson's observations on Lyttelton, Akenside Thomson and Milton.

discussion of Richard Savage's *Authour to be Let*, Johnson complained:

[T]he liberty of the press is a blessing when we are inclined to write against others, and a calamity when we find ourselves overborne by the multitude of our assailants; . . .⁴⁶

If Johnson so earnestly deplored abuses of freedom of the press, he was not unique in his day, being in such good company, for instance, as that of Henry Fielding and Horace Walpole and numerous other commentators.⁴⁷

At the basis of much of Johnson's doubt of the value of an unrestrained press as the organ of popular expression is his frequently and pointedly stated scorn of professional news and party hackwriters. In his prefaces to the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *London Chronicle*, in his essay serials, in his "Reflection on the present State of Literature" in the *Universal Visiter*, even while he commiserated the unhappy lot of the periodical writers, he denounced their lack of ability and their venality. By clear implication he repudiated the essentiality of freedom for a press that would encourage, even insist upon, the prostitution of the writers' services. He was very much like Tobias Smollett's Mr. Bramble, who wrote to Dr. Lewis that "The liberty of the press is a term of great efficacy; and like that of the Protestant religion, has often served the purposes of sedition. . . . like every other privilege, it must be restrained within certain bounds."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ *Lives of the Poets*, II, 361.

⁴⁷ Fielding, *Covent-Garden Journal*, Nos. 49, 51, 55, 60; also *The Works of Henry Fielding, Esq.* (ed Leslie Stephen, London, 1882), VI, 319 ff., 407-437. Walpole, *Memoirs*, III, 117, IV, 112 [Candor], *A Letter to the Public Advertiser* (London, 1764) [A pamphlet printed for J. Almon] John Forster, *The Life and Times of Oliver Goldsmith* (Boston and New York, 1900), III, 23.

⁴⁸ *The Expedition of Humphrey Clinker* (Oxford, 1930), letter dated June 2, pp. 122-124. Mr. Bramble forcefully denounced the characters of the newswriters. Johnson insisted upon absolute truthfulness in all walks of life, and hence objected particularly to the practice of writers who would lie at the behest of their employers. See his prefaces for the *Gentleman's Magazine*; *Adventurer*, No. 50; *Rambler*, Nos. 96, 165, 180; *Idler*, No. 20; Boswell, *passim*; *Tour to the Hebrides*; etc. His abhorrence of lying is closely allied to the widespread eighteenth-century practice, alleged and actual, of libelous writing. The charge of libel was an easy means of abuse by government officials who "legally" eliminated writers of the opposition. Although there was adequate basis for protest against truly libelous writing (see Walpole, *Memoirs*, III, 117; Fielding, *Works*, VI, 319 ff., 407, 437; [T. Hayter?], *An Essay on the Liberty of the Press chiefly as it respects personal*

By the middle of the eighteenth century freedom of the press had become a popular issue. Demands in pamphlets, periodicals, and similar organs of communication vouchsafed the support of the masses and made inevitable not only official sanctions but official restraints. The major consideration, indeed, as has already been indicated, was not that of freedom but of how much freedom there should be. The most liberal exponents of a free press have always granted the need for some kind of restrictions;⁴⁹ although, again it has been generally granted, the ideal is the least limitation.⁵⁰ Sir William Blackstone, who attempted to set down the English law of his time, wrote:

[T]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. . . . but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done . . . is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points. . . . But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which when published, shall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order. . . . the only plausible argument heretofore used for restraining the just freedom of the press, 'that it was necessary to prevent the abuse of it,' will entirely lose its force, when it is shewn (by a seasonable exertion of the laws) that the press cannot be abused to any bad purpose, without incurring a suitable punishment: whereas it never can be used to any good one, when under

Slander, London, 1754), there were equally justified complaints against arbitrary excessively severe prosecution. (See Hume, *History of England*, II, 486; Walpole, *Memoirs*, I, 256, IV, 112; [Anon], *Letters on the Subject of the proper Liberty of the Press* (London and Dublin, 1790); *The Whole Proceedings on the Trial . . . against John Stockdale . . . to which is subjoined an Argument in Support of the Rights of Juries* [by Thomas Erskine] (Dublin, 1790). Fair trials were finally guaranteed by passage in 1792 of the Fox Libel Act (32 George III, c. 60). Of libel in general there is no record of Johnson's opinion. He did once state, however, (in 1776) that there should be no restraint at all in writing of the dead. The truth should be told at all costs. Boswell disagreed on the legal grounds of responsibility for libel and he also objected to the validity of the Fox Libel Act (Boswell, III, 16 n.).

⁴⁹ See Hocking, *op cit.*, p. 69. "Freedom without limitation is a chimera."

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

the control of an inspector. So true will it be found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to maintain the liberty of the press.⁵¹

The most general thought of the day asserted the need of a press that was free to criticize the government, but like Blackstone's insisted that punishment after publication was necessary to prevent libelous abuse and vilification.⁵² Johnson, on the other hand, desired restrictive laws before publication, to gainsay the danger of abuse.⁵³ Generally, however, few attempts were made to define the limits of the checks.

Duplicating his complete faith in an absolute government and its obligation to give the citizenry any privileges which are not harmful to the state, Johnson protested against liberal concessions to the press for fear they would be abused. From his understanding of human nature Johnson had deduced that the people, refusing to bow to a despotic regime, would lend their support to only a benevolent government. On the same plane of reasoning he speculated that the rulers would of necessity not withhold any privileges of utterance which their consciences told them were the moral right of the people.⁵⁴ Since the citizen owes absolute allegiance to the state, the magistrate ought to restrain "any one who attempts to teach . . . doctrines contrary to what the State approves."⁵⁵ Even as Johnson seriously considered the possibility and essentiality

⁵¹ *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (4th ed., Dublin, 1771), IV, 151-153. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 9-10, censures Blackstone for not limiting punishment after publication, thus giving citizens insufficient protection and providing a kind of effective censorship. A broader eighteenth-century definition of a free press was that of Lord Mansfield: "As for freedom of the press, I will tell you what it is, that a man may print what he pleases without license; as long as it remains so, the liberty of the press is not restrained." Cited by G. J. Patterson, *Free Speech and a Free Press* (Boston, 1939), p. 67.

⁵² Some examples are: [Candor], *A Letter to the Public Advertiser* (London, 1764); [Father of Candor], *An Enquiry into the Doctrine, lately propagated, concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers* (London, 1764); *Literary Liberty Considered in a Letter to Henry Sampson Woodfall* (London, 1774); *The Celebrated Speech of the Hon T. Erskine*. Cf the extreme view of Rousseau (*Social Contract*, p. 218), who said that censorship must come from the will of the people or it is ineffectual.

⁵³ See above, discussion of Johnson on *Areopagitica*.

⁵⁴ See above, fn. 9, Johnson on conscience and on the duty of the magistrate to judge according to his conscience.

⁵⁵ Boswell, IV, 216.

of a free state, so he considered the extent of the license that may be given to the press. He meditated that the ideal of a free press like that of a free government was being cleverly dangled before the masses by the politicians as an irresistible if mysterious treasure. The worth of the treasure, Johnson felt, the people failed to comprehend. He commented ironically that he should dissuade the political leaders "from any direct attempt on the liberty of the press, which is the darling of the common people, and therefore cannot be attacked without immediate danger."⁵⁶

Johnson examined the problem in the light of his own views on statecraft and conceded the existence of a dilemma. On the one hand he feared the danger that might arise if a despotic arbitrary government imposed shackles on expression; on the other he feared the seditious harm that might be done if malcontents were to be permitted to write unreined. Again, as in his political ideology, he denied the ability of the "rabble" to think and to speak for themselves. We must remember that he did not deny that they had this right morally; he simply did not think that they could administer this right except through the agency of a strong, benevolent, central authority. The best expression of his concern over this predicament occurs in his *Life of Milton*. While examining *Areopagitica*, in which he found himself at odds with Milton's liberal, revolutionary opinion on the unlimited scope of free expression, Johnson revealed his irresolution.⁵⁷ He wrote:

The danger of . . . unbounded liberty and the danger of bounding it have produced a problem in the science of Government, which human understanding seems hitherto unable to solve. If nothing may be published but what civil authority shall have previously approved, power must always be the standard of truth; if every dreamer of innovations may propagate his projects, there can be no settlement; if every murmurer at government may diffuse discontent, there can be no peace; and if every skeptick in theology may teach his follies, there can be no religion.⁵⁸

Although Johnson accepted Milton's principle that dicta-

⁵⁶ *A Complete Vindication of the Licensers of the Stage*, in *Works*, V, 489.

⁵⁷ [Francis Blackburne], *Remarks on Johnson's Life of Milton* (London, 1780), p. 59, finds the discussion of *Areopagitica* a contradictory "see-saw of the arguments pro and con"

⁵⁸ *Lives of the Poets*, I, 108.

torial suppression of opinions is evil, he nevertheless took the more practical, less theoretical stand best suited, in his opinion, to his times and country. Neither England nor any other country, by Johnson's inferences, was yet ready for freedom of expression. He protested against those who believed

The remedy against these evils is to punish the authors; for it is yet allowed that every society may punish, though not prevent, the publication of opinions, which that society shall think pernicious: but this punishment, though it may crush the author, promotes the book; and it seems not more reasonable to leave the right of printing unrestrained, because writers may be afterwards censured, than it would be to sleep with doors unbolted, because by our laws we can hang a thief.⁵⁹

This, then, serves as Johnson's answer to Blackstone, and to Milton, who almost a century and half earlier had in a sense anticipated Blackstone, writing

that it is of the greatest concernment in the Church and Commonwealth, to have a vigilant eye how Bookes demeane themselves as well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest judgment on them as malefactors. . . . And yet on the other hand unless wariness be us'd, as good almost kill a Man as kill a good Book.⁶⁰

The liberal theories of Milton were inimical to Johnson. At time Johnson appears to be conservative in the matter of a free press to a point little short of reaction. Yet at other times he is almost radical in denouncing violations of liberty.⁶¹ The answer involves no inconsistency by Johnson. Actually he was quite positive in his deference to reasonable authority but as firmly adverse to any acts which, according to his own lights, constituted oppression by that authority.

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⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Gabriel Peignot, *Essai Historique sur la Liberté D'Ecrire* (Paris, 1832), parallels Johnson's attitude that complete freedom is dangerous for the masses. Of Johnson's comments in the above quotation, he said, "Ces réflexions sont fort judicieuses" (pp. 108-109).

⁶⁰ *The Works of John Milton* (Columbia University Press Edition, 1931), IV, 297-298.

⁶¹ Recently H. W. Liebert sought to prove Johnson always followed a medial line, doing what he thought necessary for the whole of society. ("Reflections on Samuel Johnson: Two Recent Books and Where They Lead," *JEGP*, XLVII [1948]: 80-88)

COLONEL MACLEANE AND THE JUNIUS CONTROVERSY

By FRANCESCO CORDASCO

The Junius identification has never been resolved. Although the suggestion is often made on the basis of Taylor's publications¹ that Sir Philip Francis was Junius, still, as recent as 1927,² it has been argued that Junius was Lord Shelburne. The interminable commentaries³ and the perplexities incident to each apologist's favorite identification have tended to dissuade further inquiry, yet *Stat Nominis Umbra*, and speculation seems inevitable. This paper introduces a possible identification which has not received the attention it merits: was Colonel Macleane Junius?

Colonel Lauchlin (or Laughlin) Macleane, like many of the other competitors, was supposed by several of his private friends to be Junius, but these pretensions were never made public.⁴ His name was first mentioned by Almon,⁵ but it strangely seldom appeared in any of the lists of the false Juniuses. In 1816 Sir David Brewster was looking over the papers of James Macpherson and found among them several letters addressed to Macpherson with the signature of L. Macleane, bearing the dates 1776-1777. Macpherson and Macleane were the London agents for the Nabob of Arcot, and Colonel Macleane was the friend and confidential agent of Warren Hastings. These papers related to the affairs of India; and though many of them were hurried notes, bearing only the Colonel's initials, yet they were

¹ John Taylor, *A Discovery of the author of the letters of Junius*. (London, 1813); *The Identity of Junius with a Distinguished Living Character established* (London, 1816). In the first publication Taylor had argued for the case of Dr. Francis.

² *The Letters of Junius*, ed C. W. Everett (London, 1927).

³ See John Edmunds, "Annotated, descriptive bibliography of the Letters of Junius," *Bulletin*, Merchantile Library of Philadelphia 2 (1890-2); see, also, Everett, *op cit.* and our *A Junius Bibliography*. . . (New York, 1949).

⁴ Wingrove Cooke, *History of Party* (London, 1837), 3. chap. 6. The claims of Colonel Macleane are briefly stated from a communication made to the author from Sir David Brewster

⁵ John Almon, *Letters to a Nobleman*. . . (London, 1768; reprinted, London, 1816).

vigorously and elegantly written, and contained passages which suggested the pen of Junius. One of these began with the following sentence: "I shall follow your advice, my dear sir, implicitly. The feelings of the man are not fine, but he must be chafed into sensation."⁶ This and similar passages excited the curiosity of Brewster and led him finally to Galt's *Life of West*,⁷ where he found the interesting passage:

An incident of a curious nature brought him [West] to be a party, in some degree, in the singular question respecting the mysterious author of the celebrated letters of Junius. On the morning that the first of these famous invectives appeared, his friend, Governor Hamilton, happened to call; and inquiring the news, Mr. West informed him of that bold and daring epistle. Ringing for his servant at the same time, he desired the newspaper to be brought in. Hamilton read it over with great attention; and when he had done, laid it on his knees in a manner that particularly attracted the notice of the painter who was standing at his easel. "This letter," said Hamilton in a tone of vehement feeling, "is by that d——d scoundrel Maclean." "What Maclean?" inquired Mr. West. "The surgeon of Otway's regiment; the fellow who attacked me so violently in the Philadelphia newspapers, on account of the part I felt it my duty to take against one of the officers. *This letter is by him*. I know these very words. I may well remember them." And he read over several phrases and sentiments which Maclean used against him. Mr. West then informed the Governor that Maclean was in the country and that he was personally acquainted with him. "He came over," said Mr. West, "with Colonel Barré, by whom he was introduced to Lord Shelburne (afterwards Marquis of Lansdowne), and is at present private secretary to his lordship."⁸

This remarkable anecdote,⁹ in the immediacy of the discovery

⁶ Cooke, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Life and Studies of Benjamin West* (London, 1816-20).

⁸ *Ibid.*, Part 1 267. Prior (*The Life of Oliver Goldsmith*, London, 1837, 2 150) makes the following reference to this event "In 1761 while Maclean was surgeon to Otway's regiment, quartered in Philadelphia, a quarrel took place with the Governor, against whom Maclean, who was a man of superior talents, wrote a paper distinguished by ability and severity, which drew general attention. Colonel Barré subsequently so well known in political life, then serving there with his regiment, and who was probably involved in the quarrel, is said to have formed a regard for him in consequence of the part he took"

⁹ Brewster searched in vain in the colleges and repositories of America for the paper containing this attack upon Governor Hamilton. Galt may have been mistaken in his notice. Maclean might well have attacked Hamilton in a pamphlet, which, like so many polemical pieces, has disappeared. It is inconceivable that Hamilton could have been attacked in the public press.

of Macleane's letters, induced Brewster to enter upon an inquiry foreign to his own studies and to pursue it for thirty years. For Brewster, in the favor of no other candidate for the Junius identification could so much matter be produced. For him there was no question that Macleane was Junius.¹⁰

Lauchlin Macleane was born in the county of Antrim in 1727 or 1728.¹¹ His father, John Macleane, was a nonjuring clergyman, remotely connected with the Macleanes of Coll, and was driven from Scotland because of his attachment to the exiled family, and for his refusal to pray for King George I and the royal family. This must have happened before 1726, for he married in Ireland, to which he had fled, and settled near Belfast. Thus driven from his fatherland to foreign Ireland, an ardent mind like that of John Macleane must have cherished strong feeling of dislike and even hatred against the dominant party by whom he was persecuted; and in the legacy of revenge which he doubtless bequeathed to his son, can be seen the origin, if his son were Junius, of that unconquerable hatred of Scotland and the Scotch which rankled in the breast of Junius. In no other candidate can be found such powerful reason for the bitter and never-ending anathemas of Junius against Scotland.¹² John Macleane was soon a gentleman of fortune, and seems not to have remained in the Church. Lauchlin, his second son, was sent in 1745 (o.s.) from a school near Belfast to Trinity College, Dublin,¹³ where he became acquainted with Goldsmith and Burke. Later, he went on to Edinburgh to study medicine; and on the 4th January, 1756, he was introduced by Goldsmith to the Medical Society, of which he became a member.¹⁴ On one occasion Goldsmith was saved from prison,

¹⁰ Brewster's researches have never been published. Through the kindness of Mr. Benton Takmon of Folkstone, England, they have come to the hands of the writer. Only Cooke (*op. cit.*) and Brockhaus (*Die Briefe des Junius*, Leipzig, 1876) seem to have examined Brewster's papers.

¹¹ The extended biographical notice seems warrented. Most of it is drawn from Brewster. Macleane is not listed in the *DNB*.

¹² Certainly the Franciscan theory is, in this matter, weak. See Abraham Hayward, *More about Junius: The Franciscan theory Unsound* (London, 1868).

¹³ The entry in the college register reads: "1745, Maii 29. Lauchlin Macleane Pens: I—Filius Johanni Generosi—Annum agens 18—Natus in Comitatu Antrim—Educatus sub Ferula, Mro. Dennison—Tutor, Mr. Reid."

¹⁴ It is interesting to note that Goldsmith, Isaac Barré, and Macleane were all residing in Scotland at the same time. A letter of Macleane attests Goldsmith's residence.

to which he was about to be remanded for having become surety for the debts of a fellow-student, by the liberality of Maclean.¹⁵ On the 6th August 1755, with the completion of his medical studies, he obtained the degree of M.D.,¹⁶ and shortly after entered the army as surgeon to Otway's regiment (the 35th).

It has been impossible to determine whether Maclean was in any of the expeditions to North America which were fitted out in 1757 or 1758, but he did accompany the expedition of 1759 in which Wolfe was killed on the Heights of Abraham and the command of the British troops devolved on Brigadier-General Townshend. Townshend was unpopular with the army, and particularly obnoxious to Colonel Isaac Barré¹⁷ (bearer of despatches to the Government) and Maclean, and to other friends of Wolfe. According to Horace Walpole, "he, and his friends for him, attempted to ravish the honours of the conquest from Wolfe. Townshend's first letter said nothing in praise of him. In one to the Speaker of the House, he went so far as to assume the glory of the last efforts . . . ; and in the other more private despatches, he was still more explicit."¹⁸ In answer to Townshend's selfish and ungenerous conduct Barré and Maclean drew up and published in 1760 *A Letter to an Honourable Brigadier-General*,¹⁹ which so clearly resembles in

¹⁵ Brewster papers, see Prior, *op. cit.*, 2. 153 Maclean was not always so liberal Maclean is the pressing creditor who caused Smollett so much worry (see E. S. Noyes, *Letters of Smollett*, Cambridge, Mass., 1926, pp. 8, 42, 43, 64, 119, 155, 188). Noyes was unable to establish the identity of Maclean. However, the identity is clear in view of Maclean's connections with the Duke of Hamilton (see note 16) and Smollett's and Maclean's dealings with John Wilkes (see H. Bleackley, *Life of John Wilkes*, London, 1917). See our "Smollett's Creditor Maclean Identified," *Notes and Queries*, 193 (1948), 141-142.

¹⁶ His thesis, *Dissertatio Medica Inauguralis de Erysipelate* (available in Library of Medicine and Surgery, University of Edinburgh) was dedicated to the Duke of Hamilton.

¹⁷ Barré was seriously considered to be Junius. See John Britton, *The Authorship of the Letters of Junius elucidated including a biographical Memoir of Lt Col Isaac Barré* (London, 1848). See, also, *Letters of Horace Walpole*, ed. Peter Cunningham (London, 1861), *passim*. Britton's excellent case for Barré completely overlooked Barré's association with Maclean.

¹⁸ *Memoirs of the Reign of George II*, 3. 222.

¹⁹ *A Letter to an Honourable Brigadier-General, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in Canada* (London, 1760). See *ibid.*, ed. N. W. Simons (London, 1841) Britton, *op. cit.*, makes much of this letter in his case for Barré. See further, John Jaques, *The History of Junius and his Works . . .* (London, 1843), pp. 136, 370.

its style and sentiments the letters of Junius. Maclean's part in this attack is particularly interesting with reference to one of the miscellaneous letters, signed *A Faithful Monitor*, ascribed to Junius. In this letter we find this passage: "I am not a stranger to this *par nobile fratrum* [Lord Townshend, and his brother Charles, then Chancellor of the Exchequer]. I have served under the one, and have been forty times promised to be served by the other."²⁰ Who but Barré or Maclean are likely to have written this sentence? They both served under Lord Townshend, and though it is not probable that Barré could have been promised any situation under the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it is very likely that Maclean might have received such a promise.

Early in 1761 General Monckton was appointed Governor of New York, and in December of the same year he left that city with a large force for the reduction of Martinique. Otway's 35th Regiment formed part of the eleven battalions selected by Monckton, and Maclean accompanied the General as his private secretary. With the successful conclusion of the campaign, the regiments to which Barré and Maclean belonged were disbanded. Maclean seems to have settled in Philadelphia as a physician, and to have remained there for some years. In an anonymous *Memoirs*²¹ some mention is made of Maclean's Philadelphia residence, and Prior²² attests to his great medical reputation in that city. It appears to have been in 1761, before he accompanied General Monckton to Martinique, that Maclean published the attack on Governor Hamilton, which the Governor so well remembered and led him to associate him with Junius. As West said (see note 8), Maclean had returned to England with Barré, and through the good offices of the latter had become secretary to Lord Shelburne. In 1766, Maclean met Barry, the painter, in Paris, and had an opportunity of being useful to him on his way to Italy; and Burke, in one of his letters to Barry, written in the beginning of 1767, informs him "that Maclean is Under Secretary in

²⁰ See Woodfall's *Junius* (London, 1812), 2. 469

²¹ "Dr. Laughlin Maclean and his lady were acquaintances of my grandfather and visitors at his house sometime between 1761 and 1766" (*Memoirs of a Life chiefly passed in Pennsylvania*, Harrisburg, 1811, p. 211 and *passim*).

²² *Op. cit.*, 2. 154 See, also, *op. cit.*, note 21, chap. 2.

Lord Shelburne's office, and that there is no doubt but he will be, as he deserves, well patronized there."²³

As Lord Shelburne's private secretary, and, afterwards, as Under-Secretary for the Southern Department, Maclean was in a position which had to lead to wealth and honors; but the Duke of Grafton's intrigues in the Cabinet blasted all Maclean's prospects. As early as July, 1768,²⁴ the Bedfords had begun to persecute Lord Shelburne. The King, preferring a Mr. Lynch, refused to confirm Shelburne's nomination of Lord Tankerville to be Resident Minister at Turin, and Lord Shelburne was so indignant at his refusal, that he would have resigned, had not the Chancellor, Lord Camden, persuaded him otherwise. Shelburne's enemies prevailed and Lynch was appointed Envoy Extraordinary to the King of Sardinia. The Duke of Grafton finally succeeded in forcing the resignations of both Shelburne and the illustrious Lord Chatham on the 21st October 1768. Maclean, naturally, followed the fate of his chief, and doubtless felt keenly the loss of the honors and emoluments of his office. In less than *three* months, 21 January 1769, Junius launched the first formidable philippic against the new ministry. Is it to be doubted that the attack emanated from Lord Shelburne's party? Lord Shelburne, Barré, and Maclean, were the principal persons aggrieved by the change in the ministry, and it is among them alone that Junius can be found. Britton's facts and reasonings²⁵ confirm this opinion, and it remains for a choice between Barré and Maclean.²⁶

In the intrigues which resulted in the dismissal of Shelburne, the king had taken an active part, and as early as May, 1767, he had spoken of Lord Shelburne's party as "a hydra-faction," and had characterized Shelburne as "a secret enemy."²⁷ The conduct of the king therefore only irritated the friends of Lord Chatham and Shelburne, and it was doubtless to the strong feeling which it engendered that is owed Junius's address to the

²³ Prior, *Life of Burke* (London, 1824), I 208

²⁴ For the historical connections introduced see, G. O. Trevelyan, *Early History of Charles James Fox* (London, 1880).

²⁵ *Op. cit.*

²⁶ Everett, *op. cit.*, has argued the case of Shelburne. However, Shelburne disclaimed authorship when he was Marquis of Lansdowne and had nothing to fear. See an interview of Shelburne by Richard Phillips, *Monthly Magazine*, July (1813).

²⁷ William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, *Correspondence* (London, 1888), 3. 206.

king. From 1768 to 1771, during the greater period of time the letters were publishing, Macleane sat in Parliament for the borough of Arundel, but owing to a speech impediment, he was not distinguished as a speaker, and his talents, to a considerable degree, were hidden from the public. The friend of Shelburne and Barré, Macleane could easily have obtained all that knowledge of what was going on at Court that Junius possessed in so remarkable a degree. That Macleane had this knowledge was believed by his contemporaries. When Major Cambell wished to show how Hugh Boyd, whom he believed to be Junius, got the necessary information, he stated that *he got it through his friend Macleane*, who then moved in the first circles.²⁸ Jeremy Bentham stated that Lord Shelburne told him that he knew all that passed at Court, through the two Ladies Waldegrave, who lived at court as "Ladies of Honour, or *some* such thing."²⁹ Bentham also tells us that Captain Blankett and Mr. Jekyll were *necessary instruments* to Lord Shelburne, and that it was their business to *watch in the quarters of the enemy*. "His Lordship [Shelburne] did not care much about Hastings; but knowing the part the King took, and having all the king's conversations repeated to him, he professed to take Hastings' part."³⁰ And when the conversation turned upon Lord Mansfield, Bentham learned "that he was the object of undisguised antipathy to Lord Shelburne and Lord Camden,"³¹ the two great friends of Junius. If we keep this court intimacy in mind, remember the triumvirate of Shelburne, Barré, and Macleane, and recall the disclaimer of authorship of the letters by Shelburne almost at his death-bed,³² it can scarcely be refused assent that either Barré or Macleane was Junius. Britton,³³ in his strong case for Barré, was presented with an insurmountable difficulty: Why did Barré, were he Junius, cease to write in January, 1772? He was then in perfect health; he retained his seat in the House of Commons; he was then the friend and correspondent of Shelburne and Chatham; he received no bribe from the government; he continued to maintain the same principles, and was associated with the same political friends. In

²⁸ *The Miscellaneous Works of Hugh Boyd* (London, 1800), 1. intro.

²⁹ E. Bowring, *Life of Jeremy Bentham* (London, 1841), p. 112.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³² *Monthly Magazine*, *loc. cit.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³³ *Op. cit.*

his *last* private letter to Woodfall, dated 19 January 1773,³⁴ Junius assures him that he had good reason for discontinuing his communications: "In the present state of things, if I were to write again I must be as silly as any of the horned cattle that run mad through the city, or as any of your wise aldermen. I meant the cause and the public. Both are given up. I feel for the honour of this country when I see that there are not ten men in it who will unite and stand together upon any one question. But it is all alike, vile and contemptible." In his *Dedication to the English Nation*, however, which he sent to Wilkes on the 3rd November, 1771, he utters sentiments of a very different kind: "You are roused, at least, to a sense of your danger. The remedy will soon be in your power. If Junius lives you shall often be reminded of it."³⁵ Junius, if he lived, did not fulfill his pledge. Barré lived, and lived under circumstances which well might have called him into the field. In a letter written *two* days after Junius abandons "the cause and the public," Barré announced to Pitt that the honours of his profession had been withheld from him, though the Secretary of War had, "in a private and unsought for conversation," promised him promotion in his turn, and that he was thus an object of persecution, and would quit the army if he were "not reinstated according to seniority of rank, and the rightful pretensions of service."³⁶ Surely, had Barré been Junius, this act of persecution would have summoned him again into the field.³⁷ There is, too, another objection to Barré: Why did Barré, if he were Junius, so vilely, in the guise of Junius, castigate Scotland and the Scotch? Barré had no reasons for the violent antipathy. The repudiation of Shelburne, and the discountenance of Barré leave only their associate and confidant—Colonel Maclean.

³⁴ Woodfall, *ed. cit.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Pitt, *op. cit.*, 4 242

³⁷ Lord Shelburne, in a letter to Pitt, notices the retirement of Colonel Barré: "Your Lordship has been informed of what passed relative to Colonel, now Mr. Barré Lord Barrington, after an interval of eight days more, signified the king's acceptance of his resignation, since which Lord North and the Bedfords have avowed separately and without reserve their disapprobation of the measure which occasioned the step. This leaves no doubt from what quarter the measure comes. It is but just to apprise your lordship what proscribed people you honour sometimes with your correspondence" (Pitt, 4. 253).

Macleane was the friend, the countryman, and the fellow collegian of Burke. "It is an undoubted fact," according to Prior,³⁸ "that Burke himself indirectly acknowledged to Sir Joshua Reynolds that he knew the writer of Junius." Mrs. Burke, Joshua Reynolds, and Malone all believed that Burke polished the compositions of Junius for the public eye;³⁹ and if we attach truth to these statements, it would be difficult to find any other friend than Macleane for whom Burke could have performed this act of kindness.

The connection of Wilkes with Junius is well known. They were at one time apparently friends, and at another enemies. In taking Wilkes's part against the King and the ministry, Junius says, "I know that man much better than any of you; that Nature intended him for a good-humoured fool, but that a systematical education, with long practice, had made him a consummate hypocrite."⁴⁰ And yet in a month or two Junius is writing Wilkes as a political friend, and assisting and advising him in his proceedings. This was precisely the situation of Macleane and Wilkes. Macleane had not only been his political coadjutor, but had lent Wilkes money as well. Wilkes, incensed, possibly, by the conduct of Macleane, was a party to an attack on Macleane in the *Public Advertiser* in January, 1771.⁴¹ With the evidence before him of Wilkes's guilt, Macleane invited him to a duel. Wilkes refused to accept the challenge, and denied that he was the author of the offensive letter, and thus compelled Macleane to publish the correspondence in the *Public Advertiser*.⁴² It is of some value to note that in this attack of Wilkes upon Macleane, Wilkes himself is injuriously treated, a circumstance that Wilkes pleads is proof that he did not write the letter. To this Macleane replied: "There is not a

³⁸ *Life of Burke*, 1. 150.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1. 153.

⁴⁰ Woodfall, *ed. cit.*, Letter 52, 24th July, 1771. After Junius' friendly correspondence with Wilkes from August to November, 1771, two of his letters relating to the Bill of Rights Society were misrepresented to the public. He suspected Wilkes to have done this, and desired Woodfall to tell him "that he will not submit to be any longer aspersed" (see Woodfall, *ed. cit.*, 3. 46).

⁴¹ "After Wilkes had been in exile, he appeared, accompanied from Paris by Mr. Laughlin Macleane, an old acquaintance of Mr. Burke, privately in London, early in May, 1766" (Prior, *Burke*, 1. 152).

⁴² See Bleackley, *op cit.*, *passim*.

syllable of what Mr. Wilkes calls *injurious to him* which does not point to the source from which the letter sprang. His favourite foibles alone are touched upon, and with a very gentle hand. But is it not the stale trick of all assassins when they stab in the dark to give themselves a slight wound that they may escape suspicion.⁷ ”⁴³

About this time a remarkable change seems to have taken place in the views and position of Junius, and, importantly, a correspondent change in the views and position of Maclean. Lady Shelburne died on the 5th January, 1771, and soon afterwards Lord Shelburne left England for the Continent. It is impossible to determine whether Maclean was left without patronage by Shelburne's departure, but be that as it may, he seems to show at this time a disposition to favor the ministry. He is referred to as the author of a pamphlet in *Defence of the Ministry on the Subject of the Falkland Islands*,⁴⁴ and by it to have acquired the patronage of Lord North. On the 8 May, 1771, he resigned his seat for Arundel by accepting the Chiltern Hundreds. In the same month Lord North appointed him superintendent of Lazarettos at a handsome salary. In January, 1772, he was appointed Collector of Philadelphia. His absence from England agrees *exactly* with the interval in the correspondence between Junius and Woodfall: 10 May, 1772, to 19 January, 1773. Maclean returned to England in 1773 to receive a new and lucrative appointment from the government; and Junius reappeared from his occultation of eight months, not to castigate the ministry, nor to fulfill his patriotic pledge to the English nation, but to disappear, completely, from political controversy. Julius no longer wrote under his real signature. The last correspondence is the note of farewell to Woodfall dated 19 January, 1773.

In the month of April, 1773, Maclean was appointed Commissary-General of Musters, and Auditor-General of Military Accounts in India with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. This must have been a reward for a service greater than his pamphlet. He went out to India in the same ship as Sir Philip

⁴³ Cooke, *op. cit.*, 3 267.

⁴⁴ Brewster was unable to find a copy of this pamphlet. The pamphlet is mentioned in one of the miscellaneous letters. See Woodfall, *ed. cit.*, Letter 90 (3 343). There is no doubt of its existence and its amity to the ministry.

Francis, and after a successful residency, resigned his position early in 1775. Before he left India Macleane managed to receive from Warren Hastings a commission to act as his confidential and political agent;⁴⁵ and from the Nabob of Arcot at Madras he was entrusted with a similar agency. He arrived in England in the winter of 1775 and with Macpherson devoted himself to the affairs of the Nabob. Gleig⁴⁶ testifies to the "noble exertions and disinterested friendship of Lieutenant-Colonel Macleane." While in England Macleane played an important part in the tender of Hastings' resignation. It is an irony of fate that Hastings, the friend and benefactor of Macleane, should finally have been completely destroyed by the eloquence of Macleane's close friend, Burke.⁴⁷

Matters of business necessitated Macleane's return to India in July, 1777. On his return home he perished when the packet *Swallow* foundered off the Cape of Good Hope in October of the same year.

One serious objection has been raised to the authorship of the letters by Macleane.⁴⁸ In the second letter of eighteen lines signed *Vindex*, Macleane's pamphlet on the Falkland Islands is scurrilously referred to: "In spite of Mr. Laughlin's disinterested, unbroken, melodious eloquence, it is a melancholy truth . . .".⁴⁹ It has been supposed that Macleane could not have written so of himself. To this objection there are ready answers. First, the authenticity of the letter has never fully been established.⁵⁰ Second, if we admit the letter as genuinely from the pen of Junius, it was an excellent method of misleading his enemies, and one particularly appropriate when both Macleane and Junius were beginning to desert "the cause and the public." Macleane charged Wilkes with the very same trick only *five weeks* before the questioned letter appeared.⁵¹

⁴⁵ See S. Gleig, *Memoirs of the Life of Warren Hastings* (London, 1841), for association of Macleane.

⁴⁶ *Op cit.*, § 287 ff.

⁴⁷ Burke's speech, *The Nabob of Arcot's Debts* (London, 1785), was the beginning of Hastings's impeachment.

⁴⁸ Britton, *op. cit.*; Cooke, *op. cit.*; C. W. Dilke, *Papers of a Critic* (London, 1875), vol 2; Brockhaus, *op cit.*

⁴⁹ Woodfall, *ed. cit.*, Letter 90 (§ 343).

⁵⁰ See J. Swinden, *Junius—Lord Chatham, and the Miscellaneous Letters proved to be Spurious* (London, 1833).

⁵¹ See note 43.

And, too, there are in the letters of Junius many medical metaphors and expressions ("the *caput mortuum* of vitriol") which eloquently bespeak the training of Maclean.

The identity of Junius may only be established *presumptively*, but it must be conceded that in no one else's favor can so great a mass of evidence be presumed as in that of Colonel Laughlin Maclean, friend and associate of Goldsmith, Burke, Macpherson; creditor of Smollett; fellow-conspirator of Lord Shelburne and Colonel Isaac Barré; defender of Warren Hastings.⁵²

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⁵² Since the writing of this paper we have anxiously sought and acquired a hand-sewn manuscript which Sir David Brewster describes which contained the miscellaneous notations of the Earl of Shelburne for the identification of Junius. Shelburne had promised that he would divulge the author (see note 26), and in the manuscript, which was evidently to be the basis of his autobiography, he categorically names Maclean to be Junius, and goes on to review the life of Maclean. A series of notations follows in which Shelburne explains the transference of information to Maclean, and the Corsican policy of the Bedfords (against which Junius thundered) is detailedly noted. Here the manuscript ends. *Movet Urna Nomen.*

RECURRENT WORDS IN *THE PRELUDE*

By ELLEN DOUGLASS LEYBURN

From the time of Coleridge critics have delighted to show the discrepancy between Wordsworth's theory of poetic diction and his practice. Coleridge's comments are familiar:

I reflect with delight, how little a mere theory, though of his own workmanship, interferes with the processes of genuine imagination in a man of true poetic genius, who possesses, as Mr. Wordsworth, if ever man did, most assuredly does possess, "The Vision and the Faculty Divine."

. . . feeling a justifiable preference for the language of nature and good sense, even in its humblest and least ornamented forms, he suffered himself to express, in terms at once too large and too exclusive, his predilection for a style the most remote possible from the false and showy splendour which he wished to explode.¹

On such authority we feel easy about enjoying Wordsworth's poetry while setting aside the theory as a mere case of overstatement. Josephine Miles has gone further than Coleridge in her book, *Wordsworth and the Vocabulary of Emotion*,² to show that Wordsworth is linked to the eighteenth century exactly by his taste for stated emotion in contrast to our twentieth century preference for poetry that conveys emotion by indirection. There is indeed beyond the vocabulary of emotion treated by Josephine Miles a wealth of sheer abstraction in *The Prelude* which might seem another link with eighteenth century poetry.

As we contemplate such a weight of evidence, we wonder what becomes of Wordsworth's feeling that he was making a revolution in poetic diction by using the real language of men, a conviction from which he never departed, though he somewhat modified his statement of what he meant by "the real language of men." Yet somehow there persists in us as in Wordsworth himself the feeling that he did bring about a revolution in poetic diction. The language of *The Prelude* is

¹ S. T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, ed. J. Shawcross, Oxford, 1907, II, 45 and 70

² U. of Cal. Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942.

not the language of *The Essay on Man*, though both are philosophic poems and both abound in abstractions. We sense a difference between Pope's abstractions and Wordsworth's, or indeed between Wordsworth's own abstractions in his early poems and those in *The Prelude*. The difference is so pronounced that when we come upon old fashioned personified abstractions in *The Prelude*, we are startled if not dismayed. Wordsworth seems to have lost his own tone of voice and to speak with a sort of ventriloquism in the lines:

And here was Labour, his own Bond-slave, Hope
That never set the pains against the prize,
Idleness, halting with his weary clog,
And poor misguided Shame, and witless Fear,
And simple Pleasure, foraging for Death,
Honour misplaced, and Dignity astray; (III,630-35)³ .

Likewise when he uses conventional descriptive epithets: "spreading Pine," "froward Brook," "roaring wind," "clamorous rain," "vernal heat," (IV, 36, 40, 76, 77, 94) we feel as if he has lapsed into an earlier idiom and is not writing in the way we have come to think of as "peculiarly unborrowed and his own."

The explanation of our feeling that Wordsworth does have his own idiom, even though his poetry abounds in abstractions and stated emotions, lies, I think, in his philosophy. Professor Pottle provides the clue for an analysis of Wordsworth's diction in *The Idiom of Poetry*: "The moment he had it [the religion of Nature] everything was clear. He had his subject matter and he had his idiom."⁴ The "religion of Nature" to which Wordsworth attained rested upon the idea of the earth as the visible language of God.⁵ Since this is a warmly animated view of nature and demands more than intellectual assent if it

³ Line numbers throughout are those of the text of 1805, ed Ernest de Selincourt, Oxford, 1936.

⁴ F A Pottle, *The Idiom of Poetry*, Cornell, 1946, p 133.

⁵ This view I think he owed partly to a discovery of Berkeley's philosophy during the period of his first intimacy with Coleridge. The chief elements in the Berkeleyan system: the conception of the universe as the visible language of God and the emphasis on the percipient mind in relation to the physical world with the consequent relation between man and man and between God and man, all are present in Wordsworth's poetry after 1797. See my "Berkeleyian Elements in Wordsworth's Thought," *Journal of English and German Philology*, January, 1948, XLVII, 14-28.

is to be believed at all, we should expect the poet holding it to be in a state of vivid sensation and to convey his response in the words of his poetry. Just so Wordsworth does communicate in his diction the vitality of his belief.

A glance at a sample of Pope's diction in *The Essay on Man* will help to explain how achieving his particular philosophy sharpened and enriched Wordsworth's use of words. It might almost be said that the difference between Pope's diction and Wordsworth's is demanded by the difference in their philosophies. The word which dominates the first book of the *Essay on Man* is *System*. It is the Chain of Being as set forth by King and Bolingbroke which Pope is celebrating. He communicates his admiration for the beauty and order of a universe where "system into system runs." (1. 25) But he is not recording—still less advocating—any personal response of the individual to the system, unless mere acceptance be considered a response. The conception remains remote because "a system" cannot be immediately apprehended. The word suits the philosophic structure about which Pope is speaking; but it would be impossible to express Wordsworth's view of nature with its emphasis on the percipient mind of man without a warmer diction.

An analysis of certain recurrent words in *The Prelude* demonstrates this warmth and shows why Wordsworth clung to the idea that he was reforming the language of poetry, though he dropped his insistence on using the "language of conversation." It is perhaps not amiss to quote once more the crucial sentences in which he propounds his own view of his diction because he worked out the theory during the period when he was writing the first books of *The Prelude*:

Advertisement to Lyrical Ballads (1798)

They were written chiefly with a view to ascertain how far the language of conversation in the middle and lower classes of society is adapted to the purposes of poetic pleasure.

Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800)

It was published, as an experiment, which, I hoped, might be of some use to ascertain, how far, by fitting to metrical arrangement a selection of the real language of men in a state of vivid sensation, that sort of pleasure and that quantity of pleasure may be imparted, which a Poet may rationally endeavor to impart. . . The principal

object, then, proposed in these Poems was to choose incidents and situations from common life, and to relate or describe them, throughout, as far as was possible in a selection of language really used by men, and, at the same time, to throw over them a certain colouring of imagination, whereby ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual aspect; . . . There will also be found in these volumes little of what is usually called poetic diction; as much pains has been taken to avoid it as is ordinarily taken to produce it; this has been done for the reason already alleged, to bring my language near to the language of men; . . . I have at all times endeavoured to look steadily at my subject.

Appendix to Lyrical Ballads (1802)

The earliest poets of all nations generally wrote from passion excited by real events; they wrote naturally, and as men: . . . It is indeed true, that the language of the earliest Poets was felt to differ materially from ordinary language, because it was the language of extraordinary occasions; but it was really spoken by men, language which the Poet himself had uttered when he had been affected by the events which he described, or which he had heard uttered by those around him⁶

These passages are a comment on what Wordsworth was actually doing. We have to agree with him that in *The Prelude* as much as in the humblest of the Lyrical Ballads he is using the real language of men exactly because the language conveys to us his state of vivid sensation. The diction itself confronts us with the conviction about nature which is Wordsworth's reality.

He is indeed looking steadily at his subject. He is not simply taking a familiar philosophy and "poetizing it." He is doing just what he declares he is doing, taking a "review of his own mind" and showing how it has developed through the beneficent influence of nature. His new perception of the speaking face of nature gave him the means of interpreting his own experience. It also gave him his own language. Just as the richness of texture which we feel in his terms comes into the poetry exactly concurrently with a fresh richness of thought and feeling, so it might also be suggested that the enriching of Wordsworth's diction is almost in proportion to the enriching of his understanding of his relation to nature during his sojourn at Alfoxden.

⁶ Wordsworth's *Literary Criticism*, ed Nowell C Smith, London, 1905, pp 1, 11, 13-14, 18, 41, 42.

Wordsworth's new perception of the universe is perhaps most clearly incorporated in his use of the word *earth*.

the earth
And common face of Nature spake to me
Rememberable things; (I, 614-16)

is a peculiarly Wordsworthian statement. The richness of effect is achieved partly by what Wordsworth does with the word *earth* itself. He keeps us conscious of the plainest meaning, ground, dirt, and even emphasizes this meaning by going on to the *common* face of Nature. Yet the larger meaning of the whole world that surrounds us, "the earth on which [Man] dwells" (XII, 447-48) is the one to which our attention is called by the comment on what the earth does: it not only speaks, but it speaks rememberable things. This seeing our ordinary surroundings as the speaking voice of God is the heart of the Wordsworthian philosophy. As Wordsworth communicates his thought, he enlarges his diction by the very process of communication. *Earth*, as Wordsworth uses it, takes on the whole feeling of the conception of the earth in the philosophy; but the philosophic conception is given ballast by the retaining in the word of the plain every day meaning of ground. Thus Wordsworth's philosophy is literally rooted in the earth. It is hardly necessary to multiply examples such as "the speaking face of earth" (V, 12) which incorporate the spiritualized view and at the same time give it substance by retaining the plain meaning of the word. We know Wordsworth's regard for substance from his use of *substantial* as a word of praise in such phrases as "substantial lineaments" (I, 628) and "substantial things." (XII, 234) With world, which is a more imposing word than earth in ordinary usage, Wordsworth is likely to put in an extra term, "visible world" (II, 293) or "circumambient world" (VIII, 47) which specifically calls to mind that he is speaking of something to be sensuously preceived. The doubleness of Wordsworth's intention in the use of *earth* (or world when it is a synonym) is explained in a pair of lines where the word does not occur:

To the end and written spirit of God's works,
Whether held forth in Nature or in Man. (IV, 358-59)

In the passage near the beginning of Book V, where Wordsworth summarizes the substance of the earlier books, he shows the relation of the divine mind through the language of nature to the mind of man:

Hitherto,
In progress through this Verse, my mind hath look'd
Upon the speaking face of earth and heaven
As her prime Teacher, intercourse with man
Establish'd by the sovereign Intellect,
Who through that bodily Image hath diffus'd
A soul divine which we participate,
A deathless spirit. (V, 10-17)

He has already insisted on the essential part of the perceiver in this active universe:

Emphatically such a Being lives,
An inmate of this *active* universe;
From nature largely he receives; nor so
Is satisfied, but largely gives again,
For feeling has to him imparted strength,
And powerful in all sentiments of grief,
Of exultation, fear, and joy, his mind,
Creates, creator and receiver both,
Working but in alliance with the works
Which it beholds. (II, 265-75)

The position given to the percipient mind by Wordsworth is revealed to us in his use of the word *being*, and at the same time the philosophy enriches the word. When Wordsworth feels "the sentiment of Being" (II, 420) or speaks of "the immortal being," (V, 22) he is clearly aware of something beyond himself. But just as clearly it is something in himself. So when the word refers directly to man's being, the idea of divinity is still in it, as is vividly revealed in such phrases as "Great birthright of our Being" (II, 286) or

spreads abroad
His being with a strength that cannot fail. (IV, 160-61)

It is there even when he uses the word in the sense of "a being," "the progress of our Being, (II, 239) "A favor'd Being." (I, 364) This is the sort of being who can perceive the objects in the earth as part of the balance "Both of the object seen and eye that sees." (XII, 379) Such a being reads

in the hills "The changeful language of their countenances."
(VII, 727) The relation of man to being itself is given in the lines:

There came a time of greater dignity
Which had been gradually prepar'd, and now
Rush'd in as if on wings, the time in which
The pulse of Being everywhere was felt,
When all the several frames of things, like stars
Through every magnitude distinguishable,
Were half confounded in each other's blaze,
One galaxy of life and joy. Then rose
Man, inwardly contemplated, and present
In my own being, to a loftier height;
As of all visible natures crown; and first
In capability of feeling what
Was to be felt; in being rapt away
By the divine effect of power and love,
As, more than anything we know instinct
With Godhead, and by reason and by will
Acknowledging dependency sublime. (VIII, 623-39)

Object as it is used in *The Prelude* is clearly a complex word, if we may adopt the Empsonian terminology.⁷ Of the meanings given in the N. E. D., those which seem to me to fall within Wordsworth's feeling of the scope of the word are "3. Something placed before the eyes . . . a material thing . . . b. Something which on being seen excites a particular emotion, as admiration, horror, disdain, commiseration, amusement . . . 4. That to which action, thought, or feeling is directed." 3b apparently links the meanings 3 and 4 in the Wordsworthian phrases: "an object in my mind of passionate intuition," (X, 587-8) "the object of its fervour," (X, 819) and "objects of its love." (III, 369) This emotional quality seems to inhere in the word as Wordsworth uses it and to be retained with emphasis just on the emotional richness in the uses: "affinities

⁷ William Empson, "The Structure of Complex Words," *The Sewanee Review*, Spring, 1948, LVI, 230-50. Empson's categories of equations seem to me arbitrary; but it is possible to profit by the enrichment of our reading which his attention to hidden meanings in diction has brought about without taking over the paraphernalia of his system of equations. The word *sense*, though clearly part of the set of terms under consideration, is omitted from the present study because of the careful attention Empson gives to it. But his analysis, brilliant as it is, is apparently based on what I think a false assumption that *The Prelude* is a piece of casuistry in Wordsworth's self defense.

in objects," (II, 403-4) "objects that were great or fair," (VIII, 450) "Nature and her objects," (VIII, 522) "all objects being themselves capacious," (VIII, 756-7) "Imagination . . . tried her strength among new objects," (VIII, 796-98) "objects which subdu'd and temper'd them," (II, 71-72) "objects, even as they are great." (X, 142) Yet the ostensible meaning is only the simple one of "something placed before the eyes." So strong is the feeling that outward objects are objects of emotion, and of beneficent emotion, that when Wordsworth wants to use the word without this suggestion, he has to give it an opposite derogatory emotion: "I was betray'd by present objects." (X, 883-4) He has so charged the word itself with feeling that he has almost lost it in the meaning *merely* of something placed before the eyes, though that meaning is almost always part of his richer use of the word. When he wants to convey this meaning uncolored by the connotations he has given *objects*, he sometimes resorts to the phrase "outward things." (VII, 623) But he also uses this phrase for more than objects in the sense of bodies:

Not of outward things
Done visibly for other minds. (III, 174-75)

When he wants the two meanings of *object* distinct in the same passage, he clarifies the senses by modifiers:

Holds up before the mind intoxicate
With present objects and the busy dance
Of things that pass away, a temperate shew
Of objects that endure. (XII, 33-36)

His lines:

I thus convoked
From every object pleasant circumstance
To suit my ends; (X, 737-39)

might be taken as a comment on what he does to the word itself.

One of the most interesting words in the Wordsworthian language is *forms*. Sometimes it is specifically limited, as in the phrases, "outward forms," (VI, 668) "exterior forms," (III, 159) and "vulgar forms of present things." (XII, 361) Frequently it seems to be used in the quite simple sense of

Nor am I naked in external things,
Forms, images; (I, 165-66)

by form
Or image unprofaned; (II, 325-26)

And earth did change her images and forms
Before us, fast as clouds are chang'd in Heaven.
(VI, 429-30)

Thus when Wordsworth expresses gratitude for “forms distinct to steady me,” he goes on to explain:

I still
At all times had a real solid world
Of images about me. (VIII, 602-604)

Images seem likewise identified with forms in the heightened passage:

Wisdom and Spirit of the universe!
Thou Soul that art the eternity of thought!
That giv'st to forms and images a breath
And everlasting motion! (I, 428-31)

But here clearly both are made the types and symbols of eternity. The juxtaposition enforces the feeling that the forms

are images, so strongly suggested when the word *forms* is used alone.

There is a parallel doubleness of effect in the word *image* used alone. Indeed the effect is more than double, for in his use of this term Wordsworth seems regularly to call into play at least three of the meanings given in the N. E. D.: "An artificial imitation or representation of the external form of any object," "A mental representation of something (esp. a visible object), not by direct perception, but by memory or imagination; a mental picture or impression; an idea, conception," and "A thing in which the aspect, form, or character of another is reproduced; a counterpart, a copy . . . A thing that represents or is taken to represent something else; a symbol, emblem, representation." There may be even a fourth dictionary meaning: "A representation of something to the mind by speech or writing" in the use:

For images, and sentiments, and words,
And everything with which we had to do
In that delicious world of poesy,
Kept holiday; (V, 603-6)

The notions and the images of books. (VIII, 516)

The sense "artificial imitation" is dominant in the use "waxen Image which yourselves have made." (VIII, 434) But this feeling of artificiality is usually remote rather than prominent in Wordsworth's use of *image*. It may be in a measure present in the many uses where the word seems to mean: "A mental representation . . . not by direct perception, but by memory or imagination; a mental picture" as in the phrases, "a mind beset with images," (VI, 179-80) "leave behind a dance of images," (VIII, 164) "The gladsome image in my memory," (X, 995) "Some fair enchanting image in my mind." (IV, 104) Certainly, however, in these examples the feeling of artifice is very faint. What is emphasized is the vividness of the picture in the mind. Indeed the strength of Wordsworth's power of visual representation, his "disposition to be affected more than other men by absent things as if they were present,"⁸ was so strong that the images seem to have been presented to him as actual forms. This power of visualization helps, I think,

⁸ Wordsworth's *Literary Criticism*, p. 23.

to explain the use of the word *images* so frequently in conjunction with *forms* in a way that suggests simple reduplication, or at most intensification, of the plainest meaning of *form* itself: *i. e.* shape.

But the word *image* goes through the same sort of heightening that Wordsworth gives to *forms*. The meaning "counterpart, copy" is in such uses as "images of danger and distress" (VIII, 211) and "no composition of the thought, abstraction, shadow, image." (XII, 84-85) From this meaning of copy, we move to the meaning "symbol, emblem, representation." The phrase "the perfect image of a mighty Mind" (XIII, 69) used of a mountain night scene seems to have a purely figurative or symbolic intent. And this is true when Wordsworth speaks of the "image of right reason," (XII, 26) and

An image not unworthy of the one
Surpassing Life (VI, 154-55)

It is, of course, impossible to make an image, an actual copy, of a mind or spirit. But here again, even in the most highly spiritualized use of the word, we are conscious of the actual images, the shapes, in nature on which the symbolic use is based. The symbol and the essence symbolized are both present in the word. The same combination is brought home to us in the use of the word *imagery*:

or the visible scene
Would enter unawares into his mind
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
Its woods, and that uncertain Heaven, receiv'd
Into the bosom of the steady Lake. (V, 409-13)

The double intent of the diction again reveals Wordsworth's view of God and nature: nature as actually and in her sensuous forms the means of communication between God and man. The spirit speaks through nature.

Wordsworth's frequent term for this spirit in nature is *Presence* or *Presences*. His very choice of a word emphasizes the vitality of his conception of "living Nature." (VI, 119) The immediacy with which he can apprehend the forms as symbols is made possible by the actual presence of what is symbolized. The simple meaning of "being present" is a basic

one for Wordsworth and, I think, determines his choice of this particular word to stand for spirit. But the emphasized meaning is "Something present, a present being, a divine, spiritual, or incorporeal being or influence felt or conceived as present." This is so much Wordsworth's sense that there is an example from him to explain this meaning in the N. E. D. All the power of divinity is in the Presences in the lines:

Yet would the living Presence still subsist
Victorious; (V, 33-34)

Add unto this, subservience from the first
To God and Nature's single sovereignty,
Familiar presences of awful Power. (IX, 236-38)

But part of this very force comes from our feeling of the actuality of the sheer being present. Such an exclamation as:

Ye Presences of Nature, in the sky
And on the earth! (I, 490-91)

within the expression itself intensifies the meaning "present being" by the meaning "being present"; but I think the double effect is always felt in Wordsworth's usage, whether he calls attention to it or not. Indeed we can hardly think of Wordsworth's objects, forms, and images without thinking of the presences in them.

A word that acquires a special force, though perhaps no complexity of meaning, through Wordsworth's view of nature is *intercourse*. He uses it almost regularly to describe his communion through nature itself with the spirit in nature:

I held unconscious intercourse
With the eternal Beauty. (I, 589-90)

Nor was this fellowship vouchsaf'd to me
With stinted kindness . . .
In solitude such intercourse was mine. (I, 442-43, 449)

The means of apprehending the Presences in nature, of holding such intercourse, is imagination, which Wordsworth calls a "Power." (VI, 527, VII, 498) His use of the word *power* has a curious complexity, for he not only shifts among definitions of it as a quality, but goes over into the meaning: "A celestial or spiritual being having control or influence; a deity, a divinity." The reverence with which he viewed the imagination perhaps enabled him to make the transition from

"holy powers and faculties," (III, 83-84) imagination, awful Power, to "a plastic power," (II, 381) "visionary power," (II, 330)

that universal power
And fitness in the latent qualities
And essences of things, by which the mind
Is mov'd by feelings of delight. (II, 343-46)

Indeed, he links two meanings in the sequence: "Of Genius, Power, Creation and Divinity itself," (III, 171-72) and he enforces the connection in the lines:

I felt a kind of sympathy with power,
Motions rais'd up within me, nevertheless,
Which had relationship to highest things. (X, 417-19)

Consequently we have rather the feeling that the divine and human power are all one in such passages as: "the hiding-places of my power," (XI, 336)

What there is best in individual Man,
Of wise in passion, and sublime in power, (X, 667-68)

"incommunicable powers," (III, 188)

'Tis a power
That does not come unrecogniz'd. (I, 47-48)

There are other earthly gifts besides man's imagination that partake of this sublime quality: "names . . . were Powers," (IX, 180) "words in tuneful order . . . a passion and a power." (V, 579-80)

speak of them [books] as Powers
For ever to be hallowed; only less,
For what we may become, and what we need,
Than Nature's self, which is the breath of God.
(V, 219-22)

The idea of goodness is associated with *power* as with *object*. Again Wordsworth has to reduce the word by derogatory modifiers such as "false, secondary power," (II, 221) or "vulgar power," (V, 595) if he wants the meaning simply of ability. In the lines:

such object hath had power
O'er my imagination since the dawn
Of childhood, (XII, 146-48)

while the word seems to mean simply force, the juxtaposition

with *object* and *imagination* gives it some of the favorable connotation of these words; and its own aura of divine power still comes with it.

Indeed the interrelation of all these terms, and especially the fact that they come together in the passages where the poetry is most impassioned, is exactly what makes them seem peculiarly Wordsworthian. Their occurring in clusters in the most characteristic lines is precisely the basis for picking these particular words to analyze. Their very frequency makes it impossible to quote the passages in proof; but there is at least one in almost every book of the poem.⁹ It is perhaps these linked uses of the words that seem to belong peculiarly to him which most justify Wordsworth's feeling that he was adding a new vitality to the language of his poetry, that it is indeed the language of man in a state of vivid sensation that he is speaking. It is worth noting that most of the words which belong to him in a special way are not "learned words"; but what is significant for Wordsworth, at least by 1800, is their conveying his reality. The richness of his diction goes with the richness of his thought. It is the poet of Wordsworth's definition, "a man speaking to men,"¹⁰ whom we hear in the lines:

In one beloved presence . . . there exists
A virtue which irradiates and exalts
All objects through all intercourse of sense.
No outcast he, bewilder'd and depress'd;
Along his infant veins are interfus'd
The gravitation and the filial bond
Of nature, that connect him with the world.
Emphatically such a Being lives,
An inmate of this *active* universe;
From nature largely he receives; nor so
Is satisfied, but largely gives again,
For feeling has to him imparted strength,
And powerful in all sentiments of grief,
Of exultation, fear, and joy, his mind,
Even as an agent of the one great mind,
Creates, creator and receiver both,
Working but in alliance with the works
Which it beholds. (II, 255-75)

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⁹ I, 427-41, II, 250-80, III, 121-38, 359-71, V, 615-29, VI, 661-72, VII, 716-40, VIII, 593-605, XI, 105-223, XII, 278-379, XIII, 66-119.

¹⁰ *Wordsworth's Literary Criticism*, p. 23.

SANDALS MORE INTERWOVEN AND COMPLETE:

A Re-Examination of the Keatsean Odes

By THOMAS E. CONNOLLY

Both Garrod¹ and Ridley² have made very thorough and competent studies of the metrical development of the Keatsean odes. For two reasons it is desirable to combine the results of their individual efforts into one study. First, they differ on certain minor points of interpretation; therefore it will be of value to examine the differences in a combined study. Second, there is an obvious advantage of unification to be gained by the combination in one place of the results of the investigations of these two scholars. Their studies will, then, form the basis of the synthesis which is to follow.

It has already been shown by first Garrod and then Ridley that the study of the ode form which Keats developed must begin with the long journal letter to George and Georgiana Keats³ which was begun on 14 February and completed on 3 May 1819. It is the section of this letter dated, "Friday—April 30—" which has bearing on this subject. Here Keats wrote out three sonnets, the first and third of which I reproduce:

ON FAME

You cannot eat your cake and have it too.—Proverb

How is that Man misled	
How fever'd is that Man)	who cannot look (a)
Upon his mortal days with temperate blood	(b)
Who vexes all the leaves of his Life's book	(a)
And robs his fair name of its maidenhood	(b)
It is as if the rose should pluck herself	(c)
Or the ripe plum's finger its misty bloom	(d)
As if a clear Lake meddling with itself	(c)
Should fill cloud its pureness with a muddy	
gloom.	(d)

¹ H. W. Garrod, *Keats* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 157.

² M. R. Ridley, *Keats' Craftsmanship: A Study in Poetic Development* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 312.

³ *The Letters of John Keats*, ed by M. B. Forman (London: Humphrey Milford, 1931), II, 317-70.

Here endethe ye Ode to Psyche.

Incipet altera Sonnetta.

I have been endeavouring to discover a better Sonnet Stanza than we have. The legitimate does not suit the language over-well from the pouncing rhymes—the other kind appears too elegiac—and the couplet at the end of it has seldom a pleasing effect—I do not pretend to have succeeded—it will explain itself.⁵

The sonnet which then follows is the peculiar result of an attempt to vary the rhyme scheme of the two traditional sonnet-forms and to combine them into a self-contained, but not a couplet or quatrain stopped, unit.

If by dull rhymes our English must be chaind	(a)
And, like Andromeda, the Sonnet sweet,	(b)
Fetterd, in spite of pained Loveliness;	(c)
Let us find out, if we must be constrain'd,	(a)
Sandals more interwoven and complete	(b)
To fit the naked foot of poesy;	(d)
Let us inspect the Lyre, and weigh the stress	(c)
Of every chord, and see what may be gain'd	(a)
By car industrious, and attention meet;	(b)
Misers of sound and syllable, no less	(c)
Than Midas of his coinage, let us be	(d)
Jalous of dead leaves in the bay wreath crown,	(e)
So, if we may not let the muse be free,	(d)
She will be bound with Garlands of her own.	(e)

By an examination of the metrical structure of the *Ode to Psyche* in the light of the first two of these sonnets (in which there is a closer resemblance to legitimate sonnet forms than in the mere fourteen lines of the third) it will be seen that this ode was the direct result of experimentation with the sonnet form. What had begun as experimentation with one of the most rigid lyric verse forms resulted eventually in an effective modification of one of the oldest and most loosely constructed verse forms in the history of poetry.

⁵ Ridley, *op cit.*, seems to effectively correct Garrod's identification of "legitimate" sonnet with the Petrarchan sonnet. Garrod had based his ingenious interpretation on Colvin's copy of the letter in which the original punctuation, and consequently the sense, of this passage had been altered. Ridley correctly interprets the "legitimate" sonnet to be the Shakespearean and the "elegiac" sonnet to be

O Goddess hear these tuneless numbers, wrung	(a)
By sweet enforcement and remembrance dear,	(b)
And Pardon that thy secrets should be sung	(a)
Even to into thine own soft-conched ear!	(b)
Surely I dreamt to-day; or did I see	(c)
The winged Psyche, with awaked eyes?	(d)
I wander'd in a forest thoughtlessly,	(c)
And on the sudden, fainting with surprise,	(d)
Saw two fair Creatures couched side by side	(c)
In 'deepest grass beneath the whispering fan	(f)
Of leaves and trembled blossoms, where there ran	(f)
A Brooklet scarce espied	(c)
'Mid hush'd, cool-rooted flowers, fragrant eyed,	(e)
Blue, freckle-pink, and budded Syrian	(f)

The first fourteen lines of the *Ode to Psyche* (printed above) have the rhyme scheme *a b a b c d c d e f f e e f*. Thus, they are, in effect, a combination of the first two quatrains of a Shakespearean sonnet with a variation of a Petrarchan sestet. When these lines are compared with the sonnet beginning "How fever'd is that Man . . ." (see page 299 above) they will be found to have a close resemblance in metrical construction. Although in its final form the rhyme scheme of the sestet of the sonnet will be seen to be *e f e g g f*, an examination of the original lines reveals that it was intended to have a rhyme scheme of *e f e f f e*. The rhyme scheme of the first sestet in *Psyche* is *e f f e e f* which more closely interlaces the quickly repeated center rhymes by uniting them between the forward-listening first and backward-listening sixth lines. The second alteration of the sonnet scheme is seen in the shortened twelfth line which seems to look forward to the shortened eighth line of the Nightingale stanza.

This examination is, of course, based upon the ode as it appeared in the letter. Whether by accident or design when the poem was published the word *fan* in line ten was changed to *roof*, upsetting the rhyme scheme and leaving inorganic lines.

The next nine lines do not fit into any possible sonnet combination. Their rhyme scheme is an inorganic line followed by two couplets and a quatrain.

the Petrarchan The full statement of this argument would lead us away from the general subject into too great detail

They lay, calm-breathing on the bedded grass;	
Their arms embrac'd and their pinions too;	(a)
Their lips touch'd not, but had not bid adieu,	(a)
As if disjointed by soft-handed slumber,	(b)
And ready still past kisses to outnumber	(b)
At tender eye dawn of aurorian love.	(c)
The winged boy I knew	(d)
But who wast thou O happy happy dove?	(c)
His Psyche true?	(d)

These lines fall into the lulling regularity of the couplet which is quite appropriate to the image they carry, and then they move to the quatrain with the short twenty-first and even shorter twenty-third lines to close the first stanza in an almost breathless anticipation of the address to Psyche which follows in the next section.⁶ They are obviously transitional and introductory and might naturally be expected, as such, to depart from the predominating pattern of the poem.

O latest born, and loveliest vision far	(a)
Of all Olympus faded Hierarchy!	(b)
Fairer than Phoebe's sapphire-region'd star,	(a)
Or Vesper amorous glow worm of the sky;	(b)
Fairer than these though temple thou hadst none,	(c)
Nor Altar heap'd with flowers;	(d)
Nor virgin choir to make delicious moan	(c)
Upon the midnight hours;	(d)
No voice, no lute, no pipe no incense sweet	(e)
From chain-swung Censer teeming—	(f)
No shrine, no grove, no Oracle, no heat	(e)
Of pale-mouth'd Prophet dreaming!	(f)

The next twelve lines (ll. 24-35, printed above) are three quatrains quite evidently patterned on the Shakespearean sonnet. The end couplet is wanting, and once again the shortened line within the sonnet structure seems to attract Keats. The sixth, eighth, tenth, and twelfth lines are reduced to three feet. This attraction to the short line as a variation of the sonnet-form appears to be very strong in this the first of the six great odes. It will be seen that Keats does not

⁶ Ridley speculated (*op cit.*, p 199) that in line 11 the words "where there ran" originally might have read "where there was," and so bring the inorganic fifteenth line into a septet anticipating the additional line of *To Autumn*. What this would do to lines 10 and 14 as well as his sonnet sestet theory at this point, he does not say.

entirely abandon his efforts in this direction until after the *Ode to a Nightingale*.

O Bloomiest! though too late for antique vows;	(a)
Too, too late for the fond believing Lyre,	(b)
When holy were the haunted forest boughs,	(a)
Holy the Air, the water and the fire.	(b)
Yet even in these days so far retir'd	(c)
From happy Picties, thy lucent fans,	(d)
Fluttering among the faint Olympians,	(d)
I see, and sing by my own eyes inspired.	(c)
O let me be thy Choir and make a moan	
Upon the midnight hours;	
Thy voice, thy lute, thy pipe, thy incense sweet	(c)
From swung Censer teeming;	(f)
Thy Shrine, thy Grove, thy Oracle, thy heat	(c)
Of pale-mouth'd Prophet dreaming!	(f)

The next fourteen lines (ll. 36-49) present the most complicated structure in the poem. It is true, as Ridley says, that they present an odd parallel to the sonnet *To Sleep* in which we saw two apparently inorganic lines (the ninth and tenth) repeating the *bc* rhymes from the first and second quatrains to give a rhyme scheme of *abab c d c d b c e f e f*. In these fourteen lines at present under consideration, we have as Ridley says, a rhyme scheme which appears to be, based on the same principle except that lines 9 and 10, inorganic within these fourteen lines, go outside the sonnet structure to repeat exactly the rhyme words of lines 7 and 8 in the preceding twelve lines. But what neither Ridley nor Garrod (who notices the same thing) seems to notice is that lines 9 and 10 are not the only lines repeated. The whole sestet from the preceding twelve lines is repeated almost exactly here, the only change being in thought from *Psyche not having* all these things to *Psyche having* all these things in Keats. So that we are left with an even more intricate manipulation of the sonnet structure than appears when these two sections are considered separately as they were by Garrod and Ridley.

Considered together they compose twenty-six lines, twelve of which make two exactly repetitive patterns of six lines each. If these two passages were to be removed the remaining fourteen lines would form a type of sonnet, complete in thought, though of a peculiar rhyme scheme made up of a quatrain,

two apparently inorganic lines which rhyme with lines in the removed sections, and two quatrains: *a b a b c d e f e f g h g h*.

Thus, considering these twenty-six lines (ll. 24-49) together, we find not two, but three sonnets so completely interwoven that they seem to defy any absolute analysis.

The first fourteen lines of the final section of the poem return to a more regular sonnet pattern, both in line length and rhyme scheme. This regularity is appropriate both to the close and for the passage which follows upon the extremely involved metrical manipulation of the preceding twenty-six lines.

Yes I will be thy Priest and build a fane	(a)
In some untrodden region of my Mind,	(b)
Where branched thoughts new grown with pleasant pain,	(a)
Instead of pines shall murmur in the wind.	(b)
Far, far around shall those dark cluster'd trees	(c)
Fledge the wild-ridged mountains steep by steep,	(d)
And there by Zephyrs streams and birds and bees	(c)
The moss-lain Dryads shall be charm'd lull'd to sleep.	(d)
And in the midst of this wide-quietness	(e)
A rosy Sanctuary will I dress	(e)
With the wreath'd trellis of a working brain;	(f)
With buds and bells and stars without a mane ⁷	(g)
With all the gardner, fancy e'er could frame feign	(f)
Who breeding flowers will never breed the same—	(g)

These fourteen lines show the third variation of Keats's attempt to break the sonnet after the octave. These lines are a perfect Shakespearean sonnet except for the fact that the couplet is inserted after the first two quatrains and before the third quatrain. His first attempt at breaking the sonnet after the octave came in the sonnet *To Sleep* where the ninth and tenth lines repeated the *b c* rhymes of the first and second quatrains; the second attempt came in having the ninth and tenth lines repeat the rhyme words of the preceding twelve lines; now he tries a couplet at this point.

The poem ends with a quatrain differentiated from the preceding quatrain by the shortened second and fourth lines. This, of course, gives the final subsiding note to the whole.

⁷ For *name*.

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And there shall be for thee all soft delight	(h)
That shadowy thought can win;	(i)
A bright torch, and a casement ope at night	(h)
To let the warm Love in.	(i)

Of the six odes, the *Ode to Psyche* presents the most difficult problems to the analyst. Keats very soon after this poem adopted a uniform ode stanza. The metrical pattern of the remaining odes is much more regular and, with the exception of the shortened eighth line in the *Nightingale* ode and the introduction of the eleventh line into the ode *To Autumn*, is uniform barring a few minor variations in the sestet.

The four odes, *Ode to a Nightingale*, *Ode on Indolence*, *Ode on Melancholy*, and *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, are all based on a stanza of ten lines. This stanza is composed of a Shakespearean quatrain followed by a Petrarchan sestet. The quatrains are uniformly regular; what variations exist are found in the last three lines of the sestet.

The *Ode to a Nightingale* is the only one of the four odes which holds to one metrical pattern in the sestet (*c d e c d e*), and it is the only one which introduces a shortened, three foot line (the eighth). This rhyme scheme for the sestet is the most common scheme to be found in these four odes. In the remaining three each line of the sestet contains five feet.

The *Ode on Indolence* keeps to the *Nightingale* sestet rhyme scheme for the first four stanzas; in the fifth stanza this pattern changes to *c d e d c e*, and in the sixth and last stanza it becomes *c d e c e d*.

The last of the three stanzas of the *Ode on Melancholy* offers the only variation from the *Nightingale* pattern in this poem. Here the rhyme scheme is *c d e d c e*.

The most irregular of these four odes is the *Ode on a Grecian Urn*. In this poem three rhyme schemes are used for the sestet: the first and last stanzas rhyme *c d e d c e*; the second stanza has that pattern *c d e c e d* which is found in the last stanza of the *Ode on Indolence*; the third and the fourth stanzas are regular in following the *Nightingale* pattern *c d e c d e*.

Keats reached the perfection of his ode stanza in *To Autumn*. Here the Petrarchan sestet with which he had been constantly experimenting in each of the preceding four odes was changed

slightly by the addition of another line, and became a septet. Even here we see the effort toward regularization. The first four lines of each of the three stanzas are Shakespearean quatrains. The septet in the first stanza has the rhyme scheme *c d e d c c e*; the second and third stanzas do not leave such a spread between the first rhyme of the septet and its repetition, but follow the pattern *c d e c d d e*.

Thus, for the metrical evolution of the Keatsean odes. The rapid refinement of the final stanza-form which appears in *To Autumn* becomes more marvelous when it is remembered that the experimentation which began late in April culminated in September 1819 in the controlled beauty of the stanzaic structure of *To Autumn*.

HENRY JAMES'S REJECTION OF *THE SACRED FOUNT*

By CLAUDE J. RAETH

1

The canon of Henry James's criticism is enriched in the New York Edition by more than the direct statement of the prefaces. James illustrated his critical cadre not only by prefaces and revisions but also by significant omissions. He outlined—negatively, as it were—his mature conception of what competent art should be by the very works which he deemed unfit to be included in the Edition. Moreover, of the seven novels which he omitted from the New York Edition, only *The Sacred Fount* belongs to his late manner, belongs to the years which saw the creation of *The Ambassadors*, *The Golden Bowl*, and *The Wings of the Dove*.¹ Thus, the failure of this novel to satisfy James as worthy to join the later three marks it as a significant commentary upon his final concept of the art of the novel.

The Sacred Fount fails because it fails to mean—which is to say, for James, because it fails to be. The failure, then is one of form; it derives, as James came to see, from a violation of genre—of the very form by which meaning was to be established. If we can analyze the faults of *The Sacred Fount*, we can see what James considered to be the valid form of the short story and the novel, what devices of presentation and point of view he held to be proper to each form, and what expression and meaning could be fitted into these forms. And, if we can see the failure of the *Sacred Fount* as James saw it, we may suggest an answer to the vexing question of what the novel means; for that failure has led many commentators to shrug the novel off as beyond interpretation and has forced some few into critical capriciousness.

¹ The omitted novels are *Watch and Ward*, 1871; *The Europeans*, 1878; *Confidence*, 1879-80; *Washington Square*, 1880; *The Bostonians*, 1885-6; *The Other House*, 1896; and *The Sacred Fount*, 1901. *The Outcry*, 1911, was too late; and the unfinished works, *The Ivory Tower* and *The Sense of the Past*, were added posthumously in 1917.

The most objective summary of the novel would say that it reveals the attempt of an unnamed narrator to confirm a theory about the nature of human relationships by observing the behavior of a group of people at a country-house weekend. The theory is that in a love connection, one member may aggrandize his own personality by drawing upon the energy of the other. The narrator observes, on his way to the country house, that a married couple whom he has known shows evidence of this change as the woman has become younger and the man older; physical energy has been transferred from the one to the other. Intrigued by his theory, he seeks to corroborate it by noting that an unmarried man, who had previously shown no signs of wit and intellectual vivacity, has become mentally revived; the hypothesis the narrator makes is that if he can find the partner who has contributed wit to the man, he will have established the second relationship and substantiated the theory. The complications that balk the research are two: first, the witty man is unmarried, and his partner is hidden by the secrecy inherent in a liaison; second, once he gets on the apparent track, the narrator is hindered by the individuals involved, each of whom has a private reason for maintaining the secrecy of aggression and ravished defeat. The novel concludes with the attempts of the narrator to avoid being rebuffed in his search, his battle with aggressors, and his admission at the very end that he cannot maintain himself or his theory.

The title of the novel refers to the principle which operates in the relations of the two couples. The narrator enunciates the formula when he observes the rejuvenation of Mrs. Brissenden and the aging of her husband.

"One of the pair," I said, 'has to pay for the other. What ensues is a miracle, and miracles are expensive. . . . Mrs. Briss had to get her new blood, her extra allowance of time and bloom, somewhere; and from whom could she so conveniently extract them as from Guy himself? She has, by some extraordinary feat of legerdemain, extracted them; and he on his side, to supply her, has had to tap the sacred fount. But the sacred fount is like the greedy man's description of the turkey as an awkward dinner dish. It may be sometimes too much for a single share, but it's not enough to go round.'"²

² *The Sacred Fount* (New York, 1901), p. 29. See also pp. 16-17.

As the novel expands, however, it tends to shift its emphasis from the action of the couples to the reactions of the narrator. His effect is to intrude the problem of consciousness upon the couples, since his whole action is to gain for himself the awareness of their states. The consciousness which the narrator tries to bring to the problem clarifies the moral issues at stake in the process of tapping the sacred fount, that symbol of basic individuality; and the aggressors are committed to resist the awareness of their culpability. The narrator sums up this reaction when he criticizes the attitudes of Mrs. Brissenden and her husband toward their changed states. She takes her "miracle coolly."

"And doesn't see then how her victim loses?"

"No. She can't. The perception, if she had it, would be painful and terrible—might even be fatal to the process. So she hasn't it. She passes round it. It takes all her flood of life to meet her own chance. She has only a wonderful sense of success and well-being. The other consciousness—"

"Is all for the other party?"

"The author of the sacrifice."

"Then how beautifully 'poor Briss,' " my companion said, "must have it."

... "Oh, he has it so that, though he goes, in his passion, about with her, he dares scarcely show his face . . . The agents of the sacrifice are uncomfortable, I gather, when they suspect or fear you see."³

The operation of consciousness upon the narrator is different from its effect upon the principals; he is interested in the thrill and sport of intellectual exercise and resists the claims of morality which would involve him in attacking the aggressors and in aiding the victims.⁴ The narrator's probing is dependent upon the corroboration given him by others, especially by the four principals, since he himself has no relationship with them except as a prying outsider. He is primarily dependent upon Mrs. Brissenden, who has given him the clue to the theory of the sacred fount at the beginning when she, in her physical bloom, has shown that she lacks the mental sharpness to be

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-1. See also, pp. 71, 96-7, 136, 183-4, and 294-5, for other examples.

⁴ For example, *ibid.*, pp. 22-3, 136-7, 201-3, and 230-1

aware of her situation and of the narrator's threat to it. But as the threat of the narrator's quest becomes apparent to the two aggressors, they join to attack him. Mrs. Brissenden, coached by Gilbert Long, the intellectually revived aggressor, uses her physical energy to deny the validity of any of the narrator's assumptions about the sacred fount. And at the end, the narrator is overcome by her attack and abandons the quest. "I *should* certainly never again, on the spot, quite hang together, even though it wasn't really that I hadn't three times her method. What I too fatally lacked was her tone."⁵

That the novel is ambiguous and difficult to interpret is attested by the reactions of commentators upon James. Some have confessed their inability to make a decision.⁶ And the two real attempts at making a decision fail to solve the basic problem, that which develops out of the particular use of the narrator and of the meaning of his search and defeat in relation to the meaning of the two couples.

Wilson Follett says the novel is a "definitive parable of life and the artist," showing the artist must be defeated by the accidents of life and must find significance only in the world of imagination. He contends that *The Sacred Fount* was omitted from the New York Edition because it is not a novel but a "riddle, a practical joke, a merciless self portrait," and he sees the narrator as James himself.⁷ Such a charge as this would certainly explain the absence from the collected edition; but it raises the question why James with all his insistence that the artist keep out of his work, published the novel at all. R. P. Blackmur follows Follett's thesis that *The Sacred Fount* is an examination of the function of the artist, but he modifies the extremity of Follett's conclusions by maintaining that the book is a novel⁸ and that it is essen-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 319

⁶ See J. W. Beach, *The Method of Henry James* (New Haven, 1918), pp. 250, 254; Rebecca West, *Henry James* (New York, 1916), pp. 107-8, Pelham Edgar, *Henry James, Man and Author* (London, 1927), p. 148, and Edmund Wilson, *The Triple Thinkers* (New York, 1938), p. 136

⁷ "Henry James's Portrait of Henry James," *The New York Times Book Review*, Aug. 23, 1936, pp. 2, 16

⁸ Blackmur later recanted and said *The Sacred Fount* is "not a novel at all but a vast, shadowy, disintegrating, parable, disturbing, distressing, distraught, indeed distraught. . . ." "In the Country of the Blue," *The Kenyon Review*, V (1943), p. 597.

tially in the vein of James' ghost stories. Blackmur, without committing himself as to whether or not the narrator is deluded at the end, says that he is a projection of James himself, acting as the voice of conscience. "... James is the hidden conscience of his characters, and as conscience he is himself their sacred fount."⁹

The foremost question raised by *The Sacred Fount* is the place and function of the narrator, since all the action and characters are seen through his eyes and since the validity of any conclusion about the two couples must be tested in reference to the narrator's final admission of incompetency to judge. Follett's conclusion that the narrative method in the novel is a violation of James's critical cadre seems substantiated, for *The Sacred Fount* is the only novel to use first-person narration, and it was dropped from the collected edition. But the novel is not a freak, as Follett implies; rather it has significant relations to the structural and stylistic experiments which James made in his mature years. The novel illustrates, both in form and subject, phases of James's development as he was preparing to write *The Ambassadors*, *The Wings of the Dove*, and *The Golden Bowl*.

2

The only published statement in which James tries to answer a reader's question about *The Sacred Fount* occurs in a letter to Howells on December 11, 1902, more than a year following publication.

[*The Sacred Fount*] is one of several things of mine in these last years that have paid the penalty of having been conceived only as the 'short story' that (alone, apparently) I could hope to work off somewhere (which I mainly failed of) and then *grew* by a rank force of its own into something of which the idea had, modestly, never been to be a book. That is essentially the case with the *S.F.*, planned, like *The Spoils of Poynton*, *What Maisie Knew*, *The Turn of the Screw*, and various others, as a story of '8 to 10 thousand words'!! and then having accepted its bookish necessity or destiny in consequence of becoming already, at the start, 20,000, accepted it ruefully and blushing, moreover, since, *given the*

⁹ "The Sacred Fount," *The Kenyon Review*, IV (1942), pp. 328-352. See especially pp. 349-52.

tenuity of idea, the larger quantity of treatment hadn't been aimed at. I remember how I would have chucked the whole thing at the 15th thousand word, if in the first place I could have afforded to 'waste' 15,000, and if in *the second* I were not always ridden by a superstitious terror of not finishing, for finishing's and for the precedent's sake, what I have begun.¹⁰

The conclusions to be drawn from this statement are that *The Sacred Fount* failed as a novel because it could not transcend those elements of the short story in which it was conceived, that its tenuous subject belonged to the shorter form, and that the novel was written at a time marked by an urge to move into the larger possibilities offered by the novel. Admittedly, many of James's productions grew larger than their intended scope; in the letter to Howells, cited above, James notes three, all of which he included in the New York Edition. An explanation as to why *The Sacred Fount* "paid the penalty" in a greater degree lies most clearly in the relationship of a slight subject, usually found in the short stories, with its device of expression, first-person narrative. For, with the exception of *The Sacred Fount*, first-person narrative appears in James's works not in the novels but in the short stories.

The basic reasons for James's use of first-person narrative in short stories are two. The first advantage of the device is that it gives objectivity; it relieves the author from the necessity of stepping into the work in an omniscient role, a role which offends both James's sense of the artistic integrity of the work and his wish for unity of effect. This advantage, however, the device shares with the other methods of revelation, of achieving an impersonal point of view. The second advantage, and the one which peculiarly fits first-person narrative to the short story, is its fitness to provide economy and brevity in the presentation of a restricted action which is designed to present a subject of limited idea.

James's interest in objectivity in fiction, in defining the degree to which the artist may appear directly in the work, springs from the kind of subject, the psychological examination, he took as his province; and it springs also from his high regard for artistic method, which he recognized as the

¹⁰ *The Letters of Henry James*, ed. Percy Lubbock (New York, 1920), i, 408-9.

special distinction between art and life and as the essence of art, the means by which it can function. The bent of James's mind toward the complicated operation of human consciousness is the mark of all his work. In his old room at Cambridge on December 26, 1881, reflecting on his youth when his joy in life was not overclouded, he wrote: "The freshness and desire, the hope, the curiosity, the vivacity, the sense of richness and mystery of the world that lies before us—there is an enchantment in all that which it takes a heavy dose of pain to quench. . . ." ¹¹ And in *The Art of Fiction* in 1884 he was annoyed at the adverse criticism, in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, of "certain tales in which 'Bostonian nymphs' appear to have 'rejected English dukes for psychological reasons.'" He would only say, "There are few things more exciting to me, in short, than a psychological reason. . . ." ¹²

However, James recognized that, in the creation of a psychological story, the function of art is to provide some order and clarity so that the inchoate functioning of consciousness can be comprehensible to the reader. Even the emotional states which are the substance of the ghost stories, perhaps the most obvious manifestations of the "richness and mystery of the world," must be presented with all the cares of art. In his remarks on "The Turn of the Screw" in the preface to the ninth volume of the New York Edition, James said that his interest was "to knead the subject of my young friend's, the suppositious narrator's, mystification thick, and yet strain the expression of it so clear and fine that beauty would result." ¹³ The complex experience of the "villainy of motive in the evoked predatory creatures" could be cast into a story insofar as James could make the reader "*think* the evil, make him think it for himself, and you are released from all weak specifications." ¹⁴ The achievement of this goal lies in the use, for presentation, of the narrator as the funnel of impression. The one entry of the idea of the story in the Notebooks con-

¹¹ *The Notebooks of Henry James*, ed. F. O. Matthiessen and Kenneth Murdock (New York, 1947), p. 35.

¹² *Henry James, Representative Selections*, ed. Lyon N. Richardson (New York, 1941), pp. 92-3.

¹³ *The Art of the Novel, Critical Prefaces by Henry James*, introduction by R. P. Blackmur (New York, London, 1934), p. 173.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

cludes with the sentence, "The story to be told—tolerably obviously—by an outside spectator, observer."¹⁵

The Notebook entries for *The Friends of the Friends* show the place of the narrator in the short story. The original idea is that of a man and woman who, without having met in life, manage to complete their union after her death. In the first entry for this ghost story, James decided upon first-person narration. "There would be various ways of doing it, and it comes to me that the thing might be related by the 3rd person, according to my wont when I want something—as I always do want it—intensely objective."¹⁶ In this entry, and in a later one, James makes the narrator a third person, a woman who is the fiancée of the man and a friend of the other woman.¹⁷ The narrator is to record the growth of the intimacy of her beloved with her friend, culminating in the narrator's suspicion that he is communing with the ghost of the dead friend.

Objectivity, then, stands as the means whereby art may build from life, whereby order is given the disordered.¹⁸ With *The Ambassadors*, James saw that the complexity of Strether's experience could not be completely presented even in using him as a center of consciousness and avoiding the need to explain anything that Strether himself might not explain.

The thing was to be so much of this worthy's [Strether's] intimate adventure that even the projection of his consciousness upon it from beginning to end without intermission or deviation would probably still leave a part of its value for him, and *a fortiori* for ourselves, unexpressed. I might, however, express every grain of it there would be room for—on condition of contriving a splendid particular economy.¹⁹

James stressed the function of objectivity in imposing clarity and independence in a representation of life when he attacked

¹⁵ For Jan. 12, 1895, p. 179.

¹⁶ For Dec. 21, 1895, p. 231.

¹⁷ For Jan. 10, 1896, pp. 241-4.

¹⁸ For James's statements on the need for order and limitation in artistic representation, see his comments upon *The Portrait of a Lady*, *Notebooks*, p. 18; upon *Roderick Hudson*, *The Art of the Novel*, pp. 5-6, and upon "The Coxon Fund," *The Art of the Novel*, pp. 229-30.

¹⁹ *The Art of the Novel*, p. 317.

the use of the autobiographic form by H. G. Wells. James wrote to Wells, "There is, to my vision, no authentic, and no really interesting and no *beautiful* report of things on the novelist's, the painter's part unless a particular detachment has operated, unless the great stewpot or crucible of the imagination, of the observant and interpretive mind in short, has intervened and played its part. . . ." ²⁰

The devices for attaining objectivity, James recognized, are many; he used them according to the needs of each particular piece he created. In the Notebooks, he early suggested letters and a journal as means of narration.²¹ The bulk of his short stories relies on narration by an observer, either in the first or third person. And in the later novels occurs the concentration upon the consciousness of those characters central to the action. First-person narrative is a means to objectivity, the objectivity that James thought Taine had expressed so well in saying that "Turgenieff so perfectly cut the umbilical cord that bound the story to himself."²² But it is only one of the several devices, and it is one associated with the short story. The place of first-person narration in *The Sacred Fount* can best be understood by first examining what makes the method appropriate to the short story, to a genre other than the novel.

3

The second function of first-person narrative is to effect economy and brevity of structure. It is in James's attempt to achieve such an effect that we may get an insight into the working-out of *The Sacred Fount*. For the device is one which James associated especially with the short story; and the growth of *The Sacred Fount* from a short story to a novel may show us in detail how and wherein James was dissatisfied with the work as it embodied the inappropriate development of a short-story subject by a short-story device into the form

²⁰ *Letters*, ii, 181-2. See also a letter to Mrs Humphrey Ward scolding her for her lack of objectivity by dealing with characters omnisciently, i, 326. And see the comments upon dramatic objectivity in the preface to *The Ambassadors*, *The Art of the Novel*, pp. 322-5.

²¹ *Notebooks*, pp. 11, 15, 52.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

of a novel. The distinction which James makes, in searching out the specific form which is proper to a given subject, is in terms of the degree or amplitude of revelation of the consciousness. Thus, for example, the "villainy of motive" which interested him in "The Turn of the Screw" was to be symbolized in the ghost, in the "evoked predatory creatures," and he would not seek to explain the "villainy" but only to impress the sensation, the effect, upon the reader through the reaction of the narrator: Make the reader "*think* the evil." The novel, on the other hand, deals with evil through the extended psychological operation of the protagonists, struggling to a state of consciousness, of comprehension. In this fashion, Isabel Archer develops; in this fashion, Maggie Verver seeks her salvation.

James noted his conception of the function of the observer as a means of attaining formal economy in the preface to *The Golden Bowl*.

I have already betrayed, as an accepted habit, and even to an extravagance commented on, my preference for dealing with my subject-matter, for 'seeing my story,' through the opportunity and sensibility of some more or less detached, some not strictly involved, though thoroughly interested and intelligent, witness or reporter, some person who contributes to the case mainly a certain amount of criticism and interpretation of it. Again and again, on review, the shorter things in especial that I have gathered into this Series have ranged themselves not as my own impersonal account of the affair in hand, but as my account of somebody's impression of it—the terms of this person's access to it and estimate of it contributing thus by some fine little law to intensification of interest. The somebody is often, among my shorter tales I recognize, but an unnamed, unintroduced and (save by right of intrinsic wit) unwarranted participant, the impersonal author's concrete deputy or delegate, a convenient substitute or apologist for the creative power otherwise so veiled and disembodied.²³

The achieving of economy by using a narrator may be illustrated by James's comments upon *The Coxon Fund*, which he characterized as a "complicated thing" done "with a strong brevity and lucidity."²⁴ The germinal idea in the Notebooks

²³ *The Art of the Novel*, p. 327. The rest of the passage develops the gain in objectivity, reflecting the manner in which both advantages were usually blended in his mind.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

is stressed as a "little story." Reading a biography of Coleridge aroused in James an interest not in delving into the character of the poet himself, but rather in illustrating the imaginative and sympathetic appreciation, by someone, of a character like the poet; it occurred to James that such appreciation might well be developed by having another character make a sacrifice for the poet.²⁵ In the next entry, developing the illustrative subject, James sets his goal "a strong subject, a rich subject *summarized*—that is my indispensable formula and memento." And the use of the narrator is to avoid the difficulty of the "literal record—anything merely narrative, with the detail of narrative"; for the contribution of the narrator to the subject is to "compress and confine it by making it the picture of what I see."²⁶ The narrator, then, can summarize, define, and explain—contributing first, the objectivity of the removal of the author, and second, the abridgement which is not possible if an action is so dramatized that the reader draws his own conclusions.²⁷

4

When James wrote *The Sacred Fount*, probably sometime in 1900,²⁸ he had undergone a change of interest, from the desire to write short pieces of fiction to a wish to attempt the larger possibilities of the novel. In an entry in the Notebooks in 1889, the same entry in which he had praised Turgenieff's objectivity, James said he wanted to create "a large number of perfect, *short* things, *nouvelles* and tales, illustrative of ever so many things in life."²⁹ But ten years later, January 27, 1899, after he had concentrated on short pieces in the years following the failure of *Guy Domville*, he wrote, "the desire to get back only to the *big* (scenic, constructive 'architectural' effects) seizes me and carries me off my feet."³⁰ Significantly,

²⁵ For April 17, 1894, p. 152

²⁶ For April 25, 1894, p. 160.

²⁷ For the use of the narrator to give an impression see also in the *Notebooks* the germs of *The Author of Beltraffio*, p. 58, an unused idea, p. 144, and the entries for *The Next Time*, pp. 180, 201. For two apparent contradictions of the value of first-person narrative, see p. 130 on *The Golden Bowl*, and pp. 300-01 on *The Sense of the Past*.

²⁸ The interval is between the last *Notebooks* entry, Oct. 5, 1899, and the copyright, Feb. 16, 1901.

²⁹ P. 101.

³⁰ P. 269. See also p. 135.

the ideas that were later to be developed into *The Ambassadors* and *The Golden Bowl* were first entered in the Notebooks in the earlier years of this period as notes for subjects for short works. *The Golden Bowl*, on November 28, 1892, was seen as a "little tale."³¹ On February 14, 1895, James rejoiced, as he returned to the idea, in the aid to creation of structure which accrued from using a scenario as in a play.³² And later that year, he listed the subject as one of a group of potential novels.³³ Similarly with *The Ambassadors*: the first entry is for October 31, 1895, when the story about Howells's remark in Paris suggested "some little illustrative action," a "sujet de nouvelle."³⁴ Nowhere in these early notes, it should be remarked, does James associate these ideas, even as short stories, with first-person narrative. However, in the entries for *The Sacred Fount*, the method of first-person narrative appears early.

The Notebook entries for *The Sacred Fount* establish what James meant when he described it as intended only as a short story. Its subject, the "*tenuity of idea*" which James noted, places it in the category of the short pieces in which the interest is not primarily the penetration into a character but a record of character in its external manifestations. The particular economy of the short story, the summarization in the point of view of a person outside the subject, follows as necessary to establish the concentrated impression which is to be made upon the reader. And a narrator, a device used "in the shorter things in especial," is clearly seen as organic to the story. Under the date of February 17, 1894, James noted the idea of a young man married to an older woman who regains her youth while he becomes preternaturally aged. Then James speculated on adding a transfer of mental power, "of cleverness and stupidity," and on the idea of a liaison which is suspected but which can be proved only by the fact of an observed outward change.

The fact, the secret, of the *liaison* might be revealed in that way. The two things—the two elements—beauty and 'mind,' might be correspondingly, concomitantly exhibited as in the history of two related couples—with the opposition, in each case, that would help the thing to be dramatic.³⁵

³¹ P. 130.³² P. 187-8.³³ P. 233³⁴ Pp. 227, 225.³⁵ Pp. 150-1.

The story, thus, was to be revealed, or told, as the external manifestation of the internal relationship of the couples. Objectivity demanded that the representation be achieved with the absence of the author's making explanations in his own person; and economy stipulated the use of an observer to summarize, to record a history. The idea has dictated this development, since the idea has postulated a symbol in the appearances of the couples, like the symbols of the ghost stories, and has not predicated an analysis of their consciousness in the fashion of the late novels. The second and last discussion in the Notebooks, under the date February 15, 1899, expanded these early conclusions.

Don't lose sight of the little *conchetto* of the note in former vol. that begins with fancy of the young man who marries an old woman and becomes old while she becomes young. Keep my play on idea: the *haison* that betrays itself by the transfer of qualities—qualities to be determined—from one to the other of the parties to it. They *exchange*. I see 2 couples. One is married—this is the *old-young* pair. I watch *their* process, and it gives me my light for the spectacle of the other (covert, obscure, unavowed) pair who are not married.³⁰

The movement of the story was to be the process of discovering and establishing the nature of this relationship by using the observed fact of one couple's behavior to fix the hypothesis and by seeking to prove the same rule at work in the other couple.

If *The Sacred Fount* had become a short story, the narrator would most likely have remained a device of presentation, and the primary emphasis would have been placed upon the subject of the two couples. The entire action would have been so grouped as to "explain" the process implied in the title; and the narrator would have served principally to record for the reader the facts of the changes of outward appearance in the couples, to conduct the search for that evidence in the second union which would corroborate the principle, and to introduce facts from the past which would explain the phenomena discovered during the weekend. However, as the story expanded, the narrator became a central character expressing a theme in the novel. "I watch *their* process," James said in the plan

³⁰ P. 275.

for the short story; but in the novel, the emphasis is more on the "I," on the action in the consciousness of the narrator.

The relationship of *The Sacred Fount* to the three novels which followed it lies in this exploitation of the growth of consciousness. But in *The Ambassadors*, *The Wings of the Dove*, and *The Golden Bowl*, the consciousness of characters central to the subject is the primary interest. If *The Sacred Fount* had been done in the manner of these novels, one or more of the four principals would have been developed as a center of consciousness, and the narrator would have become a confidant like Maria Gostrey or Fanny Assingham. Or a new subject would have been invented to draw the narrator more closely in. The development of the narrator in this novel is an exploration of the technique which was to produce Strether, Milly Theale, Kate Croy, Merton Densher, Maggie Verver, and the Prince; but the experiment failed because it was conceived in different terms.

James noted the "*tenuity of idea*," embraced in the subject represented by the symbol of the intense inner life adumbrated in external appearance. On the other hand, the subject of the later novels is clearly the inner life itself: it is Strether's "process of vision into his life, as concentrated in the outbreak in the garden";³⁷ it is "the idea . . . of a young person conscious of a great capacity for life, but early stricken and doomed," for *The Wings*;³⁸ it is the searching and probing of the characters in *The Golden Bowl* for their fundamental moral obligations to each other. Even the attempt to explore consciousness directly in *The Sacred Fount*, in the narrator's search, differs from the equivalent attempt in the succeeding three novels; the narrator is defeated in his struggle to attain awareness, for his endowments are imperfect. But the centers of consciousness in the other three do understand their positions, do reach awareness, however much they may be defeated in material success. When *The Sacred Fount* ends with the narrator's capitulation, it harkens back to the kind of ironic statement found in some short stories, like *The Friends of the Friends*. When the narrator of *The Sacred Fount* confesses that he has the intellectual capacity to perfect his analysis but

³⁷ *The Art of the Novel*, pp 307-9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

lacks the "tone," he concedes his lack of endowment to cope with the aggressors who are arrayed in complete mental and physical power. The more amply endowed protagonists of the late three novels can achieve a positive moral view of their worlds.

The Sacred Fount is similar to these three other novels of the major phase only in the action of the narrator. The moral values of the couples and of the narrator are relatively simple. The moral values in the other three novels, on the other hand, are complex; there is no simple opposition of right and wrong, as in the early novels and many of the short stories: indeed, the essence of the search for consciousness is that no simple decision is possible for Strether, Milly or Maggie. Where *The Sacred Fount* attains complexity is in the enlargement of the role of the narrator, in his constituting an attack upon the aggressors; and this subject is not integrated with the revelation of the principle symbolized in the "sacred fount," as, in contrast, the opposition of the Prince and Charlotte is integrated with, is actually the core of the principle symbolized in the golden bowl.

James might have been commenting upon the experiment of using first-person narrative in the novel when he rejected it, in the preface to *The Ambassadors*, as unsuitable for that novel. To James, the use of the first-person for the central character of a novel was typified by the looseness of *Gil Blas* and *David Copperfield*, by the lack of objectivity, by the absence of the art of representing a subject with an apparent independent existence. And the value of this objectivity was the freedom from having to explain everything about the depths of Strether's personality. James saw that the complexity of the situation was to be expressed in the variety of attitudes toward the central subject which would inhere in the variety of other characters. The novel was to present Strether's "sense of these things" as it exhibited his reacting to them, not in his relating them; for James saw clearly "the menace to a bright variety—involved in Strether's having all the subjective 'say,' as it were, to himself."³⁰

The narrator of *The Sacred Fount* comes under this indict-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 317-21. See also the comments on the Prince in the preface to *The Golden Bowl*, p. 329.

ment of autobiography. In the Notebooks he is planned as the observer, the register of changes in the couples, the device of presentation. But in the novel he has become one of the protagonists as the action changes from the mere revelation of the liaison to the battle by the two aggressors to prevent that revelation. As a narrator, however, he filters all the action through his consciousness and becomes a "menace to bright variety." For James postulated the difference between the short story and the novel in his views of the difference functions of objectivity and economy in the two forms. The short piece of fiction, with its limited idea and restricted action, needed summarization; its objectivity could be gained through the observer, often a narrator. The novel, with its greater amplitude of idea and action, could approach more nearly the ideal of the stage where the audience makes its own deductions with a minimum of summarization; the objectivity of the three great novels of this period is attained in the device of the center of consciousness, with economy created by the use of *ficelles*, those confidants who introduce background material and offer in their conversation a variety of point of view.⁴⁰

That James did not intend to repeat the mistakes of *The Sacred Fount* can be seen from his changes in *The Sense of the Past*. In an entry in the Notebooks for August 9, 1900, the time he was writing, or may have finished, *The Sacred Fount*, he wrestled with the problem of using first-person narrative to present the subject of a young man's being attracted by the past as represented in the ancestral ghost. He concluded, "What I feel I roughly make is that, if, under this rubric, I can arrange anything simple enough to be told in the first person, I shall manage; but if that, if, it won't go so, there's no use in it."⁴¹ But as the work apparently grew beyond simplicity, James was able to overcome his superstitious fear of leaving a project unfinished. He shelved the work until 1914 when he began a draft for the novel in which he dropped the use of first-person narrative and shifted to a

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, see especially the conclusion to the preface to *The Ambassadors*, pp. 321-6.

⁴⁰ *Notebooks*, pp. 300-1.

method whereby revelation would rise out of the relations which the hero would develop with the other characters.⁴² This method, the method of the great novels, was that conceived after the failure of the experiment which was *The Sacred Fount*.

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⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 368.

WALLACE STEVENS: THE USE OF POETRY

By BERNARD HERINGMAN

The world of Wallace Stevens' poetry has always been two, "things as they are" and "things imagined." The dichotomy has been so constant that certain terms are stock symbols of the two realms. The moon, blue, the polar north, winter, music, poetry and all art: these consistently refer to the realm of imagination, order, the ideal. The sun, yellow, the tropic south, summer, physical nature; these refer to, or symbolize, the realm of reality, disorder, the actual. And just as Crispin, "the poetic hero" of "The Comedian as the Letter C," alternates between the two in his search for a valid esthetic, so Stevens, in his poetry, has

conceived his voyaging to be
An up and down between two elements,
A fluctuating between sun and moon.

From *Harmonium* to *Notes toward a Supreme Fiction*, the poetry is concerned with these two worlds, separately and in varying relation. The concern is made explicit in dust-jacket statements by Stevens: about *Ideas of Order*, which "attempts to illustrate the role of the imagination in life, and particularly in [the realistic] life at present"; about "The Man with the Blue Guitar," which "deals with the incessant conjunctioning between things as they are and things imagined."

The concept of the *fiction* becomes a key to Stevens' developing projection of a synthesis of Imagination and Reality and thus to his concern (in both his poetry and his occasional criticism) with the use of poetry. At first the *fiction* is roughly equivalent to *poetry*, as a manifestation, or a voice, of Imagination. In "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman" (*Harmonium*),

Poetry is the supreme fiction, Madame.

In "The Comedian as the Letter C," in the course of Crispin's search, "The moonlight fiction disappeared" in favor of "the essential prose," or Reality. But Stevens carefully reminds us

that the prose may "wear a poem's guise at last," suggesting a possible synthesis. It is suggested again in "Another Weeping Woman" (*Harmonium*), with

The magnificent cause of being,
The imagination, the one reality
In this imagined world.

"To the One of Fictive Music" (*Harmonium*) is an invocation to the poetic muse, saying that poetry must work from immediate reality, yet asking that it be endowed with "the strange unlike," with the unreal imagination.

Stevens also makes use of the *fiction* in *Parts of a World*, in terms of a problem of belief. Here, in "Asides on the Oboe" he poses "a question . . . / Of final belief," a question of choosing the fiction in which to place our final belief. "If . . . man is not enough" to believe in, the poem says, we can still believe in an "impossible possible philosophers' man," a man who sums up the world and us. This man is like the inhabitant of the heaven or ideal realm pictured in "The Greenest Continent" (*Owl's Clover*), in being "the transparence of the place in which/He is." He is a creator of reality in his own supreme imagination. He is a poet, "and in his poems we find peace." The poem suggests a fusion of Reality and Imagination by means of a *fiction*.

Stevens has mentioned the *supreme fiction* in his prose as well as in his poetry, in a way that encourages interpretation of a developing use of the concept as connected with the fusion or synthesis of his dichotomy.

There is, in fact, a world of poetry indistinguishable from the world in which we live, or, I ought to say, no doubt, from the world in which we shall come to live, since what makes the poet the potent figure he is, or was, or ought to be, is that he creates the world to which we turn incessantly and without knowing it and that he gives to life the supreme fictions without which we are unable to conceive of it.¹

It is not likely that Stevens means that the two "indistinguishable" worlds are in all respect the same. But the passage has double relevance to his theme of the intersection of Imagination and Reality: socially, in that the poet thereby helps

¹ "The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words," in *The Language of Poetry*, ed. Allen Tate (Princeton, 1942), pp. 120-21

men to live their lives; esthetically, and ontologically, in that poetry thereby constitutes a greater reality.

Both aspects of the theory find major development in *Notes toward a Supreme Fiction*. The two aspects—The social and the esthetic—cannot, of course, be mutually exclusive, but this paper is primarily concerned with the esthetic. In this consideration, an examination of the function and location of poetry (as subject or referent *in the poems*) in terms of Stevens' dichotomy is an illuminating guide. Poetry has generally in his work been a symbol of the whole realm of imagination, and a special manifestation of that realm. It has been a means of escape from reality, a means of ordering the chaos of reality, a means of finding the good in reality, and, simply, a means of describing reality. At times the last two functions have been carried to the point where poetry has been relocated as a subordinate part of Reality, usually as the voice of that realm. The relation of the two realms has naturally varied with the variation in the place of poetry, chiefly in an alternation between conflict and conjunction, sometimes with a separation so nearly complete that no systematic relation could be traced.

For an estimate of the final development of the fictive synthesis of Imagination and Reality, the location and function of poetry are again guiding factors. The shifting process of these factors reaches a kind of finality in the *Notes*, corresponding to the final development of the synthesis. Although in most of Stevens' work, poetry is located either in the realm of imagination or, less frequently, in reality, another tendency makes itself felt almost from the beginning, always in connection with the development toward the idea of synthesis. There has been a shift toward the center, toward the balancing point between the two members of the dichotomy. This became fairly evident in *Owl's Clover* and "The Man with the Blue Guitar." It culminates in the *Notes*, where the central location of poetry is not only an implicit necessity but a symbolically explicit fact and theme. For example, in a section (VII) of "It Must Give Pleasure," the third book of the *Notes*:

It must be that in time
The real will from its crude compoundings come,
Seeming, at first, a beast disgorged, unlike,

Warmed by a desperate milk To find the real,
 To be stripped of every fiction except one,
 The fiction of an absolute—Angel,
 Be silent in your luminous cloud and hear
 The luminous melody of proper sound.

Here poetry is the supreme fiction, central between the *real* and the *absolute* or ideal, central between men and *Angel*, between *crude compoundings* and refined reality. The fiction is agent of synthesis and, in *luminous melody*, product of synthesis. This development parallels the poet's remark that "It is not only that the imagination adheres to reality, but, also, that reality adheres to the imagination and that the interdependence is essential"; a corollary also of his remark on the poet's intenser "realization" of "resemblance": his "sense of reality keen enough to be in excess of the normal sense of reality creates a reality of its own."² Starting from an intersection of Imagination and Reality, poetry creates a synthesis, and thus creates a new world of transcendent reality.

Stevens adds evidence of his interest in the poetry of intersection and synthesis by finding similar transcendence in the poems of Marianne Moore and William Carlos Williams. He sees it, as Miss Moore sees it, in her "conjunction of imaginary gardens and real toads"; and in his preface to one of Williams' books: ". . . how often the essential poetry is the result of the conjunction of the unreal and the real, the sentimental and the anti-poetic, the constant interaction of the two opposites."³

Notes toward a Supreme Fiction is no formalized philosophic discourse, logically constructing this metaphysics of intersection and consequent synthesis. It is well to consider the title, which establishes a tentative tone and a feeling, common in reading Stevens, of the poet's deprecatory attitude toward himself and his art. Still, the "toward" indicates approach to a goal, and three sub-titles suggest a definition and possible construction of the supreme fiction. "It Must Be Abstract"; "It Must Change"; "It Must Give Pleasure."

The brief prologue sums up Stevens' dedication to poetry.

² *Ibid.*, p. 122; and "The Realm of Resemblance," *Partisan Review*, XIV (1947), 247.

³ "A Poet that Matters," *Life and Letters Today* (London), XIII: 2 (December, 1935), 65-65; W. C. Williams, *Collected Poems 1921-1931* (New York, 1934), 3.

He meets it in a light of "living Changingness," finds "the uncertain light of single, certain truth," and makes his affirmation:

For a moment in the central of our being,
The vivid transparence that you bring is peace.

Here is another crucial mention of the *transparence* which brings peace and is a quality of "heaven." This sublime state comes *in the central of our being*. The phrase conveys more than a sense of intense feeling. *Central*, used as a noun, carries a sense of relation which *center* would lack, as well as making the statement more striking. In other words, it locates the situation at the intersection of the two realms. The use of *our* supports this interpretation with both of its main possible readings. If *our being* means that of Stevens and the muse he addresses, then the *vivid transparence* is between them. If *our*, in contrast with the first person singular of the rest of the poem, refers him to his fellows, then the poet becomes representative of the reality-world of mankind in that intersection with imagination which results in the sublime situation he describes.

The idea of the poet as representative of humanity-reality is borne out, in turn, by a theme to which Stevens has given considerable attention. It is especially noteworthy here because of its relevance to the theme of intersection in the dichotomy. For Stevens the poet is a microcosm, summing up in himself the whole universe of the dichotomy and, in himself, constituting an intersection which results in poetry. Stevens states a credo for a projected ideal poet:

*I am the truth, since I am part of what is real, but neither more nor less than those around me. And I am imagination, in a leaden time and in a world that does not move for the weight of its own heaviness.*⁴

The development of this theme also traces back through the whole of Stevens' work. It begins with such early examples as "I was the world in which I walked," from "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon" (*Harmonium*), where it is related to the location of the poet *in reality*. It develops through a stage represented by "Re-Statement of Romance" (*Ideas of Order*),

⁴ "Figure of the Youth as a Virile Poet," *Sewanee Review*, LII (1944), 526.

This Platonic *idea*, in Stevens usually *the first idea*, recurs in eight of the ten sections of this first book of the *Notes*. In several cases there is an approach to synthesis by way of specific relation of the *idea* to the reality of which it is an abstract. This is particularly true in section III, where "The poem refreshes life," making it possible for us to return to "the first idea," which is "an immaculate beginning," and to move between "that ever-early candor" and "its late plural," between the idea and its descendant manifestations. From this movement begun by "the poem" we feel "an excitation, a pure power." Finally, in III the nonsense of life "pierces us with strange relation." *Nonsense* refers to some nonsense syllables in previous lines, to the nonsense sounds of the rise and fall of the ocean, an old symbol of life-reality, and to the non-sense which is the first idea of life, or poetry, which relates the first idea and life.

Section IV attempts definition of the source of poetry: "From this the poem springs: that we live in a place that is not our own and . . . not ourselves." And this is hard. The implications are that the poem springs from desire to escape the place, to soften its hardness, or to make it our own. The last seems most likely in the context, particularly as the poem is, in the last line of the section, "the sweeping meanings that we add." This is another note toward the intersection of two worlds.

Section VI refers back to the place we live in, which is not our own, where it was hard "in spite of blazoned days." Now the sun (which blazoned the days) has changed the poet's house, and magnolia fragrance comes close, "False flick, false form, but falseness close to kin." This is a prefiguration of "the unreal of what is real" of "Holiday in Reality" (*Transport to Summer*), another hint of fusion in the dichotomy, of the merging of false and true, real and imagined. The hint is supported in succeeding lines of the section, which state "It must be" one or both in a series of opposites, symbolizing fusion quite clearly in the concluding paradox which "It" must be: "An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought." Since "It" has no distinguishable antecedent in the section, this "It" is probably the same one which "Must Be Abstract," that is, the supreme fiction.

Section VII supplies another note toward the same goal, with an alternation of symbols of the two realms on which "the truth" is said to depend. The dependence seems to be not so much on the "lake" of one realm (Reality) or on the "composing" of the other (Imagination) as on the presence of both, on the "balances that happen," with "moments of awakening."

Section VIII tells of *the first idea* in terms of the "major man," another of Stevens' related figures, who is not man but an abstract of man, who lounges by the sea and reads about the thinker of the first idea (God?). He is another point of intersection for the symbolic dichotomy; he is given the possibility of expressing the synthesis in a sudden new language. This major man is an extension partly of the figure of the poet and partly of the earlier hero-figure in Stevens, thus linking two realms again, microcosm-fashion.⁵

The final section modifies and clarifies:

The major abstraction is the idea of man
And major man is its exponent, abler
In the abstract than in his singular,
More fecund as principle than particle,
Happy fecundity, flor-abundant force,
In being more than an exception, part,
Though an heroic part, of the communal.

It is of him, ephebe to make, to confect
The final elegance . . .

The ambiguous genitive of *idea of man*, both subjective and objective, conveys in itself the basic intersection which culminates in the *final elegance*. We are given in one phrase the abstraction about common man and the abstraction which is a force in the mind of man, the two merging to become the source of creation.

3

"IT MUST CHANGE"

Section I relates the idea of change to the idea of abstraction. Because of change, there is the perpetual cyclical flux which

⁵ The poet, of course, regularly epitomizes Imagination; the hero, in Stevens, epitomizes society and environment, i. e., Reality.

we notice in particular objects in nature. Thus "The constant / Violets, doves, girls . . ." are also "inconstant objects . . . / In a universe of inconstancy." The *constant* violets in this world of change, of living and dying, can only be the abstractions of these objects. This is another example of the "ever-early candor" and "its late plural" given in section III of "It Must Be Abstract."

Section IV figures forth the whole essence of Stevens.

Two things of opposite natures seem to depend
On one another, as a man depends
On a woman, day on night, the imagined
On the real. This is the origin of change.
Winter and spring, cold copulars, embrace
And forth the particulars of rapture come.

The rest of the section elaborates on this in some of Stevens' most beautiful lines. From this passage Hi Simons drew his relation of "It Must Change" to "the law of inherent opposites" of "Connoisseur of Chaos," (*Parts of a World*), the law which in the *Notes* he found "expanded into a sort of dialectical principle of universal movement."⁶ This is not merely an expansion, however, because here the opposites embrace and the embrace produces rapture. This is a note on the relation of change to the supreme fiction. The passage epitomizes the dichotomy, synthesis, and at least an aspect of the supreme fiction which arises in synthesis.

This book of the *Notes* is also a development of some of Stevens' uses of *change* in *Owl's Clover* (II, v): "It is only enough to live incessantly in change," and "So great a change / Is constant," and "But change composes, too." One significant example of change in the earlier passage shows summer, which is a symbol of nature-reality, changing with a sudden falling of the leaves. This would correspond to abstraction. Later in *Owl's Clover* (V, i), change makes a meaningful reappearance in relation to the poet, who is the cause of "rhapsodies of change" but is not changed by them.

Other sections of "It Must Change" suggest various processes of change, in the realms of both reality and imagination, and synthesis of the poles or opposites which produce change.

⁶ "Wallace Stevens and Mallarmé," *Modern Philology*, XLIII (1946), 244.

Thus, in VIII, the spouse, the stripped woman who is elemental, physical reality is not naked, not stripped of the "final filament," because

A fictive covering
Weaves always glistening from the heart and mind.

Similarly in IX the poem is spoken of as alternating between "the poet's gibberish" and "The gibberish of the vulgate," with a question as to whether it moves "to and fro" or is "of both at once." The question is answered in the closing lines, where the poet is said to try "by a peculiar speech" to compound the two.

The last section echoes one of the hints of synthesis in "It Must Be Abstract," (VII) with a "lake . . . full of artificial things," a complete metaphor for the synthesis of Reality (the lake) and Imagination, the synthesis which has now been given a source in a corresponding pair of principles of the supreme fiction, change and abstraction. The final couplet refers to both, to abstraction again in "beginnings" and to change in the process recorded by Time, writing down the particulars of "The suitable amours" which are proposed "Of these beginnings."

4

"IT MUST GIVE PLEASURE"

The place of pleasure in the fictive synthesis is less clearly described than the place of the abstract or of change, but "pleasure" surely resides in "The luminous melody" which is sounded by finding "The fiction of an absolute." This comes with the intersection of the real and the ideal, with poetry at the center of the two realms, as I have already indicated in reference to this passage of section VII.

Again a passage of Stevens' prose illuminates his poetry:

It is the *mundo* of the imagination in which the imaginative man delights and not the gaunt world of the reason. The pleasure is the pleasure of powers that create a truth that cannot be arrived at by the reason alone, a truth that the poet recognizes by sensation.⁷

⁷ *Sewanee Review*, LII (1944), 522.

This later definition of pleasure is a direct echo of a passage in section I, where, after mentioning the "facile exercise" of speaking and singing the joy in the heart of the multitude, Stevens writes:

But the difficultest rigor is forthwith,
On the image of what we see, to catch from that
Irrational moment its unreasoning,
As when the sun comes rising, when the sea
Clears deeply, when the moon hangs on the wall

We reason about them with a later reason.

The concluding line is almost verbatim the first line of section IV, which continues:

And we make of what we see, what we see clearly
And have seen, a place dependent on ourselves.

The place is the *mundo* of the passage from Stevens' essay, made of our vision, which consists of the ideal abstraction (what we see clearly) crossed with the real (what we have seen, experience). This would seem over-reading except that it is exactly what is symbolized in the following lines, as a "mystic marriage" between two who before had loved but would not marry. Then they took one another and married, and it was well because "the marriage-place was what they loved," and "They were love's characters come face to face." Here the pleasure is the pleasure of love. In section I, as glossed by the prose, it appeared as the pleasure of a perception which is a creation of truth beyond reason. But marriage is, after all, a creation of truth beyond reason, particularly if the partners, like these, are the characters of love, the paradigms of pleasure, the symbols of real and ideal.

Section VI indicates synthesis again, when the protagonist makes a choice beyond thought, which can again be glossed from the prose passage and thus indicate the pleasure in creation of truth beyond reason. The Canon (who has been punned on as humming a fugue in section V) chooses

to include the things
That in each other are included, the whole,
The complicate, the amassing harmony.

Stevens has shown us the pleasure of music before, as well as written about the pleasure of music. Harmony as pleasure is supported by the "luminous melody" of section VII. And this pleasure is also related, in VII, to the discovery of "an order as of / A season," as of summer and winter, symbols of the two worlds, as *order* is a symbol of their intersection.

5

The supreme fiction is the ideal poetry, the poetry which fixes the balance of the real and ideal realms, the synthesis which induces moments of illumination, like "Pure coruscations . . . beyond / The imagination." ("Late Hymn from the Myrrh-Mountain." *Transport to Summer*) The last section of the *Notes* offers an appropriately consummate example, even to the touch of irony which so often accompanies instances of special intensity in Stevens' poetry.

That's it: the more than rational distortion,
The fiction that results from feeling. Yes, that.
They will get it straight one day at the Sorbonne.
We shall return at twilight from the lecture
Pleased that the irrational is rational,
Until flicked by feeling, in a gilded street,
I call you by name, my green, my fluent mundo.
You will have stopped revolving except in crystal.

Mundo, the world he is in and the world he *is*, the world beyond reason, will be fixed and illuminated in a supreme fiction. In a moment of epiphany, knowing the world, knowing himself, knowing reality and imagination in intersection, he knows the supreme reality. It is the reality of poetry.

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